

The Long Shadow of German Colonialism

Thomas Rogers

The people of what was once German-occupied Africa are demanding reparations for the colonial violence that shapes the region to this day.

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Christian Ender/Getty Images

Members of the Herero and Nama communities taking part in the annual Reparation Walk, starting at the Swakopmund Concentration Camp Memorial, to honor victims of German colonial violence, Swakopmund, Namibia, March 2019

On
May
28,
2021,
Germany's
foreign
minister,

Heiko
Maas,
held
a
press
conference
in
Berlin
to
announce
what
was
meant
to
be
a
momentous
breakthrough
in
the
country's
attempts
to
address
its
colonial
past.
Maas
said
that
he
was
"happy
and
thankful"
that
after
five
years
of
talks,
German

and
Namibian
negotiators
had
approved
a
“reconciliation
agreement”
over
atrocities
committed
by
Germans
during
the
colonial
period.
“In
light
of
Germany’s
historic
and
moral
responsibility,”
he
said,
“we
will
ask
Namibia
and
the
descendants
of
the
victims
for
forgiveness.”

From
the
1880s
to
1919,
Germany
controlled
what
are
now
Togo,
Burundi,
Cameroon,
Namibia,
and
Rwanda,
among
other
African
territories,
as
well
as
part
of
what
is
now
Papua
New
Guinea
and
several
islands
in
the
western
Pacific.
Even
by
the
standards

of
European
colonialism,
Germany's
actions
in
Namibia
—
then
known
as
German
Southwest
Africa
—
stand
out
for
their
brutality.
Between
1904
and
1908
German
officials
and
soldiers
killed
tens
of
thousands
of
Herero
(now
often
known
as
the
Ovaherero)
and
thousands

of
Nama
people
in
a
campaign
of
extermination
widely
acknowledged
as
the
first
genocide
of
the
twentieth
century.

Germany
has
long
skirted
accountability
for
its
actions
in
Namibia.
When
Chancellor
Helmut
Kohl
visited
the
country
in
1995,
he
refused
to
meet

with
Herero
representatives,
and
when
President
Roman
Herzog
visited
in
1998,
he
denied
that
there
were
judicial
grounds
for
reparations.
The
Bundestag
has
never
formally
recognized
the
killings
as
a
genocide.
But
Maas's
announcement
was
meant
to
signal
that
Germany
was
finally

living
up
to
its
historical
responsibilities
and
included
a
promise
that
it
would,
“in
a
gesture
of
recognition
of
the
immeasurable
suffering
exacted
on
the
victims,”
pay
€1.1
billion
(\$1.2
billion)
in
aid
allocated
for
reconstruction
and
development
over
the

next
thirty
years.

In
the
weeks
that
followed,
however,
any
goodwill
resulting
from
the
announcement
crumbled.

The
main
groups
representing
the
descendants
of
the
victims
argued
that
they
had
been
unfairly
left
out
of
the
negotiations,
partly
because
of
Germany's
refusal

to
include
anyone
outside
the
government.
Many
also
denounced
the
payment
as
inadequate
compensation
for
such
a
horrific
injustice,
given
that
the
amount
was
merely
equivalent
to
the
foreign
aid
Germany
has
given
Namibia
since
1989,
and
expressed
outrage
that
the
agreement

omitted
the
word
“reparations.”

Plans
by
German
president
Frank-
Walter
Steinmeier
to
travel
to
Windhoek,
the
Namibian
capital,
and
officially
ask
for
forgiveness
were
called
off
after
Herero
and
Nama
groups
threatened
to
stage
a
protest.

Henny
Seibeb,
the
deputy
leader

of
Namibia's
Landless
People's
Movement,
an
opposition
party
representing
groups
that
lost
land
under
colonialism,
told
me
by
phone
last
year
that
he
saw
the
proposed
size
of
the
payment
as
a
"mere
joke"
that
did
not
reflect
the
depth
of
the

injustice.

Paul

Thomas,

one

of

the

leaders

of

the

Nama

Genocide

Technical

Committee,

told

me

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. My great-grandfather's name was Ebenezer, so most of his people

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Others
have
pointed
to
a
contrast
that
has
loomed
over
the
negotiations:
although
Germany
has
refused
to
hold
direct
talks
with
representatives
of
the
Herero
and
Nama,
since
1952
it
has
paid
more
than
\$90
billion
in
compensation
to
the
victims
of

the
Holocaust,
partly
through
an
agreement
negotiated
with
the
Claims
Conference,
an
NGO
representing
Jews
around
the
world.

