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cussion was limited to supporting established military policies. More fundamental was the resurgence of antagonism against West Point, and the criticism of the purposes and methods of the military academy. "There is a stiff prejudice in civil life against the West Pointer," complained the cadet yearbook of 1927. Another officer diagnosed the existence of "a current epidemic, militarophobia." All the varied antimilitary prejudices came to the fore. Those of pioneer stock disliked the Army because it was the antithesis of rugged individualism. Recent immigrants disliked the Army because of its Old World aristocratic associations. Labor disliked the Army because of its strike duty. And business? "The composite American business mind," wrote one naval officer, signaling the return to the orthodox military view of commerce, "values present advantage above future security and can see no profit in national insurance in times of peace." Underlying all was American distrust of government and the belief that the military along with the civil branches of the public service were inherently inefficient and largely unnecessary. It was time as one officer bluntly put it, to "face the facts."¹⁸ The military effort to bridge the gap to society had been a failure. The triumphs of antimilitarism were not due to Bolshevism, but to the natural apathy of the American people, their inherent dislike for war, their linking of the military with war, and their faith in a future of peaceful progress. The Neo-Hamiltonian compromise was impossible in the postwar world. The opposition was not a few pacifists and radicals. It was America itself. Rejected again, there was nothing for the military to do but to retreat back to their prewar isolation and find interest and satisfaction in the mundane duties of their profession.*

* Illustrative of the withdrawal was the changing content of the Army's foremost professional magazine, the *Infantry Journal*. In the early twenties, its pages were filled with articles on political issues, Communism, national defense policy, social and economic problems. Since the Army was involved in political controversy, very few articles were critical of that service; instead, the virtues of the military program were extolled. By the late twenties and early thirties, however, politics had disappeared from the *Journal*. Its content became more strictly professional, and, at the same time, self-criticism of the military, of Army conservatism, organizational defects, technological backwardness, became much more extensive. Sober discussion of technical military problems replaced the earlier exhortations to political action.

The Constancy of Interwar Civil-Military Relations

BUSINESS-REFORM HOSTILITY AND MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM

The evaporation of Neo-Hamiltonianism in the benignity of the 1920's reunited the American community in its distaste for military affairs. In part this reflected the renewed dominance of business pacifism during the twenties. It was also manifest, however, in the other strand of the liberal tradition preëminent during the second and fourth decades of the century. Reform liberalism originated in the 1880's and 1890's in the guise of populism and swept forward into the twentieth with the muckrakers, the progressive movement, the New Freedom, and, eventually, the New Deal. Many of the ideas of the reformers with respect to military affairs, and certainly the language in which they expressed their ideas, differed considerably from those of the spokesmen of business. Yet the basic substance and the ultimate effects of the reform approach and the business approach were the same. The antimilitarism of reform liberalism complemented the antimilitarism of business liberalism. In this respect there was no fundamental change from Wilson to Harding to Roosevelt. As a result, the manifestations of military professionalism during the interwar period were remarkably static. The ideas and institutions which had been produced during the years of business rejection reflected intense professionalism on the outskirts of society. With the postwar collapse of the Neo-Hamiltonian bridge, civil-military relations resumed this pattern and maintained it throughout the twenties and thirties. The constancy of American military pro-

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prospects of congressional approval for such a plan rapidly receded after 1920, the arguments advanced in its favor became more and more removed from military requirements. In the end, the officers were advancing UMT as more or less the universal panacea for all the social ills which beset America. It would strengthen national unity, promote the amalgamation of ethnic groups, and encourage democracy and tolerance. It would be physically beneficial and would virtually eliminate illiteracy in the United States. Far from injuring industry or retarding the development of occupational skills, it would have just the reverse effects. The Army would discharge its recruits with a basic training in law, commerce, transport, engineering, or any one of a number of other technical fields. Most important were the moral benefits to be derived from universal training. At the same time that it was quite rapidly espousing the values of a commercial civilization, the officer corps could still retain some elements of the old sense of the moral superiority of the military to the business way of life. Loyalty, patriotism, honor, discipline, fairness, a respect for law could be inculcated in the youth of the nation through military training. In short, the officers proved conclusively the need of universal service for every reason except military ones.¹⁶

