

Part III

Morality and Beauty

Hume on Moral Rationalism, Sentimentalism, and Sympathy

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Introduction

The eighteenth-century sentimentalists based morality in our affections and sentiments. There are two ways they do this. First, what has moral value are certain first-order sentiments, passions, and affections, which motivate us to act, and actions expressive of these sentiments. Second, what makes them valuable are our reflective, second-order sentiments, sentiments we have about our sentiments or those of others. We feel approval or disapproval towards ourselves or others for having and acting on certain first-order sentiments and affections. David Hume traced our reflective second-order sentiments to sympathy, which makes his theory the most powerful version of sentimentalism ever produced. I will explain why his account of morality is powerful, but first I briefly describe the approach he takes in his moral theory.

Hume steps into an ongoing philosophical debate about the foundation of morality that Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) initiated. Hobbes, as his contemporaries read him, believed we are naturally self-interested, power-hungry creatures. Without some sort of society our lives would be “nasty, brutish, and short.” We thus agree to hand over our power to a sovereign, who not only makes the laws that are necessary for us to live together, but who also has the power to make us comply with them. Acting morally is a matter of complying with the laws the sovereign establishes, but the basis of morality is our self-interested desire to preserve ourselves.

Two kinds of moral theory developed in reaction to Hobbes – rationalism and sentimentalism. Both objected to Hobbes’s theory, but on different grounds. By the time Hume wrote the *Treatise of Human Nature*, however, almost everyone agreed that Hobbes’s theory had been refuted. With Hobbes’s theory no longer on the table, there were only two possibilities for Hume to consider – rationalism or sentimentalism. If one falls, the other stands. Thus, he thinks he must show that moral rationalism fails before he can present his sentimentalist account of morality. His arguments against moral rationalism are found in the *Treatise* 3.1.1, 3.2.1, and in *An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals*, Appendix I. He presents his version of sentimentalism in Book 3 of the *Treatise*, the *Enquiry*, and in various essays. The *Treatise* account is the most interesting, innovative, and thorough statement of his theory.

In the first section, I provide the philosophical background necessary for understanding both Hume's arguments against moral rationalism and his version of sentimentalism. In the next section, I examine Hume's arguments against the rationalists, and in the following section, I turn to his account of morality, especially his idea that morality springs from sympathy.

Philosophical Background

Hume's rationalist opponents

Hume has two rationalists in mind – Samuel Clarke (1675–1729) and William Wollaston (1660–1724). His primary target is Samuel Clarke, who defends rationalism in the second volume of *A Discourse concerning the Unchangeable Obligations of Natural Religion* (1706). Clarke appeals to reason to explain almost every facet of morality. Moral rules are rules of reason, so acting morally and acting rationally are the same. We perceive moral rules by means of reason alone. The rational awareness that an action is right has the power to obligate us and to motivate us.

Clarke claims that there are certain eternal and necessary relations in which God, human beings and other entities stand. It follows from these relations that certain actions are fit or unfit to be done. He believes that each kind of thing has a nature or essence, knowable by reason. The different natures of things determine the different relations in which things stand to one another. They, in turn, make certain actions fit or unfit. These relations are eternal and necessary, and impart a kind of immutability and necessity to actions. Most of Clarke's examples bring in the idea of comparative fitness: one kind of action is more fit than another in certain circumstances. Because God is infinitely superior to us, it is more fitting that we should worship and obey him than dishonor him. Because He is the supreme ruler, dispensing rewards and punishment, it is more fitting that He should make innocent people happy than miserable.

Clarke frequently compares moral truths to mathematical truths, claiming they are self-evident, certain, and knowable in the same way that fundamental mathematical axioms are. Consider the axiom that the whole is greater than the part. As long as you know what the terms in it mean, you know that it is true and certain. You don't need to make any observations or conduct any research; reason alone enables you to know it. Clarke believes that the fitness and unfitness of actions are self-evident and certain in the same way. Like John Locke (1632–1704), he thinks that if we begin with these self-evident truths, we may demonstratively prove certain moral rules, although neither produced such a demonstration.

Clarke objected to Hobbes's idea that the good person needs to be prodded by sanctions to do what is right. Genuinely virtuous action is rational action, and we do not need sanctions to do what we have a reason to do. We may be motivated simply by the rational intuition that an action is fitting or obligatory, that is, by the motive of duty, the motive from which the morally good person acts.

At one point Clarke says that evildoers, by opposing the nature and relations of things, "endeavor to make things be what they are not, and cannot be," which he thought is

as absurd as trying to change a mathematical truth (Clarke 1706: 201). William Wollaston, the second rationalist Hume opposes, constructs his entire moral theory around this idea. But, unlike Clarke, for whom the basic moral notions are fitness and unfitness, Wollaston argues that moral goodness and evil may be reduced to truth and falsehood. His only work, *The Religion of Nature delineated* (1724), was extremely popular during his lifetime, but, as we will see, he later became the butt of jokes.

Wollaston argues that we are able to say things not only with words, but also with actions. Defining true propositions as those that express things as they are, he maintains that actions may express, declare, or assert propositions, by which he means something more than that we understand gestures such as laughing or weeping. To use his example, if one group of soldiers fires on another, the first group's actions declare that the second are their enemy. If they aren't, their declaration is false. Since we can understand actions, they – like sentences – have meaning, and whatever has a meaning is capable of truth and falsity. Immoral actions deny things to be what they are, and thus express false propositions. If I break a promise, I falsely declare I never made one. If I am ungrateful, I falsely assert that I never received favors from you. To treat things as being what they are not is, for Wollaston, as irrational and absurd as denying that $2 + 2 = 4$.

