No. 014/2023 dated 30 January 2023
By Tomohiko Satake
SYNOPSIS
Japan perceives that the security environment it operates in has continued to worsen and its existing defence arrangements need “fundamental reinforcement.” Japan has sought to break away from its previous low-profile security posture and to strengthen its defence capabilities through strategic use of military assets and supply lines, advanced technologies, economic security, and partnerships with like-minded countries.
COMMENTARY
The
resurgence of great power competition has had a significant impact on
Japan's security. Previously, Japan’s major security concerns came
mostly from North Korea’s missiles and “grey zone” threats that fall
short of major conflicts. Because of rising tensions in the Taiwan
Strait and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, however, there has been growing
concerns about the possibility of high-end conventional conflicts, or
even nuclear ones. It has been increasingly common for analysts to
observe that a “Taiwan contingency is a Japanese contingency” and that
"today's Ukraine may be tomorrow's Asia.”
This explains why
Japan has actively supported Ukraine’s resistance to Russia’s invasion
and, in line with its European partners, imposed strong sanctions
against Russia. Despite Japan’s previous efforts to avoid a two-front
war with Russia and China, these two countries have increasingly aligned
themselves and coordinated their joint military actions in areas
surrounding Japan. China has continued to expand its maritime and air
activities around Japan and has more than 2,000 missiles within range of
Japan. With North Korea’s continuing advance in its nuclear and missile
capabilities, Japan now faces security challenges on three fronts.
Given
the worst-ever security environment since the end of World War II,
Japan’s political stance in the great power competition has become
clearer than before. Japan can no longer enjoy the luxury of keeping its
distance from this competition, and has, in fact, become increasingly
involved as an important player. Japan’s active support to Ukraine, as
well as its active diplomacy in the G7 and NATO, have clearly
demonstrated its determination to support the Western community. So long
as the existing order continues to be challenged by revisionist powers,
Japan is likely to maintain this posture.
Fundamental Reinforcements of Defence Capabilities
Faced
with this strong sense of crisis, Japan is moving forward rapidly with
efforts to "fundamentally reinforce" its defence capabilities. According
to Japan’s brand-new National Defence Strategy released in
December 2022, the "fundamental reinforcement" of its defence capability
includes seven elements: (1) stand-off defence capability, (2)
integrated air and missile defence capability, (3) unmanned defence
capability, (4) cross-domain operation capability, (5) command and
control and intelligence-related functions, (6) mobile deployment
capability/civil protection, and (7) sustainability and resiliency. To
strengthen these capabilities, Japan aims to increase defence-related
budgets by up to 2 per cent of GDP by 2027.
Regarding the
enhancement of standoff defence capabilities, Japan’s Self-Defence
Forces (SDF) has long sought to build a defence capability that would
not pose a threat to other countries, such as, by intentionally
shortening the range of its fighter jets. Japan has reviewed this policy
in the face of China’s anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) strategy, as
well as the expanding "missile gap" between the two countries. The SDF
has already decided to extend the range of the Type 12 surface-to-ship
guided missiles deployed in the Nansei Islands and to acquire JSM
air-to-ship missiles and JASSM air-to-surface missiles for use on
fighter aircraft. It has also reportedly considered introducing
submarine-launched cruise missiles.
In addition, lessons learned
from the war in Ukraine include the need to strengthen the ability to
sustain the war effort over the long term. In particular, it has become
urgent to secure ammunition and fuel depots in the Southwest Islands
(which will be the base of operations for the SDF and US forces in the
event of a contingency), increase equipment production, and enhance
warfighting capability through rapidity in the transportation of troops
and supplies. To prepare for missile attacks, the strengthening of base
compatibility and the decentralized deployment of military assets are
also being discussed.
Japan has also sought to strengthen defence
capabilities by using advanced technologies such as AI, unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAV), and quantum technology. In addition to research into
the development of stand-off electronic warfare aircraft, unmanned
underwater vehicle (UUV) technology, and high-speed glide bombs for
island defence, Japan’s Defense Equipment Agency is also working with
the private sector to strengthen the development of technologies that
could be "game changers" in the future. Those technologies may
potentially include directed energy weapons or quantum positioning
systems. The introduction of attack-type UAVs is reportedly also being
considered.
Japan has also enhanced the SDF’s interoperability
with the military forces of allies and friends to strengthen deterrence.
In particular, Japan has promoted institutional, tactical, and
strategic integration with the United States, with particular emphasis
on the integration of US forces and the SDF in new domains. As part of
this effort, for example, the Ground SDF and the US Army’s Multi-Domain
Task Force conducted joint training in the Southwest Islands in August
last year. The Ministry of Defense has also decided to establish a
permanent joint headquarters to provide for unified command of the SDF’s
ground, maritime and air forces. This could also contribute to
jointness and interoperability between SDF and US military units.
Further,
Japan has strengthened its partnerships with countries other than the
US. In January 2021, Japan and Australia agreed to a Reciprocal Access
Agreement (RAA). The SDF also began protecting Australian military
assets in 2021. In November 2022, the two countries announced a new
Declaration of Security Cooperation, which made it clear that Japan and
Australia would consult and consider joint actions in the event of
regional contingencies. Japan also concluded an RAA with the United
Kingdom in January 2023. With India, Japan agreed to promote defence
equipment and technology cooperation, as well as conducting a first
fighter jet training exercise.
Finally, Japan has stepped up its
defence engagement with Indo-Pacific countries under the banner of a
"Free and Open Indo-Pacific". The Indo-Pacific Deployment – a long-term
deployment mission conducted by Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force
(MSDF) that began in 2017 – has returned to normal operations after a
temporary reduction in size and duration due to the spread of COVID-19.
In 2022, the total number deployed amounted to 980 personnel from air
and maritime force units, the largest number ever. In addition to
Australia and India, SDF units have also been deployed to Pacific Island
countries such as Solomon Islands, Tonga, and Papua New Guinea,
strengthening the SDF's presence in the region.
Economic Security
Another
important measure to cope with diversified threats is the promotion of
economic security. Since 2019, the Japanese government has been rapidly
developing new organizations, posts, and laws related to economic
security. In May 2022, the Law for the Promotion of Economic Security
was passed by the Diet. The new law aims at strengthening supply chain
resilience, protection of critical infrastructures, support for the
development of emerging technologies, and the closed-door filing of
patent applications. Japan has also strengthened economic security
cooperation with the US through the economic version of the “2 plus 2”
talks newly established in April 2022.
Key concepts in Japan's
economic security policy are "strategic autonomy" and "strategic
indispensability.” The former concept entails the strengthening of the
foundations essential for the maintenance of national life and
socioeconomic activities in extreme circumstances in order to avoid
excessive dependence on other countries. The latter concept, on the
contrary, is about Japan's strategic intent to develop and produce
internationally indispensable technologies and capabilities and to
create situations where other countries are forced to depend on Japan.
To achieve these goals, Japan has sought to invest resources in
internationally competitive fields, such as semiconductor materials or
machine technologies.
Since the end of World War II, Japan has
prioritized economic activities over security under the so-called
"Yoshida Doctrine." Although security has never been neglected, Japan
has considered it prudent to take a low profile in this aspect so long
as it could come under the security umbrella of the United States. Now,
however, the economy could become subordinate to military security, and
the Kishida administration is working to increase defence spending under
the banner of "fundamentally reinforcing" defence capabilities.
Apparently, the long era of peace, a low-profile defence posture and
heavy reliance on the US, has come to an end, and Japan is stepping up
to a critical turning point in its approach to security and defence.
Tomohiko
Satake is a Senior Research Fellow of Japan’s National Institute for
Defense Studies (NIDS). Views expressed in this commentary do not
reflect the official views of NIDS or the Ministry of Defense of Japan.
This commentary is an adapted version of the article published in the
CSCAP Regional Security Outlook 2023, which is available on the CSCAP
website (www.cscap.org).