The Army's new activities also involved it in political controversy with pacifist, religious, and educational organizations. Refusing to take the officers' arguments at their face value, these groups viewed the ROTC program, the summer camps, and the proposed UMT plans as schemes for the militarization of society which could lead only to war. Civilian memories of the horrors of the French trenches and the natural repugnance against instructing teenagers in the gory techniques of bayonet wielding were capitalized upon in the antimilitary propaganda. The services responded by denouncing the motives and activities of the peace groups. The epithet "pacifist" had been coined just prior to World War I to describe the opponents of the Neo-Hamiltonian preparedness program. It was now widely employed by the military officers to describe anyone who criticized military objectives. In contrast to their prewar perspective of themselves as an outcast minority, the officers now sought to portray themselves as representative of all true Americans and as one hundred per cent patriotic. Their

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opponents, on the other hand, were visualized as a small, conspiratorial, subversive clique, either insidiously plotting to undermine American institutions or unconsciously serving as the tools of those who did have this as their goal. The officers participated fully in the national denunciation of Reds and Bolsheviks which swept the country in the early twenties, and they did not hesitate to go further and to link their pacifist opponents with the Red Menace. While conceding that some of the pacifists might just be sentimentalists with an unreasoned opposition to war or taxpayers with a desire to reduce military expenditures, they tended to view the core of pacifists as political radicals who opposed military training with the ultimate aim of destroying the Army and Navy and overthrowing the government.¹⁷ The services reflected the true will of the American people; their opponents were the political outcasts.

It was only slowly that the officers were disabused of this illusion. By the end of the decade, however, it had become impossible for them to maintain their identification with the community. The opposition to military ideals and the military program which was so strong within the government could no longer be blamed upon misinformation or the failure of Congress to reflect accurately the sentiment of the country. Nor could the mounting opposition to the military intrusion into education be viewed as only the work of a conspiratorial minority. Army expenditures were reduced far below that level which the officers believed necessary to carry out the purposes of the National Defense Act. The postwar reaction against navalism had reduced appropriations and produced the Washington arms conference. The localized recruiting campaign had failed to produce significant results. Military training in the secondary schools was coming under increasing attack and was being discontinued in some areas. Bills in Congress proposed to abolish the compulsory aspects of ROTC. It was manifestly obvious that "a wave of feeling against military training in our schools and colleges seems to be spreading over this country." When the new Chief of Staff, General Summerall, in 1926 sought to arouse public support for larger defense appropriations, he was abruptly silenced by the President, an action which served to point up the fact that the new freedom of officers to participate in public dis-

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the wisdom of supporting" a strong national defense. Finally, in these immediate postwar years, the Army also made a determined effort to institute localized recruiting, assigning each Regular Army unit to a specific geographical area and hoping in that way to build up popular support and to capitalize upon local pride.¹² Not only was the Army as a whole to be reunited with the people, but each regiment was to develop close ties with a particular locality.

This new range of activities inevitably altered the attitudes and behavior patterns which were most highly valued within the military services. The forces must adjust to society. "The character of our Army and Navy," a naval officer argued, ". . . must reflect the character of the American people — American ideas, ideals, and thoughts." The new outlook must embody the spirit of Washington's injunction: "When we assumed the soldier, we did not lay aside the citizen." Officers were told to abandon the appearance of exclusiveness and to develop a "fellow-feeling for all citizens." In training the citizen-soldier, the officer must rely upon "cooperative spirit" rather than discipline. The prewar practice of boasting about their failure to vote must be dropped. The soldier, like any other citizen, had a duty to exercise his franchise; the abstention of the officer from the polls would be "looked at rather askance by the progressive business man with whom he speaks." The military must abandon their old dislike of publicity and actively woo public opinion through all the devices and media utilized by any business corporation. All other social groups, even conservative institutions like the churches, had hired publicity men and public relations advisers; it was time for the Army to do likewise. "We must get on our feet at once and adopt business methods to meet business conditions," it was argued in marked contrast to the prewar military distaste for anything suggestive of business or commercialism. This new approach was formally recognized by the rescission of President Wilson's order banning public discussion of national policy by officers, and by the issuance in 1927 of a new Army regulation declaring that public defense and advocacy of the national military policies was "naturally and logically one of the important duties of the officers of the Army."¹³

The instruction of the civilian components in particular required a new type of officer with a new outlook. It was essential,

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in the words of General MacArthur, that the officer have "an intimate understanding of the mechanics of human feeling, a comprehensive grasp of world and national affairs, and a liberalization of conception which amount to a change in his psychology of command." The officer on duty with the reserves must be qualified in "salesmanship" as well as the professional skills of a soldier. He must be a "good mixer" as well as a good fighter. Officers detailed to reserve duty were advised to make friends with the local Chamber of Commerce, to meet influential businessmen, to work closely with the local American Legion post, and to join the Kiwanis or Rotary. In short, they were to blend with middle-class business America. Above all, they were warned "not to be too military."¹⁴