The sentimentalists' reading of the rationalists

Francis Hutcheson (1649–1746), Hume's sentimentalist predecessor, opposes moral rationalism in his book, *Illustrations upon the Moral Sense* (1728). He was a brilliant arguer and Hume freely employs many of his objections to rationalism. Hutcheson claims that God gave us, in addition to the other senses, a special moral sense that disposes us to feel approval or disapproval when we contemplate people's character traits. He argues that the only character trait the moral sense approves of is benevolence. Temperance, courage, prudence, and justice are virtuous only when motivated by benevolence. He distinguishes universal benevolence, which aims at the happiness of all human beings, from particular forms of benevolence, such as patriotism, parental love, and pity. The former is the morally best motive.

Hume follows Hutcheson in translating moral rationalism into a sentimentalist framework. One surprising advantage the sentimentalists had over the moral rationalists is that they had a more fully developed view of reason and they reinterpret rationalism in terms of it. They characterize reason in two ways.

The first is that reason compares ideas to find relations among them. Reasoning is “nothing but a *comparison*, and a discovery of those relations . . . which two or more objects bear to each other” (T 1.3.2.2). Hume calls these relations, the philosophical relations. Later on in the *Treatise*, he divides them into two types – relations of ideas and matters of fact. The four relations of ideas are resemblance, degrees of quality, contrariety, and proportion in quantity. We may find the first three relations simply by inspecting and comparing the ideas themselves. By inspecting my idea of an orange and my idea of a lemon, I find that oranges are sweeter than lemons. To ascertain proportion in quantity, however, we must engage in a more extensive reasoning process – we must produce a demonstration. Hume clearly has Clarke in mind and probably Locke as well.

Matters of fact include identity, contiguity, and causality. To determine whether any of these relations hold, we must consult experience rather than examining our ideas. We discover the first two relations by direct perception. Causal reasoning is the only way to judge matters of fact we don't directly perceive; it involves a more complicated process of reasoning. While Hume doesn't have any particular rationalist in mind who belongs in this group, its inclusion makes his survey exhaustive.

The second way Hume characterizes reason is that it consists in the discovery of truth or falsehood. Hume has Wollaston in mind here, since he tries to reduce moral goodness and evil to truth and falsehood. Like Hutcheson, Hume isn't sure how to interpret Wollaston's criterion of immoral actions, so he looks at a number of possible interpretations, and argues that none of them make sense.

There is another important way in which Hume follows Hutcheson in translating moral rationalism into a sentimentalist framework. Roughly speaking, we may distinguish two different aspects of a moral theory – a spectator component and an agent component. The spectator component is primarily concerned with answering questions that arise when we assess people: when is it appropriate to hold people responsible and to praise or blame them for what they have done? The agent component is primarily concerned with answering questions that arise when we deliberate: what should or ought I to do? Every complete moral theory must include a discussion of both components, although philosophers tend to privilege either the spectator or the agent component.

Hume like Hutcheson takes the basic moral concepts to be spectator concepts – praise and blame, approval and disapproval – rather than the concepts agents use in deciding what to do – right and wrong, fit and unfit. Both build their moral theories around the idea of an admiring and disapproving spectator. Both also think that what we approve and disapprove of in the first instance are people's character traits and the motives that typically spring from those traits. As such they offer a theory about what character traits are morally good and bad – a theory of virtue and vice. Actions, as they see them, are merely external signs of inner character traits and motives. Actions are appropriate objects of praise and blame, but only when they express people's character traits and motives.

Clarke and Wollaston, by contrast, privilege the agent component. According to them, the basic moral concepts are those we use in deciding what we should do – right or wrong, fit or unfit. Moreover, they think these concepts apply in the first instance to actions rather than to character traits. Hume, however, interprets the rationalists as privileging the spectator concepts, as he does. He characterizes the rationalists not only as offering a theory of approval and disapproval, but also as thinking that they primarily apply to character traits and motives. On his reading of the rationalists, they are concerned, as he is, to distinguish virtuous character traits from vicious traits. Keeping this in mind will help in understanding Hume's arguments against moral rationalism and his sentimentalist account of morality.

The moral project

Rationalists and sentimentalists agree that we possess moral concepts and that they have practical and psychological effects on us. We may be motivated to perform an action by the thought that it is our duty and feel ashamed when we fail. Moreover,

during this period there is general agreement about the content of morality. Both rationalists and sentimentalists assume that we know more or less what is good or bad, virtuous or vicious. They also agree that the basic moral ideas are simple and can't be defined in terms of their component parts. Although they can't be defined this way, Hume thinks we may explain how we come to have moral concepts and their effects on us.

Along with his empiricist predecessors, Hume took the philosophical project to be investigating the origin of our ideas, passions, and sentiments. In his "Introduction" to the *Treatise*, Hume says that like Locke, Hutcheson, and others, he wants to apply Newton's experimental method to the study of the human mind. He thinks that the proper way to understand an idea's content is to explain its origin. To do that, we need to find the "simplest and fewest" causes of our ideas and to base our explanations solely on experience. Hume's project in *Treatise 1* is to find the most fundamental laws that explain the operations of the mind in acquiring such ideas as causality and identity. In *Treatise 2*, his aim is to discover the most basic laws that explain passions such as love and hatred, pride and humility, as well as various desires and aversions.

