Business Times
The art of foreign policy ‘muddling through’ in the US
From the Atlantic to the Pacific, President Biden has a playing-by-ear-as-you-go modus operandi that has worked
Leon Hadar
EACH time President Joe Biden makes an important foreign policy move, like last week’s announcement that the US was increasing its military presence in the Philippines and gaining access to four more sites there, or the recent decision to send Ukraine a battalion of 31 M1 Abrams tanks, the tendency among pundits is to deconstruct the president’s action and try to discover the “logic” or “meaning” behind it.
The conventional wisdom is that this kind of decision was a direct result of efforts to promote a “grand strategy” and that it reflects the president’s foreign policy “doctrine” and that therefore it “makes sense”.
This approach to analysing foreign policy decisions applies to them an “intelligent design” model.
President Biden didn’t just wake up one morning and decided to strengthen military ties with the Philippines or provide Ukraine with the military resources it needs in order to stand up to Russia. It’s all part of a grand strategy.
But in reality, much of what happens in the foreign policy arena under US presidents, including important decisions, amount to ad hoc responses to outside events at home and abroad, that sometimes run contrary to the White House occupant’s earlier statements and policies.
They are often driven by personal and political considerations, and may lack a coherent design.
They are in essence reactive and not deliberative, and involve what political scientists refer to as “muddling through”, an evolutionary process that could result in outcomes that no one planned or expected.
Hence president Franklin D Roosevelt pledged to voters that America would stay out of the then war in Europe, only to emerge later as the president who led the US to victory in World War II.
Similarly, US entry into the war in Vietnam amounted to an evolutionary process under which four US presidents, pressured by a succession of crises, were gradually drawn into the military conflagration in South-east Asia.
Or take President Biden’s response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Recall that during the first stages of the war the White House expected a quick Russian victory with President Volodymyr Zelensky fleeing Ukraine and seeking refuge in the West.
The plan was then to provide assistance to the Ukrainian guerrilla forces that would be fighting the Russian occupiers.
Yet President Biden adjusted quickly to what happened next to almost everyone’s surprise: A powerful Ukrainian resistance and a Russian failure to achieve its military goals. Russian President Vladimir Putin miscalculated on a quick victory and was forced to commit more and more forces to avoid defeat.
President Biden then “globalised” what started out as a regional conflict, described the Russian invasion as an attack on the international order, and moved to rally the Western allies behind a massive campaign of economic sanctions against Russia, and to subsidise Ukraine’s defence, the goal being preventing a Russian military victory.
The US goals expanded now to a more active effort to contain Russia, including the revival and expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Nato), and the restoration of the status quo before the February 2022 invasion and, in the long run, of the balance of power in Europe.
A year after the Russian invasion, the American mission has expanded beyond the earlier plans. The US is sending Ukraine its largest military aid package yet, worth US$3.75 billion and including Bradley armoured personnel carriers, while pressing Germany to send Leopard 2 battle tanks. It has sent Ukraine tens of thousands of artillery and mortar rounds from American stockpiles, and is now providing Ukraine with M1 Abrams tanks.
But at the same time, recognising the limits operating on him at home and abroad, President Biden has refrained from declaring that the US was seeking a total military victory against Russia or calling for the overthrow of Vladimir Putin.
He has excluded the option of direct US military intervention in the war and has even been opposed to providing Ukraine with offensive weapons like F-16 jets.
Reflecting this playing-by-ear-as-you-go modus operandi, the Biden administration is waiting to see whether Ukraine could achieve its goals of recovering the areas in its south-east that Russia annexed last September.
If that does not happen, expect President Biden’s strategy to evolve once again, this time by pressing both sides to reach a ceasefire and perhaps to prepare for some sort of a diplomatic deal between Ukraine and Russia.
Even if Ukraine fails to win back the territories that Russia had invaded, American success in helping the Ukrainians to maintain their independence, in rallying the Western allies behind US policies and doing all that without drawing the US into a military quagmire – while maintaining Congressional and public support for the policy – should be seen as a historic achievement for President Biden.
That would include the build-up of a stronger Nato, with Germany and other members of the alliance playing a more assertive military role in their defence and standing ready to invite an independent Ukraine to join them in helping maintain the balance of power in Europe.
President Biden’s strategy in the Pacific has evolved in a similar way to his policies in Europe.
He entered office with many expecting that the former internationalist vice-president would attempt to reverse his predecessor’s antagonistic approach towards China, including by revoking a set of US tariffs on Chinese products.
Again, like in the case of Russia, President Biden refrained from introducing a grand strategy to contain China’s geo-strategic rise and the economic challenges it posed to the US. Or, for that matter, from suggesting that the two superpowers are engaged in a new Cold War.
Instead, the president adopted a series of policies that in some respects are tougher on China than those of his predecessor and which, taken together, created the sense that the US and China are moving in the direction of a new Cold War.
Hence the Biden administration proposed new limits on US investment in China companies after banning China from buying the most advanced computer chips and the equipment that makes them, a decision that Professor Willian Overholt of Harvard University called a “declaration of economic war”.
Similarly, President Biden resisted pressure from Republican China hawks to revoke the traditional One China policy on Taiwan and rejected proposals to establish full diplomatic ties with Taipei.
Instead, the president has sent clear signals that the US approach over Taiwan is changing. He has said four times that the US military will defend Taiwan in the event of conflict, while his aides insist that the policy hasn’t changed.
Asia-Pacific presence
More significantly, President Biden has worked to strengthen US military ties with Australia, Japan, India, and now with the Philippines, leaving little doubt that the US is expanding its military presence in the Asia-Pacific, and positioning itself to constrain China’s armed forces and to strengthen its ability to protect Taiwan.
But Biden has disappointed those who believe that the American global status should consist not only of diplomatic and military power and that its role as a leader in the Pacific and the Atlantic should include efforts to liberalise the international trading system.
That in a way is just another example of the president’s muddling-through approach.
He recognises there is very little public or congressional support for a free trade agenda, and being the pragmatist that he is, he has adjusted to that reality instead of trying to fight it. Expect this approach to change when the political reality at home changes.