5 Ways Biden Can Thread the Needle With Israel’s New CoalitionBy Aaron Miller & Daniel Kurtzer - February 1, 2023
U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken has returned from the Middle East with few tangible results in his diplomatic pouch.
With
his visit coming just after several days of violence between Israelis
and Palestinians—including an Israeli military raid in the West Bank
city of Jenin that killed nine Palestinians, some of whom the Israel
Defense Forces said were Palestine Islamic Jihad members implicated in
past terrorist attacks, as well as a shooting outside an East Jerusalem
synagogue by a Palestinian that killed seven Israelis—there wasn’t much
hope, let alone expectation, of progress.
At a minimum, progress
would have meant getting both Israeli and Palestinian leaders to take
concrete steps to de-escalate and work together to prevent terrorism and
violence in the future. Through no fault of Blinken’s, this could never
have been achieved.
Blinken’s public remarks made clear that he
had raised concerns with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu about
his government’s proposed judicial reforms that, according to many
jurists, would impinge on Israel’s democratic system. Blinken advised
reaching a national consensus before undertaking partisan change.
There
wasn’t much to show, however, on efforts to contain the violence and
rebuild trust between Israelis and Palestinians. The Palestinian
Authority has suspended security cooperation with Israel in the West
Bank, leaving everything in the hands of the Israeli army. Meanwhile,
the Israeli cabinet proposed measures on Sunday to retaliate for the
Jerusalem terrorist attack, but it is hard to see how the policies,
which include destroying the homes of terrorists’ families or deporting
them, will help deter future attacks; there’s scant evidence that it has
worked when carried out in the past.
Coming almost immediately
on the heels of a flurry of back-and-forth U.S. and Israeli
trips—Israeli Strategic Affairs Minister Ron Dermer to Washington and
U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan and CIA Director William
Burns to Israel and the West Bank—it was clear well before Blinken
arrived that his visit would be part of a broader piece, with particular
focus on Iran. Never before had a U.S. administration engaged with a
new Israeli government as early, as often, and at this high a level.
Clearly,
that engagement reflected the Biden administration’s real concern about
the new right-wing government’s direction and offered an opportunity to
lay down some markers, especially on issues related to Israeli policies
toward Palestinians and on the judicial reforms that might erode Israel
democracy. At the same time, judging by the tone and tenor of the
Blinken visit, the Biden administration has clearly decided to embrace
the new Israeli coalition publicly and not confront it. We wouldn’t be
surprised if an early Netanyahu visit to Washington is in the offing.
The
administration surely is aware of the risk that this flurry of
high-level visits will be perceived as legitimizing the most extreme
government in Israel’s history. But Joe Biden—a preternaturally
pro-Israel U.S. president whose initial instincts were never to confront
Israel but to work with it—seems willing to take that risk. Biden has
other priorities, not to mention his likely decision and announcement to
seek a second term. Fighting with Israel is risky business, especially
in light of a Republican Party that has set itself up as Israel’s sole
stalwart friend. Biden might be persuaded to get tough with Israel and
the Palestinians if there were realistic chances of achieving a
breakthrough that would make a fight worthwhile. But there simply
aren’t.
There are no easy choices for an administration facing
this Israeli government. Here are five suggestions the Biden
administration could follow to have any chance of successfully
navigating what’s likely to be a very fraught road ahead.
1) Hang
it on the prime minister. Netanyahu has said repeatedly he can control
the more radical impulses and actions of his ministers, and the Biden
administration ought to hold him to that commitment. Palestinian
terrorism and the predisposition of some of Netanyahu’s ministers to use
the violence to advance their narrow political agenda in the occupied
territories present Netanyahu with a test that will be difficult to
pass. The decisions made by the Israeli cabinet on Sunday indicate how
difficult it will be for Netanyahu to rein in the radicals.