The pushing of the military program involved adoption of the values as well as the techniques of a business civilization. In order to persuade their opponents of the validity of their conclusions, the military had to adopt the premises of their opponents' thinking. The defense of the regular services in terms of their non-military benefits to society, which Leonard Wood had argued in the prewar years, was continued and elaborated upon. The Navy was extolled in terms of its contributions to industry and science, above and beyond its role as the country's first line of defense. The Navy, its Secretary declared in 1921, is "engaged continuously in useful and humanitarian enterprises." Two years later it was claimed that the Navy's work in humanitarian causes justified its existence even if it never fired another shot. The Army was praised for its contributions to "national development of resources, science, and manhood." By educating officers and men in civilian skills, it "blended defensive readiness with industrial and civic aid." There should be no reticence in pointing out the "economic value of the Army's peacetime accomplishments." The summer training camps were, in true Wood style, defended on the grounds of their contributions to national unity, and the Regular Army was declared to be one of "the greatest agencies in the nation in the teaching of good citizenship."¹⁵

The most extreme instances of the military denying themselves, and advocating a military program for nonmilitary reasons, were in their postwar campaign for universal military training. As the

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The officer corps evened the score with Wood during the war by denying him combat command. The politicians evened the score after the war by thwarting his second great ambition. Rejected by the military, Wood still hoped to redeem himself in politics. He was a leading contender for the Republican presidential nomination in 1920. But the convention and the country were tired of the martial spirit. Too much the politician for the military, he was too much the soldier for the politicians. His fellow Republicans wanted normalcy not preparedness, the easy dollar not the strenuous life. Theodore Roosevelt, had he lived, might have been flexible enough to adjust to the new mood; but not Leonard Wood. He was swept aside by the postwar antimilitarism. What place was there for him in an America of commercialism and flapperism, gin mills and jazz, Jimmy Walker and F. Scott Fitzgerald, Harding and Mencken? The new administration did the best it could for him by sending him out to the Philippines to resume his post as Governor General. He returned briefly to the United States in 1927 to die in a country which hardly remembered him and which had little use for him.

THE ABORTIVE IDENTIFICATION WITH SOCIETY, 1918-1925

After 1918 the military made every effort to continue the wartime identification with American society and to expand the Neo-Hamiltonian link with the American community. Particularly in the Army, the war was viewed as ushering in a new era of civil-

was first and foremost, an aggregation of human beings, gallant, lovable, wonderful human beings, who might be made craven or glorious according to the leadership given them. To take them into battle, to make them fight to gain a position, by means of them to win a campaign, was only one of a general's functions. That was essential; but it was equally important to make these men in his charge true and devoted citizens of the Republic, to give them a vision of their country, to show them what they were fighting for."

Leonard Wood (New York, 2 vols., 1931), II, 268. Wilson explained his reasons for keeping Wood in the United States in a letter to the *Springfield Republican*, June 5, 1918:

"In the first place, I am not sending him because Gen. Pershing has said that he does not want him, and in the second place, Gen. Pershing's disinclination to have Gen. Wood sent over is only too well founded. Wherever Gen. Wood goes there is controversy and conflict of judgment."

Gen. Peyton C. March, wartime Chief of Staff, had little in common with Pershing except his strict professionalism—and his dislike of Leonard Wood. See March's *The Nation at War* (Garden City, N.Y., 1932), pp. 57-68.

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military relations. "The 'splendid isolation' of the Regular Army," proclaimed the *Infantry Journal*, "is a thing of the past." The Army was to become a participating member of American society. An Army as a special caste apart from the people, said the Secretary of War in 1920, "is relatively useless." Instead, it must be "in fresh and constant contact with the thoughts and feelings of the civil fireside from which it had come."¹¹ The hopes of the military largely reflected their belief that the separation of the Army from the populace prior to the war was primarily physical in nature, the result of its being strung out in its frontier garrisons remote from the centers of population, civilization, and commerce. With the end of Indian fighting, the reasons for this isolation were now over. The urge to belong, to be accepted, to identify with the community at large, was the primary goal of the military officers as they stressed the necessity of "getting close to the people."

