

## Chapter 4

1942–1947

### “Spreading Like the Green Bay Tree”

When his opinions were unpopular, Willmoore Kendall usually upheld them all the more. Given his opposition to American entry into World War II, it was predictable that he would continue to champion isolationist ideas. He might have chosen this path as an alternative academic career. If an established isolationist intellectual, Kendall would have found it psychologically difficult to sound academic retreat. For inspiration, he might have drawn inspiration from renowned scholars Charles A. Beard and Harry Elmer Barnes. Both stuck stoutly to their noninterventionist views, deriding Roosevelt’s foreign policy even in wartime. With his combative persona, Kendall—with the prominence of a Beard or a Barnes—would have been tempted to dig in to defend his views.

If *John Locke and the Doctrine of Majority Rule* had come out a year earlier, Willmoore might have possessed sufficient scholarly stature to have taken this stand. Appearing in 1941, the book had attracted favorable notice. In *Social Forces* James Godfrey of the University of North Carolina praised Kendall’s “minute examination” of Locke. Finding that the English philosopher advocated majority rule more than individual rights, said Godfrey, amounted to a “revolution” in Locke studies. In November 1941 budding political theorist Eric Voegelin wrote Kendall seeking advice about Locke’s views on religion. Kendall, he said, was “the only expert on Locke I know in this country.” Kendall sent back a textual analysis of Voegelin’s article, with 165 suggested corrections. Though stunned, Voegelin made many of the revisions. Charles Hyneman called critics of Kendall’s *Locke* less imaginative than its admirers.<sup>1</sup>

Had Kendall proclaimed his antiwar position longer than he did, his stance would have come at great cost. As his father had come to understand (during World War I) and as Willmoore surely remembered, the United States treated

wartime dissidents harshly. If famous enough, even isolationists who tried to get behind the American war effort suffered Roosevelt's wrath. Charles Lindbergh—banned from military service—and Lawrence Dennis—tried for sedition—provided examples of the administration's vindictiveness. Despite their fame, Beard and Barnes became *personae non gratae* in academia. Kendall was obscure enough that his isolationism remained under the radar. He was able to shift careers to join the "cloak and gown" world of American intelligence work. And he would remain part of this world for more than a decade.<sup>2</sup>

To be sure, many other isolationists of Kendall's ilk also navigated this wartime transition. Raymond Walsh happily went to work doing public relations for the CIO, becoming an avid supporter of FDR and his policies, foreign and domestic. When William Eddy left academia, he became a major player in the rapidly expanding American intelligence apparatus. Charles Hyneman, also an isolationist, slid successfully into wartime military service. Revalo Oliver, Kendall's anti-New Deal friend from Illinois, used his linguistic skills to lead a large government cryptography effort at Arlington Hall, part of the United States Army Signal Corps.<sup>3</sup> One notable exception to this accommodation to war was Mulford Sibley. As a Quaker convert from Methodism, Sibley declared as a conscientious objector.

When Kendall joined the CIAA in June 1942, he entered a bureaucratic arena in which lines of engagement between competing agencies had already been drawn. The CIAA was established (under a different name) in August 1940. Through the efforts of its chief, Nelson A. Rockefeller, it became the chief intelligence agency for the Western Hemisphere. By the time Willmoore joined the CIAA in June 1942, the organization—drawing on Rockefeller's fame, wealth, connections, and energy—had carved out a significant niche in intelligence circles. Rockefeller disliked William Donovan, head of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and convinced President Roosevelt to order the OSS out of Latin America. The Federal Bureau of Investigation did any needed clandestine work there. The CIAA retained control of American propaganda for the Western Hemisphere for the duration of the war. The main CIAA charge, of course, was to combat Axis influence.<sup>4</sup>

Kendall's skill set proved ideal for this work. He was fluent in Spanish and French, read German and Italian, had experience as a newspaper reporter, and possessed understanding of radio and advertising. With this background he could, on demand, write prose rapidly for various required reports and press releases. Kendall had spent lots of time abroad, had knowledge of contemporary world politics, possessed two degrees from Oxford, and a PhD in political science from Illinois. His "imaginative and inventive mind" gave Kendall "an extraordinary capacity to read and extract essentials." According to Charles S. Hyneman, Willmoore was "in the fullest sense loyal to the

American people and the government and other institutions which they establish."<sup>5</sup> Not all of Kendall's coworkers shared this last attribute.

After obtaining his new position in June 1942, Willmoore worked for a year with the "content committee" of the CIAA. Working 14 hours a day, he prepared two daily radio scripts, each of which he authored, translated, and readied for transmission. This work included typing and proofreading the final Spanish and Portuguese drafts. After an early promotion, Willmoore found himself leading a staff of eight "extremely able writers" tasked with promoting U.S. interests in Latin America via shortwave. Essentially, Kendall oversaw the production of propaganda for Latin America and found the post "the most interesting job that has ever fallen into my hands." He did some ghostwriting, including an article in 1943 for Francis Jamieson, chief of the CIAA's press division, within a large volume entitled *Journalism and the War*. From December 1942 until May 1943, Willmoore mostly lived in New York where both CBS and NBC partnered with the CIAA on producing broadcasts. His professional duties again separated him from Katherine whose job required her to be in Washington. Receiving a salary "out of the sphere of the rational," Willmoore "went up like a shot" in the organization. In 1943 he received an important promotion with an assignment as the CIAA Press Representative for Colombia.<sup>6</sup>

By late 1942, after he had become well settled in the organization, Kendall wrote glowingly to friends about his job. Addressing Francis Wilson, for example, he said he had taken "to the work like a fish to water." Expanding on this point (and mixing metaphors), Kendall continued that he "was spreading myself like the green bay tree."<sup>7</sup> As a preacher's kid, Bible verses came readily to Willmoore's mind. He took this line from Psalm 37:35 which, in good King James prose, reads in full, as follows: "I have seen the wicked in great power, and spreading himself like a green bay tree." From the context of the letter, Kendall meant that he was excited about his work and thriving in it, for he already knew himself to be an effective and innovative intelligence officer. With promotions and a growing salary, he was finding greater financial security than he had ever known. Kendall, then, did not mean to identify himself with "the wicked" referenced in the psalm. Yet his citation of the verse revealed the perils of his new course. Intelligence work allowed Willmoore to put his expertise to good use, but it was full of moral dilemmas and professional pitfalls, including a focus on secrecy and studied manipulation of the masses. The new job also drew him away from scholarly work. Political theory remained Kendall's passion, but intelligence work gave him little time for intellectual pursuits. Intelligence work also pushed him away from the left, for it was as an intelligence officer that Kendall made his rightward turn. This transformation would have major implications for his own career and, ultimately, for the future of American conservatism. World War

It meant the loss of isolationist innocence for Kendall but also for the United States more generally.

Meanwhile, the war threw Willmoore's personal life into disarray. In the Fall of 1942, the Kendall household in Richmond was crowded. Pearl Kendall, together with Walter, his wife Helen and their two children, lived there with Katherine. Close conditions made for "a harrowing experience" which was unpleasant for all concerned. The newly widowed Mrs. Kendall had a hard time getting over her husband's death, remaining despondent for months. She became "an almost pathological case," according to Katherine, as her grief deepened and her adjustment to widowhood worsened. For much of this time, Willmoore was living in New York. Trying to hold down the fort proved challenging for Katherine, as she found herself "with a house full of Kendalls, of all ages & sizes & temperaments."<sup>8</sup>

In the Spring of 1943 Kendall experienced a "violent reaction" after receiving shots for typhus and typhoid which were required before he could travel to Bogotá. Kendall looked forward to the upcoming assignment where, he told his sister, he was "down for very important tasks." In his job he would "mainly exercise a counter-propaganda function." At the end of May he left to take his new assignment which again separated him from Katherine who remained in the United States. She planned to travel to Colombia to live with him, but the couple did not come together again until Willmoore returned from South America. In fact, after their time together in Richmond in 1941 and 1942, Katy and Ken seldom lived together for long. The war opened up major career opportunities for both of them and deepened preexisting rifts in their relationship. When he went to work for the CIAA, she stayed in Richmond to finish her job there. Later she obtained employment with the Red Cross in Washington. There she experienced "a meteoric rise," then got a job with the United States Children's Bureau working with teachers and social workers from Latin America. These professional obligations forced them into separate domiciles. Even when living together, Katherine and Willmoore spoke of how busy they were. Many of their friends, including Charles Hyneman, lived in the Washington area, but it was difficult to socialize, as war work left little free time. Anyway, said Katherine, there was "a liquor shortage and how can you be convivial without a high ball."<sup>9</sup>

Kendall served as CIAA press agent in Colombia for several months. Stationed in Bogotá, he traveled throughout the country. Much of this work concerned mundane matters, such as how to design, print, place, and market American brochures, posters, press releases, and magazine subscriptions to appeal effectively to the country's many different social classes. The purpose was to use publicity to put the United States in the best light possible and its Axis enemies in the poorest. The means was to portray the United States as more democratic, humane, rich, powerful, and sophisticated than its Axis

enemies. Part of this effort was to promote a pictorial magazine for Latin America, *En Guardia*, produced by the CIAA. This publication imitated such civilian magazines as *Life* from the United States and *El Hogar* of Argentina. It attained a circulation of a million readers by war's end.<sup>10</sup>

Kendall made good use of his knowledge, experience, and talents in Colombia. With broad knowledge of global alternatives to capitalism, he noticed "enormous interest" in consumer cooperatives in the country. He persuaded his CIAA superiors to emphasize Axis suppression of such groups and their vitality in Allied countries. He also promoted a pamphlet called "The Nazi War Against the Catholic Church." Designed to appeal to "a wide and select audience" of Colombians, it countered Axis propaganda about the Vatican. To "avoid offending the sensibilities of Colombian neutrals," he thought it unwise to picture the Nazis as Neanderthals. Relying "exclusively on positive themes" was more effective. Such themes included posters about Roosevelt's "Four Freedoms" and books of "cartoons and jokes."<sup>11</sup> Providing propaganda posters praising President Roosevelt, whom he still despised, must have stuck in Kendall's craw.

To his superiors Kendall stressed the need for cultivating the Colombian press. To do so he provided "exclusive" placements of CIAA material with *El Tiempo* and *El Espectador*, the widely circulated Bogotá dailies. He prized connections with these newspapers but placed materials they did not print elsewhere. In this effort, his knowledge of newspaper work and small-town life came in handy. He opposed the purchase of UPI or AP wire service subscriptions for local papers but came up with clever ways to share information with small-town weeklies. The CIAA provided them information more cheaply than they could get it from the wire services. He recognized that such outlets practiced a type of journalism almost entirely devoted "to strictly local events." Because the papers had lots of "cover-to-cover readers," however, he knew the CIAA might obtain "more careful attention" for U.S. publicity efforts than through other media venues. Cumulatively, these weeklies had a larger circulation in the hinterlands than did the big Bogotá dailies. Struggling financially, they would welcome free stories from the CIAA. As press agent, Kendall also tried to help friendly Colombian newspapers obtain newer printing presses made in the USA.<sup>12</sup>

Kendall pushed successfully for creation of a nationwide "daily radio news show." This program would "supplement" shortwave broadcasts from Washington, partnering with local radio stations. In the Fall of 1943, for example, Kendall promoted U.S. radio broadcasts saluting Cartagena's independence day. He also facilitated the request of the Colombian owner of a local radio station to air a program about this milestone in the United States. These radio programs rebroadcast or produced locally by the CIAA became among the most popular programs in Cartagena by 1944. Willmoore thought

it important to travel throughout the country to cultivate "influential writers both on Bogotá and in the provincial capitals." He wanted such contacts to provide these intellectuals a nuanced view "of controversial questions." As regards radio, Kendall focused serious attention on quality control. He contacted Rockefeller, for example, to inform him that a particular Washington newscaster was unpopular with Colombian listeners. "San Francisco newscasters" he added, needed to learn to "pronounce correctly the names of Latin American personages and places."<sup>13</sup>

Kendall had to make sure that his country's message in Colombia was coherent and consistent with official American policy. In many respects he was a model press agent. In July 1943, for instance, he urged the CIAA chairman in Cartagena to trace and destroy posters with recruiting slogans for the U.S. Marines. The "armed forces of the United States," he said, "do not seek recruits in Latin America." When controversial topics arose, such as the Allied bombing of Rome, Kendall penned communiqués for release to the local papers. To superiors back home, he also reported Colombian local reactions to war news and to American propaganda efforts. CIAA efforts in Colombia were quite successful. Actual Axis initiatives in the region were few. But the war helped the United States expand its cultural and economic influence in South America. Kendall worked with bureaucrats, ambitious local politicians, American oilmen, embassy personnel, Allied intelligence agents, military officers, visiting journalists, CIAA representatives in other Colombian cities, and intellectuals hired to promote U.S. aims. He translated important newspaper articles and sent them to Rockefeller so the boss might react quickly to events. He sent cultural information on Colombia back home. For example, he provided local newspaper clippings on "feminism in Colombia" to journalist Ruby Black, first biographer of Eleanor Roosevelt. Kendall promoted cultural and economic exchanges between the two countries. He publicized in Colombia, for example, an exhibit of Latin American artists at the Museum of Modern Art in New York and gave American businessmen news about "an industrial exposition in Medellín." He also gave assistance to Colombian writers wanting their work to appear in the United States.<sup>14</sup>

