EVER SINCE it was founded in 1944, the
imf has
had to get used to reinventing itself. Today, however, it faces an
identity crisis like none before. The fund, whose annual spring jamboree
kicks off on April 10th, is supposed to provide a financial safety-net
for countries in distress. Yet, although the poor world is in the throes
of the worst debt crisis in decades, the fund seems all but unable to
lend.
The fund has hundreds of billions of dollars of spare firepower and has
sought more from its members. However, since the pandemic began its
loan book has grown by a paltry $51bn.
The
fund is paralysed because it is a multilateral institution that aspires to
represent the whole world,
at the same time as being a club which is controlled by America and its
Western allies. That worked when America was the world’s dominant power
and was intent on pursuing liberal internationalism. Now China is
trying to build an alternative order and America is turning inward.
Unless the fund acts soon, its ability to do its job as a crisis lender
will be in question.
In its infancy the imf’s
main role was to promote balanced trade and manage the Bretton Woods
system of fixed exchange rates. It was only when those arrangements
collapsed that it shifted its focus to another of its missions:
providing emergency cash, with strings attached, to countries in crisis.
From the 1980s, and especially during the Asian financial crisis in
1997, the fund became known for its unyielding application of economic
orthodoxy. In the 2010s it revised some of its views on austerity and
capital controls, and tried to promote its softer side.
Today
the fund’s role as a crisis lender is both shrunken and less
successful. Many big emerging markets have amassed vast quantities of
foreign-exchange reserves to guard against currency crises. Some 30% of
the fund’s outstanding lending has gone to just one borrower, Argentina.
The imf lends to countries like Egypt and Pakistan,
which are strategically important to America. But these have gained
licence to put off reform indefinitely; the fund has been urging
Pakistan to mend its sales tax since at least 1997. And the imf
is no longer the only crisis lender in town. Gulf countries including
Saudi Arabia now offer emergency cash, often using obscure methods, say
by depositing money at the borrower’s central bank.
The
main problem is that China has become a big creditor to the poorest
countries, whose needs are small but urgent. Rising interest rates and
the pandemic have left at least 21 in default or seeking debt
restructuring, and many more look fragile. Yet China is reluctant to
participate in debt write-downs, in part because it objects to the imf
not bearing its share of losses—a vital safeguard for a lender of last
resort. The fund has not overseen a single write-down involving China
since the crisis started.
Without them, countries’ finances may not be sustainable even as creditors are bailed out. America worries about imf
funds flowing into China’s pockets. Although many loans have been
approved, most are supposed to be conditional on restructuring that has
not been agreed on—much of the cash intended for Suriname, for example,
has been in limbo for more than a year. As the fund has floundered,
China has boosted its own emergency lending.
Together these trends risk making the imf
irrelevant—just like another global institution, the World Trade
Organisation, which has also been sabotaged, this time by America. With
debt talks frozen, the fund is conjuring up new goals, such as lending
to help with climate change. That has caused a turf war with the World
Bank, which is better suited to project finance.
The
fund does not need a new mission. It needs the ability to get tough on
rogue creditors. For some the solution is for it to align itself
explicitly with the West, perhaps by implementing restructurings that
ban countries from ever again borrowing from unco-operative official
creditors. But even if such a policy were credible, it would be a
mistake to freeze out China entirely. Not only would it be against the
spirit of the fund’s mission, but if countries are forced to make a
once-and-for-all choice between financial spheres, some may well choose
China’s.
Instead the imf
should make borrowers suspend payments on their debts to obstructive
official creditors for as long as a fund programme is active. That would
circumvent and punish lenders that block restructuring, while leaving
open a path to their participation should they decide to behave
constructively. The IMF would remain open and global. It
would not push China away, but save a seat at the table should it choose
to take one. Such a strategy would echo the fund’s inclusive approach
to several communist states in the cold war.
Though the imf
should not close itself off, the sooner it can bypass today’s
blockages, the better. Helping countries in crisis is much harder and
less glamorous than it used to be. But it is still essential. ■
Correction (April 6th 2023): An earlier version of this article said an extra $1trn had been committed to the IMF since the pandemic began. This misrepresented the status of some of the money. Sorry.