Like
most military technological innovations, the ability to make a modern
main battle tank survivable has been outstripped by the fielding of
defensive systems designed to overcome such defenses. If a modern
military force attempted to launch a large-scale tank-dominated attack
against a well-equipped peer-level opponent armed with modern anti-tank
missiles, the result would be a decisive defeat for the attacking party
marked by the smoking hulks of burned-out tanks.
Don’t
get me wrong: tanks still have a vital role to play on the modern
battlefield. Their status as a mobile bunker is invaluable in the kind
of meat-grinder conflicts of attrition that have come to define the
current stage of large-scale ground combat. Speed and armor still
contribute to survivability, and the main gun of a tank remains one of
the deadliest weapons on the modern battlefield.
But
the modern tank performs best as part of a combined arms team,
supported by infantry (mounted and unmounted) and copious amounts of
supporting arms (artillery and close air support.) As part of such a
team, especially one that is well-trained in the art of close combat, the tank remains an essential weapon of war. However, if operated in isolation, a tank is simply an expensive mobile coffin.
Much
has been made about the recent decision made by NATO and allied nations
to provide Western main battle tanks to Ukraine. The politics of this
decision is its own separate topic. This article will address the
operational practicalities of this decision, namely has the military
capability of Ukraine been enhanced through the provision of these new
weapons systems.
To
answer this question, one needs to examine three basic issues:
training, logistical sustainability, and operational employment.
Training
It
takes 22 weeks to train a basic American M1 Abrams crewmember. That
training just gives the soldier the very basic skill set to be
functional. Actual operational expertise is only achieved through
months, if not years, of additional training in not just the system
itself, but employing it as part of a similarly trained combine arms
team. Simply put, even a Ukrainian tank crew experienced in the
operation of Soviet-era T-72 or T-64 tanks will not be able to
immediately transition to a Western-style main battle tank.
T-72B3M main battle tanks from the 1st Guards Tank Regiment at Red Square
© Sputnik / Yevganiy Odinokov
First
and foremost, the crew size of a Soviet-era tank is three, reflecting
the reality that the Soviet tanks make use of an automatic loading
mechanism. Western tanks have four crew members because the loading of
the main tank gun is done manually. Adapting to these dynamics takes
time, and requires extensive training.
Training
is expensive. NATO is currently providing Ukraine with three types of
Western main battle tank: the British Challenger 2, the German Leopard
2, and the American M1A2. There is no unified training course—each tank requires its own unique training prospectus that is not directly transferable to another system.
The
decentralized training processes created by such a diverse approach
promotes inefficiencies and generates discrepancies in outcome—one crew
will not be like another, which in combat, where units are supposed to
be interchangeable to promote predictable outcomes if all other
circumstances remain the same, is usually fatal.
Moreover,
these problems will only be enhanced by the emphasis that will be
placed on rapid outcomes. The reality is whatever training programs that
are developed and delivered by the nations providing the tanks will be
insufficient to the task, resulting in poorly trained crews taking
extremely complicated weapons systems into the most dangerous
environment in the world for a tank—the teeth of a Russian Army designed
and equipped to kill these very same tanks.
Logistical Sustainability
Tanks
are among the most technically challenging weapons systems on a modern
battlefield. They are constantly breaking down, especially if not
properly maintained. For the M1 Abrams,
for every hour a tank is in the field, there are three hours of
maintenance time required. This problem only becomes magnified in
combat.
Normally
an armor unit is equipped with highly specialized organic maintenance
crews that can repair most of the minor issues that can sideline a tank.
Given the training requirements to produce this level of high-quality
mechanic, it is unlikely Ukraine will be provided with this kind of
maintenance support.
A
Ukrainian artilleryman throws an empty 155MM shell tube as Ukrainian
soldiers fire a M777 howitzer towards Russian positions on the frontline
of eastern Ukraine, on November 23, 2022.
This
means that the tanks that are being provided to Ukraine will need to be
returned to NATO nations for any significant repairs of equipment that
is damaged through simple usage or actual combat. In short, it is highly
likely that a Western main battle tank in Ukrainian hands will break
down at some point during its operational use by Ukraine, meaning that
the total number of tanks available to Ukraine will be far less than the
number of tanks provided.
Operational Employment
Ukraine’s commander in chief of the Armed Forces, General Valerii Zaluzhnyi, told The Economist
last month that he needed 300 tanks, 500 infantry fighting vehicles,
and 500 artillery pieces, if he were going to have any chance of
defeating Ukraine.
Following
the January 20 meeting of the Ramstein Contact Group, and subsequent
follow-on discussions about the provision of tanks, NATO and its allied
partners have agreed to provide less than 50% of the number of tanks
requested, less than 50% of the number of infantry fighting vehicles
requested, and less than 20% of the artillery requested.
Moreover,
the timetable for delivery of this equipment is staggered incoherently
over a period that stretches out for many months, and in some cases
extends into the next year. Not only does this complicate training and
logistical sustainability issues that are already unfavorably inclined
for Ukraine, but it makes any meaningful effort to integrate this
material into a cohesive operational employment plan all but impossible.
In short, Ukraine will be compelled to commit the equipment
provided—especially the tanks—into combat in piecemeal fashion.
The truth about tanks is that NATO and its allied nations are making Ukraine weaker,
not stronger, by providing them with military systems that are overly
complicated to operate, extraordinarily difficult to maintain, and
impossible to survive unless employed in a cogent manner while supported
by extensive combined arms partners.
The
decision to provide Ukraine with Western main battle tanks is,
literally, a suicide pact, something those who claim they are looking
out for the best interests of Ukraine should consider before it is too
late.