In
June
2021
the
Ovaherero
paramount
chief
Vekuii
Rukoro
claimed
in
a
TV
interview
that
Germany
was
willing
to
negotiate
with
the
Claims
Conference

but
not
the
Herero
and
Nama
“because
they
were
white
Europeans,
and
we
are
Black
Africans.”

Germans
first
arrived
in
what
became
German
Southwest
Africa
in
1883
with
the
intention
of
establishing
a
trading
post.
A
year
later
the
traders
helped

convince
Chancellor
Otto
von
Bismarck
to
turn
the
territory
into
a
German
protectorate.
Bismarck
had
long
resisted
calls
by
the
public
and
political
rivals
to
establish
an
overseas
empire.
The
reasons
for
his
change
of
mind
are
still
debated,
but
he
was

partly
swayed
by
reports
of
potential
diamond
deposits
in
the
region
and
the
ultimately
false
hope
that
private
merchants
would
carry
much
of
the
financial
burden.

At
the
time
the
territory
was
home
to
between
200,000
and
250,000
people,
including
approximately

80,000
members
of
the
Herero
ethnic
group,
who
lived
with
large
herds
of
cattle.
Other
groups
included
the
Nama,
Ovambo,
Damara,
San,
and
Baster.
The
territory's
fertile
area
was
bordered
on
the
west
by
the
Namib
Desert
and
the
Atlantic
Ocean,
and

on
the
northeast
by
the
Omaheke,
a
nearly
waterless
expanse
of
desert
that
stretches
into
Botswana.

When
German
settlers
and
administrators
arrived
in
the
region,
they
deceived
Africans
into
selling
them
large
parcels
of
land,
mistreated
them,
and
humiliated
their
leaders.

In
some
cases
they
also
encouraged
animosity
among
local
groups.

When
the
Africans
fought
back,
Berlin
sent
more
troops.

In
January
1904
a
conflict
between
Herero
and
Germans
escalated,
leading
the
Herero
to
launch
an
offensive
to
retake
their
territory.
More
than

a
hundred
Germans
were
killed;
in
response,
Berlin
dispatched
General
Lothar
von
Trotha,
a
veteran
of
the
Boxer
Rebellion
obsessed
with
the
idea
of
“race
war,”
to
take
over
leadership
of
the
colony.

The
conflict,
known
as
the
Herero
and
Nama

War,
became
a
pretext
for
widespread
atrocities.
In
August
1904
Trotha
attacked
approximately
50,000
Herero
men,
women,
and
children
at
a
mesa
called
the
Waterberg
in
the
north
of
the
territory.
When
the
survivors
tried
to
escape
into
the
Omaheke
desert,
the

Germans
set
up
a
perimeter
to
enclose
them,
occupied
water
wells,
and
ordered
all
those
fleeing
from
the
desert
to
be
killed.
In
October
Trotha
issued
a
now
notorious
proclamation
calling
for
the
Hereros'
extermination:

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A
German
officer,
Ludwig
von
Estorff,
described
in
his
diaries
“terrible
scenes”
as
the
Hereros
fled
from
one
watering
hole
“to
the
next,
losing
almost
all
their
cattle
and
very
many
people.”
Some

Hereros
slit
the
throats
of
their
animals
and
drank
their
blood
to
keep
from
dying
of
thirst.

During
the
war
the
Germans
established
concentration
camps
meant
to
provide
labor
for
German
businesses,
but
conditions
there
were
so
horrific
that
few
prisoners

were
able
to
work.
Numerous
Nama,
who
had
launched
a
guerrilla
war
against
the
Germans,
were
also
confined
to
the
camps.

At
a
camp
on
Shark
Island,
a
rocky,
exposed
outcropping
on
the
Atlantic
coast,
prisoners
were
given
barely
any
clothing,

food,
or
shelter.
Berthold
von
Deimling,
the
commander
of
the
Southern
Region
of
the
protectorate,
said
that
as
long
as
he
was
in
charge,
“no
Hottentot”
—
a
pejorative
term
for
the
Nama
—
“would
be
allowed
to
leave
Shark
Island
alive.”

Between
September
1906
and
March
1907,
1,032
of
the
camp's
1,795
prisoners
died.
The
exact
number
of
victims
of
the
genocide
remains
uncertain,
but
by
the
time
the
prisoners
were
allowed
out
of
the
camps
in
1908
up
to
100,000
Herero
and

approximately
10,000
Nama
had
perished.

Following
the
genocide,
the
German
authorities
expropriated
nearly
all
the
Africans'
territory
and
forced
them
to
join
a
“semifree”
labor
market
in
which
they
had
little
choice
but
to
work
for
German
landowners.
Those
who
refused

were
forcibly
allocated
to
an
employer,
and
every
African
over
the
age
of
seven
was
required
to
carry
“a
metal
disc
to
be
worn
visibly”
at
all
times
and
produce
it
on
demand
to
the
police
or
“any
white
person.”
Marriages
between

Africans
and
Germans
were
prohibited.

Africans
were
also
banned
from
walking
on
sidewalks
and
riding
horses,
and
all
Africans
were
required
to
greet
passing
Germans.

In
1921
the
Treaty
of
Versailles
transferred
the
colony
to
South
Africa,
which
later
imposed
the
apartheid

system
on
the
territory.

Although
the
publication
of
Morenga
(1978),
a
best-
selling
anticolonial
novel
by
Uwe
Timm
that
was
later
adapted
into
a
popular
three-
part
miniseries,
briefly
pushed
Southwest
Africa
into
West
German
awareness,
it
remained
overshadowed
by
the

crimes
of
the
Nazis
and
the
postwar
trauma
of
national
division.
Even
after
German
reunification
and
Namibian
independence
from
South
Africa
in
1990,
many
Germans
remained
only
vaguely
aware
of
the
atrocities
carried
out
in
Southwest
Africa,
or
they
imagined
that
the

German
colonial
project
was
more
enlightened
than
those
of
Great
Britain,
France,
and
Belgium.

That
began
to
change
in
the
early
Aughts,
largely
thanks
to
pressure
from
Herero
and
Nama
groups.
Both
peoples
have
little
representation
in
Namibia's
postindependence
government.
The

South
West
Africa
People's
Organisation
(SWAPO)
has
dominated
every
election
since
1990,
largely
thanks
to
support
from
the
Ovambo.
(In
the
most
recent
election,
in
2019,
the
party
won
sixty-
three
of
the
ninety-
six
seats
in
Parliament.)
And
despite
Namibia's
redistribution

programs,
a
disproportionate
amount
of
the
land
still
belongs
to
a
small
white
minority.

In
2003
the
Herero
People's
Reparations
Corporation
filed
a
suit
in
the
District
Court
for
the
District
of
Columbia
demanding
reparations
from
Germany
—
a
proceeding
made
possible

by
the
US's
Alien
Tort
Statute,
which
allows
foreigners
to
seek
compensation
for
international
human
rights
violations.
The
German
government
has
claimed
it
is
immune
from
such
claims
because
the
UN's
1948
Genocide
Convention
could
not
be
applied
retroactively.
Although
the
suit

was
eventually
dismissed,
it
helped
open
the
door
to
negotiations.

Meanwhile
several
academics
—
including
Joachim
Zeller,
Henning
Melber,
Isabel
Hull,
and
most
prominently
Jürgen
Zimmerer,
a
professor
of
history
at
the
University
of
Hamburg
—
began
drawing
attention
to
Germany's

colonial
crimes.
In
2001
Zimmerer
published
*Deutsche
Herrschaft
über
Afrikaner
(German
Rule,
African
Subjects)*,
seemingly
the
first
in-
depth
book
about
the
policies
of
German
Southwest
Africa.

¹ It focuses on the attempts by German authorities to create a utopian “racial state” in the colony. Although the book is perhaps too detailed for a general readership, it was decisive in dispelling what Zimmerer describes as the “mist” of amnesia around German colonialism.

That
mist
has
lifted
further
in
the
past
decade.
In

2016
the
German
Historical
Museum
in
Berlin,
the
largest
and
most
important
museum
of
German
history,
hosted
the
country's
first
major
exhibition
about
its
colonial
period.
The
repeatedly
delayed
completion
of
the
Humboldt
Forum
—
a
museum
housing
ethnological
artifacts
in
a

reconstruction
of
the
Hohenzollerns'
Berlin
palace
—
has
also
focused
attention
on
German
colonial
history.
While
protests
against
racial
inequality
grew
abroad
and
in
Germany,
activists
and
scholars
argued
that
the
forum's
leaders
had
not
done
enough
to
investigate
the
provenance
of

many
of
its
artifacts.

As
a
result
there
have
been
genuine
shifts
in
cultural
policy.

Last
summer
Germany
signed
a
groundbreaking
agreement
with
Nigeria
to
repatriate
all
its
Benin
Bronzes,
sculptures
looted
by
British
troops
in
1897
that
were
later
sold
or

donated
to
a
number
of
European
and
American
museums.
The
state
minister
for
culture,
Claudia
Roth,
announced
in
early
2022
that
she
was
exploring
more
widespread
restitutions,
adding
that
the
crimes
of
the
colonial
era
were
“a
blank
spot
in

the
memory
culture.”

Efforts
to
find
understanding
with
the
Herero
and
Nama
remain
more
fraught.

In
late
2021
the
new
German
government
led
by
Olaf
Scholz
of
the
center-
left
Social
Democrats
presented
a
coalition
agreement
with
the
Greens
and
the

probusiness
Free
Democrats,
in
which
it
made
vague
promises
to
commission
independent
studies
about
German
colonialism
and
to
begin
developing
a
“learning
and
remembrance
site
for
colonialism.”
It
also
promised
to
“drive
forward
the
investigation
of
colonial
history”
and
to
push
for

“reconciliation”
with
Namibia.

That
will
not
be
easy.
Namibia’s
government
has
now
backtracked
on
its
plans
to
ratify
the
reconciliation
agreement
and
has
called
for
it
to
be
renegotiated,
and
the
German
government
has
thus
far
rejected
calls
to
reopen
discussions.

Such
talks
would
be
a
test
for
Germany's
foreign
minister,
Annalena
Baerbock
of
the
Greens,
who
has
promised
to
pursue
a
foreign
policy
in
keeping
with
her
party's
progressive,
environmentalist,
and
feminist
principles.

New
talks
would
presumably
need
to
directly
involve

the
Herero
and
Nama
and
their
diasporas,
who
are
likely
to
demand
that
any
payment
be
officially
recognized
as
reparations.
Such
a
concession,
however,
would
probably
be
rejected
by
German
negotiators,
since
it
could
open
Germany
to
similar
claims
from
Greece
and

Italy,
which
are
requesting
compensation
for
crimes
committed
during
World
War
II.

It
would
also
bolster
the
legal
cases
of
other
former
colonies
against
European
powers
and
potentially
usher
in
a
new
wave
of
lawsuits.

The
discussion
of
reconciliation
has
been

complicated
by
other
events.
In
the
spring
of
2020
a
bizarre
conflict
erupted
over
the
decision
by
the
Ruhr
Triennale,
an
arts
festival
in
western
Germany,
to
invite
the
Cameroonian
academic
Achille
Mbembe
to
give
a
talk.
After
a
local
politician
quoted

passages
from
Mbembe's
work
out
of
context
—
they
drew
parallels
between
the
Holocaust
and
South
African
apartheid
and
criticized
Israel's
actions
in
Palestine
—
Germany's
federal
commissioner
on
anti-
Semitism,
Felix
Klein,
said
such
comparisons
between
the
Shoah
and
other
historical



events
represented
a
“recognizable
anti-
Semitic
pattern”
and
called
for
Mbembe
to
be
disinvited.

Although
the
festival
was
ultimately
canceled
because
of
Covid-
19,
Klein’s
intervention
outraged
many
on
the
left
who
believed
that
Mbembe
and
others
should
be
allowed
to

suggest
links
between
colonial
crimes
and
the
Holocaust.
The
leaders
of
more
than
thirty
cultural
institutions,
including
the
Deutsches
Theater
in
Berlin
and
the
Moses
Mendelssohn
Center
for
European-
Jewish
Studies
in
Potsdam,
signed
a
letter
arguing
that
“Germany’s
historical
responsibility
should

not
lead
to
a
blanket
moral
or
political
delegitimization
of
other
historical
experiences
of
violence
and
oppression.”

Journalists
and
historians
have
been
arguing
about
this
in
the
German
media
ever
since.
The
debate
is
reminiscent
of
the
Historikerstreit,
or
“historians’
dispute,”

of
the
1980s,
which
erupted
after
the
historian
Ernst
Nolte
argued
that
Germany
did
not
bear
an
exceptional
burden
of
guilt
for
the
Holocaust,
since
mass
killing
had
occurred
before
—
particularly
in
the
Soviet
Union
—
and
was
not
historically
unique.

Numerous
scholars
disagreed:
Jürgen
Habermas
argued
that
such
comparisons
downplayed
German
responsibility
and
that
the
Holocaust
should
be
seen
as
a
singular
historical
event.
Habermas's
view
ultimately
became
a
cornerstone
of
the
German
approach
to
memory
culture.

In
what
has
become

known
as
the
Historikerstreit
2.0,
Zimmerer
—
who
is
the
most
widely
known
scholar
to
probe
the
connections
between
German
Southwest
Africa
and
the
Third
Reich
—
has
been
one
of
several
historians
arguing
in
favor
of
a
comparative
view.
He
makes

clear
that
he
does
not
believe
that
the
genocide
of
the
Herero
and
Nama
was
a
rehearsal
for
the
Holocaust
or
that
the
two
are
equivalent
in
scale
or
motivation.
But
he
argues
that
by
examining
parallels
between
them,
one
can
arrive

at
a
more
accurate
view
of
the
forces
driving
German
and
global
history:

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2

Zimmerer
writes
that
“the
colonial
experiences
represent
a
cultural
reservoir
of
cultural
practices
from
which
those
serving
the
National
Socialists
could
avail
themselves.”
In
the

1920s
and
1930s
German
Southwest
Africa
was
romanticized
in
public
memorials,
school
curricula,
films,
and
books,
including
a
popular
genre
known
as
“colonial
literature.”

Until
1945
the
best-
selling
book
for
young
readers
in
Germany
was
*Peter
Moor’s
Journey
to
Southwest
Africa,*

about
a
young
man
who
volunteers
as
a
soldier
in
the
German
colony
and
heroically
takes
part
in
the
campaign
against
the
Herero
and
Nama.
Zimmerer
argues
that
these
cultural
influences
helped
build
support
for
Nazi
policies
based
on
racial
difference

and
anti-
Semitism.

He
notes
that
geographers
affiliated
with
Berlin's
Friedrich
Wilhelm
University
(now
Humboldt
University)
had
been
involved
in
conceiving
colonial
policy
in
the
late
nineteenth
and
early
twentieth
centuries,
and
pushed
for
the
expansionary
policies
that
led
to
the

occupation
of
Eastern
Europe
during
the
Third
Reich.
Anthropologists
who
later
became
leading
proponents
of
“race
biology”
in
Nazi
Germany
were
influenced
by
research
carried
out
in
German
colonies
in
Africa.
Some
of
the
regulations
imposed
during
the
Nazi
occupation
of
Poland

—
a
ban
on
Poles
riding
bicycles
and
entering
movie
theaters,
a
requirement
for
all
Poles
to
greet
passing
Germans

—
echoed
policies
previously
instituted
in
Southwest
Africa.

Zimmerer
also
argues
that
the
“biological
interpretation
of
world
history
—
the
conviction

that
a
Volk
needs
to
secure
space
in
order
to
survive
—
is
one
of
the
fundamental
parallels
between
colonialism
and
Nazi
expansion
policy”
in
Eastern
Europe.
Hitler’s
*Generalplan
Ost*
called
for
much
of
Central
and
Eastern
Europe
as
well
as
the

Soviet
Union
to
be
emptied
of
inhabitants
and
resettled
by
German
farmers.

A
special
effort
was
to
be
made
to
recruit
settlers
who
had
previously
lived
in
African
colonies.

In
1941
Hitler
said
about
Ukraine,
“The
Russian
territory
is
our
India,
and

like
the
English
rule
it
with
a
handful
of
people,
we
will
rule
our
colonial
territory.”

In
2021
in
*Die
Zeit*,
Zimmerer
and
the
American
scholar
Michael
Rothberg
emphasized
that
“a
ban
on
any
comparison
and
contextualization
leads
to
the
Shoah

being
excised
from
history.”