The basis for uniting the Army with the people appeared to be laid in the National Defense Act of 1920. This was universally hailed by military spokesmen as inaugurating the new age of civil-military relations. The primary mission of the Regular Army was now held to be the training of civilian components—the National Guard and Organized Reserves. The new ROTC program, an extended and much broader form of the old land grant college plan, made military instruction available in any qualified college or high school. In little over a decade, more than three hundred ROTC units were set up at schools and colleges with about 125,000 students participating in the program which absorbed the energies of about 5 per cent of the Regular Army officers corps. A second link with the civilian population came from the summer training camps for youths, developing out of Leonard Wood's prewar Plattsburg movement. The first of the new camps opened in 1922 and offered a combination of military and civic instruction to ten thousand young men for a thirty day period. Thirdly, the 1920 Act authorized the detail of regular officers as instructors with the National Guard and reserves. The Army goal was to build a nation-wide organization, so that every community in the country would have representatives of at least one of the Army components, whose views, the Secretary of War hoped, would "be felt among their neighbors until all our people come to appreciate

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the people rather than as "the career of a chosen class."⁹ While recognizing the military need of preparedness, he stressed even more the civic need: the desirability of stimulating throughout the country the military, or at least semi-military, virtues of patriotism, responsibility, devotion to duty, and manliness. In 1913 he organized summer training camps for college youths. In 1915 this idea was expanded into the Plattsburg camp for businessmen. At the end of World War I, before his unit was demobilized, Wood turned his division into a university, pushing educational plans for both officers and enlisted men. He wanted to combine military training with a broader education in citizenship and the ideals of national service. Wood justified universal military training by its political, educational, and moral benefits. It would give meaning to citizenship, and it was the logical corollary of universal manhood suffrage. It would reduce crime and improve economic efficiency. It would unite the country, forming a single national spirit transcending sectional, class, and nationality group differences. In a similar vein, Wood defended the Regular Army for its constructive work in engineering, public health, sanitation in Cuba, the Canal Zone, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines.¹⁰ Wood's outlook is summarized in the titles of two lectures delivered in 1915: "The Military Obligation of Citizenship" and "The Civil Obligation of the Army." In stressing the universality of military service, Wood harked back more to Jefferson than to Hamilton, although the imperatives he invoked to plead his case — manliness, duty, responsibility, patriotic ardor — were not those which received primary emphasis in Jefferson's formulation.

During the decade prior to American entrance into the World War, Wood was a leading figure in the drive for a positive national policy and the increase in America's armed strength. He played a major role in stimulating the outpouring of preparedness literature which flooded the country.* His support for preparedness went far

* These books of 1914-1917 constitute one of the few significant bodies of writings by American civilians and military men on defense issues. The tone of virtually all those favoring preparedness was thoroughly Neo-Hamiltonian. Many were written by close friends of Wood, others were dedicated to him, and to others he contributed introductions. Some of the more notable were Jennings C. Wise, *Empire and Armament* (New York, 1915); Frederic Louis Huidekoper, *The Military Unpreparedness of the United States* (New York, 1915); R. M. Johnston, *Arms and the Race* (New York, 1915); Eric Fisher Wood, *The Writing on the*

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beyond the policies of the Wilson Administration. His close personal ties with Roosevelt and the other Neo-Hamiltonians linked him with their violent attacks upon what they described as the pacifism and vacillation of Wilson. Wood himself was on occasion in his public speeches highly critical of his Commander in Chief. He was also thoroughly identified with the Republican Party, and in 1915 and 1916 was openly receptive to the idea that he might become its presidential nominee.

Political participation further alienated Wood from the military profession of which he never had been a full-fledged member. Lacking the West Point background, entering the Army as a surgeon, becoming the confidant of Cleveland and McKinley and the intimate friend of Roosevelt, making his military reputation as leader of the thoroughly unprofessional Rough Riders, Wood was viewed with suspicion and jealousy by many within the officer corps. Rejecting the 1899 advice of the War Department that he get out of the Army, he had instead risen to its highest post. Inevitably, the rapid rise of this medical man over the heads of deserving career officers was attributed to political favoritism. His political activities barnstorming about the country between 1908 and 1917 did not sit well with a generation of officers indoctrinated in the Sherman-Upton philosophy of a silent, impartial professional service. Eventually, the officer corps settled up with him. In the first war which they directed in their own fashion, the professionals could find no place for Leonard Wood. Eager though Wood was for military glory, Pershing viewed him as an subordinate political general and refused to have him in France. He was shunted aside and spent the war directing a training camp on this side of the Atlantic. Although he blamed Wilson and the Democrats for the treatment he received, his real enemies this time were the military professionals he had so long flouted.*

Wall (New York, 1916). Theodore Roosevelt was the only figure who overshadowed Leonard Wood in the preparedness campaign.

