An intellectual battle rages: Is the U.S. in a proxy war with Russia?
Vladimir
Putin says the West is trying to ‘finish’ Russia. The Biden
administration denies the accusation. But leaked documents reveal the
extent of U.S. involvement in the Ukraine fight.
Three
days before the Feb. 24 anniversary of his Ukraine invasion, Vladimir
Putin outlined what he had learned during a year of war. With its
ever-increasing supply of sophisticated weapons, Putin said, the West
was now using Ukraine as a “testing range” for its plans to destroy
Russia.
Its goal was “to spark a war in Europe, and to eliminate competitors by using a proxy force,” he said in a presidential address. “They plan to finish us once and for all.”
Putin
has come a long way since the morning of the invasion, when he outlined
a brief “special military operation” that would permanently rescue
breakaway regions of Ukraine — Crimea and part of the eastern Donbas
region — from the “humiliation and genocide perpetrated by the Kyiv
regime” during the previous eight years of low-level conflict.
“It
is not our plan to occupy the Ukrainian territory. We do not intend to
impose anything on anyone by force,” he said in remarks that now seem
almost quaint in light of a brutal war to retain and expand Ukrainian territory now occupied by its troops.
But
Putin’s more recent depiction of a Western-provoked war threatening
Russia’s very existence has resonated, particularly in the Global South,
where some countries see the United States engaged in what they
consider serial interventions around the world, and have declined to
take sides.
Whether
Ukraine has become a “proxy” war between great powers has itself become
an intellectual and political battlefield. The word has a dictionary
definition — a person or entity authorized to act for another. More
popularly, it has come to mean sending someone else to do your own dirty
work.
Scores
of images recently leaked online, many with classified U.S. military
and intelligence assessments, illustrate how deeply the United States is
involved in virtually every aspect of the war, with the exception of
U.S. boots on the ground.
Maps
illustrate troop locations, battle plans and likely outcomes on the
battlefield down to the smallest towns, along with the location and
strength of Russian defenses. There are lists of weapons systems in use
by both sides, casualty estimates, summaries of intercepted
conversations and assessments of everything from special forces
capabilities to expended ammunition.
The
leaked documents confirm in detail that the United States is using its
vast array of espionage and surveillance tools — including cutting-edge
satellites and signals intelligence — to keep Kyiv ahead of Moscow’s war
plans and help them inflict Russian casualties.
But
Biden officials adamantly reject the proxy label, noting that it is a
defensive war Ukraine didn’t start and that Kyiv is fighting for its
very survival. While the United States has a legitimate interest in the
outcome, and a legal right to provide aid requested by another sovereign
government, Ukraine is running operations on the ground.
“This
is a war of choice by Putin,” Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin said in an
interview. “We are not in a war with Russia, and we won’t be in a war
with Russia. … It was Russia’s choice to begin with.”
That
may be true, but the administration has given Ukraine more than $40
billion in military and economic aid, along with real-time targeting
assistance and sophisticated weapons systems on which it has trained
Kyiv’s forces.
Some
domestic critics of Biden’s policy openly echo Putin’s charge, if not
necessarily his professed assessment that the Western goal is to
eliminate Russia. Donald Trump, in a recent presidential campaign video,
called the war a “proxy battle” and said the Biden administration was
only “pretending to fight for freedom.” Instead, he said, Biden
“globalists” were using it to distract Americans “from the havoc they’re
creating right here at home.”
In
a tweet last month, Rep. Marjorie Taylor Greene (R-Ga.) called the war
“ridiculous” and said Russia poses no danger to the United States or its
NATO allies. “We are paying for … a proxy war with Russia, when I’ve
never seen Putin actually show in any detail his plans to invade
Europe,” she added. “I don’t believe the lies that I’m being told about
this.”
Although
he later called Putin a “war criminal,” Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis (R),
an undeclared presidential contender, evinced a similar strain of
isolationism during a February appearance on “Fox & Friends.” “I
don’t think it’s in our interest to be getting into a proxy war with
China, getting involved over things like the borderlands or over
Crimea,” DeSantis said.
While
some conservatives slam what House Speaker Kevin McCarthy (R-Calif.)
has called Biden’s “blank check” for Ukraine, others think the president
has been too restrained in doling out enough aid for Ukraine to defeat
the Russians. “If you want to fight a proxy war against Vladimir Putin’s
vindictive, brutal, destructive desire to be remembered as Peter the
Great, then fight the damn proxy war; don’t do it halfway,” the National
Review’s Jim Geraghty wrote last month.
The
administration itself has provided rhetorical grist for Putin’s proxy
portrayal. “We want to see Russia weakened” so that it can never invade
another country again, Austin said early in the conflict.
At a NATO summit in Madrid last June, Biden said Americans should be prepared to pay higher energy and gasoline prices
“for as long as it takes” to defeat Russia, a phrase he has
subsequently used in nearly every statement since then about Western aid
for Ukraine. While insisting there will be no U.S. or NATO troops in
Ukraine, he has said the war must end in a “strategic failure” for
Russia.
“Ukraine
will never be a victory for Russia. Never,” Biden said as he marked the
anniversary of the war’s beginning during a visit in February to Kyiv.
Most
Western allies agree. “Whose proxy is Putin? It’s a war of occupation,”
Lithuanian Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis said in an interview
during a recent Washington visit.
“We
[must] stop it once and for all. And then, we can create the actual
architecture for the whole continent — that includes Ukraine, Moldova,
Georgia and keeping everybody safe,” Landsbergis said.
Landsbergis
is not alone in professing an expansive goal for the war in Ukraine.