By late 1943 Kendall was back in the United States. Impressed by his performance in Bogotá, the CIAA gave him a promotion and a pay raise. The organization also promised further moves upward if he stayed on. But Willmoore continued to fear being conscripted into military service. As he had prepared to fly to Colombia in May 1943, for example, Kendall had remained in a "disastrous" state of uncertainty. He believed the draft board back home in Oklahoma might not let him leave the United States. Feeling "the hot breath of the Stillwater board on the back of my wretched neck," he decided to enlist. He would have preferred to remain a civilian. The new

military position promised to be tedious, but he did not regret his decision, for it ended a long "war of nerves" on his psyche. In making the formal shift into military service, Kendall received an "overnight commission." In March 1944 he wrote his sister that he would get "a two-weeks 'special' basic training course, at a camp near Washington." This arrangement would, he noted, "confirm my captaincy with an absolute minimum of discomfort."<sup>15</sup>

Kendall entered the army on February 14, 1944, was soon promoted to captain, and by 1946 had attained the rank of major in the Army of the United States. All along he knew that he would be assigned as an "Officer of the Secretariat" for the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB). This organization was established in January 1942 by the members of the Pan-American Union and based in Washington. Kendall continued to travel frequently to South America, mostly, he told his sister, "to Bolivia, Colombia, and Argentina." The IADB's purpose was to bring together technical specialists from the twenty-one Union republics to help plan defense of the hemisphere. Kendall found his IADB tasks of translating, editing, and writing official documents "tiresome." He often went through already translated documents "to certify them as absolutely correct." He served as an interpreter for U.S. military specialists who traveled on junkets to meet their Latin American counterparts and to show off U.S. military technology to its Western Hemisphere friends. In his position, Kendall had to attend "diplomatic cocktail parties" three times a week. The job required him to drink, make small talk, interpret for "fat Latin American generals," and push their wives "around the dance floor." Year later, as he struggled with alcoholism, Kendall pinpointed the onset of his drinking problem to this time. To his sister he complained in 1944 about "the pointlessness" of his job at the IADB.<sup>16</sup>

In November 1944 Willmoore looked back on his two and a half years in government service. He considered the experience to have been a "distressing phase" of his life. "Interminable" days at the office left him little time to do what he loved best, that is, to read good books and to engage in intelligent conversation. Long hours on the job and difficult commutes left him "much too tired to attempt anything likely to make demands upon the intellect." In Bogotá he had possessed more leisure time but confided to his sister that the "nervous strain" which he felt from making "the fight I was sent there to make left me little inclination for serious reading." He feared that he would come out "of wartime Washington with a mind dulled beyond all possibility of resharpening."<sup>17</sup>

At this point Kendall retained his left-wing political convictions but did not regard himself as a "liberal." In March 1944, for instance, Kendall still described himself as "a good socialist" in private correspondence. He considered liberals to be dishonest phonies not serious about social change. Just before the presidential election of 1944, he said that "everything I

am interested in seeing accomplished in politics depends . . . upon getting Mr. Roosevelt out of the way, where he cannot claim the allegiance of the people most likely to get together, some day, to form a leftwing third party." Willmoore cast an absentee ballot in Oklahoma for Republican candidate Thomas Dewey. He had no real confidence in Dewey either whom, he said, "had become a New Dealer himself in the course of the campaign." When Roosevelt handily won a fourth term in office (and carried the Sooner State by eleven points), Kendall expressed chagrin. He wondered gloomily if FDR would run for a fifth time in 1948.<sup>18</sup>

In late 1944 Willmoore received a letter from Juan and Maria Teresa Andrade. The couple, almost miraculously, had survived in German-occupied France. Imprisoned, Juan had escaped in a daring rescue operation led by an old POUM colleague. The Andrades wrote that they were experiencing dire economic difficulties. Willmoore, who now had many useful government contacts, provided help. He sent generous, regular shipments to his old friends. Drawing upon the largesse of the United States government, the shipments included rice, sugar, flour, corned beef, honey, powdered milk, blankets, and clothes. There were enough supplies to provision not only the Andrades but also many of their refugee colleagues. Kendall also sent the Andrades boxes of Camel cigarettes—which he knew could be exchanged for cash—and sent similar packages to other old comrades from his days in pre-Civil War Spain. Kendall continued to send such help for more than a year until the economic situation of the Andrades improved. Tellingly, he did not get into politics in his letters with his friends, even though they were eager to engage in political discussion.<sup>19</sup> Aside from satisfaction at helping old associates, one suspects Kendall knew the Andrades could provide valuable information about politics in postwar Europe.

