IN HIS magisterial narrative about the crisis that led to World War I, “The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914”, distinguished British historian Christopher Clark detailed mutual misunderstandings and unintended signals that drove the world toward the catastrophe that destroyed Europe and planted the seeds of global conflict.
The legendary German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck had predicted in 1888 that “some damned foolish thing in the Balkans” would one day trigger a great European war, which was exactly what happened on June 28, 1914 after the murder of the heir to the throne of the Austro-Hungarian empire by a young terrorist trained in Serbia.
But as Clark argues, there was nothing inevitable in what happened, that an event in the Balkans, a peripheral region far from Europe’s centres of power and wealth, would end up destroying the international balance of power and ignite a world war.
Instead, as he described in his book, the leaders of the great European empires found themselves sleep-walking into a war that none of them was really seeking. Each of the major players, including Russia, Austria-Hungary, Germany, France and Great Britain, took actions that in themselves were seen as justifiable – like Moscow providing support for the Serbian insurgents responsible for the murder of Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife, which activated key decision centres in Europe’s capitals, where leaders seemed to be losing control of events and making the worst possible decisions.
But as Clark also makes clear, much of what had happened in the critical days leading to the Great War had its roots in a Europe racked by chronic problems, a fractured world of instability and militancy. That that world was saddled with an evidently ineffectual set of political leaders explained what happened next.
The notion of “sleepwalking” into international crises and wars runs contrary to what political scientists refer to as the “rational actor model” of political leaders making the most cost-effective-decisions based on their nations’ interests.
Yet when a leader does what he or she considers to align with their country’s interests, the decision – like raising the defence budget, forming an alliance with another nation, expanding their nations’ military presence – can be compared to a billiard ball whose movements affect the position of the other balls in the game, and triggers responses that eventually create chaos instead of establishing order.
Some may argue that some features of today’s international system recall those of pre-World War I Europe, when economic globalisation and the forces of integration produced a political backlash in the form of aggressive nationalist movements – when a rising global power (then Germany, today China) challenged the supremacy of the reigning one (then the British Empire, today the United States). When there was a sense that there was so much social and technological change taking place, without an international system seeking to create some semblance of order and stability – a system then dominated by the leading European powers, today by new and old players seeking to control their geo-political fate.
US President Joe Biden’s surprise visit to Kyiv this week (Feb 20) and his meeting with Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky, where he pledged US$460 million in new aid to the country, demonstrated US willingness to stand up to Russian aggression.
America’s position has been driven by the recognition that Ukraine has the right to defend itself and that the Russian invasion posed a threat to the balance of power in Europe maintained by the US and its North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Nato) allies – which give the Americans the right to provide Ukraine with money and material.
But for what purpose exactly? Most military experts agree that even under the best-case scenario, Ukraine cannot “win” a war against a nuclear Russia, and that Russia wasn’t going to surrender Crimea and the Donbas, areas it conquered from Ukraine, and which have a large pro-Russia population.
If those assumptions are correct, continuing to provide support for Ukraine could mean pursuing a war without end, which could lead to a protracted stalemate.
Pursuing a war with no endgame would in itself raise the economic and military costs for the US and its allies even if it doesn’t lead to direct American military involvement in Ukraine and a possible military confrontation with Russia.
When a global superpower like the US makes such foreign policy decisions, it can be compared to playing a four-dimensional chess game – when a move it makes on one part of the chessboard could have an effect on its position on another part of the board.
From that perspective, pursuing a long and costly war aimed at a declining global power in Europe, Russia, means that the US would be under pressure when it comes to employing its economic and military resources in trying to respond to what, according to the general consensus in Washington, is the main geo-strategic and geo-economic challenges facing the US today – a rising China.
It’s clear that America’s European allies won’t have a chance standing alone in dealing with the threat from Russia. But then America’s allies across the Pacific expected the Americans to project their military and economic power in Asia, and most of them regard the war in Ukraine as a strictly European affair that doesn’t require their involvement.
All of this is taking place at a time of growing US diplomatic, geo-economic and military tensions with Beijing, as demonstrated by the recent unproductive meeting between US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken and China’s top diplomat, Wang Yi, in Munich. During the meeting the two sides failed to resolve their differences, with the Chinese refusing to offer an apology for sending balloons over the US airspace.
And now it seems that China – which until recently stated its support for Moscow in the war in Ukraine, but has declined to provide its partner in Moscow any military assistance – is reconsidering its stance. Indeed, Blinken and other US officials have warned that China may be preparing to give weapons and ammunition to Russia to help it pursue the war in Ukraine.
Wang blamed the US for being the obstacle to peace in Ukraine and, after his meeting with Secretary Blinken, headed to Moscow, where he met with Russian President Vladimir Putin just as President Biden was holding talks in Kyiv with President Zelensky.
These Chinese moves are sending a message to Washington that China may be ready to make the war in Ukraine costlier for the US unless the Americans rethink their current strategy, and press President Zelensky to consider reaching a deal with the Russians, a move that the US earlier insisted it would not take.
The possibility of China raising its involvement in the Ukraine War may accelerate a process under which the US – backed by its European allies and a few Asian partners like Japan and South Korea – would be leading a bloc of like-minded governments seeking to contain both Russia and China, while the Chinese join an axis of nations that include Iran and North Korea, that are backing Russia’s aggression in Ukraine. And against the backdrop of longstanding disagreements over Taiwan and other issues, it all raises the possibility that these players will end up sleepwalking into a global catastrophe.