Regime propagandists like Nashat al-Daihi routinely accuse Sisi's
critics of being on the Muslim Brotherhood's payroll [photo credit:
Egypt TV]
Indeed, one only needs to look at the nature of the ruling coalition
and the state of the opposition regime to discern its resilience, at
least in the medium term. In terms of the ruling coalition, the military
has spread its tentacles to dominate the state apparatus and the
judiciary, creating a ruling coalition that is controlled by the
military establishment with junior partners being other domestic
security services, some members of the judiciary and senior technocrats.
Notably missing is a broad-based civilian political party that could
act as a balance to the military, giving the regime room to evolve and
reform under external pressure. Indeed, even though the Sisi regime has coopted members of the NDP, Hosni Mubarak's old ruling party, into the new party Mostaqbal Watan,
there is no evidence that the party has any direct influence on policy
nor does it occupy significant government posts or any governorships
despite the fact it is the majority
party in Parliament. The lack of a ruling civilian party means that
there is no avenue for big business interests, some of whom have
suffered from the deepening crisis, to apply pressure on the military to
reform either the political system or the model of militarised state
capitalism which is at the heart of the crisis. It also means that the
levers of the state remain firmly in the hands of the military with no
civilian contender from within the regime able to emerge to challenge
its grip on power. Indeed, the military is by far the most powerful
political actor in the country and has continued to press forward with
the militarisation of other organs of the state. The latest bizarre
example of this phenomenon is the involvement of the military college in
the training of public servants with an obligatory 6 month training
course being a prerequisite for appointment to government jobs, a clear
case of ideological indoctrination and vetting of possible dissidents.
Of course the other avenue of change would be the opposition which
could, potentially, apply popular pressure on the regime to reform or
directly challenge Sisi through popular mobilisation. This, however,
seems a remote prospect. Decimated by years of siege and mass repression
the opposition is far from being able to challenge or even pressure
Sisi. This became apparent in the National Dialogue, a process announced
in 2022 in an attempt to navigate the worsening economic crisis and the
possible popular anger that might erupt. Repression has not eased since
the declaration of the start of the dialogue in April 2022, with the numbers
of those arrested in 2022 reaching 6,515 cases, more than the 2021
figure which tallied at 6,232 cases. Those that were released reached
1360 cases, less than the 2021 figure of 1,616 cases. (These numbers are
the ones that could be documented, the real figures of those arrested
are probably much higher).
There were reports that Sisi was not pleased with the progress with
the dialogue. Keeping true to the regime vision of politics, the
president seems to have hoped
that the dialogue would provide technocratic solutions to Egypt’s
deepening crisis with limited reference to human rights and democracy.
The dialogue has yet to yield any substantial results on the economic
crisis, to say nothing of the easing of repression, or a liberalisation
of the political system. The weakness of the opposition does not only
mean that it is unable to apply pressure on the regime but it also means
that it is ill-suited to take advantage of a popular protests if it
occurs. Notably as well, the Muslim Brotherhood remains designated as a
terror group and not included in the National Dialogue, another structural hurdle that continues to weaken the opposition.
In essence, the prospect that the economic crisis is sufficient to
dislodge the regime is a clear case of wishful thinking. Indeed, even if
the popularity of the regime suffers, (which it seems to have, based on
the recent results of the journalist and engineering syndicate
elections which saw them slip outside of the regime's control), it is
not sufficient to shake Sisi's iron grip. There is a clear lack of
organised political actors, with a broad base of support, that can
mobilize growing anger over the economic crisis. This, however, does not
mean that the regime’s long term future is secured. On the contrary,
the regime decision completely to close the public space and relegate
all civilian forces to the sidelines has placed it under considerable
strain and has left it with limited tools to deal with popular unrest
through co-option or demobilisation. This will likely lead to an
emergence of new forms of opposition whose demands will be far more
radical than the opposition of 2011 and that the regime will be
ill-equipped to deal with.