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Forty
years ago, I was the speech writer for the commandant of the Marine
Corps. One of my additional duties was to write speeches when a retired
commandant came on active duty to stand in for the current commandant
when he could not attend a big event. I would also be tapped as the
traveling aide for the former commandant.
One
day, I was escorting Gen. Leonard Chapman, who had been the 24th
commandant. On our flight to the speech site, I had the temerity to ask a
question. I had always been fascinated that -- unlike the other service
chiefs, each of whom had a variety of competing constituencies -- the
commandant of the Marine Corps had virtually unlimited power over the
Corps, matched only by the Pope of the Roman Catholic Church. I asked
him why he thought that had come about.
He gave it some thought for a moment.
"We
grew from an organization that was less than a regiment in size to the
nearly 200,000 Marines we have today [1983]," he said. "The commandant
has always been seen as a super-regimental commander. That has been a
strength, but it is also a potential weakness. If we ever get a truly
bad one, it could destroy the Corps."
It
has taken four decades, but his pessimistic prediction may have come
true. Gen. David Berger, who recently retired, may well be the
commandant who doomed the Corps.
There
have been several transformational commandants in the storied history
of the Marine Corps. Chapman would not claim to be one of them. However,
during the nadir of the Vietnam War, when the other services were
lowering standards to increase recruitment, Chapman doubled down.
Readers
of a certain age will remember Marine Corps recruiting slogans such as
"We never promised you a rose garden" and "Nobody likes to fight, but
somebody has to know how."
A
few years later, in the wake of a weak commandant, Medal of Honor
recipient Gen. Lou Wilson stopped by Hawaii during a swing through the
Pacific and reiterated Marine Corps values as the all-volunteer force
kicked in. I was a company commander at the time. Under pressure to
recruit and retain less-than-quality Marines, Wilson said, "We would
have a quality Corps if all that was left was him, the sergeant major,
and the flag and the Bible."
He and Chapman saw the Marine Corps through the worst of Vietnam and its post-war doldrums. They paved the way for the future.
Other
20th-century commandants recognized threats and opportunities facing
the Corps and acted decisively using that absolute power in a
transformational way. The first was Gen. John Lejeune.
Following
World War I, many critics of the Marine Corps claimed that it was
merely a second land army and was expendable, despite its exemplary
performance in combat. Lejeune pushed the Marine Corps toward a more
traditional naval mission in pursuit of amphibious operations in an
anticipated war with Japan. That vision paid great dividends in World
War II battles such as Guadalcanal, Tarawa and Iwo Jima.
During
the period of military angst following Vietnam, there was much
hand-wringing about the military being too unimaginative to fight
outnumbered against the forces that the Soviet Union could bring to bear
against the U.S. and NATO. Over the objections of the sitting
commandant, Navy Secretary James Webb selected Al Gray as the next
person to head the Corps.
Gray
wasted no time in imprinting his vision of maneuver warfare on the
service as a doctrine for fighting outnumbered and winning. He also
created the concept of turning the forward-deployed Marine Corps
Amphibious units into Marine Expeditionary Units Special Operations
Capable, or MEU (SOC), to deal with the growing terrorist threats and
other operations short of war worldwide. That vision proved its worth in
real war during Operation Desert Storm, as well as evacuation
operations of American citizens in Somalia and humanitarian operations
in Bangladesh and the Philippines.
By
the mid-1990s, other threats arose, requiring new ways of thinking and
the potential use of innovative technologies. When he became commandant,
Gen. Charles Krulak expanded the small Marine Corps Experimental Unit
into the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab, which examined emerging threats
such as urban warfare, as well as nuclear, chemical and biological (NBC)
weapons. Believing basic training not to be challenging enough, he
instituted a capstone recruit training event -- "the Crucible" -- that
recruits had to survive to earn their Eagle, Globe and Anchor insignia.
That foresight paid off in places like Fallujah, Ramadi and Helmand
province in Afghanistan.
Change
can be disruptive, and most transformational commandants were followed
by successors who institutionalized the reforms while keeping the ship
on a steady course. Commandants such as Robert Barrow, Carl Mundy and
James Conway kept the organization advancing while resisting attempts by
civilian administrations to force the Marine Corps to adopt trendy
progressive reforms like decriminalizing drug use; they believed that
the combat readiness of the Corps would be degraded by such notions.
Having
a strong commandant at the helm proved to be critical in the superb
performance of Marines in wartime operations as well as peacetime
emergencies. No matter how large or small the mission, the Marine Corps
was ready.
It
should be noted that the transformational commandants did not divest
the service of existing capabilities. In the case of Lejeune, Gray and
Krulak, the new mission and capabilities were additive; many came by
spending other people's money.
Unfortunately,
Chapman's fear of a misguided commandant came to pass with the
elevation of Berger in 2019. For whatever reason, Berger believed that
the Marine Corps needed radical change. He resurrected the fear of the
Corps being seen as a second land army in the wake of Iraq and
Afghanistan and directed a change to concentrating on deterring or
fighting a naval war with China called Force Design 2030 (FD 2030).
To
buy the anti-ship missiles needed to fight this war -- which probably
won't happen -- Berger divested many of the capabilities that had
allowed the service to contribute to big wars while still serving
critical roles in pop-up crises that have traditionally made the Marine
Corps useful to the nation. This came to a head when Berger had to admit
to top military leadership that the Marine Corps could not respond to
an evacuation mission in Sudan and a disaster relief crisis in Turkey.
For the first time in its storied history, the Marine Corps had to say,
"Sorry, we can't do the mission."
The
transformational commandants of the last century used war gaming and
field experimentation to test their new concepts. In the case of the
development of amphibious operations, literally hundreds of war games
were conducted at the Naval War College, combined with several
force-on-force fleet exercises. Bad ideas were discarded, and good ones
tested. The same was true of Gray's development of maneuver warfare and
Krulak's urban projects.
Berger's
efforts are opaque because the few war games he sponsored were
classified. One major field experiment was conducted, and the scenario has been criticized as
being biased to favor the defending FD 2030 team. There is no public
data to intellectually justify the billions in divestment of
capabilities to buy the new toys Berger wanted.
At
the present time, the Marine Corps does not have a confirmed
commandant. Berger's anointed successor is pending congressional
confirmation, which is held up over a non-military matter. If, and when,
he is finally confirmed, the new commandant will have to be his own
man, able to reevaluate the damage to the Corps done by his predecessor.
Even if he decides to reverse course, it will take at least a decade to
repair the Berger legacy. A strong commandant system works, but only if
the person selected is wise, not delusional.
--
Gary Anderson retired as chief of staff of the Marine Corps Warfighting
Lab. He lectures on War Gaming and Alternative Analysis at the George
Washington University's Elliott School of International Affairs.