* Hermann Hagedorn in his highly sympathetic biography of Wood summed up the difference between him and Pershing as follows:

"The conflict between Wood and Pershing went deeper than mere personal antagonism. Their views of what the American army should be differed fundamentally. To Pershing — brought up on the Prussian theorists, Clausewitz, Bernhardi, Treitschke, von der Goltz — the army was a machine, to be used as man, the intelligent, uses any other machine for his own purposes. To Wood, the army

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interested in professional literary work, and have now a fair promise of success in it.

Given this attitude, it is not surprising that his superior officer declared in a fitness report that Mahan's "interests are entirely outside the Service for which, I am satisfied, he cares but little and is therefore not a good officer."⁴ After this last tour of sea duty, Mahan did retire in 1896 and thereafter only served on active duty during the Spanish-American War and on a few other temporary occasions.

Mahan's theories thus reflected the civilian intellectual currents of his time as well as the developing naval professional outlook. The change in his activities from professional work to popular writing coincided with the change in his thinking from professional realism to the defense of expansion and violence. To support his position, he called in Christian doctrine, Social Darwinism, utilitarianism, and nationalism. He elaborated upon the civilian doctrines of manifest destiny. Mahan was truly "a child of his age, an age of budding imperialism."⁵ In his magazine articles, he consciously appealed to the sentiments for expansion stirring in the American populace. As he himself said, his writings traced "not my development, but the progress of national awakening from 1890 to 1897." His function was that of popularizer and articulator of the political sentiments of the day. Mahan's doctrines were in many respects more widely accepted by the American public than by the American Navy. His immediate influence upon his fellow officers did not equal that of the more professionally inclined Luce and Sims.⁶ Separated from his profession, Mahan rode the swelling tide of imperialist sentiment in the 1890's. He was acclaimed at home and honored abroad. His books were best sellers, his articles widely read and quoted. He was the premier spokesman of the new doctrines, the confidant and adviser to Lodge, Roosevelt, and the other Neo-Hamiltonian political leaders of the day. In shifting his base from the naval profession to public opinion, however, he had gained temporary strength at the expense of permanent support. Inevitably, after the turn of the century, the reaction against Neo-Hamiltonianism and imperialism set in. Popular opinion swung back toward liberalism, isolation, pacifism, and indifference to

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preparedness and the responsibilities of national greatness. His books no longer commanded the audience which they once did. Mahan vigorously criticized *The Great Illusion*, but it was Norman Angell rather than he who was now the best seller. In his autobiography published in 1907, the sense of separation from the public was as manifest as the sense of separation from the profession. The American people, Mahan regretted, were unmilitary, and they viewed the military spirit as "the obtrusion of an alien temperament." His warnings as to the dangers from Germany and the needs of naval preparedness fell on deaf ears. The American people, he declared in 1912, "are singularly oblivious of the close relation between peace and preparation." In 1913 he admitted that his "vogue was largely over."⁷ The next year he died.

LEONARD WOOD. Leonard Wood had fewer initial connections with military professionalism than did Mahan. Graduating from Harvard Medical School, he became an Army surgeon and for several years saw service in the final Indian campaigns in the southwest. Ordered to Washington in Cleveland's administration as surgeon to the President, he stayed on with McKinley. When the Spanish War broke out, he joined with Theodore Roosevelt in organizing the Rough Riders. Wood came out of the war a major general of Volunteers and served as military governor of Cuba from 1899 to 1902. McKinley also promoted him from captain in the Medical Corps to brigadier general in the Regular Army. Subsequently, Roosevelt made him a major general and sent him out to be military governor in the Philippines. Returning in 1908, he served as commander of the eastern department of the Army and as Chief of Staff from 1910 to 1914.

Wood's views on military and national affairs were expressed in his speeches, writings, and actions after his return to the United States in 1908. Like Mahan's, his outlook was, to a large extent, that of the military professional. He was instrumental in advocating and instituting professional reforms in the Army.⁸ Nonetheless, like Mahan, he also ended up the proponent of an unmilitary political *Weltanschauung*. Wood's thought revolved about the twin ideas of the responsibility of the citizen for military service and the benefits to the citizen from military service. Unlike the professional military man, Wood saw the Army as the embodiment of

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a means of settling international disputes. He believed that an equilibrium of power was the best means of preserving peace, and that effective armed preparedness was a national necessity. Following the preachings of Luce, he urged naval officers to concentrate upon the true heart of their profession, the science of naval warfare, and to appreciate the importance of naval history to its mastery. He was a consistent advocate of a balanced system of organization for the Navy Department which he believed would effectively delimit civilian and military responsibilities. He also urged the establishment of a national defense council modeled after the British Defense Committee so as to secure adequate coordination of foreign and military policies. In all these respects, Mahan was enunciating standard military ideas common to both Navy and Army officers of the period.

