Libyan prime minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh and Turkish President Recep
Tayyip Erdoğan at a press conference in Ankara, Turkey, April 12, 2021
[photo credit: Office of the President of Turkey]
Coincidentally, a month later a joint venture between Greece’s
largest oil refiner HelleniQ Energy and Exxon Mobil that had been forged
in July 2022 announced it would begin seismic surveys off Crete’s southern coast. Whilst for Greece this is about more
than its rivalry with Türkiye, Crete represents a focal point of the
eastern Mediterranean crisis and the clash of perspectives between
Greece and Türkiye over how to delineate maritime boundaries. The
potential for significant gas reserves between southwestern Crete and
eastern Libya makes this an incendiary issue.
Following October’s MoU, European diplomats were incensed and quietly
briefed that Turkish vessels near Crete could result in European
warships being dispatched as previously
occurred near Cyprus. While Greece hopes that the partnership with
Exxon will buy it American protection should Greek vessels start
drifting into the waters Libya and Türkiye claims, Türkiye is likely to
respond similarly. Just to further complicate matters, Egypt is also
inserting itself into this contentious yet potentially profitable patch
of water. In December, Egypt unilaterally declared its western maritime
borders, cleverly not infringing on Türkiye’s continental shelf while leaning into Libyan claimed waters southwest of Crete. This may have drawn the ire of Libyans, but ultimately inserts an Egyptian claim that gives them a role in whatever dispute or resolution will come.
This bubbling situation is likely to come to a head this year. Not only are the Exxon-HelleniQ survey results due,
but with Turkish elections announced for May and Erdoğan relying on
international drama to bolster his standing at home the situation is
volatile. Moreover, east Med politics are now driving further discord in
Libyan politics. Egyptian and Greek refusal to recognise the GNU has
created an incentive to try and form a new Libyan government that could
sign its own MoU with Athens to legally supplant the Türkiye-GNU
accords. However, with Haftar ally Fathi Bashagha failing to legitimise
himself, and Cairo’s talks for a new government stalling this is now
likely only to happen should east Libya announce a formal re-division
from Tripoli with its own set of institutions and governance system in
the east, as happened following the 2014 civil war (something Haftar has
also threatened to do.) On the other side, with the Turkish parliament recently ratifying the MoU and Italy penning a US$8 billion gas deal
new energy-based inertia is forming under the GNU which will make any
push for elections harder. Libya’s judiciary (increasingly co-opted by
Benghazi-based Aguileh Saleh in 2022) have tried to nullify the MoU, a decision being ignored
by Tripoli's GNU. However, with the new status quo settling, it could
be the disagreement over the MoU which sparks a return to re-division.
With hopes for progress on any political process now harder, and
foreign actors lining up behind the different camps the situation is
eerily reminiscent of the era preceding Haftar’s war on Tripoli – just
with more at stake for all parties this time around. With tensions high,
any play for the gas, even if just performative could trigger a cascade
of retaliations which sparks renewed conflict in Libya or the
Mediterranean itself.