Hume's moral project is of a piece with his overall project. In the first *Enquiry*, he aligns himself with those "abstruse" philosophers who "regard human nature as a subject of speculation; and with a narrow scrutiny examine it, in order to find those principles, which . . . make us approve or blame any particular object, action, or behaviour" (EHU 1.2). He contrasts this with "easy" philosophy, which aims to make us morally good. Hume's task, as he sees it, is to explain the origin of our moral concepts, discovering the laws that explain the causes of our approving virtue, and therefore providing an account of what we mean by "virtue." He isn't directly interested in making his readers morally better.

Our moral approval and disapproval of character traits and the actions that express them, like any other human activity, are to be explained in wholly naturalistic terms. There are two senses in which Hume's moral theory is naturalistic. One concerns his Newtonian ambition of explaining moral sentiments and concepts in a way that is consistent with the scientific picture of the world. The other is that he rejects attempts to ground morality in religion. There is no need to appeal to anything outside of human nature to explain morality. Not only do appeals to God and particular religious doctrines offend against naturalism, but also religion is damaging and dangerous to human beings. We would be happier and morally better without it.

The foundational issue

The foundational issue between rationalists and sentimentalists concerns the source of our moral concepts. Do our basic moral ideas spring from reason alone or from sentiment? Hume frames the debate about the origin of moral concepts in terms of his own theory of the mind. He reminds us that all the contents of the mind are perceptions. On this view, to engage in any type of mental activity – seeing, judging, thinking, or loving – is to have some perception before the mind. Similarly, "to approve of one character, to condemn another, are only so many different perceptions" (T 3.1.1.2). Hume divides perceptions into two types – ideas and impressions – a distinction that is supposed to capture the difference between our experience of thinking of something and our experience of feeling something. Impressions are more forceful and vivacious perceptions than ideas.

The foundational issue is to determine what kind of perceptions approval and disapproval are and then to explain how we come to have these perceptions. The debate between rationalism and sentimentalism about the origin of moral concepts reduces to the question of

Whether 'tis by means of our ideas or impressions we distinguish betwixt vice and virtue, and pronounce an action blameable or praise-worthy? (T 3.1.1.3)

If the judgment that a person's action is virtuous were simply a matter of comparing and relating ideas, we would be able to arrive at moral ideas by means of reason alone.

Hume offers four arguments to show that reason alone isn't the source of moral ideas. In a fifth argument, Hume challenges the rationalist account of the motive of duty. The arguments are:

- 1 the argument from motivation (T 3.1.1.4–7);
- 2 the arguments from truth and falsehood (T 3.1.1.9–16);
- 3 the argument that reason discovers relations of ideas or matters of fact (T 3.1.1.18–26);
- 4 the “is–ought” argument (T 3.1.1.27);
- 5 the argument concerning the motive of duty (T 3.2.1.2–8).

Several of these arguments are complex, consisting in a number of sub-arguments, but I won't necessarily examine each one.

Before turning to Hume's arguments against moral rationalism, it is important to remember that there are different types of moral rationalism and that his arguments are directed to only one version – dogmatic rationalism. Clarke best exemplifies this view. According to him, the nature and relations of things are part of the framework of the universe. While we know them by means of reason alone, they exist prior to and independently of reason. Today, Clarke would be labeled a realist. Dogmatic rationalism should be distinguished from the sort of rationalism Immanuel Kant went on to develop. On Kant's view, the principles of reason aren't part of the fabric of the universe, but are principles that our minds generate, which we then apply to the world around us and to ourselves.

Arguments against Moral Rationalism

The argument from motivation

Hume's first argument, one he thinks decisive, is the argument from motivation. It is directed primarily against Clarke and has only two premises. The first is that moral ideas have pervasive practical and psychological effects on us, something both experience and philosophy confirms. Experience shows that we are often motivated to perform an action because we think it is obligatory or to refrain from performing it because we think it is unjust. We try to cultivate the virtues in ourselves and are proud when we succeed and ashamed when we fail. If morality did not have these effects on our passions and actions, moral rules and precepts would be pointless, as would our efforts

to be virtuous. Philosophy, Hume notes, is commonly divided into two kinds, speculative and practical, and philosophers classify morality as practical because they agree that moral ideas have these practical effects. As Hume puts the first premise, “morals excite passions, and produce or prevent actions” (T 3.1.1.6).

The second premise is that by itself reason is incapable of bringing about any of these effects. It isn’t able to excite passions or move us to act or to refrain from acting. Hume’s support for this premise appears in *Treatise* 2.3.3, in the section entitled “Of the influencing motives of the will.” Hume challenges the widely held view that we ought to govern our actions by reason rather than passion, arguing that “reason alone can never be a motive to any action of the will” and “can never oppose passion in the direction of the will” (T 2.3.3.1).

Hume argues by a process of elimination. Taking it as settled that reason consists in finding relations of ideas or establishing matters of fact, he considers mathematical reasoning from the first group and causal reasoning from the second. He asks us to look at instances of action where these two types of reasoning have a bearing on action. When we do, we will see that reason alone could not have moved us.

