Joseph Fitsanakis, Intellinews, 30/1/23
ON FRIDAY, DECEMBER 30, 2022, an assailant on a motorcycle opened
fire on Sinan Ateş, the leader of Turkey’s most feared
paramilitary force, known as the Grey Wolves. By that evening, the
38-year-old Ateş had expired in an Ankara hospital, prompting
analysts to forewarn that Turkish politics had entered new and
unchartered territory. Indeed, some observers claim that Ateş’
assassination may impact Turkey’s upcoming presidential elections
in unpredictable ways. The leading political figures in this
strategically important NATO member-state, including its
authoritarian leader, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, are paying close
attention.
Turkey’s Far-Right Shock Troops
Known officially as the Idealist Clubs Educational and Cultural
Foundation, the Grey Wolves organization is the paramilitary arm
of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), a militant political
force that occupies most of the far-right space of Turkish
politics. The MHP espouses authoritarian and anti-Western views
and is violently opposed to negotiations with Turkey’s ethnic
minorities, including the Kurds. Its politics appeal to
ultra-conservative voters, who are usually male and over the age
of 35. The Grey Wolves operate as the MHP’s shock troops, often
engaging in bloody street fights against Kurds, leftists, and
other popular forces that stand in opposition to the Turkish
far-right. Known for their machismo and violent bravado, the Grey
Wolves appeal to working-class men in their teens and twenties. In
essence, therefore, the MHP and the Grey Wolves are two sides of
the same coin.
In 2015, the MHP formed an electoral pact with President Erdoğan’s
Justice and Development Party (AKP). The formation of this pact,
known as the People’s Alliance, marked the culmination of a long
process of informal cooperation between the two sides, which had
been going on since at least 2007. The People’s Alliance has been
instrumental in preserving the AKP’s domination of Turkish
political life in recent years, despite the loss of popularity
that President Erdoğan has been experiencing. Currently the AKP
relies directly on the MHP’s parliamentary support to rule Turkey
with a minority government. The Grey Wolves, which tend to be more
unruly than their parent organization, are nominally in support of
Erdoğan, but tend to see him as too mellow and not sufficiently
authoritarian.
The Fragmentation of the MHP
The MPH likes to project itself as a unified militant
organization. In reality, it has always been the product of an
uneasy alliance between disparate far-right groups. Its membership
ranges from social conservatives to ultranationalists, Hanafi
(Sunni) puritans and even neo-fascists. In 2017, when the MHP and
the AKP formed the People’s Alliance, several of these groups
voiced serious misgivings about aligning themselves with Erdoğan.
Eventually, a vocal faction of pro-Western and secularist
conservatives left the party over concerns that the MHP would be
completely absorbed by the pro-Islamist and anti-Western AKP.
These dissenters proceeded to form the İyi Parti (Good Party), a
reformist conservative movement, which has since grown to rival
the MHP in popularity. Some observers now claim that the formation
of the Good Party may have halved the MHP’s electoral strength. As
can be expected, the ideological split between the MHP and the
Good Party quickly spilled over to the Grey Wolves. By 2021,
dozens of leading Grey Wolves members had left the group and had
joined the splinter organization. Throughout that time, the
charismatic Ateş, who had been appointed chairman of the Grey
Wolves in 2019, remained largely silent.
By 2020, however, there were rumors that Ateş was himself close to
resigning from the MHP and joining the Good Party. Had that
happened, it would have placed Devlet Bahçeli, the veteran
chairman of the MHP, in a very difficult position, as it would
most likely further-weaken his rule inside the MHP. The rumors
that Ateş may soon leave the MHP intensified in April of 2020,
when he announced his resignation from the post of chairman of the
Grey Wolves. However, Ateş did not resign from the MHP, nor did he
leave the Grey Wolves. In his resignation letter, he praised the
militant organization and declared his allegiance to Bahçeli.
Nevertheless, many believed that Ateş’ resignation from the Grey
Wolves was the first step in his gradual distancing from the MHP,
a process that would most likely conclude with him openly joining
the Good Party.
Who Killed Ateş?
By all accounts, Ateş was killed just weeks before officially
joining the Good Party. Following his assassination, some of his
closest advisors said he had been holding rounds of consultations
with Good Party leaders in the weeks before he was killed. So far,
15 individuals have been arrested by the Ankara Police Department,
which is in charge of the investigation into Ateş’ murder. All
have strong connections with the MHP or the Grey Wolves. Moreover,
no senior leader of the Grey Wolves or the MHP, including Bahçeli,
has issued a statement of condolence about Ateş’ killing. This is
highly peculiar, given that Ateş had spent his entire adult life
in the Grey Wolves, and was Bahçeli’s prodigy and closest
confidant.
But was this a political assassination? One must keep in mind that
the Grey Wolves is not simply a political organization. It is also
a powerful economic conglomerate, with complex business interests
that, some claim, often cross the line between legitimate and
illegitimate dealings. Some of these illicit activities allegedly
include the transportation of illegal drugs, selling protection
services, running prostitution rings, as well as engaging in
large-scale human trafficking within Turkey, as well as in Europe
and Asia. It is therefore difficult to separate the Grey Wolves’
—and arguably MHP’s— political role from its financial activities.
It follows that one should not completely rule out the possibility
of a criminal or mafia-related motive behind Ateş’ killing.
Major Political Ramifications
Nevertheless, Ateş’ assassination has direct, and possibly
enormous, political ramifications for Turkey, as the already
country braces for a highly polarized presidential election this
coming May. Indeed, there is a growing sense among seasoned
observers that the potential consequences of the Ateş affair for
the upcoming election may be just beginning to be seen. There are
claims that, as a result of the MHP-Good Party split, and the
ensuing vendetta between the two factions, the MHP’s electoral
support may have dropped to below 4 percent of the national vote.
If true, that would contrast dramatically with the group’s
electoral popularity in 2015, which peaked at over 14 percent of
the national vote.
With a weakened MHP, it is likely that President Erdoğan’s ability
to cling on to power may weaken substantially in the coming
months. Recent polls show the Turkish strongman may in fact end up
third in May’s election, which would be a remarkable development
for such a dominant figure in modern Turkish political life. For
several years now, the MHP has been referred to as “Erdoğan’s
political lifeline”. This lifeline is now shrinking, and the Ateş
affair may deliver the far-right party a fatal blow. An unstable
and weakened MHP would likely have a dramatic impact on the
political future of Erdoğan, and may alter the whole of Turkish
politics in unprecedented ways.