[Salon] Fear of conflict - the key to managing Taiwan tensions

[Chas Freeman <cwfresidence@gmail.com>]

Fear of conflict - the key to managing Taiwan tensions

 

Disagreement and lack of trust dog cross-strait issues, but there is one thing China, Taiwan and the US are agreed on – conflict avoidance. This shared priority should serve as a starting point for managing tensions.

 

By Ryan Hass

 

Published by the Straits Times on 26 September 2022

https://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/fear-of-conflict-the-key-to-managing-taiwan-tensions

 

Is the situation in the Taiwan Strait on a one-way escalator to eventual conflict?

 

Given the persistent ratcheting up of tensions in the Taiwan Strait in recent years, it is becoming easier for analysts to argue that the situation will continue to escalate until it reaches a breaking point. Such lazy cynicism is dangerous, though. The hard reality is that there is no military solution to tensions in the Taiwan Strait.

 

Any conflict in the Taiwan Strait that involves the United States and China would mark the first war in human history between two nuclear-armed powers with long-range strike, cyber and space capabilities.

 

Given the national identities of the actors involved, it is hard to conceive of any side surrendering to the other. Thus, short of threatening the absolute destruction of the other side(s), there is no plausible path to war termination.

 

There also is no guarantee that any conflict, once launched, would remain limited in geographic or military scope. More likely, a conflict in the Taiwan Strait would lead to the global economy being shattered, real risk of nuclear escalation and generational setbacks for all countries involved in the fighting.

 

Even in spite of these inescapable risks, a key challenge is that it is growing harder for policymakers to foresee future scenarios that avoid conflict.

 

This problem has both a proximate dimension and a deeper structural component. At a proximate level, former US State Department assistant secretary Daniel Russel has rightly observed: "The dialogues and the mechanisms that have in the past restrained escalation and fostered some sort of resolution of an incident aren't working right now… The problem is that right now, an accident quickly becomes a crisis and a crisis could lead to conflict."

 

At a deeper level, the risk is that all sides are growing concerned about their capacity to protect their vital interests. Many in Washington are alarmed that China's combination of expanding military capabilities and shrinking strategic patience could portend future conflict.

 

There also are concerns in Taipei that President Xi Jinping will feel a personal legacy requirement to show progress in pulling Taiwan closer to China. As Mr Xi dismantles collective decision-making and concentrates power in himself, so the argument goes, risks could rise.

 

Conversely, in Beijing, there is concern that Washington is using Taiwan to split and weaken China, and that Washington is reflexively opposed to unification, peaceful or otherwise.

 

The one interest that all three sides at present share is that they each view avoidance of conflict as serving their interests. In other words, they do not agree on what to do. They do not hold out hope of building trust. They only agree on what to avoid. This shared priority on conflict avoidance should serve as the starting point for managing tensions.

 

Steps to mitigate risk

 

To this end, there are a few practical steps available to mitigate risk. One step is to shrink space for surprises and miscalculation. Predictability, steadiness, transparency and direct dialogue all limit miscalculation.

 

Washington and Beijing each want the other side to change course over Taiwan. They both must recognise that their ability to influence the other will be enhanced if they register their requests and concerns privately rather than air grievances publicly.

 

Direct, authoritative and private communications reduce the reputational costs to the other side of adjusting course, whereas public statements or actions virtually guarantee the other side will harden its posture to avoid being perceived as caving in to demands from the other.

 

In this spirit, it also is important for leaders in Taipei, Washington and Beijing to allow the other sides to preserve confidence in their theory of the case for managing cross-strait tensions. Cross-strait stability is strengthened when each side can tell itself a story that time is on its side.

 

Taiwan's theory of the case is that by improving its democratic governance, sustaining credible deterrence and deepening links with like-minded democratic countries, it will be able to withstand pressure from Beijing. Over time, Taiwan could serve as a source of attraction and emulation, leading to future evolutions in China's governance model.

 

Beijing's theory of the case is that the asymmetry in power between China and Taiwan is tilting towards China, more so with each passing year. So, too, is China's capacity to hold American forces at risk from intervening in cross-strait contingencies.

 

Beijing believes Washington is weakening itself from within and America's best days are behind it. It holds out hope that with time and improvements to its domestic circumstances, the people of Taiwan will conclude that their interests are best served by entering political negotiations.

 

There also is very little risk of Taiwan changing its legal identity, either towards independence or unification. Any change likely would require a constitutional amendment. The bar to changing the Constitution is exceedingly high in Taiwan. To date, its voters have demonstrated a stronger preference for sustaining the status quo than they have for any specific outcome to cross-strait differences.

 

Given this reality, it is unwise for Washington to pre-empt problems from the future by predetermining cross-strait outcomes it would accept or oppose. America's interests are better served by remaining anchored in principles it shares with the rest of the region - support for preservation of cross-strait peace and stability, and opposition to unilateral changes to the status quo.

 

Given these dynamics, now is not the time for any party to force a showdown in the Taiwan Strait. The minimum requirement for all sides is to avoid conflict. If leaders in Washington, Taipei or Beijing perceive they are riding a one-way escalator to conflict, they should step off it and give the other sides the political space to do the same.

Ryan Hass is a senior fellow and the Michael H. Armacost Chair in the Foreign Policy programme at Brookings Institution. He is also the Chen-Fu and Cecilia Yen Koo Chair in Taiwan Studies. This article was first published on the website of the Asian Peace Programme, an initiative to promote peace in Asia housed in the Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore.