Pseudo-academic writings on the outcome of the Russia-Ukraine War
In this essay, I offer a short critique of the article by Anatol Lieven newly published in Responsible Statecraft entitled “Where the war in Ukraine could be headed in 2023.”
There are many articles on this subject appearing in Western media as we enter the new calendar year. I single out Lieven because he brings to the subject a certain expertise in Russian affairs, impressive academic credentials earned at respected institutions of higher education and a reasonably long period of service as a professor. In a word, what we have here is an apparently academic contribution to the discussion presented by an apparently academic minded publisher.
However, let the buyer beware. What I see here in reality is pseudo-academic writing in a pseudo-academic think tank environment.
The author offers three scenarios for the conclusion of the war this year, namely by Ukrainian victory, by Russian victory and by stalemate. So far, so good. However, as we go into each scenario it is clear that Lieven has cut the narrative to lead to a predetermined outcome which just happens to provide encouragement to the people who are paying his way. The notion that this writer could be following the truth wherever it leads him relates to some other world, not the one in which Lieven operates.
Lest the reader seek to raise the same objection to my writing, I state here and now that, unlike Lieven, I have no prediction on the war’s outcome, because the strategic, let alone the tactical intentions of the Russian military in particular are at this moment entirely opaque, which is a credit to the Kremlin’s ability to hold a secret.
War reporting presently coming from Kiev and from Moscow is totally contradictory and if you do not have money on one or the other horse, you do well to guard your silence till the power balance on the ground becomes clearer thanks to an offensive launched by one side or the other.
Back to Lieven and his first scenario of an outright Ukrainian victory, by which he means the recapture of the territories occupied by Russia, a breakthrough to the Sea of Azov. He acknowledges that this would require Kiev to overcome “a major challenge” posed by Russia, and yet he holds it out as a possibility given the way the Ukrainian forces have surprised us by their valor in this war.
Let us be frank. Even among the Capitol Hill hawks, we now see outright acknowledgement these days that the chances of Ukraine liberating its lost territories are negligible. This particular scenario is offered by Lieven as red meat to the war hawks in Washington, who want to believe in the Ukrainian chance of success to justify the billions in aid now being sent their way. To make the scenario still more worthy of time and attention, and to throw a sop to its backers given its unlikelihood, Lieven sets out the risks inherent in a Russian defeat, namely some insane escalation such as Russia’s bombing Poland, Romania or other country delivering the arms to Ukraine, leading to a direct confrontation between Moscow and Washington. But a nuclear showdown, says Lieven, could point to a peace agreement in Ukraine, one that might be sweetened for Washington if at the same time Putin were removed from power.
Putin removed from power? How, and by whom?
As I have said in the past to those in the West calling for Putin’s removal, think carefully about what you wish for. Given the present day atmosphere of wartime Russia and profound social consolidation behind the armed forces, any successor to Putin coming from the ruling elites will be far more aggressive than the urbane and restrained Vladimir Vladimirovich. There are today Russian patriots calling for the removal of Lavrov as Minister of Foreign Affairs and of Shoigu as Minister of Defense and their replacement by much tougher, no nonsense statesmen. A replacement for Putin will surely arrive with his finger on the button, ready to launch a first strike nuclear attack.
Lieven’s narrative with respect to a Russian victory is equally cut to meet his preferred outcome, not an outcome dictated by the facts. From the very start, he argues that the Russians are stuck in defensive posture and have no near term plans for an offensive. And what is meant by the near term? And why not look just beyond that time period?
From this, without further ado, Lieven argues essentially that the two forces are in stalemate, his third scenario. Why stalemate? Because they have each suffered 100,000 or more casualties. Says who? Here we have the issue of Lieven’s uncritical reliance on US and British intelligence estimates. And what if the actual correlation of losses is 10 Ukrainians to 1 Russian, as some Russian estimates claim?
Just take a look at the latest development in the war on the ground. Yesterday, the Russian military command announced the results of their “revenge” strike against the Ukrainian forces in retaliation for the loss of 93 dead during the New Year’s eve Ukrainian artillery barrage on a Russian barracks in Makeyevka, Donbas. The Russians now targeted Ukrainian barracks in Kramatorsk, where there also were high concentrations of soldiers, and they claim to have killed 600 Ukrainian soldiers. Six to one. A reasonable figure to use in our calculations of losses of the sides generally. No better or worse than 1:1.
In closing, I remind readers that I have directed attention to one of the more seemingly judicious and informed journalists reporting to Western media on the war. Yet, here too the Piper calls the tune.
©Gilbert Doctorow, 2023