A sad reality is setting in: The Russia-Ukraine war will not end anytime soon. This possibility had already been raised by the middle of 2022, but Ukraine’s massive counteroffensive in September resulted in rapid gains, raising hopes in the West of a quick path to victory. Those hopes are now fading.
Writing recently in Foreign Affairs, Jim Goldgeier and Ivo Daalder observed that Ukraine would have great difficulty regaining all its territory, including Crimea, “even with greater Western military aid,” as that “would require the collapse of dug-in and reinforced Russian defenses.” Similarly, retired British Air Marshal Edward Stringer recently told the Wall Street Journal, “By continuing to drip-feed just enough for Ukraine not to lose, what the West is doing is just prolonging the war.”
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s recent visit to Washington underlined the point: A key reason for the trip was to buttress continued U.S. support, which Zelensky referred to as an “investment” in his address to a joint session of the U.S. Congress. He wouldn’t have made that speech if he thought the war would be over soon.
Nevertheless, even if the war drags on for some time more, it will end someday. But what will that ending look like? A complete Ukrainian victory and total Russian collapse? Russia regrouping and turning the tide? A perpetual stalemate that leaves both sides exhausted, but, like the Korean War, without a formal peace?
In all likelihood, the ending will be a negotiated settlement, though the terms of that settlement remain to be seen. Perhaps Ukraine will accept Russia retaining control of Crimea, if not the Donbas. Or maybe Russia will drop its opposition to Ukraine’s entry into NATO. These and many other possibilities are conceivably on the table.
But having possibilities on the table is not enough to end the war. Russia and Ukraine must be willing to sit down together at that table, and they are currently far from doing so. Indeed, for many observers, it’s appalling to think that Ukraine, which was the victim of Russia’s unprovoked attack, should ever grant anything to Russia in order to end the war. But in all likelihood a deal ending the war will be brokered, with both sides making concessions.
For one thing, a negotiated settlement to the war is consistent with the historical record. We tend to think of wars ending in the manner that World War II ended, both in Europe and Asia: with unconditional surrender. But that is simply not the case with most wars, including large wars.
Negotiated settlements are much more common. This has long been known by those who study war, be they military historians or security studies scholars. Back in 1916, Coleman Phillipson published a book titled “Termination of War and Treaties of Peace,” which, as the title suggests, showed that peace treaties whereby the two sides make concessions is how wars usually ended. Over 60 years later, Berenice Carroll identified the same trend. Over 100 years later, the finding that states end wars by agreement remains true, though states have increasingly dispensed with the signing of the actual treaties. Wars are now more likely to end in ambiguous outcomes where both sides can claim something from the war, but clear “white flag” surrenders by one side to the other remain rare.
While Russia can’t win, it won’t lose. Instead, it will hold out until Ukraine is willing to bargain.
Second, Russia started this war because it preferred war over a negotiated bargain. A core finding from the scholarship on war is that while it would seem sensible for the sides to strike a deal and avoid the death and destruction of fighting, wars occur because one side—and sometimes both—thinks it can win easily. And an easy victory that delivers all of a belligerent’s objectives at low cost is more attractive than a bargained agreement that only ensures some of them. Only after the war begins and the fighting reveals that victory will not be as easy as imagined will the sides return to bargaining.
This dynamic is clearly on display in how this war has unfolded. Russia launched its invasion under the apparent assumption that it would be a cakewalk. That this assumption has been proven wrong means Russian President Vladimir Putin should call off the invasion and bring his troops home, right? Unfortunately, it is not unusual to see aggressors double down when it’s clear they can’t win. Leaders often continue to prosecute wars, out of a concern that losing will be electorally costly or lead to a horrible personal postwar fate, or else because the losing side can’t be confident that the other will stop fighting, especially since suing for peace makes its own weakness readily apparent. While Russia can’t win, it won’t lose. Instead, it will hold out until Ukraine is willing to bargain.
Third and related, the fighting is on track to produce an indecisive battlefield outcome. While Russia will not accept defeat, Ukraine will have great difficulty achieving victory, defined as fully driving Russian forces out of the country. Indeed, some observers, such as former U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and former Defense Secretary Robert Gates, think time is actually on Russia’s side. Even if that is not the case, this war is likely to drag on for a long time with neither side clearly gaining an advantage.
Consider the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s. That deadly confrontation lasted for 8 years, resulting in over a million battlefield deaths, until eventually the two sides were simply ready to stop fighting. The war ended when both Iran and Iraq accepted United Nations Security Council Resolution 598, with the final outcome closely resembling the conditions existing prior to the outbreak of fighting. There is a real possibility that the war in Ukraine could come to resemble that conflict.
Admittedly, the war’s dynamics could change. For instance, the recognition that this may become a “long war” is fueling the “Free the Leopards” campaign, an attempt to push the German government into allowing NATO member states to re-export their German-produced Leopard tanks to Ukraine. But current conditions suggest that the war’s most likely outcome is a negotiated settlement, once the two sides eventually recognize that only striking a deal can end the hostilities.
That settlement can and should be on Kyiv’s terms, not dictated by Ukraine’s Western allies. But that is also why this is likely to be a long war. For as long as it enjoys Western support, Ukraine can avoid defeat, but will not be able to achieve victory. Meanwhile, Russia can’t win, but will not accept losing. The combination means this war will almost certainly continue, well past the upcoming one-year anniversary of Russia’s invasion. Indeed, it could well last through several such anniversaries before both sides are ready to settle. It’s a sad realization, but one that is also consistent with what we know about war.
Paul Poast is an associate professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Chicago and a nonresident fellow at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs.