U.S.-Iran Prisoner Deal Signals Possible Path to New Nuclear Deal - Israel News - Haaretz.com
In a hotel in Doha, Qatar's capital, Qatari diplomats were running back and forth between the Iranian and American delegations on Saturday trying to tie up the loose and detailed ends of a prisoner swap. This time too, as in meetings held over the nuclear issue, the rival delegations do not meet face to face, at the instruction of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
Last Thursday there was confirmation that Iran had released four American prisonerswho have been held for years in Evin prison near Tehran, placing them under house arrest (a fifth civilian had been put under house arrest earlier). This is just a preamble to the prelude of a deal which in itself may be part of a broader move that could generate a formal agreement or understandings on the nuclear issue.
In exchange for the release of the Americans, the U.S. will release five Iranian civilians imprisoned in the U.S., in addition to allowing Iran to use $10 billion of its own money that is invested in South Korean and Iraqi banks. This is not a negligible amount, comprising 60 percent of Iran’s current deficit, but it cannot be used as Iran sees fit. The path of transferring this money is complex and convoluted, and required separate negotiations that took place with the participation of Oman, Britain and Switzerland, in addition to Qatar.
The talks almost collapsed on several occasions. Six billion dollars have already moved from South Korea to a Swiss bank, deposited into a special account. The remaining $4 billion will move from Iraq to a bank in Qatar. From Switzerland, the money will go to a bank in Qatar, with the account monitored by the U.S. Treasury and the funds used exclusively for the purchase of basic products for humanitarian purposes. Only after the money is deposited in a special account in Qatar will Iran release the American prisoners, who will then be allowed to go home.
In contrast to regular money transfers, the Iranian money was held in South Korea in local currency. Iran demanded that it be converted into dollars or euros. However, this would have entailed moving the money through international clearing houses, which are obliged to abide by sanctions against Iran. There was therefore a need to find alternative ways of transferring the money in small amounts, a move which could take between 30 to 45 days, unless an expedited route is found. The U.S. Treasury is now searching for such an option.
Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei speaks during a meeting with group of clerics and religious missionaries in Tehran, Iran July 12, 2023.Credit: via REUTERS
Washington is careful to emphasize that this is not a removal of sanctions on Iran, and that the prisoner exchange is not part of an agreement on Iran’s nuclear program. President Joe Biden’s spokespeople explained that the release of American citizens is a humanitarian issue that has engaged the president ever since he assumed office.
However, not coincidentally, on Friday, one day after the prisoner swap was announced, the Wall Street Journal reported that Iran had decided to lower the quantity of enriched uranium it possesses and dilute some of the uranium already enriched back to 60 percent, while slowing the enrichment process.
There is no dispute that if this is accurate (it has not been denied yet), it could point to an Iranian willingness to advance a wider strategic move with the United States and other Western states, after almost a year of frozen negotiations over the nuclear accord.
For now, this is only a declaration of intent, at best. This does not reduce the number of centrifuges Iran is operating, in gross violation of the original accord. It sets an enrichment level of 60 percent which essentially exceeds the limits imposed on it when the accord was signed, with no commitment to a time limit on this relatively high level of enrichment.
More importantly, Iran is not yet abiding by all its commitments to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on invasive monitoring of its nuclear installations, even though it committed to doing so after the IAEA decided to suspend its investigation of two sites where enriched uranium residues had been found.
A file handout picture released by Iran's Atomic Energy Organization from 2019, shows the atomic enrichment facilities Natanz nuclear research center, some 300 kilometers south of capital Tehran.Credit: HO / Atomic Energy Organization
The lowered level of uranium enrichment as a unilateral Iranian move, not as part of an agreement, highlights the difficulty embedded in terms such as “informal agreements” and “partial agreements,” which do not guarantee the implementation of the rigid and comprehensive conditions included in the original accord, despite its flaws. Iran has systematically demonstrated its opposition to a partial agreement, since this will mean only a partial removal of sanctions; Iran wishes to have all sanctions removed.
But even if Iran decides to move toward a comprehensive deal, based on drafts composed last year that were considered the basis for an agreement, it is worried about finding itself in a situation where the new deal is not ratified by Congress or is broken by an administration headed by, say, Donald Trump or his like.
Iran is aware that Biden cannot guarantee that another administration will abide by the agreement, and has tried several times to obtain solid European guarantees in case the U.S. again withdraws from the deal, but to no avail. European governments did promise Iran that they would fulfill their commitments, but European companies and businesses are not controlled by governments and are worried about sanctions an American administration could impose on them if it opposes the deal.
The working assumption is that the prisoner exchange is not a one-off and is meant to constitute a confidence-building measure ahead of a broader agreement. The motivation driving Iran to negotiate over a new accord was only bolstered given the dire straits it finds itself in, with the serious failing of the Ebrahim Raisi government.
Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian meets with Saudi Arabia's Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud in Beijing, China, in April.Credit: WANA NEWS AGENCY/ REUTERS
The clock marking an election in two years has also started to tick, although past experience shows that the pressure of an election hasn’t really helped in speeding up negotiations on a nuclear deal. Talks about the first accord began in earnest only after the election of President Hassan Rohani, and negotiations over the second accord were stuck before an election, resuming only three months after Raisi’s election. It seems that elections in the U.S. will dictate Iran’s pace more than political developments in Iran.
At the same time, Iran is striving to implement its grandiose cooperation deal with China, by which China will invest $400 billion in Iran over the next 25 years. Iran also wishes to make economic gains by exploiting its renewed relations with Saudi Arabia and expanding trade with the United Arab Emirates. However, the realization of these agreements depends on the quick lifting of sanctions on Iran.
Iran officially joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organization last month, and submitted a request to join the BRICS group, which links China, India and Russia, among other countries. Iran could take pride in belonging to these prestigious groups, but will see no practical benefits from belonging to them as long as it cannot freely trade with these countries and invite investors to rehabilitate its economy.