"Sick at heart" in 1944 about his IADB work, Willmoore grew depressed about his personal life. The death of his father and separation from Katherine strongly affected his psyche. In October 1943 he wrote Cleanth Brooks, also the son of a Methodist minister, that he had been dealing with "moral problems" for the previous two years. He longed for a chat with Brooks, "the best guy in the world to talk oneself out to." Often living apart, Willmoore and Katherine tried to keep in touch with long letters. Katherine told Tinkum Brooks in September 1943, that despite the couple's frequent separations, it was not "as if we didn't like to live together." But Katherine was making a mark in international social work and found her career "terribly interesting." Experiencing "great emotional disturbance" when Katy's career took her to Chicago and Mexico, Ken engaged in "great meditations about what to do and how to do it." By early 1944 the Kendalls were seriously contemplating divorce. Willmoore said his "heart" was "heavy" but that the couple remained "good friends" and "perhaps more in love with one another than ever." The

prospect of divorce had arisen, according to Willmoore because of "our careers and long-term objectives." Divorce was not inevitable, but "reconciliation" not possible "because we did not quarrel." In November 1944, he said, the couple had decided "to go forward with our marriage," but he dreaded "another year of week-ending together on occasion."<sup>20</sup>

That Christmas, however, the couple, "overwhelmed with sadness," announced their formal separation. The on-again, off-again marriage saga of Katy and Ken would last several more years. Only in 1951 would the couple actually finalize their divorce. As he transitioned out of the war, however, Willmoore continued to experience "endless fits of depression." Kendall had already begun to see a therapist for "analysis" of his "feeling of hopelessness." By the summer of 1946 he claimed therapy had made him "a new man," not perhaps a "better" person but "a much happier one." On a visit to Minneapolis, however, Willmoore had a "difficult time," experiencing some "old-old problems." Such "problems" likely involved Kendall's penchant for extramarital sexual relationships. At the end of 1944, for example, Kendall had an affair with Anne Crutcher, while her husband Leon was in combat in Europe. By this time, he had developed a reputation as a womanizer which endured for years afterward. This reputation (partly explained by long separations from his wife), he admitted was earned, if perhaps exaggerated.<sup>21</sup>

These wartime travails wrung any remaining vestiges of romanticism out of Willmoore Kendall. His taste in fiction, for example, became decidedly hard-boiled. He loved the gritty, noir detective novels of James M. Cain, including *The Postman Always Rings Twice*, *Serenade*, and *The Embezzler*. And in early 1944 he expressed admiration for the unblinking look at alcoholism which Charles Jackson took in his novel *The Lost Weekend*. Given that these books were best sellers, such tastes were partly generational. Disillusioned by World War I, the Depression, and the Nazi-Soviet Pact, many intellectuals of Willmoore's age became skeptical of easy answers to complex problems.<sup>22</sup> For Kendall, these reading preferences also represented an ongoing emotional revolt against his deceased father—an extreme romantic. Additionally, these choices revealed Kendall's increasingly jaded attitude to working in a federal bureaucracy which he mostly did not respect and to being in a crumbling marriage with a successful professional woman whom he seldom saw. Then, as he was reaching an emotional low point in his life, Willmoore Kendall's career began to take off again, and within two years reached new heights.

As the war wound down Kendall feared that he would have to serve in the IADB for years, even after the fighting had ended. In his work with the board he had honed his language skills so that his command of Spanish was "pretty fancy." When the IADB sent him to Portuguese language school, he thought the move "insanity" because it might weaken his fluency in Spanish. He vowed to forget any Portuguese he learned as soon as possible.

In November 1944 Kendall began to see light at the end of his professional tunnel. He informed his sister that he would soon again be "going back to . . . [his] old job of writing and preparing transcripts for radio broadcasts to South America." Willmoore was "looking forward to the change with great eagerness" in which he would remain in the army but only loosely connected to it. In this new assignment he would "be more my own boss than the average colonel."<sup>23</sup>

Technically, Kendall remained in the army, under the aegis of the IADB until May 1946. In a sense, he was going back to his "old job" coordinating with the CIAA (soon renamed the Office of Inter-American Affairs). He worked again with that organization for a little over a year. As he contemplated his postwar career, Willmoore decided to apply for a Guggenheim Fellowship to have a full year to complete his "book on Rousseau and majority-rule." In December 1945 Kendall heard that his application for the Guggenheim had been successful. His reputation as a scholar, based largely on his Locke book, had survived the war. At the end of 1945, he claimed "great eagerness" to leave federal service. "I'm really sick of Washington," he told his sister, "and pretty much all the memories which attach to it."<sup>24</sup>