³ Such a ban would undermine attempts to learn from history: if a singular event can occur only once, there’s no need to worry about it happening again.

Some
have
argued
that
proponents
of
the
comparative
view
misrepresent
the
ideological
nature
of
the
Holocaust
and
ignore
the
particular
history
of
anti-
Semitism
in
Europe.
The
historian
Saul
Friedländer
writes:

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”

At
other
times
the
debate
has
invoked
straw
man
arguments,
with
some
commentators
falsely
claiming
that
postcolonial
scholars
want
to
equate
the
Holocaust
with
colonial
crimes.
Occasionally
it
has
become
a
proxy
for
a

battle
over
the
adoption
of
progressive
American
views
about
racial
justice.
The
editor
and
journalist
Thomas
Schmid
accused
Zimmerer
of
being
part
of
a
“trendy”
US-
imported
attempt
to
“position
the
Holocaust
behind
colonialism,”
which
“fits
with
the
contemporary
culture
of
general

suspicion
against
the
white
man
(and
white
woman).”

The
new
Historikerstreit
has
emerged
out
of
a
confluence
of
factors
—
the
debate
over
reparations,
the
pushback
against
the
Humboldt
Forum,
and,
more
broadly,
the
rise
in
Germany
of
a
globalized
sense

of
history,
in
which
debates
about
slavery
in
the
US
and
colonialism
in
the
UK,
for
instance,
are
often
transposed
onto
local
experiences.

But
it
has
also
coincided
with
a
debate
about
German
identity
and
how
to
reconcile
Germany's
postwar
self-
image,

largely
centered
on
atonement
and
guilt
for
the
Holocaust,
with
its
modern
status
as
a
country
defined
by
immigration.

In
the
past
ten
years
the
proportion
of
German
residents
who
are
immigrants
or
have
immigrant
parents
has
risen
from
approximately
19

percent
to
27
percent.
Many
of
these
new
arrivals
come
from
countries
that
were
previously
colonized
by
European
powers.
Activists
have
pushed
for
German
identity
to
be
broadened
to
accommodate
immigrants
from
Africa
or
the
Middle
East,
for
instance,
arguing
that
their

greatest
historical
trauma
is
colonialism,
not
World
War
II.

In
a
comment
on
the
Historikerstreit
2.0
in
the
*Neue
Zürcher
Zeitung*,
the
journalist
Thomas
Ribi
said
that
German
memory
culture
should
not
change
to
accommodate
these
new
arrivals,
because
immigrants
have

been
the
source
of
a
new
wave
of
violence
against
Jews:
“Immigration
in
recent
years
'enriched'
Germany
with
a
new
form
of
anti-
Semitism,
derived
from
Islam.”
It
is
true
that
anti-
Semitism
is
a
problem
among
some
immigrant
communities,
in
particular

those
from
the
Middle
East,
but
official
statistics
suggest
that
most
anti-
Semitic
attacks
in
Germany
are
carried
out
by
members
of
the
far
right.
Clearly
the
existing
approach
to
German
memory
culture
—
and
its
resistance
to
drawing
connections
between
the

Holocaust
and
colonialism

—

hasn't
been
infallible
either.

In
the
fall
of
2021
Habermas
joined
the
debate.

In
*Philosophie
Magazin*

he
insisted
that
the
singularity
of
the
Holocaust
did
not
mean
“that
the
political
self-
understanding
of
a
nation's
citizens
can

be
frozen”
and
argued
that
the
country’s
transformation
in
the
past
decade
called
for
a
reassessment
of
its
self-
image.
When
an
immigrant
arrives
in
Germany,
he
wrote,
he
or
she
“acquires
at
the
same
time
the
voice
of
a
fellow
citizen,

which
from
now
on
counts
in
the
public
sphere
and
can
change
and
expand
our
political
culture.”
Germany’s
political
imagination
must
“expand
in
such
a
way
that
members
of
other
cultural
ways
of
life
can
recognize
themselves
in
it
with
their
heritage

and,
if
necessary,
also
with
their
history
of
suffering.”