No one thinks that mathematical judgments by themselves are capable of motivating us. While we calculate how much money we are owed and how much we owe to stay out of debt, mathematical reasoning is always used in connection with achieving some pre-existing purpose, so it is always used in conjunction with causal reasoning. When causal reasoning figures in the production of action, it always presupposes some pre-existing desire or want. According to Hume, reasoning is a process that moves you from one idea to another idea. If reasoning is to have practical force, one of the ideas must be tied to a desire or affection. Noticing the causal connection between exercise and losing weight will not move you to exercise, unless you want to lose weight. Reason can’t give rise to a passion or motive by itself.

Hume now shows that reason alone can’t oppose a passion in the direction of the will. To oppose a passion, reason must be able to give rise to a motive by itself, since a motive can only be opposed by another motive, but as he has just shown, reason can’t give rise to a motive.

The argument from motivation, then, is that if moral concepts are capable of exciting passions and producing or preventing actions, but reason alone is incapable of doing these things, then moral concepts can’t spring from reason alone. If they did, they wouldn’t have the practical and psychological effects everyone agrees they have.

In the last several decades, there has been considerable debate about how to interpret and evaluate this argument. Both premises are controversial. The second premise concerns the source of motivation: Is it some sentiment or desire or is it possible for us to be moved by reason alone? Questions have been raised about what sorts of “reason” or “reasoning” Hume is talking about and whether his arguments establish that reason by itself is motivationally inert. The first premise concerns how best to explain the practical and psychological effects of moral concepts. There are two general ways to explain them and accordingly two ways of reading this premise (Brown 1989: 71–8).

One is to claim that the rational intuition that an action is right can move us, but only when it is tied to some pre-existing desire. Philosophers who accept this view claim

that everyone possesses a “moral” desire – a desire to do what is right or to do their duty – as part of their psychological makeup. The intuition that a certain course of action is obligatory becomes practical by triggering the pre-existing desire to do our duty. However, on this reading, the argument is invalid. Suppose the source of all motivation is a desire or sentiment. Then it no longer follows that reason alone is incapable of perceiving moral ideas. Reason may give rise to awareness of our duty, which in turn triggers a desire to do our duty, thereby providing a motive for acting as morality directs.

If we interpret the first premise as saying that moral concepts, when grasped, are inherently motivating or intrinsically action guiding, the argument is valid. On this reading, the awareness that an action is right or obligatory by itself provides an agent with a motive to perform it, though not necessarily with one sufficient to outweigh others that might also be present. If an agent perceives that an action is right, she necessarily has some motive to do it. If she doesn’t have a motive, she hasn’t perceived what her duty is. The conclusion now follows that reason doesn’t give rise to moral ideas because reason alone can’t motivate, whereas moral concepts do.

Another issue is whether Hume himself is committed to the idea that moral perceptions are inherently motivating, or if only the rationalist is. If we accept the former reading, this suggests that Clarke’s and Hume’s understanding of the idea must be different. Hume takes the idea that moral concepts must motivate to mean that we first need to look at the sorts of things that are capable of motivating us in order to discover what gives rise to moral concepts. Since Hume thinks that a desire or sentiment must be present if we are to be moved to act, moral concepts must be located in them. For Clarke, the implication of the claim that moral concepts are inherently motivating goes the other way. Since moral considerations by themselves are capable of moving us and we are rational creatures, once reason shows us what is morally required, we have a motive for doing it. Rational creatures respond to reason. If this reading is accepted, Hume must show that the moral sentiments are inherently motivating (Radcliffe 1996). However, if we accept the reading in which only the rationalist is committed to the idea that moral ideas are motivating, no such burden falls on Hume (Baier 1991: 184).

The argument from truth and falsehood

Hume’s second argument, which relies on the characterization of reason as concerned to discover truth and falsehood, is directed primarily against Wollaston. Since he isn’t sure how to interpret Wollaston’s moral theory, he canvasses a number of possibilities, arguing that they don’t make sense. These interpretations are based on Hume’s understanding of reason’s role in the production of action.

Hume first looks at the possibility that morally good actions are those that conform to truth and are reasonable, while morally bad actions are contrary to truth and are unreasonable. He rejects this because, strictly speaking, passions and actions can’t be true or false, reasonable or unreasonable. Hume supports this claim by extending an argument he gave in “Of the influencing motives of the will.” Reason may judge ideas to be unreasonable because they have representational content and thus may be contradictory to truth or reason. The contradiction “consists in the disagreement

of ideas, consider'd as copies, with those objects, which they represent" (T 2.3.3.5). Passions and actions, however, are "original facts and realities, compleat in themselves, and implying no reference to other passions, volitions, and actions" (T 3.1.1.9). Lacking representational content, they can't be true or false, reasonable or unreasonable. Since we judge actions to be good or bad, but actions cannot be reasonable or unreasonable, their goodness and badness cannot be a matter of their being reasonable or unreasonable.

Although actions can't be reasonable or unreasonable, Hume thinks there are several ways in which, figuratively speaking, they may be. One, where Hume explicitly mentions Wollaston, is that actions may give rise to false judgments in others. On this reading, the criterion of immoral actions is the intention to cause false beliefs in others. Wollaston, however, claimed that immoral actions express falsehoods, not cause them. But Hume's parody of his view allows him some fun, as his example makes clear. Someone walks by an open window and sees Hume cavorting with his neighbor's wife and is thereby caused to falsely believe that she is his wife. He responds that the wrongdoing in this example is unintentional, since the adulterer's intention is to satisfy his lust, not to cause false beliefs in others. Furthermore, if he had taken the precaution of shutting the window, his actions would not have been immoral, since they would not have caused false beliefs in others.

Another criticism is directed against Wollaston's actual view that wrong actions express falsehoods. His criterion is circular. It is wrong for me to take off with your property because I falsely declare it to be mine, not yours. But if we ask why this is what my action means, the answer is that the fact that it is yours *means* that I should not steal it. The truth that is supposedly denied by a wrong action already has moral content.

Reason discovers relations of ideas or matters of fact

Hume's third group of arguments relies on the characterization of reason as comparing ideas to find relations among them. If we were able to determine what is virtuous or vicious by means of reason alone, the basis of moral distinctions must lie either in one of the relations of ideas or in some matter of fact. His real opponents are those who hold that moral relations consist in some relation of ideas. Philosophers such as Clarke and Locke, he remarks, have "industriously propagated" the idea that morality is as susceptible of demonstration as is mathematics.

In his *Enquiry* account, Hume reverses the way in which he proceeds in the *Treatise*, first looking at the suggestion that the virtuousness or viciousness of an action consists in some matter of fact and then turning to the idea that it lies in or is based upon some relation of ideas. This way of proceeding is better, since it sets up the rationalist view that morality lies in some relation of ideas.

Hume's argument in the *Treatise* is this:

Take any action allow'd to be vicious: Wilful murder, for instance. Examine it in all lights, and see if you can find that matter of fact, or real existence, which you call *vice*. In which-ever way you take it, you will find only certain passions, motives, volitions, and thoughts. There is no other matter of fact in the case. (T 3.1.1.26)

Hume puts his point more clearly in the *Enquiry*. Here the crime is ingratitude. He points out that it is isn't bad in every situation. It is bad only when directed toward someone who has already shown you goodwill or has helped you. The badness of ingratitude, therefore, cannot lie in any particular fact surrounding the case. If it doesn't lie in any particular fact, maybe it lies in some relation among the facts. So Hume considers that view.

Hume argues that if you think that the virtuousness or viciousness of an action lies in one of the four relations of ideas, "you run into absurdities," since these relations hold not only among human beings, but also among inanimate objects and non-human animals. Spruce trees and pine trees resemble each other; oranges are sweeter than lemons; an elephant weighs more than a mouse. If these relations hold for these sorts of things, it should be appropriate to praise and blame them.

In his *Enquiry* discussion, Hume focuses on the relation of contrariety, a relation that has at least some initial plausibility. Consider again ingratitude. Suppose I respond to your kindness with indifference or, even worse, by treating you badly. The relation of contrariety holds between your conduct and mine, which might tempt us into thinking that the viciousness of ingratitude lies in that relation. However, it is equally contrary, if I respond to your meanness with indifference, or, even better, by helping you. In the first example, my conduct is blamable; in the second example, it is laudable. The relation of contrariety can't distinguish morally good actions from bad actions.

No rationalist, however, ever claimed that the virtuousness and viciousness of actions lies in one of Hume's four relations of ideas. Nevertheless, rationalists such as Clarke think we arrive at moral ideas by means of reason alone. Hume realizes that he arrived at his list of the four relations of ideas empirically, she imagines that the rationalist will respond that his list is incomplete. He may have overlooked a relation – specifically, the "ought" relation.

Hume offers a *reductio* of the idea that virtue and vice consists in some relation discoverable by reason alone. He considers parricide and incest, which are among the most horrible crimes we are capable of committing. His strategy is to show that any relation the rationalist might propose to account for these crimes will also be found among trees and animals. Everyone agrees that while we may act immorally, trees and animals can't. If the same relations are found in human beings and for trees and animals, the viciousness of these crimes cannot lie in any relation of idea.

Hume's first example concerns an oak tree. When a sapling grows big enough to overtop and destroy its parent, no one thinks it has acted badly. The "parent" tree is the cause of the "child" tree and the "child" tree is the cause of the destruction of the "parent" tree. Exactly the same relations are found in cases of human parricide. Since the same relations are found in both cases, but we agree that only human beings can act immorally, the moral viciousness of parricide cannot lie in any relation.

Hume makes the same argument about animals. Everyone agrees that when non-human animal siblings have sexual relations, it isn't morally bad, but all the same relations are found in incest among humans. Hume anticipates that the rationalists will reply that incest in animals is innocent "because they have not reason sufficient to discover its turpitude" whereas a human, "being endow'd with that faculty, which *ought* to restrain him to do his duty, the same action instantly becomes criminal to him" (T 3.1.1.25). But this is circular. For:

before reason can perceive this turpitude, the turpitude must exist; and consequently is independent of the decisions of our reason, and is their object more properly than their effect. (T 3.1.1.25)

Hume clearly has Clarke's dogmatic rationalism in mind. On his view, the relations upon which moral fitness and unfitness are based exist prior to and independently of our rational perception of them. If they didn't, there would be nothing for reason to perceive.

One implication of this view is that the question whether someone knows what he is doing is immoral is independent of the question whether what he is doing is immoral. Animals, as the rationalist acknowledges, can't perceive their moral duties, given their limited rational capacities. But, argues Hume:

Their want of a sufficient degree of reason may hinder them from perceiving the duties and obligations of morality, but can never hinder these duties from existing; since they must antecedently exist, in order to their being perceiv'd. (T 3.1.1.25)

Thus rationalists are in the unfortunate position of having to say that when animal siblings have sex they act badly, but don't know it.

The "is-ought" argument

The final argument that Hume offers in *Treatise* 3.1.1 is the "Is-Ought" argument. He remarks that most moral theorists begin by establishing that God exists or make some observation about human beings – that we are naturally sociable or that society is necessary if we are to preserve ourselves. But after a while, instead of finding propositions with an "is and is not," he encounters propositions with an "ought, or an ought not," which he finds troubling

For as this *ought*, or *ought not*, expresses some new relation . . . 'tis necessary that it shou'd be observ'd and explain'd; and at the same time that a reason shou'd be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it. (T 3.1.1.27)

Hume is assuming that the "ought" relation can't be basic in the sense that it doesn't need to be explained in terms of some other relation. Thomas Reid (1710–96), one of Hume's rationalist successors, complained that Hume's criticism is unfair, since even Hume must think that some relations are basic in this sense. For example, the relation of resemblance is basic for Hume. He doesn't try to explain it in terms of other relations and there is no other relation available that could explain it. The rationalist may be thinking that the "ought" relation is basic in the same way.

Twentieth-century philosophers thought the "is-ought" argument was pivotal. Many believed it supported the dictum that no "ought" can be legitimately derived from an "is," which in turn supported a non-cognitivist position in ethics. Non-cognitivism is the view that ethical judgments cannot be true or false, since they do not describe facts. While many maintained that this argument commits Hume to a non-cognitivist

view of moral judgments, others point to passages that they think show that Hume was a cognitivist (Stroud 1977: 185, 186; Cohon 1997). Still others remind us that Hume was concerned with the question of the origin of our moral concepts, not with the analysis of moral language.

The motive of duty argument

One of Hume's strongest arguments against moral rationalism occurs in *Treatise* 3.2.1, the opening section on the artificial virtues, and is aimed at Clarke's view that the morally good person acts from the motive of duty. Hume counters that doing your duty because you see it is your duty can't be the *first* or *original* motive for dutiful actions. As with many of his other arguments, he tends to couch his objection in terms of virtuous actions and their motives.

Hume claims that virtuous actions by themselves aren't meritorious. They have merit only as "signs or indications" and thus "derive their merit only from virtuous motives" (T 3.2.1.4). We would be reasoning in a circle if we held that virtuous actions were motivated by a regard for their virtuousness:

Before we can have such a regard, the action must be really virtuous; and this virtue must be deriv'd from some virtuous motive: And consequently the virtuous motive must be different from the regard to the virtue of the action. A virtuous motive is requisite to render an action virtuous. An action must be virtuous, before we can have a regard to its virtue. Some virtuous motive, therefore, must be antecedent to that regard. (T 3.2.1.4)

If virtuous actions are those performed from virtuous motives, no action can be virtuous unless there is at least initially a motive for doing it other than the desire to do it because it is virtuous. Before you can perform a virtuous action from the desire to do what is virtuous, the action must already be virtuous. What makes an action virtuous is the virtuousness of the motive, so the motive must be something other than the desire to do the virtuous thing.

Hume's point is that you cannot perform virtuous actions for the sake of their virtuousness until you know what actions are virtuous, and the desire to do virtuous actions won't tell you what actions are virtuous. To use Hume's examples, we blame a father for neglecting his children because it shows a lack of parental affection, a duty incumbent on every parent. If parental affection were not a duty, caring for your children would not be a duty. If Hume's argument is successful, the rationalist view that the motive of duty is primary is incoherent. Kant, however, took great pains to respond to this argument in section 1 of the *Groundwork*.

There is considerable debate today about what type of motive is morally best. Is the good person motivated by the sense of duty or by such natural and spontaneous motives as benevolence? Hume tried to give the rationalist view that we do the virtuous thing because it is virtuous a limited place within the sentimentalist framework. With respect to the natural virtues, he holds that the morally best person acts from spontaneous and natural motives such as benevolence, parental affection, and so on. With respect to the artificial virtues of justice, fidelity in promises, and obedience

to government, however, the normally operative and morally best motive is the sense of duty and not, as Hutcheson claimed, benevolence. The just person does what is just because she perceives it to be just.

The Moral Sentiments and Sympathy

The positive phase

Hume takes the defeat of rationalism to be the triumph of sentimentalism. He concludes that “morality . . . is more properly felt than judg’d of” (T 3.1.2.1). The moral sentiments are feelings of admiration or contempt, praise or blame that arise when we survey a person’s character. Most of the time he refers to them as feelings of approval and disapproval.

In several key passages, Hume describes the moral sentiments as calm forms of love and hatred. Approval and disapproval, he says, are “nothing but a fainter and more imperceptible love or hatred” (T 3.3.5.1). When we evaluate our own character traits, pride and humility replace love and hatred. As calm species of love and hatred, they are distinguished from the more personal love and hatred we have for family members, friends, and other associates. Our personal loves and hatreds are violent, variable, and often biased.

There is some debate about how to interpret the passages in which Hume links the moral sentiments with love and hatred. He explicitly says that the moral sentiments are calm rather than violent and that approval is a pleasant feeling, while disapproval is a painful feeling. The debate concerns whether approval is a unique pleasure that causes love or whether approval is to be identified as a species of love – a calm sort of love (Árdal 1989: 111–15; Korsgaard 1999: 9–12) Since there are passages that lend support to both views, the issue can’t be resolved on textual grounds alone. Ultimately, we need to ask which view makes better sense of Hume’s moral theory as a whole. I read Hume as thinking that the moral sentiments are calm forms of love and hatred.

Hume asks two questions about the moral sentiments. First, what kind of sentiments are they? Second, how do we explain how we come to have them? The answer to the first question, he says, is obvious. Approval is a pleasant or agreeable feeling and disapproval is a painful or disagreeable feeling. Hume appeals to experience for support. A noble and generous action strikes us as pleasant and beautiful; cruelty and treachery are painful and repulsive to us. He adds that:

No enjoyment equals the satisfaction we receive from the company of those we love and esteem; as the greatest of all punishments is to be oblig’d to pass our lives with those we hate or contemn. (T 3.1.2.2)

Hume’s point isn’t merely that we like being around people we love and dislike being around those we hate. He is saying that morality is primarily about what is lovable or hateful in the characters of those with whom we interact.

Hume concludes that “to have a sense of virtue, is nothing but to *feel* a satisfaction of a particular kind from the contemplation of a character. The very *feeling* constitutes

our praise and admiration” (T 3.1.2.3). We don’t approve of an action because it is virtuous; an action is virtuous only because we approve of it.

Hume turns next to the question about the causes of the moral sentiments, and he criticizes Hutcheson for failing to explain the moral sense – how we come to feel approval and disapproval. He also says that he will show that there are many other virtues besides benevolence. If there are many different virtues, Hutcheson must think that there is some “instinct” disposing us to approve of each one. This goes against scientific economy. Instead, we should look for a few general principles to explain why we approve of the different sorts of virtues and disapprove of the different sorts of vices.

Hume takes up that task in *Treatise* 3.3.1. His project is to “discover the true origin of morals, and of that love or hatred, which arises from moral qualities” (T 3.3.1.6). He reminds us that our moral love and hatred are primarily directed to people’s character traits and that actions are virtuous or vicious only if they proceed from some durable character trait of the person. He then introduces the most distinctive feature of his version of sentimentalism – the idea that the moral sentiments spring from sympathy.

The sympathy mechanism

Hume treats sympathy as an important mechanism of the mind and explains how it works in *Treatise* 2.1.11. Sympathy is our capacity to receive the passions, sentiments, and even beliefs of others. It is not itself a passion, so it should not be confused with such feelings as compassion, pity, or empathy. It also shouldn’t be confused with a love of humankind – Hutcheson’s universal benevolence – since Hume denies that we have such a feeling. Rather, it is a mechanism by means of which the feelings of others are imparted to us. Sympathy explains how we literally enter into the feelings of others, feeling what they are feeling. If you walk into a room where everyone is cheerful, you will tend to feel cheerful. If your friend is sad, you will tend to feel sad. Sympathy is a deep principle of human nature and even animal nature. It explains a wide range of phenomena: our interest in history and current affairs, our ability to enjoy literature, movies, novels, and, more generally, our sociability. It is central to Hume’s account of the passions, the sense of beauty, and morality.

Hume explains how sympathy works in terms of the more fundamental principles of the mind, the associative principles – resemblance, contiguity in time or place, and causation. He believes there is a pattern or regularity in the way the mind works. Certain ideas tend to go together; certain passions tend to go together. The principles of association explain how one idea naturally introduces another idea and how one passion naturally introduces another passion. Contiguity in time, for example, explains why there is a tendency for the mind to move from thoughts about Vietnam to thoughts about miniskirts. The principle of resemblance explains why grief is often followed by disappointment and anger. Hume describes the associative principles as “gentle forces.” There is only a tendency for certain ideas as well as certain passions to follow one another, not a necessary or inevitable connection. Moreover, he thinks of association, whether of ideas or passions, as immediate and unreflective. It is something that happens to us, not something we deliberately do.

Sympathy involves a four-step process. First, you arrive at the idea of what another person is feeling. Reflection on your own past experience tells you what feelings are regularly associated with what bodily expressions, actions, or verbal behaviors. When you see similar expressions and behaviors in others, you infer that they are caused by similar passions. Second, you are aware that the other person resembles you. Hume thinks that every human being resembles every other human being to some extent. We tend to experience the same sorts of passions in similar situations and we express them in similar ways. But we also resemble some people more than others. You resemble individuals who are your own age and sex, from your own country, and in the same profession more than individuals who differ from you in these ways. Third, Hume claims that you always have available to you a forceful, lively and vivacious impression of yourself. Fourth, he appeals to two points he established in Book 1. The principles of association not only relate two perceptions, they also transmit force and vivacity from one perception to the other. Since the difference between an idea and an impression is a matter of force and vivacity, the difference between experiencing a passion and having an idea of that passion is that the former is more forceful and vivacious than the latter.

Sympathy explains how you move from merely having an idea of what someone is feeling to your actually feeling what the other person is feeling. You arrive at an idea of what another person is feeling and, at the same time, you are related to that person by some sort of resemblance. Your lively and vivacious idea of yourself transmits its force and vivacity to your idea of the other person's feeling by means of the associative principle of resemblance. In this way, your idea of the other person's passion becomes forceful, lively, and vivacious. If an idea of a passion is lively and forceful enough, it becomes the very passion itself.

Hume's explanation of sympathy implies that our natural and spontaneous sympathetic reactions are variable and biased. We sympathize more easily with people who speak our language, share our culture, and are the same age or gender as us. Because the associative principles transmit force and vivacity from one perception to another, the more we resemble someone, the more liveliness and vivacity gets transmitted from my impression of myself to my idea of the other person's passion. The more vivacious and lively my idea of a passion, the more I feel what the other person is feeling.