Virtually every Western partner — collectively having pledged upward of
$80 billion to the war effort — has called not just for Kyiv’s victory
but for Putin’s defeat.
While
the battle rages on the ground, international law and conflict scholars
have fiercely debated whether it constitutes a proxy war. The short
answer: it depends on how the term is defined.
“Unfortunately
for those who like their strategic concepts to be as precise as the
best modern weaponry, ‘proxy wars’ lacks an agreed meaning and is used
in different ways,” Lawrence Freedman, professor emeritus of war studies
at King’s College London, wrote in a January essay published in Britain’s New Statesman.
“The
basic idea is that you get someone else to do your fighting for you,”
wrote Freedman, who argued that the concept did not apply to Ukraine.
But
Hal Brands, a professor at the Johns Hopkins University School of
Advanced International Studies, has said that is precisely what the
United States and its allies are doing in Ukraine. “Russia is the target
of one of the most ruthlessly effective proxy wars in modern history,”
he wrote in an opinion column for Bloomberg shortly after the war began.
“The
key to the strategy is to find a committed local partner — a proxy
willing to do the killing and dying — and then load it up with the arms,
money and intelligence needed to inflict shattering blows on a
vulnerable rival,” Brands wrote. “That’s just what Washington and its
allies are doing to Russia today.”
More
recently, as the brutality of the war has increased, and after Ukraine
scored some victories, Brands seems to have been won over, at least to
the concept that a world in which Russia emerges victorious is a danger
to all. “If nothing else,” he wrote for Bloomberg
early this year, “this war has illustrated what a world without
American power would look like, and what it looks like when America uses
that unmatched power well.”
“A
Ukraine left to its own devices would have quickly succumbed to
President Vladimir Putin’s invasion,” he wrote. “It would now be
suffering show trials, the execution and imprisonment of its leaders,
and harsh punishment of anyone who resisted Russian rule.”
The
United States didn’t “find” and enlist Ukraine to fight Russia, and it
certainly doesn’t tell it what to do, according to Freedman. “The
Ukrainian government sets the objectives, and Ukrainian commanders are
in charge of the operations.” Most important, U.S. and NATO goals are
defensive — protecting their own eastern flank from Russian expansion
and ensuring that territorial gains cannot be won by force — rather than
offensive. At the same time, NATO has a legitimate “interest in an act
of blatant aggression being thwarted,” he wrote.
Others apply a more technical explanation, noting that U.S. support for the Nicaraguan Contras
under the Reagan administration in the 1980s — including U.S.
assistance in the creation and active supply of a nonstate force,
overflying Nicaragua’s territory and covertly mining its harbors to
overthrow the Sandinista government — was a classic proxy war. The
International Court of Justice found in 1986 that the U.S. harbor-mining
and other activities had breached international law.
U.S.
support for Afghan mujahideen fighters against the occupying Soviet
Union during the Cold War in the 1980s is widely considered a proxy
conflict, as was backing for Libyan dissidents who overthrew the
government of Moammar Gaddafi during the Obama administration.
Regardless
of its rationale for supporting Ukraine, the United States has made
some useful gains in assessing Russia’s military capabilities, if only
in seeing how a country that it defines as an “acute threat” operates in
combat.
“I
thought they would do better at combined arms maneuver than they did,”
Gen. Mark A. Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said in an
interview, speaking of the early days of the invasion. “But they were
just stumbling around.”
During
offensives against Kyiv and elsewhere, Milley said, “it became obvious
that the Russian military was not capable of sustaining themselves. …
They couldn’t keep their vehicles from getting hit; they didn’t have
maintenance on-site or the ability to deliver ammunition.”
“I
don’t want to underestimate, but it does give me more confidence. The
Russian military is not as good as we previously assessed,” he said.
The leaked Pentagon documents reveal substantial Russian weaknesses, including the decimation of elite forces on the front lines — and show that U.S. officials have been able to glean an extraordinary level of information about Russian operations,
for example being able to count how many missiles are being loaded onto
bombers and, in some cases, where they intend to strike targets in
Ukraine.
But
the Western allies have had their own problems, notably in keeping up a
steady flow of weaponry and ammunition for Ukraine. “We don’t have a
country on wartime mobilization for industry,” Milley said. “The lesson
really is sustainment rates. What does that mean to us? We are very
deliberately reevaluating our own stockage levels and industrial base
relative to the war plans we have on the books for various
contingencies,” including a potential conflict with China.
“Have
we done the correct estimations of what the requirements are? They’ve
been very high in this arguably small, limited war,” Milley said. “What
would be the rates in a much larger war that the United States might be
involved in?”
As
they focus on the war confronting them, many U.S. and Western leaders,
while reluctant to voice it publicly, say they are convinced that
workable relations with Russia can never be reestablished as long as
Putin is in power. But that does not mean, they say, that Putin is
correct that their goal is to “finish” Russia.
“The
last thing we need is Russia fragmenting and the fate of all those
nuclear weapons being uncertain,” former U.S. defense secretary and CIA
director Robert M. Gates said recently. “We need a coherent Russian
state, and we need a strong government in Moscow.”
U.S. aid has increased considerably this year as Ukrainian forces prepare to launch what is considered a crucial counteroffensive this spring.
Asked what happens if Ukraine doesn’t succeed in pushing back Russian
front lines and reclaiming significant territory, the Pentagon’s top
official deflected.
They
are always “looking further down the road,” Austin said. But “we want
to make sure that they’re successful in this next fight. I think if you
lose focus on that, some of the other stuff doesn’t matter.”