In early 1946 Kendall was pleased to "find himself flooded with generous offers." His "professional situation" had improved "since those difficult years just before the war." He turned down a well-paid position as American cultural attaché in Lima, Peru. Instead he accepted a teaching position at the University of Minnesota with plans to start teaching in the Fall Semester of 1946. In July the university announced it had hired Kendall as an associate professor of political science. The previous March, however, Kendall had agreed to serve as acting head of the Latin American Division of the State Department's Office of Research and Intelligence. Here he led "a staff of 17 economists, geographers, and political scientists." Upon obtaining the post, he told his sister that he was "real excited" about the opportunity.<sup>25</sup>

This professional progress came about because of the drastic restructuring of American intelligence. When Harry Truman took office in April 1945 he decided to reduce the influence of the Organization of Strategic Services. A major factor in this decision was "bumbling and lax security" in the OSS, as detailed in a "scathing report" by Colonel Richard Park, Jr., of U.S. Army Intelligence. Park finished this report in March 1945, intending to present it to President Roosevelt. But FDR never read it (perhaps because Park's superior was wary of its anti-Soviet perspective). Upon FDR's demise, Park reached Truman with his concerns. His report cited many problems with the OSS. It included several instances of extraordinary naiveté, incompetence or worse regarding the Soviet Union. As one example, the OSS head in Bulgaria broke his cover after the Russians moved in. He provided the USSR with a complete list of OSS agents at work in the country. Park also noted

that the "Communist element in O.S.S. is believed to be of dangerously large proportions."<sup>26</sup>

Taking such information under consideration, President Truman, a few weeks after VJ Day, abolished the OSS on October 1, 1945. This step resulted in bureaucratic chaos, with the tasks of the OSS farmed out to different federal agencies. The CIAA took over some of its functions, especially in research and analysis, that is, the areas in which Willmoore Kendall operated. Destruction of the OSS meant the transfer of its research and analysis functions to the State Department. Its clandestine operations went to military intelligence. Bureaucratic disorder continued for two years until the National Security Act—which created the CIA and National Security Agency—went into effect in September 1947.<sup>27</sup> It was during this transitional and chaotic period in the American intelligence world that Willmoore Kendall achieved his highest government position.

In the Spring of 1946 Kendall entered the big leagues of the American intelligence establishment. In March he received appointment as assistant director, Special Projects Staff, in the United States Department of State. Technically Major Kendall remained in the Army of the United States until he received his honorable discharge in May. Six weeks later he became branch editor and distribution officer at his State Department job. In August 1946 he was appointed chief of the Latin American Division of the Office of Reports and Estimates (ORE) for the Central Intelligence Group (CIG). Established as something of an interagency makeshift on January 22, 1946, the CIG was the embryonic form of the CIA. Soon a consensus developed among policy-makers that the Cold War required a more centralized setup. By the time the CIA came formally into existence, however, Kendall was teaching at Yale. The CIG focused on gathering information, rather than on covert action. That focus allied well with Kendall's views on intelligence work. Kendall took a year's leave of absence from Minnesota to work for the CIG. Washington insiders smoothed this career path for Kendall, making sure Minnesota would keep his position open. Even as he made this transition, however, Kendall "deep within" almost hoped something would happen to send him to the academic post in Minneapolis. In taking up this new "big job" at the CIG, Kendall claimed that for "all intents and purposes" he had "been drafted." He feared the position would cost him as a scholar, losing prime years as a writer and researcher. He "spent the better part of a week sweating over" this key career move. Taking "the national point of view," however, he believed it "of first importance that the CIG, through the difficult months and years ahead, have the personnel it needs for the indispensable function it is charged with."<sup>28</sup>

Kendall thus took a huge step up the professional ladder. He accepted the position because he could "have an impact on the nation's business far beyond any job I've had, or been mentioned for." He found himself near

the center of the burgeoning postwar American intelligence community. He came into the CIG as part a purge of "dead wood" and lingering OSS influences from the organization. The new Director of Central Intelligence was Lieutenant General Hoyt Vandenberg. Previously head of Army Intelligence, Vandenberg brought in a coterie of "colonels" to fix the CIG. Kendall became part of this makeover, but he came in as a protégé of William Langer, Harvard historian. Langer had been chief of Research and Analysis in the OSS and continued to serve in this capacity as this division transferred to the State Department. Vandenberg and Langer worked to "refocus" American intelligence and make it more efficient. Thus, Kendall chose to put his academic career on hold for this "big promotion."<sup>29</sup>