Netanyahu
crafted this coalition to meet his immediate need to defer, nullify,
and escape prosecution in his ongoing corruption trial. He is now
saddled with it and needs to manage the coalition’s worst impulses,
including by maintaining the status quo at Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount,
not gutting Israel’s Supreme Court, and avoiding a full-blown conflict
with Palestinians in the occupied territories. Indeed, a functional
U.S.-Israeli relationship depends on it. As Blinken emphasized
throughout his visit, this relationship depends on a confluence of both
values and interests.
2) Make the relationship more
transactional. Netanyahu looks after Israel’s interests first, and so
should the Biden administration tend to the United States’. Allies trust
one another and do for one another. There’s reciprocity, not just
free-riding.
Israel wants U.S. help in normalizing relations with
Saudi Arabia (an interest the Biden administration shares) and in
toughening up an approach toward Iran. And the Biden administration
wants any number of things from Netanyahu, including a tougher Israeli
policy against Russia’s war in Ukraine. Israel is the only democracy in
the Middle East, the United States’ closest ally there, and the only
country in the region whose history is linked to genocide. It’s not
unreasonable for the United States to expect more when it comes to
Russia’s brutal invasion.
Biden isn’t pressing Israel on a
two-state solution—but he does want Netanyahu’s government to avoid
taking actions that could make the situation in the West Bank far worse
than it already is. The United States also has its own set of problems
to resolve with the Saudis; Israel can exacerbate both the U.S.-Saudi
relationship and its own future relations with the kingdom if it
continues to take provocative actions toward the Palestinians.
At
this point, though, it’s hard to see the Biden administration
explicitly laying out precise quid pro quos and trade-offs to Netanyahu
(e.g., if you ratchet up pressure on the Palestinians, we’re not going
to work with you to maintain and broaden the Abraham Accords), largely
because there’s no guarantee countries such as the United Arab Emirates
would play along. And Netanyahu would likely reject that approach. Nor
is it politically viable with the U.S. Congress. Israel has yet to
respond definitively to the U.S. request to supply vintage Hawk missiles
to Ukraine. And given Israel’s refusal to supply military assistance to
Ukraine, the answer is most likely to be no.
3) Make Iran the
priority. As volatile as the Palestinian situation may be, Iran’s
nuclear program is the only issue that might trigger a wider regional
confrontation, replete with rising oil prices and falling financial
markets.
The Biden administration and Israel still disagree over
the virtues and drawbacks of reviving the Iran nuclear deal, officially
called the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, but they do not disagree
about the danger that Iran poses in the region, whether through its
drive toward becoming a nuclear threshold state or its aggressive
behavior in Yemen, Syria, and elsewhere.
Iran’s brutal efforts to
suppress its current domestic protests and Tehran’s support for
Russia’s war in Ukraine have made the prospects of a renewed nuclear
agreement unlikely, which should reduce some of the tensions with
Netanyahu (unless, by some miracle, a renewed diplomatic opportunity
with Iran arises on the nuclear issue). And major tensions could arise
if Israel makes an assessment that it must use military force to respond
to Iran’s ramped-up nuclear program and the United States disagrees.
But
diplomacy, containment, and smart, demonstrable deterrence—certainly
including but not limited to a credible military option—will be the key
to dealing with Iran in the period ahead. That will require close and
nuanced diplomatic and security cooperation and coordination between
Israel and the United States. The recently concluded joint military
exercise involving thousands of U.S. and Israeli forces in the
Mediterranean Sea was clearly intended to send a signal to Iran of
combined U.S. and Israeli resolve, and it won’t be the last of such
coordinated initiatives in the months ahead.
4) Sharpen the
almost nonexistent current focus on the Palestinian issue. Even if the
prospects for serious progress on the Palestinian issue are almost
nonexistent now, the Biden administration must continue to press both
the Netanyahu government and the Palestinian Authority to prevent
further deterioration on the ground. White House and State Department
words and hand-wringing are not enough.