In four important particulars, however, Mahan's thinking went beyond the purely professional outlook. His theory of the significance of sea power in the rise and fall of nations transcended the limits of military analysis. By sea power, he meant all the elements contributing to national strength on the ocean, not just the military ones. His theory rested primarily upon the examples of Athens, Rome, and, above all, England. Mahan's scope was far broader than that of Clausewitz, Jomini, or other military writers. His theory was a philosophy of history not a philosophy of warfare. As such, it had political, ideological, and even racial overtones. Secondly, in his study of international relations, Mahan went beyond a mere realistic analysis of the conflicts of national interests and the situations in which they led to war. Instead, he formulated a philosophy of national power which glorified national expansion as an end in itself, a national duty and responsibility. At times, he became intoxicated with the mystique of power. The political goal of national expansion prevailed over the military goal of national security. He supported the acquisition of the Philippines by the United States, for example, on grounds of morality and duty without really considering what effects this might have on national security. Thirdly, Mahan went beyond warning of the inevitability of war to justifying it on moral and religious grounds. War was the instrument of the progressive improvement of mankind. "Power, force, is a faculty of national life; one of the talents com-

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mitted to nations by God." Finally, Mahan deviated from the orthodox military view in his attitude toward the blending of strategy and politics. "Aim to be yourselves statesmen as well as seamen," he advised naval officers, stressing the desirability of political knowledge and political action. Writing in 1911, he acknowledged the change in his own viewpoint on this subject from an earlier, more professional outlook:

I cannot too entirely repudiate any casual word of mine reflecting the tone which once was so traditional in the navy that it might be called professional, — that "political questions belong rather to the statesman than to the military man." I find these words in my old lectures, but I very soon learned better, from my best military friend, Jomini; and I believe that no printed book of mine endorses the opinion that external politics are of no professional concern to military men.³

In going beyond professionalism, Mahan became an excellent target for those within the officer corps who fell short of professionalism. Both the requirements of writing as a career and the content of what he was writing tended to separate him from the rest of the officer corps. In 1892, when his turn for sea duty came up, he attempted to avoid it by promising to retire after completing forty years of service in 1896 if he were permitted to remain on shore. He, in his own words, "by this time had decided that authorship had for me greater attractions than following up my profession, and promised a fuller and more successful old age." He would have retired immediately if that had been possible. Despite the efforts of Roosevelt and Lodge to keep him on shore, the naval bureaucracy was indifferent to his literary success — "It is not the business of a naval officer to write books," declared the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation — and Mahan was sent to sea. This thoroughly irked him.

I am enduring, not living [he wrote one friend]; and have the painful consciousness that I am expending much labor in doing what I have indifferently, while debarred from doing what I have shown particular capacity for. It is not a pleasant feeling — especially when accompanied with the knowledge that the headstrong folly of my youth started me in a profession which, to say the least, was not the one for which I have the best endowments . . . I have become exceedingly

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Both Mahan and Wood attempted to bridge the gap between the military and American society by riding the tide of temporary popular interest in military might and war. Mahan was the military officer become prophet of expansion in the first phase of Neo-Hamiltonianism in the 1890's; Wood was the military officer become prophet of preparedness in a second phase between 1908 and 1917. Mahan attempted to build a link between the Navy and the public, Wood between the Army and the public. Mahan justified expansion on nonmilitary moral, economic, and political grounds; Wood justified preparedness on nonmilitary moral, economic, and political grounds. Mahan's philosophy was a semi-military explanation of the relation of the United States to the rest of the world, Wood's theory a semi-military explanation of the relation of the armed services to the rest of the country. Each contributed to the development of professionalism in his own service, but was never at home there, and went on to become a political figure. The difference between Luce and Mahan and between Pershing and Wood were the measures of their distances from the professional ideal.

ALFRED THAYER MAHAN. Mahan was, of course, born into the main stream of the American military tradition. His father's military ideals, his early childhood at West Point, his contact with such figures as Lee and McClellan, even his name honoring the father of the Military Academy, all indicated a military career. At an early age he decided upon the Navy, graduating from Annapolis in 1859. During the Civil War and for twenty years afterward, he had a normal naval career, steadily moving up the ladder of rank and responsibility. As he himself subsequently stated, he was at this time merely the average officer "drifting on the lines of simple respectability" and very much the prisoner of his professional environment. Politically, he was a staunch anti-imperialist. In 1885, however, the turning point came when he was invited by Luce to join the Naval War College staff. During the following seven years at Newport, he embarked upon a career of thinking and writing which changed him from naval professional to naval philosopher.