Willmoore found the new job fascinating. He was in charge of about thirty-five employees whom he said were "pretty good people." He was an important liaison between his ORE and other intelligence agencies. Given a "free hand" to make changes, he reorganized the personnel in an office which he believed had suffered from poor leadership. Much of his job consisted of compiling daily intelligence reports from Latin America to provide to his superiors so that they might present the president "a daily summary of important information." At least initially, such information was what Truman mainly wanted from the intelligence services. Kendall was responsible for gathering, sifting, compiling, and presenting pertinent information from Latin America, much as he had done, on a smaller scale with lower stakes, when reporting to Coordinator Rockefeller. Kendall's reports went to the Assistant Director for Research and Evaluation, then passed through more bureaucratic hoops before reaching the president's desk. His superiors decided how to move forward with information Kendall had compiled. Sometimes they left out material which they believed did not merit presidential attention. Thus, Kendall was not in the inner circle of decision-makers and never actually met the president. Even as this work proceeded, Kendall was contemplating a return to academia. He thought at first that he would take up the post which he had left off at the University of Minnesota.<sup>30</sup>

He came into this position in the intelligence community because of his strong anti-Stalinist credentials and because of his stellar performance in previous jobs. Kendall's friend, the political scientist Evron Kirkpatrick, had joined the OSS in 1945 and voiced his concern to William Donovan that its Latin American research and analysis branch was chock full of Communists. Other intelligence personnel had shared this concern. Kirkpatrick had recommended to Donovan that Kendall "be brought in to clean out the division."<sup>31</sup> Apparently, this cleansing of communists was the "special project" to which Kendall was assigned in March 1946 in the State Department as it was taking over the research and analysis functions of the OSS. In this task, Kendall ran into some old Oklahoma comrades.

Writing privately in 1960, Kendall provided one key reason for his quick rise up the intelligence ladder. "I'm the guy who 'busted' the Maurice Halperin 'and because of that was named his successor.'" Halperin had joined the OSS after expulsion from the University of Oklahoma, where he had worked as a professor for fourteen years. Oklahoma governor Leon Phillips, ignoring Reverend Kendall's advice, sought to purge communists from the university. In 1941 the "Little Dies Committee" of the Oklahoma State Legislature took up the governor's plan. It demanded the firing of Halperin, a professor of Romance languages. Halperin lied by denying that that he was a member of the Communist Party. University authorities were skeptical of the charges and so helped arrange a "soft landing" for Halperin with the OSS.<sup>32</sup>

Halperin became one of "the most productive" Soviet agents within American intelligence agencies. He led OSS research and analysis efforts for Latin America, even as Kendall was working in the same region for the CIAA and IADB. In 1945—after he received warnings from Duncan Lee (advisor to William Donovan and himself a Soviet agent) that the FBI was closing in on him—Halperin left the OSS. He went to work for State Department intelligence, resigning this office in early 1946, to be replaced by Willmoore Kendall. Halperin, following the line of the *Daily Worker*, had been quite effective at spreading fake news, including reports which denounced and slandered Trotskyists (which surely annoyed Willmoore). In 1953 he fled the United States to avoid prosecution, and the KGB later helped him move to the USSR. Willard Z. Park, who worked for the CIAA and once led the Anthropology Department at the University of Oklahoma (and who had also been denounced the state's Little Dies Committee), turned out to be a Soviet spy too. Kendall's intelligence career, then, was built over the professional corpse of Soviet spy (and fellow Oklahoman) Maurice Halperin. Halperin's disloyalty had been an open secret for years, but when information from the ultra-secret Venona Project confirmed his guilt, Kendall was on hand to deliver the bureaucratic coup de grâce. Perhaps Kendall's most important achievement in his new post was advocating to work with the Perón regime in Argentina, not overthrow it, as some American experts, including Halperin, wanted to do.<sup>33</sup>

Despite his intelligence work, Kendall kept a hand in the academic world by teaching a political theory class at the University of Minnesota. He did much of this work from a distance, but he also made periodic visits to the Minneapolis campus. He spent lots of time in the Fall of 1946 on preparing his classwork, noting that it was the one part of his 70-hour "work week which I truly enjoy." He strongly desired to return to academia in 1947 after a "year of money-making" in intelligence work. Had Kendall ended up at the University of Minnesota as planned, he would likely have joined the

"Minnesota Mafia," a group of anticommunist, Democratic Party liberals which over the years included several friends and former colleagues—Hubert Humphrey, Evron Kirkpatrick (and his new wife Jeane Kirkpatrick), Leonard and Anne Crutcher, and Howard Penniman. With Evron Kirkpatrick in particular, Kendall had a close but competitive relationship. By January 1947, however, Kendall had started to have second thoughts about taking up his post in Minnesota. He was "getting quite a bang" out of his work with the CIG. With his office becoming "a pilot plant as regards the intelligence problem in general," he considered remaining in federal service.<sup>34</sup>