The raid in Jenin and the
terrorist attack that followed showcased two long-standing truths in
the Israeli-Palestinian drama. Some Palestinian groups, including Hamas,
Palestine Islamic Jihad, and some within Fatah, remain intent on
violent resistance. The Palestinian leaders lack a political strategy
for advancing toward their stated goal of self-determination and
statehood. The terrorism and violence inflict pain and suffering but do
not move the dial closer to a resolution of the underlying conflict.
Indeed, even the most serious outbreaks of violence and war are followed
by a return to the status quo ante, or worse, with nothing having been
accomplished.
For its part, Israel has pursued a
counterinsurgency strategy for decades designed to disrupt Palestinian
terrorist operations and inflict pain on the Palestinians as a means of
trying to end the terrorism, but it, too, has no political goal. At
best, Israel can make costs to Palestinians very high for engaging in
terrorism, but as long as Palestinians see no political avenue out of
the occupation, they appear willing to absorb those costs. For Israel,
this has meant short periods of calm interspersed with short periods of
terrorism and violence. It’s a strategic cul-de-sac with no way out.
The
Biden administration must continue to press Palestinian President
Mahmoud Abbas to resume security cooperation with Israel and to do more
to preempt terrorism and violence in the West Bank. Abbas must also
develop a diplomatic approach that responds to past Israeli and U.S.
diplomatic initiatives. And he must invigorate Palestinian politics by
calling elections for parliament and the presidency so that the
Palestinian public can make clear its choice: a process of peacemaking
or continued terrorism and violence under the slogan of resistance. The
half a billion dollars the United States has provided to Palestinians
since April 2021 provides some leverage in these discussions; more
significant U.S. leverage would be a commitment to revive serious U.S.
diplomacy in peacemaking, something that has been absent since at least
2014.
As for Israel, even as it takes security steps to protect
its population, it must also take steps to shore up the Palestinian
Authority. This includes pushing aside efforts to speed up or legalize
creeping annexation; improving economic living conditions on the ground;
ending rampant settlement activity, including the legalization of
outposts that are illegal under current Israeli law; and avoiding
actions that seek to permanently bind the West Bank to Israel. Even if
the question of using aid as leverage with Israel is off the table—it
simply will not fly in Washington, where Israel has become a domestic
political football—the United States carries enough weight to persuade
Israel to pay attention when it sees seriousness and determination on
the part of the most senior U.S. officials.
5) Make it clear that
the United States will stay out of Israeli politics—but Israel must
stay out of U.S. politics, too. Israel needs to understand that the
bilateral relationship thrives when U.S. policy toward Israel enjoys
bipartisan support in Washington. It may be tempting for Israel to game
U.S. politics and decide to throw its weight behind the Republicans, as
Netanyahu has done previously, especially as the 2024 U.S. presidential
campaign begins this year to shift into high gear.
But Israel
needs to be reminded that the United States has one president at a time
and that blatant interference of the kind that Netanyahu engaged in on
Iran during the Obama administration will be called out as an unfriendly
act with consequences for the personal relationship between the U.S.
president and Israeli prime minister.
The new Israeli government
presents the Biden administration with some very unpalatable and
inconvenient choices. It is a democratically elected extremist coalition
led by a very skillful and willful prime minister whose primary goal
isn’t stopping Iran from getting a bomb or normalizing relations with
Saudi Arabia but finding a way to escape his ongoing corruption trial.
For
that, he needs the cooperation of his coalition partners. He may be
able to control some of what they want, but because they have leverage
over him, Netanyahu can’t block everything. This virtually ensures
rising tensions with the United States, unless of course some deus ex
machina intrudes, such as war with Iran, a third intifada, or the
collapse of the government and its replacement by a more centrist
coalition.
But more likely, if the worst of the right-wing
extremists’ agenda comes to pass, the Biden administration and Netanyahu
will enter a bad patch far worse than the Obama years. And Biden—with
no choice but to push back—may well find himself in the middle of a
nasty fight that he doesn’t want or need.