[Salon] Oil: what’s behind a surprise OPEC+ production cut?



Oil: what’s behind a surprise OPEC+ production cut?

Summary: as is generally the case with surprises, markets have almost certainly overreacted to the latest OPEC+ cuts in oil output, the timing of which probably owes more to Saudi/US tensions than it does to global economic prospects. They will almost certainly be more than reversed in 2H2023.

We thank our regular contributor Alastair Newton for today's newsletter. Alastair worked as a professional political analyst in the City of London from 2005 to 2015. Before that he spent 20 years as a career diplomat with the British Diplomatic Service. In 2015 he co-founded and is a director of Alavan Business Advisory Ltd.

The final sentence of my first look at oil this year, published on 17 January, reads as follows: "So there may yet need to be a meeting before June. But, the bulls notwithstanding, now is almost certainly not the time for it."

Then, the market was in a decidedly bullish mood, suggesting that an increase in output was more likely than a cut. However, I had earlier noted that “as things stand OPEC+ currently has room for manoeuvre in either direction,” arguing that we might well see a move one way or the other before the next scheduled meeting in June. Nevertheless, the timing of OPEC+’s 3 April “voluntary” cuts in output — compounded by them being agreed without there being a formal meeting — was a genuine surprise.

This is worthy of note since, coupled with some hyperbolic headlines, they appear to have spurred a sizeable overshoot by investors (who habitually overreact to surprises). The initial surge in the price of Brent (more or less matched by the US benchmark WTI) was 8.4 percent, taking the international benchmark to US$86.44pb from a closing price on Friday of US$79.77. These gains were almost immediately parred back; but as Asian markets closed for the day both Brent (at US$84.17pb) and WTI (at US$79.78pb) were still up 5.4 percent.

It is also important to underline that the actual size of the agreed cut was 1,157,000bpd, not two million as CNN claimed. Even taking into account the extension of Russia’s previously implemented cut of 500,000bpd, CNN is way off the mark. Note too that, based on the somewhat more modest outturn relative to the cuts agreed in October, RBC Capital Market’s oil expert Helima Croft (quoted in The New York Times) reckons that, in practice, this latest round, which is due to come into effect on 1 May, will probably see OPEC+ output fall by no more than 600,000bpd.

On this basis alone it is reasonable to expect some further softening of the price in the coming days. Thus, although I continue to see the oil price as something of a tug-of-war between OPEC+ and central banks, I am not convinced that, in the short-term at least, these cuts are going to fuel inflation to the point of encouraging more interest rate rises than would otherwise be the case.

All this being said, it is worth taking a closer look at the timing.


OPEC Secretary General HE Haitham Al Ghais in a bilateral meeting with HRH Prince Abdul Aziz bin Salman Al Saud, Minister of Energy, Saudi Arabia, February 15, 2023 [photo credit: @OPECSecretariat]

Since the start of the year, Brent has been largely rangebound between US$75 and US$87pb. Admittedly, it is only two weeks since it dropped down to US$72pb on the back of SVB’s travails, subsequently compounded by the forced takeover of Credit Suisse by UBS. However, there had since been something of a recovery. Furthermore, with some signs that major central banks are slowing on interest rate hikes, an economic uptick and consequent increase in demand is on the cards. Even more odd (though possibly influenced by Beijing’s recently announced growth target for 2023 of a surprisingly modest “around 5 percent”), OPEC+ seems to have taken no account whatsoever of the speed with which at least some sectors of China’s economy appear to be recovering following the easing of COVID-related restrictions. Indeed, comparing these latest cuts with OPEC+’s October 2022 move, Goldman Sach’s Daan Struyven (quoted in the FT) underlined that “unlike then, the momentum for global oil demand is up not down with a strong China recovery.”

It is, therefore, hard to rule out the theory being touted in some of the media that Saudi Arabia engineered the cut largely as a response to Washington’s 29 March announcement that it was in no hurry to replenish the US’s Strategic Petroleum Reserve, thus allegedly breaking a commitment it had made to Riyadh last year as a quid pro quo for a boost in output. (If this is indeed so, my bet is that Washington would regard it as tit-for-tat relative to its belief that Riyadh broke its commitment to the US by cutting output last October — see the 17 October Newsletter.) As the aforementioned Ms Croft rightly argued (speaking this time to the FT): "It has been apparent that Saudi Arabia is prepared to endure increased friction in the bilateral relationship. The bottom line is Washington and Riyadh simply have different price targets for their key policy initiatives."

In the same interview, she went on to note that Riyadh’s “bilateral relationship with China is rising in importance.” This too raises question marks about the timing so soon after Beijing helped broker a deal between the Kingdom and Iran. Even though China will no doubt continue to buy large amounts of heavily discounted Russian crude, Xi Jinping’s government would not be happy about a significant and sustained rise in the price of oil generally at a time when it is pushing hard to get the economy moving again.

Taking all of this into account, I find it hard to believe that the latest cuts will still be in place come year-end as the OPEC+ announcement anticipates. This being said I very much doubt that we shall see any further shift in output — either up or down — before the 4 June meeting; and, as things stand, perhaps not even then. Nevertheless, if the International Energy Agency is even half-right in its forecast that 2023 will see the biggest in-year increase in demand since 2011, these latest cuts will almost certainly have to be more than reversed early in the third quarter unless Riyadh wants to risk cutting short the recovery.


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