By the Spring of 1947 Kendall had made his conservative turn, and ever after viewed himself as a man of the right. Working closely with a strong group of liberal political scientists was not attractive to him, however anti-communist they might be. His work in exposing disloyalty within American intelligence circles contributed to this turn. Liberals who complained about loyalty oaths or suggested protecting the civil liberties of spies were, in his view, a big part of the problem. In an April 1947 letter to Charles Hyneman, Kendall suggested that the founding fathers, if necessary, would have required "tests" to hold political office. He added that the American revolutionaries had exiled their own Loyalist opponents, "the then-equivalent of the modern Communists." Later that year, he told Francis Wilson, well known as a conservative, that he too was now "thinking along the same lines." Then he continued that: "We've had a common enemy (though of course not a common quarrel) for many years—the Liberals."<sup>35</sup>

Then something good turned up. Kendall discovered that Yale University was hiring, put in his application, and was offered a job. Strong letters of recommendation from intelligence colleagues and fellow political scientists helped Kendall secure the position. On March 24, 1947, Professor P. E. Corbett wrote to Kendall offering him a post as tenured associate professor of political science "in the fields of political theory and comparative government." Corbett noted that the department, "with rare unanimity," believed Kendall "would add greatly to the scope and quality of our work." The minimum salary for Yale associate professors was \$5,000, but the university offered Kendall \$6,000 (more than Minnesota paid but less than Kendall was making as an intelligence officer). As he prepared for Yale, Kendall told his sister that he was looking forward to the job as "the ideal solution to most of my problems." He expressed regret about leaving the organization which he had built at the CIG. His office was "jelling wonderfully" after a rough start and would now "be fun to run." In accepting the new job, Kendall expressed gratification that would be "able to teach a course at Yale on the intelligence problem." He left the CIG in "clear conscience" because he could "be instrumental in focusing the attention of a major university upon professional training for intelligence work."<sup>36</sup>

Kendall experienced a sense of vindication in getting the political science job at Yale. He beat out both Evron Kirkpatrick and Francis Wilson for the post. He told Hyneman how impressed his former professors at Illinois (including Wilson) were with his success. He mentioned his annoyance that Wilson, Clarence Berdahl, and their "little clique" had been keeping "the theory panels . . . sewed up in recent years" at the meetings of the American Political Science Association. Then he suggested that Wilson's own chances of getting a job at Yale were now slim. He was angry at Wilson and the other Illinois faculty for not having helped him secure a decent academic position.<sup>37</sup>

Kendall knew that he would have enemies in the political science department (which even in 1947 was no conservative bastion). "This guy [Cecil] Driver is full of venom," he told Hyneman, "as no man I have ever known," to whom Berdahl, his old nemesis at Illinois, was "positively Christ-like." Kendall decided, however, that Driver had little influence in the department and would not hamper his career. Kendall also believed he had strong allies in New Haven and thought he was well prepared for any departmental "in-fighting."<sup>38</sup> Kendall had emerged victorious from high-stakes battles in the American intelligence establishment. Perhaps he assumed that any struggles within a university political science department would be easily manageable. If so, he was dead wrong.

Meanwhile, Yale hired Kendall knowing about his quarrelsome reputation. Willmoore's faults were "an exaggeration of his virtues," Hyneman told Yale professor Francis Coker. Caring deeply about issues, Kendall "irritates people who would like to ignore or brush aside things that ultimately have to be faced up to." Receiving "friendly counsel on these matters" would turn him into "a tower of strength" for Yale's political science department. Hiring Kendall had an enormous upside for Yale, thought Hyneman. Quoting James Wilford Garner, he said: "That Man Kendall has read everything, and if you name a book he hasn't read, he will read it while you wait." Ultimately, Hyneman opined, Kendall would be one of "very few *American* political theorists . . . likely to make a very important contribution to political theory in the next two or three decades."<sup>39</sup> In hiring Kendall, then, Yale knew of his scholarly gifts but also understood that it was taking a risk. Apparently, the university believed it could tame Kendall's wildness. If so, the university was dead wrong.

## NOTES

1. WK to FGW, [1942], B2, WP; James L. Godfrey, Review of *John Locke and the Doctrine of Majority Rule*, by WK, *Social Forces* 20, no. 3 (March 1942): 417; Steven D. Ealy and Gordon Lloyd, eds. "The Eric Voegelin-Willmoore Kendall