This metamorphosis was largely the result of historical study and the impact upon his thinking of the events and currents of

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opinion of his day. Nonetheless, elements which propelled him in this direction were already present in his character and thought. He had never been completely satisfied with the professional military life. His interests, his thinking, and his morality went too deep to be completely absorbed within narrow professional confines. His father had warned him that he was more suited for a civilian than for a military career, and, subsequently, Mahan was to acknowledge the wisdom of this paternal insight. "I think myself now that he was right; for, though I have no cause to complain of unsuccess, I believe I should have done better elsewhere."² During his early cruises, he developed a deep interest in politics and read widely in international relations. This interest continued and grew right down to his going to the Naval War College. He was much discouraged with the inactivity and routine of the naval profession, and with the indifference it suffered from the American public. He was also extremely religious, his entire outlook colored by his orthodox Episcopalianism. Paternal influence, attendance at an Episcopalian school, and the influence of an uncle who was a minister, all contributed in this direction. At the Academy, and on his early cruises, he devoted much thought, reading, and worry to theological questions. Discontent with the naval profession, political interests, and religious concerns thus all forced Mahan to search for a wider frame of reference and endeavor. These he found in history and in public opinion. Just as his father represented the military technician who became a professional, Alfred Mahan represented the professional officer who became a political figure. In terms of the evolution of social types, the elder Mahan is separated from the younger by the professional generation of Luce, Sherman, and Upton.

The views Mahan expressed in his historical and popular writings from the publication of *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783* in 1890 to his death in 1914 were a typical Neo-Hamiltonian combination of military and nonmilitary elements. Mahan had a basically conservative outlook. The fundamental causes of war were to be found in the nature of man as a creature of passion and reason. Each nation pursued its interest, destiny, and ideals, and clashes between nations could not be avoided. Mahan was highly skeptical of the value of arbitration as

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trary to the optimistic doctrines of business pacifism, they held to the military view that war was far from obsolete. Also, like the military and unlike the liberals, the Neo-Hamiltonians argued that national policy must primarily reflect not abstract ideals but a realistic understanding of the national interest. This was the first responsibility of the statesmen. So long as nations exist, force is the ultimate arbiter. Consequently, nations must maintain adequate armaments to back up their national policies, the nature of national policy determining the size and nature of the forces required. The Neo-Hamiltonians shared with the military an essentially Clausewitzian view of the relations of policy and force. They supported the military in their efforts to build up the nation's defenses. They were more willing than most Americans to accept the military profession. Herbert Croly's *New Republic* in 1915 could pour a withering scorn at the liberal illusions of Bryan and Carnegie that a citizen army, springing to arms overnight, was sufficient for the nation's defense. Along with the military, the Neo-Hamiltonians rejected plutocracy and were bitter in their contempt for the prevailing commercialism, materialism, and the values inherent in an economically oriented way of life. They shared with the military a stress on loyalty, duty, responsibility, and subordination of the self to the requirements of the nation. Brooks Adams even went so far as to suggest openly that America would do well to substitute the values of West Point for the values of Wall Street.

Despite this wide agreement with the military ethic, there were, nonetheless, significant differences. Neo-Hamiltonianism was not completely divorced from the popular ideologies of the times. Many of its advocates, particularly Theodore Roosevelt, made an effort to rationalize the national interest in terms of universal moral values of justice and righteousness. The Neo-Hamiltonian interest in politics was much broader than the strictly military approach. Croly's international realism, manifested in *The Promise of American Life*, was part of a broad political philosophy which offered answers to the issues of domestic as well as foreign politics. More fundamental, perhaps, was the value which the Neo-Hamiltonians put on violence and force. In many respects the underlying moral values of the Neo-Hamiltonians were closer to those of aristocratic romanticism than they were to those of military professionalism.

The Neo-Hamiltonian Compromise

Peace was enervating and degrading. Man was born to struggle and triumph. Virility, adventure, the strenuous life, strife and combat — these were good in themselves. The militant version of Social Darwinism had a much greater influence on Neo-Hamiltonian ideas than it did on military thinking. Unlike the military, the Neo-Hamiltonians supported national expansion. The world was divided into vigorous nations asserting themselves, expanding their power and prestige, and weak, timid nations on the decline. The dividing line between these two groups was frequently given a racial basis, the virile Anglo-Saxon nations with the capacity for self-government opposed to the inferior peoples of the world. "The American nation," as Croly put it, "needs the tonic of a serious moral adventure." And he went on to complain that America had been too comfortable and too safe. No military man could ever agree with this analysis. And here was the root of the difference. For the military, the fundamental aim was national security. For the Neo-Hamiltonians, it was national assertion and national adventure.¹

