Emma Ashford: Hey, Matt! Greetings from sunny Cartagena, Colombia, where I’m talking about U.S. foreign policy. I’m about as far from the war in Ukraine as you can get, yet with the war’s one-year anniversary this week, Ukraine is still looming large in discussions of the United States and its global role.
Matthew Kroenig: Colombia sounds nice. I was a bit closer to Ukraine this weekend at the Munich Security Conference, and Ukraine was obviously the dominant topic on the agenda there too.
How is the war being perceived in the global south?
EA: I’d draw a pretty clear distinction between two groups of countries. First, the Western coalition that the Biden administration has pulled together, which is quite united in its continued opposition to Russia and—at least in general—its willingness to bear some costs to do so. That’s the group you undoubtedly interacted with most in Munich, and I suspect the message you heard from it was quite triumphalist, focused on the success of U.S. and European efforts to arm Ukraine and turn the tide of the war on the ground.
The second group, however, comprises a wide variety of Latin American, African, and Asian states, many of which are conflicted about their response to Ukraine. Most of them oppose the invasion itself, but they’re also wary of damaging their ties with Russia and also extremely worried about spiraling costs created by the conflict in food and energy prices globally. That’s a much more mixed picture for U.S. officials to manage.
Did I characterize the Munich crowd correctly?
MK: Yes and no. There seemed to be a consensus that the outcome of the war would have enormous consequences for the future of European and even global security. Accordingly, the common view was that the goal needed to be a Ukrainian victory—and for many also a Russian defeat.
The global south was, however, another major topic of conversation. People were genuinely puzzled as to how so much of the world could be agnostic on the issue of a war of aggression in Europe. The search for answers, however, was often superficial and revealed what former U.S. National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster calls “strategic narcissism.”
The question seemed to be: “What did we do wrong?” Officials and experts wondered, for example, whether wealthy governments should have provided more COVID-19 relief. There was a kind of naive assumption that if the West just takes the right steps, everyone will fall into line. Instead, they should have showed some strategic empathy and tried to understand the issue from the perspective of the global south’s interests.
I assume you were able to see things more from that point of view in Cartagena.
EA: I think it really highlights that for all the valuable things about meetings like the Munich Security Conference, Aspen Security Forum, or World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, they do often have a tendency to produce groupthink among like-minded officials and experts. I hope that some of the African and Latin American delegates in attendance were able to impress upon their European counterparts that it is hardly difficult to understand their viewpoint: They have interests, including the basic economic needs of their own populations, at stake in this conflict.
For that reason, I suspect Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s speech to the conference—in which he promised that China would shortly be presenting a peace plan for Ukraine, which Beijing has now revealed—might have been popular among some of those delegates. Of course, it seemed to be undermined almost immediately: Wang headed straight to Moscow after the conference, and U.S. officials alleged that Beijing is considering sending arms to Moscow to help its efforts in the war. So much for the appearance of Chinese impartiality!
MK: I’m glad you mentioned China and Russia because they are part of the other major grouping you left out above. The world is increasingly divided into three blocs: the free world (the United States and its formal allies in Europe and Asia), the revisionist autocracies (China, Russia, North Korea, Iran, and a few less capable rogues like Syria, Eritrea, and Belarus), and the new nonaligned movement (everyone else!).
China’s plan at Munich seemed to be to try to drive a wedge between Europe and the United States. Wang’s speech talked about how Europe and China could work together, but “hysterical” Americans have lost their minds and are shooting down weather balloons. You are right that they also tried to be the good guys by offering up promises of a peace plan—never mind that they only talked to the Russians, not the Ukrainians, about the plan.
China’s posturing at the conference was undermined most by the Biden administration releasing intelligence suggesting that China was preparing to provide weapons to Russia. Nothing could have made Beijing more unpopular in Europe than indications that it was getting ready to arm Russian President Vladimir Putin.
It was similar to Biden’s attempts during the early stage of the war in Ukraine to deter actions by revealing intelligence. Let’s hope it works this time.
EA: It was innovative the first time around, but at some point, I imagine it will cease to be an effective approach. Worth a try though, I guess.
The problem with these two conflicting worldviews—Western and Russian/Chinese—is that I think the last year has mostly shown they’re both wrong. The world isn’t fully united in opposing Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and they’re definitely not on board with the Biden administration’s democracy versus autocracy framing. But at the same time, the world is not united against the United States, and many countries in the global south and elsewhere view Russian and Chinese intentions with deep suspicion. It suggests a more diverse set of global viewpoints.
And for that reason, I was rather disappointed to see Biden double down on his triumphalist rhetoric about democracy and the war in Ukraine in his big Warsaw speech in Poland.
Shall we chat about Biden’s secret trip to Kyiv and his speech in Warsaw?
MK: Sure. Let’s start with the trip to Ukraine’s capital. I think it was a brave show of support for Ukraine. It was also conducted with amazing operational security. It caught everyone by surprise. I chatted with several senior Biden administration officials in Munich, and none of them let out a peep.
I assume you were less impressed.
EA: Biden’s trip was certainly a public relations coup. It upstaged Putin’s attempt to control the narrative around the first anniversary of the war. It was also brave; Biden did take a genuine—if small—risk to travel to Kyiv. I’m surprised the Secret Service allowed it; usually presidents are wrapped up in bubble wrap so tightly that they barely get to see Washington!
I’ll even applaud what I suspect was Biden—a known railroad enthusiast—seizing his chance to take a really cool train ride. A 10-hour ride into a war zone is pretty unique, and given the state of U.S. rails, it was possibly faster than some of Biden’s Amtrak regional commutes in his pre-presidential days!