The
debate
has
often
operated
under
the
assumption
that
memory
is
zero-
sum
and
that
a
greater
acknowledgment
of
colonial
crimes
will
devalue
the
historical
importance
of
the
Holocaust.
Rothberg
offers
an

alternate
view
in
*Multidirectional
Memory*
(2009),
which
sharpened
this
debate
when
it
was
published
in
Germany
in
2021.
He
argues
that
“the
Holocaust
is
frequently
set
against
global
histories
of
racism,
slavery,
and
colonialism
in
an
ugly
contest
of
comparative
victimization,”
but

that
one
should
“consider
memory
as
multidirectional:
as
subject
to
ongoing
negotiation,
cross-
referencing,
and
borrowing;
as
productive
and
not
privative.”

In
2021
Zimmerer
and
Rothberg
argued
in
*Die
Zeit*
that

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If
that
was
the
historical
approach
to
the
Shoah,
they
write,
“the
end
result
is
not
less
German
responsibility,
but
more,
not
less,
but
more
struggle
against
anti-
Semitism
and
racism.
Shouldn't
that
be
the

goal
of
any
discussion
of
the
Holocaust
and
the
crimes
of
National
Socialism?”

Such
an
approach
also
allows
for
a
more
coherent
narrative
of
German
history
—
one
in
which
the
Third
Reich
is
viewed
not
as
an
anomalous
malignancy
but

rather
as
a
convergence
of
events
that
include
colonialism.
To
reexamine
the
connections
among
the
Third
Reich,
the
genocide
of
the
Herero
and
Nama,
and
other
colonial
crimes
is
to
throw
a
more
critical
light
on
a
broader
arc
of
German
history,

including
the
Wilhelmine
period.
It
means
understanding
that
colonialism
had
long-
term
consequences
not
only
for
the
colonized
but
also
for
the
colonizers.

In
a
2017
essay
in
the
*Frankfurter
Allgemeine
Zeitung*,
the
German
novelist
Navid
Kermani,
born
to
Iranian
parents,

movingly
wrote
about
the
importance
of
shame
to
the
development
of
his
sense
of
national
belonging.

The
first
time
he
felt
like
a
German,
he
wrote,
was
during
a
visit
to
Auschwitz:
“Anyone
who
is
naturalized
in
Germany
will
also
need
to

bear
the
burden
of
being
German.”
He
then
summarized
German
identity
by
paraphrasing
a
Polish
rabbi,
Nachman
of
Breslov:
“There
is
nothing
more
whole
than
a
broken
heart.”
The
path
to
self-
knowledge
and
harmony,
in
other
words,
must
lead
through
a

shared
sense
of
shame.

Berlin's
only
memorial
to
the
victims
of
the
Herero
and
Nama
genocide
is
located
in
a
cemetery
near
Tempelhof,
an
airport
turned
park
at
the
southeast
edge
of
the
city
center,
and
remains
unknown
to
most
Berliners.

In
an
overgrown
corner
of
the
site,
visitors
can
find
a
granite
stone
from
1907
with
an
inscription
commemorating
seven
German
soldiers
who
“voluntarily
fought
in
the
campaigns
of
Southwest
Africa
and
died
heroes’
deaths.”
In
2009,
thanks
to
pressure
from
activists,

a
black
plaque
was
installed
below
that
inscription
to
honor
the
“victims
of
German
colonial
rule
in
Namibia.”
It
does
not
include
the
word
“genocide,”
but
at
the
bottom
it
bears
a
quote
from
Wilhelm
von
Humboldt,
the
Prussian
philosopher
and
educational

reformer:
“Only
a
person
who
knows
the
past
has
a
future.”



Thomas Rogers

Thomas
Rogers is a
writer based
in Berlin. His
reporting
about
Germany has
appeared in
*The New York
Times, Rolling
Stone, and
Bloomberg
Businessweek.*
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1. Translated
by
Anthony
Mellor-
Stapelberg
(Berghahn,
2021). ↩
2. Jürgen
Zimmerer,
*Von
Windhuk
nach*

*Auschwitz?:
Beiträge
zum
Verhältnis
von
Kolonialismus
und
Holocaust
(From
Windhoek
to
Auschwitz?:
On
the
Relationship
Between
Colonialism
and
the
Holocaust;
Münster:
LIT,
2011).*
↩

3. Jürgen
Zimmerer
and
Michael
Rothberg,
“Enttabuisiert
den
Vergleich!,”
*Die
Ziet*,
April
4,
2021. ↩

