With Ukraine’s counteroffensive all but halted,
the time has come for Washington to push for peace—particularly given
that Russia might launch a new offensive in 2024.
With
Ukraine’s counteroffensive all but halted, the time has come for
Washington to push for peace—particularly given that Russia might launch
a new offensive in 2024.
Ukraine’s
much-anticipated summer counteroffensive has all but ground to a halt.
The dozen new brigades trained by NATO have sustained huge casualties
without ever reaching the first line of fixed Russian defenses in
strength. Russian forces, fighting a textbook implementation of Soviet
maneuver defense, frequently enjoy air superiority and are augmented by
increasing numbers of cheap and effective weapon systems such as the Lancet drone. Every passing day draws closer to autumn and the dreaded rasputista—the
rain and mud season that impedes maneuver warfare. By all accounts, the
Ukrainian counteroffensive is on the clock and unlikely to achieve its
major objectives.
Western
arms deliveries offer little relief. Most of the pledged main battle
tanks are already in the theater, and there is limited prospect for
further deliveries. Reaching for antiques like the German Leopard 1,
first introduced in 1965, won’t be a gamechanger. The “fighter jet coalition” has pledged F-16s, but it’s unclear when and where these will be deployed. In any case, they would be outmatched against
an increasingly active and confident Russian Air Force and Russia’s
formidable integrated air defense. Stocks of precision weapons are
shrinking, which clearly plays a role in the Biden administration’s refusal to provide ATACMS missiles, vital for American security in the Pacific.
Given this grim outlook, is a “Korea Scenario” the
most likely outcome? This means that by the time the Ukrainian
counteroffensive culminates sometime in late August or early September,
the conflict freezes at territorial borders roughly corresponding to the
frontline. In effect, Ukraine trades significant parts of the four
regions annexed by Russia in 2022 for robust Western (American) security
guarantees.
This
certainly wouldn’t be the worst outcome from an American perspective.
Washington would be able to gradually defuse tensions with Moscow and
reestablish a dialogue on the future trajectory of the European security
architecture. Crucially, the United States will finally be able to
focus once again on the Pacific. Ultimately, China is the true peer
rival to the United States, and has been playing an aggressive
diplomatic game in degrading American influence since 2022, in no small
part due to the imposition of harsh sanctions on Russia.
The
problem with the “Korea Scenario,” however, is that it assumes that the
Russian leadership is desperate for a ceasefire and negotiations. There
is scant evidence of this. Not only have the Russians fought the
Ukrainians to a standstill in the south, but they launched their own offensive in the north, aimed at capturing the full extent of the Luhansk region, where Russian troops are steadily advancing. Russian society and the economy remain relatively stable,
suggesting Prigozhin’s mutiny was indeed an aberration—and his
criticism of the war always was that it wasn’t fought hard enough.
In
fact, the Kremlin might be eager for victory, rather than desperate for
negotiations. Andrey Gurulev, former commander of the Central Military
District and currently a nationalist Duma deputy, stated that
Russia’s rapidly expanding military production was sufficient for the
needs of the “special military operation” and the 150,000 new contract
soldiers that joined the military since, but that production can be
scaled to the needs of a new partial mobilization. Andrey Kartapolov,
former commander of the Western Military District and chair of the
defense committee in the Duma, made illuminating statements during the
parliamentary procedure that increased the conscription age to thirty. Noting that this would increase the pool of trained reserves that could be mobilized, he argued that
this amendment to the 1997 law is written for “a big war” and “general
mobilization” which while not necessary in the immediate, would be
fundamental for the future. Critically, an additional amendment
introduces a travel ban, coming into force in October, on anyone whose
name appears on the register of both conscripts and reservists. This
gives Russian authorities a legal mechanism to prevent an exodus like
that of October 2022, where up to 600,000 Russian men fled the country.
The
Russian leadership has repeatedly stated that the goals of the special
military operation have not changed and will be achieved by military
means. Moscow views the partition of Ukraine as a key objective,
including Odessa—oft-referenced by Vladimir Putin—but also the rest of
the Black Sea coast and potentially all the territory east of the
Dnieper. Is it possible that the Kremlin is contemplating a second
partial mobilization?
Victories
in the Kharkiv and Kherson regions late last year are what gave Ukraine
sufficient political capital to request vastly expanded military
assistance from the West. But this mechanism works both ways. The
failure of the Ukrainian counteroffensive will grant Putin a significant
boost in domestic legitimacy and political capital. Russian nationalist
spaces note the
similarities between Ukraine’s telegraphed offensive in Zaporizhzhia
and the 1943 battle of Kursk, and smugly note that German failure in
Kursk was followed by massive Soviet offensives (and victories) in Operation Bagration.
Putin
could decide to roll the iron dice and spend his domestic political
capital on a second round of partial mobilization in October. Putting
these men on an accelerated half-year training schedule means that the
Russian military enters the 2024 spring campaign season with upwards of
an additional 300,000 fresh troops, while Ukrainian forces are gradually
attritted during the winter by Russian firepower.
The
Russian dash to Kiev in 2022 largely failed due to an over-emphasis on
mechanized forces over the infantry. A Russian military that enters
spring 2024 after two rounds of mobilization will no longer face this
constraint. Achieving sufficient mass over an exhausted Ukrainian
adversary means the possibility of breakthroughs and the return of
maneuver warfare. If Russian forces can drive deep into Ukrainian
territory and capture the regions Moscow has identified as its
objectives, then the war ends in a significant Russian victory, and
crucially one reached by force of arms alone, not a peace settlement
mediated by the United States.
A
Russian victory on these terms is a significant setback for the United
States. The reputational damage to American competence and the NATO
alliance would be colossal, as the best of NATO hardware and training
has already gone into the Ukrainian military, and Russia would be able
to make the claim that it stood alone against the West—and won. The
Sino-Russian relationship would also strengthen. Finally, the cheap and
effective weapons Russia uses to win the war, such as the Lancet, will
flow to every regime opposed to American leadership around the world.
Therefore,
it is imperative that the idea of a peace settlement amenable to all
parties in the conflict—including Russia—takes hold and is seriously
pursued in Washington. Influential American figures are already engaged in
Track 1.5 diplomacy with their counterparts in Russia. These efforts
should be encouraged, expanded, and form the basis for sustained
engagement in peace negotiations. Only then will the United States be
able to focus entirely on containing China, which is of paramount
importance to American security and prosperity.
Dr.
Alex Burilkov is a researcher focusing on Russia and the post-Soviet
space at the Centre for the Study of Democracy at the Leuphana
University of Lüneburg in Germany. Alex obtained his Ph.D. on the
maritime strategy of emerging powers from the University of Hamburg.
Wesley
Satterwhite is a U.S. Department of State consultant and a military
intelligence officer in the U.S. Army Reserves. He holds a master’s in
security studies from Georgetown University and a bachelor’s in
diplomacy and international Relations from Seton Hall University. The
views expressed are his own and do not necessarily represent the views
of any U.S. government entity.