MAHAN AND WOOD: THE TRAGEDY OF THE MILITARY PUBLICIST

The participation of Alfred Mahan and Leonard Wood in the articulation of Neo-Hamiltonian ideas was the first and only time in American history that professional military leaders contributed so directly to the outlook and activities of a political movement. Other military officers, before and since, have been prominent in political life. But they have usually been popular heroes identifying themselves with a civilian interest or movement. Their role has been passive and instrumental. The contribution of Mahan and Wood, on the other hand, was active, positive, and intellectual. They brought many elements of the military ethic to Neo-Hamiltonianism. Yet the influence was not simply in one direction. In espousing Neo-Hamiltonianism, Mahan and Wood had to make concessions to American opinion and become something less than military. Despite their popularity and influence, this was their tragedy: to be caught between two worlds. With one foot on the bedrock of military professionalism, and the other in the shifting sands of politics and opinion, they were unable to maintain a standing on either.

The Failure of the Neo-Hamiltonian Compromise, 1890-1920

THE NATURE OF NEO-HAMILTONIANISM

From roughly 1890 (the publication of *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783*) to 1920 (the rejection of Leonard Wood by the Republican National Convention), a group of statesmen and publicists and a school of thought existed in America which might be labeled Neo-Hamiltonian. The outstanding individuals in this group were Theodore Roosevelt, Henry Cabot Lodge, Elihu Root, Albert J. Beveridge, A. T. Mahan, Herbert Croly, Leonard Wood, Henry Adams, and Brooks Adams. The common bond among these diverse personalities was an outlook on politics which transcended the usual American categories. The Neo-Hamiltonians did not fall into the liberal tradition of Jefferson, Jackson, Spencer, and Wilson. Yet neither were they completely conservative, in the sense in which Calhoun was conservative. On economic issues, they bridged the gap from the reforming tendencies of Croly and the *New Republic* group to the staunch standpatism of Elihu Root. More significantly, the Neo-Hamiltonians also combined elements of military and civilian thinking. They were in fact the first important American social group whose political philosophy more or less consciously borrowed and incorporated elements of the professional military ethic.

The fundamental cause of Neo-Hamiltonianism in an age otherwise characterized by business pacifism was the shock of American involvement in world politics at the end of the nineteenth century. Neo-Hamiltonianism was essentially a positive reaction to the

The Neo-Hamiltonian Compromise

end of isolation and a favorable response to the opportunity to play power politics. It briefly captured the attention and support of the American people by its emphasis on power and the primacy of the national interest. Woodrow Wilson, however, dealt it a death blow by developing an alternative philosophy of international involvement which transcended national interest and which was more deeply rooted in the American liberal tradition. Neo-Hamiltonianism had a semi-conservative explanation of the role which America should play in world politics. Wilsonianism offered a completely liberal explanation. Given the overwhelming devotion of the American people to the values of liberalism, it was inevitable that the latter should displace the former. And when the Wilson program failed, the American people reacted in the 1920's, not by going back to Neo-Hamiltonian interventionism, but by abandoning intervention altogether and returning to liberal isolationism. Neo-Hamiltonianism never had a secure base in the continuing interests and outlook of any specific social or economic group. The political vehicle of the Neo-Hamiltonians was the Republican Party, and, when they finally lost control of that party to business elements, they were irremediably excluded from further political influence. The main current of American liberalism flowed majestically onward between 1890 and 1920. Neo-Hamiltonianism was a side eddy of a different hue, which at times diverted a substantial portion of the political water, but which was ultimately reabsorbed by the main channel.*

The civilian expressions of the Neo-Hamiltonian ethic — the writings and speeches of Theodore Roosevelt, the philosophizing of the Adamses, the policies of Elihu Root, the editorials of the pre-war *New Republic* — reveal a peculiar amalgam of liberal-conservative values. Neo-Hamiltonianism differed from liberalism and resembled the professional military viewpoint in its appreciation of the role of power in human affairs. Like the military and unlike the liberals, the Neo-Hamiltonians saw international politics as basically a struggle among independent nations with interests which not infrequently brought them into conflict with each other. Con-

* Neo-Hamiltonianism reemerged briefly in 1940 and 1941 when Grenville Clark, Stimson, Robert P. Patterson, Elihu Root, Jr., and others in the Roosevelt-Root-Wood tradition played a major role in stimulating American rearmament and in securing the passage of the Selective Service Act of 1940.