Russia sent General Khalifa Haftar about 1200 Wagner group mercenaries
as well as Russian armed forces and warplanes to help him in Libya's
civil war and it remains his most committed ally. [photo credit: social
media]
A War on the Wagner Group?
Since Haftar’s war on Tripoli collapsed in summer 2020, Libya has
seen relative peace. While there have been limited skirmishes, the mass
mobilisations and heavy fighting that hallmarked 2014-2020 haven’t
returned. This is partially the result of a balance of power between
Russia and Türkiye reducing Libya to just another talking point in the
regional Putin-Erdogan rivalry. But for Russia, Libya was an early test
case for a new form of foreign policy, imperialism via Private Military
Contractor (PMC). By channelling their Libya policy through a PMC,
Russia was able to retain a sense of plausible deniability on global
stages like the UN Security Council while seizing assets and fastening
friendships with important regional actors like the UAE and Egypt. While
Russia and Haftar may have lost the war, Wagner forces were still able
to secure three military bases down Libya’s centre, and most Libyan oil
installations.
Russia’s entrenched position has long caused angst in London and
Washington but was treated nonchalantly by Europeans. While Russia
secured a military airbase about 450 miles from NATO’s Sicily
headquarters, they hadn’t moved in any equipment to render it a direct
threat. Similarly, Haftar Libyan oil accounts for less than 1% of global
supply meaning Europe could comfortably turn a blind eye. But Russia’s
war on Ukraine changed everything. Not only did the Western world
finally realise Vladimir Putin wasn’t just being dramatic when he
routinely framed himself as their existential enemy, alternatives to
Russian energy had to be quickly secured. Russia was also using Libya as
a beachhead for a Wagner driven Africa policy that was claiming
valuable resources across the continent whilst driving European
expulsions from key countries like Mali and Burkina Faso.
Nevertheless, little was actually done about it, perhaps due to a
naïve belief that the political process would progress and lead to the
expulsion of all foreign forces. As that dream fades, this appears to be
changing. On January 13, CIA director William Burns visited
both Dabeiba in Tripoli, and Haftar in Benghazi. This rare trip was
seemingly focused on what’s been dubbed the ‘Wagner Triangle’ of
military bases at Ghardabiya in Sirte, Jufra in central Libya, and Brak
al Shati in Libya’s south together with the need to reliably secure oil.
Burns also allegedly demanded Haftar break with Wagner, something the
Marshal refused with a flimsy excuse that it would lead Türkiye to
attack him. The US solution seems to be to form a joint Libyan force to
reclaim Ghardabiya airbase and, gradually, other Wagner positions in
Libya. Many consider this dubious given the complete dependence of
Haftar’s forces on Wagner. Even the alternative discussed amongst
western Libyan forces of replicating the model through which they had
reclaimed Sirte from ISIS – of a broad coalition, with Western support
that Haftar is invited to join but probably won’t – was considered
unlikely for many reasons. Not only are Libyan forces notoriously
difficult to organise and campaign through, but it would have incendiary
domestic and regional political affects.
However, the January 20th designation of Wagner group as a transnational criminal organisation
shows America’s anti-Wagner campaign is serious and growing. This new
designation prohibits Americans from providing any services to the group
putting US citizen Haftar in an awkward position. With both Wagner and
Haftar under pressure and looking to strengthen their Libyan hand, a
renewed oil embargo is a likely development. But given the current
environment, this time around any blockade could trigger long-discussed
plans for the Tripoli government to seize southwestern oilfields from
Haftar with Turkish assistance. This could easily spiral out of control,
making Libya and north Africa an early victim of a new US war on
Wagner.
Tomorrow in the newsletter Tarek Megerisi examines the second
black swan: renewed hostilities breaking out in Libya and potentially
beyond over natural gas contestations in the eastern Mediterranean.