In the U.S.-China competition, the real ‘existential’ danger is nuclear war
I keep thinking about the comment that Rep. Mike Gallagher (R-Wis.) made at the first hearing,
back on Feb. 28, of the House select committee on the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP): “This is an existential struggle over what life will look
like in the 21st century, and the most fundamental freedoms are at
stake.” The committee chairman was right, but not in the way that he
meant.
A
leading China hawk, Gallagher claimed: “The CCP is laser-focused on its
vision for the future — a world crowded with techno-totalitarian
surveillance states where human rights are subordinate to the whims of
the party.” While it’s true that the Chinese Communist Party has created
a system of “techno-totalitarian surveillance” in China and is happy to
sell its surveillance technology to other countries,
there is scant evidence that it is conspiring to export its system of
oppression globally. Gallagher’s vision is merely an update of the old
Cold War paranoia about a supposed Soviet plot to take over the world,
which missed the fact that Soviet leaders were driven primarily by
defensive concerns about their own security.
But
Gallagher is right that the United States and China are locked in an
existential struggle, because this new cold war, like the original Cold
War with the Soviet Union, has the potential to turn into a nuclear
conflict. This is a danger that China hawks — and the U.S. public in
general — do not pay sufficient attention to. President Biden, for
example, repeatedly says that the United States will defend Taiwan if it’s attacked, without any mention of the potential consequences of a conflict with China.
“It
seems odd that war with China over Taiwan seems a comfortable
assumption for so many when the U.S. and NATO remain cautious about
Russia’s war in Ukraine precisely because of the perceived risk of
nuclear escalation,” John K. Culver, a CIA veteran and former national intelligence officer for East Asia, told me.
Even
many worst-case scenarios about China are too sanguine about the
outcome of a conflict. In March, for example, House Republicans took
part in a U.S.-China war game organized by retired Rear Adm. Mark Montgomery, a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. After the exercise was first reported by my Post colleague Olivier Knox, I reached out to Montgomery to ask how it unfolded and whether it included a nuclear exchange.
He
said, “The war game ended up with China having a lodgment on Taiwan,
but not having defeated the Taiwan Army.” The United States suffered
“significant casualties” and Taiwan “awful casualties.” Montgomery
explained that the scenario “did not escalate to nuclear, although that
is certainly a possibility in this sort of contingency.”
The
lack of a nuclear exchange is quite common in U.S.-China war games, at
least those conducted at the unclassified level. (A senior defense
official told me this is no longer the case with top-secret Pentagon war
games.) A recent war game
organized by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS),
like the congressional war game, had the United States and its allies
defeating a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Victory came at “high cost” —
“The United States and its allies lost dozens of ships, hundreds of
aircraft, and tens of thousands of service members” — but not at the highest
cost: i.e., the destruction of U.S. cities. CSIS senior adviser Mark F.
Cancian told me that, although he would pursue “a follow-on project
that looks at nuclear operations,” he wanted to focus specifically on
conventional operations.
That’s
a perfectly legitimate choice, but it inadvertently risks reinforcing
assumptions that a U.S.-China conflict could avoid nuclear escalation.
Even a New York Times op-ed
in February written by an Australian scholar, headlined “A War With
China Would Be Unlike Anything Americans Faced Before,” focused on
cyberwarfare and economic warfare — not nuclear warfare.
And yet China is in the midst of a rapid nuclear buildup. The latest Pentagon report on Chinese military power
projects that its nuclear stockpile will grow from 400 warheads today
to 1,500 warheads by 2035. The report also warns that, while China
nominally adheres to a “no first use” policy on nuclear weapons,
“Beijing probably would … consider nuclear use to restore deterrence if a
conventional military defeat gravely threatened PRC survival.” Given
that a failed invasion of Taiwan could threaten the CCP’s power, it’s
reasonable to worry that China could up the ante by going nuclear.
The
risk of nuclear escalation is all the greater because, as a senior U.S.
admiral explained to me, it would be difficult for the United States to
win a war over Taiwan by attacking only Chinese ships at sea and
Chinese aircraft in the skies. The United States could find itself
compelled, as a matter of military necessity, to attack bases in China.
China, in turn, could strike U.S. bases in Japan, South Korea, the
Philippines, Guam, even Hawaii and the West Coast.
Culver,
the former intelligence officer, told me, “Even if Beijing announced
that its retaliatory strikes against Hawaii or the West Coast of the
U.S. were conventionally armed, it would risk immediate U.S. escalation.
Can a U.S. president refuse to launch in the 30 minutes between missile
launch from China and impact in the U.S.?”
When
two nuclear-armed powers attack each other’s territory, it would be
difficult to keep the conflict contained at a conventional level. Both
sides, admittedly, would have an incentive to avoid “mutual assured
destruction,” but countries often act rashly in the heat of battle,
particularly after they have suffered significant casualties and feel
the need to ensure that their troops did not die in vain.
For a sense of how destructive a war with China could be, read “2034: A Novel of the Next World War”
by retired Adm. James Stavridis, a former supreme allied commander in
Europe, and Marine combat veteran Elliot Ackerman. It ends — spoiler
alert — with nuclear devastation in both countries.
Stavridis
told me: “If the U.S. and China manage to sleepwalk into a conventional
war, the chances of it escalating into a nuclear exchange are
significant. Two great powers who face each other in combat are unlikely
to avoid using tactical nuclear weapons, at least at sea. Once that
threshold is crossed, it is but a short step to a much broader nuclear
conflict. Think 1914 with nuclear weapons at the ready.”
1914 with nuclear weapons? Now that’s an existential danger.
This
is not an argument for kowtowing to Beijing or abandoning Taiwan. It
is, however, a potent warning about the dangers of blundering into war
with China. The United States should continue to support Taiwan and to
deter China, but should also keep lines of communication open and avoid
needless provocations such as recognizing Taiwan’s independence — as has
been rashly suggested in the past year by former secretary of state Mike Pompeo and 19 House members.
That’s a fast-track to World War III. Maintaining the fiction that
Taiwan is a renegade province of China is a small price to pay for
avoiding nuclear annihilation.