An inflection point in US trade policy
22 January 2023
December
2022 highlighted how much US trade policy has changed in recent years.
It is tempting to blame the changes on former US president Donald Trump,
whose protectionist views were strongly held and clearly stated. Many
observers have been surprised by the Biden administration’s continuation
of many Trump policies, albeit with different rhetoric, which
culminated in the December rejection of two World Trade Organization
(WTO) decisions that went against the United States.
The
change is due to several developments in the global economy that have
been underway for some time. The first is the confluence of trade and
national security. US public opinion has shifted markedly against China
over the past decade and China is now viewed as both an economic and
security threat.
This
perception, combined with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, has made it
difficult to have a conversation about trade without also discussing its
impact on US national security. Much of the debate has concerned
sanctions and export controls, but the Trump tariffs on China,
especially steel and aluminium tariffs, have also been a major cause of
controversy and, in the latter case, the source of WTO litigation.
The
second change is the belief of many in the Biden administration that
traditional free trade agreements have benefitted large corporations and
their executives at the expense of workers. The administration is
determined to rectify that inequity. So far this has meant avoiding
traditional trade negotiations that include market access and instead
promoting re-shoring, or at least ’friend-shoring’, to bring
manufacturing jobs back to the United States. The recently enacted
Inflation Reduction Act is a good example of this, providing substantial
incentives for bringing manufacturing back to the United States in
sectors like semiconductors, batteries and critical minerals.
The
third change, long in the making, is companies’ interest in making
their supply chains more resilient and less vulnerable to chokepoints
and shortages caused by natural disasters, pandemics or political
interference. Here, too, companies are interested in security, though
for them it is economic and supply security rather than national
security, although the former is directly related to the latter. Company
efforts to shore up their supply chains generally have the support of
the US government.
The
result of all these trends is a thorough reassessment by both companies
and government of the risks of doing business internationally. All
three trends are at work in the US economic policy in Asia, particularly
in the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF). Although no one says it
out loud, the IPEF is about
reinforcing US presence in
the region and presenting an alternative to China’s influence, just as
the Trans-Pacific Partnership was. It is also conspicuously not about
market access.
Asian
nations looking for tangible benefits are not going to find very many.
The US approach, typified by its slogan, ’a trade policy for workers’,
focuses on better rules and standards on labour and the environment as
well as other regulatory issues.
The
changes in other countries’ policies that the United States is seeking
are not economically or politically cost-free, but so far the United
States does not seem prepared to pay for them, arguing that the changes
sought are good for these countries and for the world in order to avoid a
’race to the bottom’. That is probably true, but it is not likely to be
sufficiently persuasive by itself.
As
a result, much of the negotiation will focus on issues not directly
related to trade but which align closely with the trends noted above,
like supply chain resilience, cooperation, information sharing,
infrastructure, decarbonisation, tax and anti-corruption policies.
The
most difficult pillar will be the trade pillar. The Asian parties will
find many of the US demands difficult to accommodate and without
tangible benefits.
In
the United States, Biden has put forward the IPEF in response to
widespread criticism that he does not have an Asian economic policy. He
will soon discover that his proposals do not solve the political dilemma
of trade for the Democratic Party. The proposals are too little for the
business community who want more
market access and
too much for the Democrats’ left wing, who will oppose binding trade
agreements that might tie the Congress’ hands in developing US policy in
the future.
The
US rejection of the WTO cases that it lost will further complicate
trade negotiations by casting doubt on the US’ willingness to respect
international trade rules and undermining its credibility when it seeks
to call out other countries for their violations. The United States has
been the bulwark of the system for the past 75 years, but it now risks
becoming the chief offender.
If
the other parties to the IPEF begin to doubt the US commitment to
expanding trade and to the international rules that govern it, two
things are likely to happen. The IPEF negotiations will be more
difficult to conclude and the other nations may start devoting more of
their time and resources to other regional groups, such as RCEP and
APEC. This would not be in the US’ interest and the consequential
increasing in China’s economic influence in the region may not
ultimately be in theirs.
William
Reinsch holds the Scholl Chair in International Business at the Center
for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC.