Dear Colleagues and Friends,
In the following essay I deal with one of the most important aspects of the growing crisis over the Ukraine -- the context into which I believe the Russians and the Ukrainians both consciously and unconsciously view it. That is, in what ways have today's Russians and Ukrainians been molded by their long historical and largely overlapping experience.
Experience, after all, is a key determinant in all human affairs. Moreover, the heritage of the past is not something or a series of "somethings" that happened long ago and are now irrelevant. Heritage is constantly reinforced in myths, songs, pageants, teachings in schools, readings in the press and proclamations by governments. Consequently, it is something the Russians and Ukrainians know by heart and that shapes their definition of what is right, just and even necessary. If we wish to understand them, we must have at least some sense of what they see.
There are of course many aspects of their experience, but I believe that two are particularly significant today: they are the growth of a sense of nationhood and a deep fear of foreigners. I argue that whether or not we like what we find or agree with their approach to today's crisis, we need to understand them.
So, to put it baldly, my aim here is to not so much to put us "on the same page" as to let us read their page. Reading that page requires some effort, and our record as well as current polls show that we rarely make the effort. As we all know, many of our fellow citizens do not know even where the Ukraine is or what language is spoken there. This is true not only of "common" citizens but even of some of those our President has selected to represent America abroad.
We are not much helped by even a careful reading of the media. Not only does it promise to tell us about the world in miniscule sound bytes, but what little is passed along is given to us by "presenters" who are often as ignorant as the rest of us. Since few of them have any ability to analyze, they can offer only clichés. And, of course, vested interests play a key role in what we are told in foreign affairs as in other affairs.
Reading the press on the Ukrainian crisis, I am struck by all of these features -- ignorance, superficiality and prejudice. The latest issue to bring these out is the way that Russian President Vladimir Putin's December 4 speech to his people was reported: there was very little analysis of what he said or why he said what he did. We didn't like what he said.; so it was simply treated as though spoken by a new Hitler. Yet, apparently it was approved by something like 85% of the Russian people. Even more striking, his stance was apparently overwhelming approved by a particularly remarkable group. That group was composed of the 23,000 "rising leaders" -- judges, lawyers, professional people and other "thinking people"-- who had been picked under a program devised by Library of Congress under a grant from the US Congress. They were not radicals and certainly did not hate America. Yet they listened to Putin with approval. If that happened, we would be foolish not to try to understand what they heard that we did not.
What other people hear when we speak is often not what we think they should hear. Some of it, of course, is that we say things that do not match what we are actually doing or have done. But much of it is simply that our experiences are different. We Americans are remarkable in many ways, but one particularly important way is that we often simply assume that other people think like we do. When they don't, we are often astonished and annoyed. Why do they not see the world as we do? 'Enry 'iggins had it right: "Why can't a woman be more like a man?" (Or a Russian like an American?)
In this essay, I have tried to make it as easy as possible to grasp enough of what has shaped the Russians and Ukrainians without distorting their "page."
Before I begin, allow me two general remarks about crises that grow out of my experiences as a policy planner and as a historian: first, I assume that all reasonable people would agree that the objective of policy should be to resolve crises in ways that restore or create a basis for security, peace and well-being.
Second, I believe that wise and constructive leaders will focus on achieving this objective and plan strategies to achieve it. However, in states where public opinion and vested interests define what is politically possible, even far-sighted leaders will be tempted to emphasize short-term, clever, tactical moves to gain advantages for their governments or for themselves and/or to disconcert the opponent.
To some extent, obviously, strategy and tactics overlap: sophisticated leaders cannot usually afford to be seen to take what the media, the public or their rivals would categorize as "soft" or "unpatriotic" positions. But, this political necessity is sometimes and should always be balanced by an understanding of where their actions lead or what new crises they create So, it is critically important to keep in mind trends and destinations beyond the headlines. I will try to do so.
I begin, as the Russians and Ukrainians do, with the sources of their deep memory.
William R. Polk December 15, 2014