Witness Tells Asharq Al-Awsat about Meeting Saddam Twice during US Occupation
Saddam Hussein firing his gun in the air from a balcony in Baghdad on December 31, 2000 (Getty Images)
A retired Iraqi, who had a working relationship and friendship with former President Saddam Hussein, revealed on the anniversary of the 2003 battle of Baghdad that he met with him twice after the Iraqi capital was captured.
Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, the retired Iraqi disclosed that he had two meetings with Saddam: the first was in Fallujah on April 11, just two days after the US capture of Baghdad, and the second meeting was in the Iraqi capital on July 19, four months after the city had fallen.
He confirmed that Saddam was traveling to enhance resistance operations against the US occupation.
The retiree, who requested anonymity for security reasons, claimed that Saddam was near Firdous Square in Baghdad on the day an American tank toppled his statue.
He went on to say that Saddam led the first resistance operation from a nearby location that night, targeting US positions around the Abu Hanifa al-Numan Mosque in Baghdad’s Azamiya neighborhood.
The attack involved young members of the Arab Socialist Baath Party, Fedayeen Saddam, and fighters from various Arab nationalities. It also resulted in several casualties.
As the battle intensified, Saddam’s aides were surprised to see him attempting to approach the fight scene with an RPG launcher. His entourage surrounded and prevented him from charging into the thick of the fray.
“We want you to continue leading us,” they told him. At that moment, some concluded that Saddam had a desire to be martyred that night.”
The battle continued until dawn on April 10.
Saddam then headed to Heet, where he spent the night at the house of a Baath Party member before leaving to the outskirts of Fallujah the next day.
“On April 11, the president’s entourage summoned five people, including myself, for a meeting,” the source said.
“The meeting was held at a place adjacent to a gas station on the outskirts of Fallujah, and attended with Saddam were his son Qusay and a number of security and party officials, but his personal secretary, Lt. Gen. Abid Mahmud, was not present,” they added.
Saddam was dressed in casual clothing and appeared calm and composed. He inquired about the situation inside Fallujah and the presence of US troops in Anbar.
When told that US soldiers had entered houses in Fallujah, Saddam responded firmly and said: “Drive them out.” This was seen as an order to begin operations.
“We must be patient. The battle is long. It is our duty to drain the enemy and open fronts everywhere to ensure their instability in Iraq. Set ambushes for them on the main roads, and they must know that Iraq is a tough nut to crack, let this be a lesson to them,” said Saddam according to the source.
During the meeting, an attendee mentioned that some Shiite fighters had begun targeting the Fedayeen who had come to fight against the US.
Saddam Hussein quickly interrupted, clarifying that the Shiites were fellow Iraqis and that such actions could not be attributed to them as a group.
“After giving further instructions, Saddam left the meeting for security reasons,” recalled the source.
Before noon the following day, Saddam met with accountants from the Presidential Diwan on the outskirts of the Dora area in southern Baghdad and received from them a sum of money to support the resistance.
Saddam insisted on signing a paper proving that he owed a sum of $1.25 million. On the paper, the reason for the loan was cited as a fund to sustain resistance operations against the US occupation.
On July 18, the retiree, located in Baghdad at the time, was approached by a young man who gave them a rendezvous at a secret location in Azamiya after the dawn prayer.
The following day, the source found themselves in the presence of Saddam and four new companions.
Saddam was dressed in a traditional robe and carried a pistol.
He expressed his sadness and disappointment that “some provinces in Iraq have accepted not to resist the occupation after promising to do so.”
“How can some people accept being subservient to the occupiers?” wondered Saddam.
“We must read our people well,” he added.
“This responsibility falls on the religious leaders, tribal sheikhs, and authorities who had previously sent and promised to issue a strong fatwa against the occupation as soon as its forces crossed the Kuwait-Iraq border,” he said at the secret meeting, according to the source.
Saddam then reminded of how Iraqis as whole were united during the war against Iran.
“Iraq is the last line of defense, and if it falls, some Arab countries will be directly occupied, and others will suffer indirect occupation,” explained Saddam.
“If Iraq falls, all the doors will be opened to Iran, and its influence will spread as far as Morocco,” he warned.
Furthermore, Saddam criticized the Arab stance and expressed his disappointment with Syria’s position.
“I received a promise from Bashar al-Assad that Syria would stand with Iraq as soon as the first shot was fired. But he changed his mind.”
“Many will pay the price for leaving Iraq to fall,” forewarned Saddam.
The story began on April 6, 2003, at 10:30 p.m. in Baghdad when a small group of US tanks arrived at the Republican Palace and the Rashid Hotel.
The phone of Gen. Tahir Jalil Habbush, director of intelligence at the time, rang, and on the other end was Lt. Gen. Mahmud, Saddam’s secretary.
Though relations between the two sides were strained, Lt. Gen. Mahmud was the sole conduit for receiving orders from Saddam and delivering messages to him.
What Lt. Gen. Mahmud said next was explosive.
He instructed the director of intelligence to scout the Baghdad-Salahuddin and Baghdad-Diyala roads, to determine which one was safer to exit Baghdad in case of emergencies.
“Do you think I lead a military corps to be able to secure these two roads?” Gen. Habbush replied.
Lt. Gen. Mahmud then retorted with a veiled threat and hung up the phone.
The request seemed strange to Gen. Habbush as he discussed it with his office director at the alternate headquarters of the intelligence agency.
They both concluded that Saddam would be leaving Baghdad to lead the military operation against the invasion from outside the city.
After receiving orders from Saddam, Gen. Habbush was left with no option but to carry them out no matter the difficulties or risks. The consequences of any failure to fulfill his duty were well known, and the director of intelligence did not need to be reminded of the price of angering Saddam.
Gen. Habbush decided to personally conduct reconnaissance and set out at night to the town of Tarmiyah, where he found the road to be safe. Communications had been cut in Baghdad, so he asked his companion, Col. Mahmoud, to return to the capital and use his office phone to inform Lt. Gen. Mahmud that the road to Diyala was open and safe, and that he would personally return within hours.
During his attempt to scout the other road, Gen. Habbush spotted convoys of cars, and it became clear that US planes had dropped bombs on the road, making it extremely dangerous to continue towards Baghdad.
At midnight, Gen.Habbush made his decision: he would not return to Baghdad since Saddam was leaving it.
He closed his phone and decided to join the resistance.
Gen. Habbush joined the resistance and Saddam later faced his well-known fate.