But the substance of his remarks in Warsaw continued to display what I see as the major flaws of the administration’s approach to the war in Ukraine: He reemphasized the democracy angle of the conflict, talked about Russian human rights violations, and emphasized unity in the West. But it didn’t really address any of the big questions about the conflict: Where is it going? Does anyone have an endgame? How will the United States and Europe interact with Russia and Ukraine going forward?
MK: After one year of war, these are the right questions to ask. I have my answers. The endgame should be Ukrainian victory.
My criticism of Biden’s speech, therefore, and of my interlocutors in Munich is that the rhetoric does not match the reality. If winning is really the goal, then they should give Ukraine the weapons it needs to win, including fighter aircraft and longer-range missiles—now.
Given that they are only providing weapons in an incremental manner, however, it is almost as if the West is afraid of a Ukrainian victory. I fear that the revealed preference of the West may be only to help Ukraine fight to a draw to set up peace negotiations.
That would be a mistake.
EA: I’d take that, but triumphalist messaging from Biden might make that harder to achieve—or at least more difficult to sell politically. Look, the United States is running out of supplies in a lot of key areas. U.S. companies are not making enough ammunition to keep the Ukrainians supplied with what they’re using and are rapidly running down the United States’ own stocks of a lot of critical things. I agree that the West—with the exception of the Eastern European states closest to Ukraine—are probably aiming for a stalemate here.
But I don’t see how substantially increased supplies would be viable at this point. And some of the debates about weaponry are getting increasingly silly. Airplanes, for example, are likely to either sit pointlessly on a tarmac somewhere or get shot down by Russian air defenses. This is the first time in decades that a war has involved a peer competitor of the United States in terms of air defense technology; the result has been that offensive air power has been far less used in this war than you might expect. So I’m not sure why the Ukrainians are pushing so hard for planes, when it doesn’t seem particularly valuable. It might be valuable as a signal but not particularly useful otherwise.
MK: How would NATO fight this war? Would they use aircraft? Of course. If victory is really the goal, then no one should fight with an arm behind their back.
EA: Well, as my Stimson Center colleague Kelly Grieco has argued persuasively with U.S. Air Force Col. Maximilian Bremer, Ukraine is an air denied environment, which means that air defenses are making it too costly and difficult to use manned aircraft at scale. Even if it were NATO fighting this war, then they probably still wouldn’t be able to use planes!
I’m fine with sending weapons to Ukraine so long as it doesn’t interfere with U.S. national security needs, but at least they should be useful weapons in the context of this war. The F-16s are not that useful.
Then there are the weapons that the United States maybe can’t afford to send. There are lots of conversations about sending some of the most advanced U.S. systems (i.e., the Army Tactical Missile System) to Ukraine, but to be frank, if military leaders are saying they can’t send these systems to Ukraine without compromising U.S. military readiness, then I don’t see why we’re having this discussion. There are also growing concerns in Congress that we might be depleting ammunition and supplies we could need in a Taiwan contingency or for the U.S. military to use elsewhere. This is a serious concern for policymakers and one reason why “what would NATO do?” is not the standard we should be using here. NATO isn’t fighting this war; Ukraine is.
MK: NATO would use longer-range strike capabilities to suppress Russian air defenses. So let’s give longer-range weapons to Ukraine. As I’ve argued before, the West should give Ukraine everything it needs except nuclear weapons. Speaking of nuclear weapons, did you see Putin’s speech?
EA: Ah, Putin’s annual speech. A long-time staple of Russia watchers, who tune in to find out key things like who is seated in the audience, whether this year’s so-called anonymous callers will praise the president or merely commend him, and whether Russia hit its annual grain production quota. It’s practically Soviet.
But this year was a bit different. In addition to the grain output—a record 150 million metric tons, if you include the grain stolen from Ukraine over the last year—we got an announcement that the Russians will suspend their participation in the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (known as New START), the only remaining major arms control treaty between the United States and Russia. The Russians say they’ll still abide by the caps but are suspending all inspections.
As a proponent of large nuclear arsenals, are you pleased? Arms control is officially dead.
MK: It is on life support. The United States is still abiding by the treaty, but it is hard to imagine Putin returning to full compliance given the state of U.S.-Russia relations. For the first time since the 1970s, there are no negotiated limits on Russia’s nuclear forces.
At best, New START only had three more years to go. It expires in 2026. There were no provisions for additional renewals. And there is no way the U.S. Senate will pass a treaty approving bilateral U.S.-Russian arms control at a time when China is engaging in a rapid nuclear buildup.
China’s buildup might require the United States to increase its numbers of strategic, deployed nuclear forces, and New START was an obstacle to that.
So, in short, Putin did Washington a favor.
EA: The United States has more than 5,000 nuclear warheads; China has 350 warheads. I feel like that problem won’t arise in the next three years.
Regardless, the New START suspension is probably less important in a practical sense than it might seem. We hadn’t had any inspections since pre-COVID-19, so this is just formalizing the existing state of affairs. To keep track of Russian nukes, the United States will now have to rely instead on euphemistically named “national technical means” (i.e., spying).
But it’s a big blow to the cause of arms control more broadly. I know you don’t agree, but it seems to me to make sense to maintain arms control with adversaries, perhaps particularly with adversaries. With New START gone, there’s little common ground for new U.S.-Russia arms control engagement, even after Ukraine, and the prospects look slim with regard to China as well.
MK: Arms control is important, but negotiated numerical limits do not seem feasible for the foreseeable future. I suspect the future of arms control will be more in risk reduction measures like missile launch notifications, strategic stability talks, and the like.
But, with that, I think it is about time to wrap up.
EA: What are you talking about? If Putin gets to give two-hour speeches, I think we can easily fit in another dozen topics here!
(Editor: No.)