Hume thinks the other two associative relations also influence our capacity to react sympathetically to others. We sympathize more strongly and easily with those to whom we are related by causation and who are spatially or temporally contiguous to us – friends, family, neighbors, and fellow citizens. If I am related to someone in all three ways, I will be able to conceive of that person's passion “in the strongest and most lively manner.” Although sympathy enables us to enter into the feelings of anyone – we resemble everyone to some extent – our capacity to react sympathetically to others varies with the variations in the associative relations. For shorthand, call the natural and spontaneous operation of sympathy, “unregulated” sympathy.

Sympathy, like the associative principles that explain it, operates in us as a “gentle force.” It isn't a mechanism that we may turn on or off at will. Instead, it is something that happens to us, immediately and unreflectively. If you are watching a scary movie, you can't help but feel afraid. If you happen to live with people who are

always criticizing you, you can't help but inherit their disapproval, which, in turn, makes you miserable and unhappy. Although we can't directly control whether and with whom we sympathize, we may modify the effects of sympathy in various ways. For example, Hume suggests that we move away from critical parents or friends, since distance weakens their feelings of disapproval.

One final point about sympathy is that by itself it doesn't motivate action. Although it isn't by itself a motive, it may enter into the explanation of why someone performs certain actions. For example, Hume explains why we feel pity when we see or read about the distressing experiences of others by appealing to the sympathy mechanism. While sympathy explains how we come to feel their pain, it doesn't explain how we are going to react to those painful feelings. Our inherited pain may move us to help them, but it may also motivate us to walk away or to take an aspirin.

The general point of view and the regulation of sympathy

Hume develops his theory of moral evaluation in 3.3.1 of the *Treatise* in response to two objections to his idea that the moral sentiments spring from sympathy. The first begins with the acknowledgment that the loves and hatreds resulting from unregulated sympathy are variable and biased. This poses a problem for Hume because he thinks we tend to morally love and hate the same sorts of character traits in people. It doesn't matter whether we are causally related to the person, contiguous to her, or resemble her in special ways. If someone in Scotland has the same "good" character trait as someone in China, the trait is equally loved and esteemed. Moral love can't be based on sympathy, because our moral approvals don't vary, but the loves and hatreds that result from the natural and spontaneous workings of sympathy do vary.

The second objection is that "virtue in rags" is still esteemed. Sympathy works by looking at the actual effects of a person's character traits. But sometimes misfortune or lack of opportunity prevents someone from exercising a good character trait, and as a consequence, it doesn't bring about the beneficial results it normally would. However, even when the beneficial results aren't realized, we still esteem the person for her virtuous character trait. As Hume puts it, "virtue in rags is still virtue; and the love, which it procures, attends a man into a dungeon or desert, where the virtue can no longer be exerted in action, and is lost to all the world" (T 3.3.1.19).

Hume responds that moral love and hatred arises from sympathy, but only when it is regulated by "some steady and general points of view." There are two regulative features of the general point of view. The first is that we survey a person's character from the perspective of that person's narrow circle – the people with whom she regularly interacts. Typically these will include the person herself and her usual associates: her family, friends, neighbors, co-workers, and so on. We sympathize with the people who make up a person's narrow circle, and we judge character traits to be virtuous or vicious in terms of whether they are good or bad for those in her narrow circle.

The second feature is that we regulate sympathy further by relying on general rules that specify the usual effects and tendencies of character traits, rather than the actual effects of a person's character traits. For example, if some misfortune prevents

a person from exercising her kindly impulses, we judge her kindness to be morally good because in normal circumstances it is beneficial to others.

Although Hume explicitly introduces only two regulative components of the general point of view, others may be derived from them. For example, the actual composition of a person's narrow circle will vary from person to person and for an individual over her lifetime. Moreover, in most cases we know nothing or very little about the actual composition of a person's narrow circle. Since we are able to morally love and hate people who are unfamiliar to us – people who live in remote countries or are from distant ages – this suggests that we do not survey a person through the eyes of her actual narrow circle, but rather through the eyes of what would be a person's normal or usual narrow circle.

Hume maintains that sympathy, when regulated by the general point of view, causes us to admire four kinds of character traits – those that are useful or immediately agreeable to the possessor or useful or agreeable to others. As an empirical hypothesis, he thinks it must be confirmed by experience, a task he takes up in his discussion of the individual virtues.

The general point of view is, for Hume, the moral perspective. Its regulative features define a perspective we can share with everyone, from which we may survey a person's character traits. When we occupy the general point of view, we sympathize with the person herself and her narrow circle, and come to love the person for those traits that normally are useful and pleasant for everyone in her narrow circle. The moral evaluations that result when we take up the general point of view differ in important ways from the judgments that arise from two other perspectives – the perspective of self-interest and the perspective of unregulated sympathy.

From the point of view of self-interest, I tend to love anyone who serves my interests and benefits me, and hate anyone who opposes my interests and harms me. From a self-interested point of view, I will dislike my rival's industriousness because it counteracts my own interests. But by viewing my rival through the eyes of her narrow circle and by sympathizing with the effects her character trait would typically have on them, I will be constrained to see her industriousness as worthy of love. In the same way, what we love and hate from the perspective of unregulated sympathy may be opposed to our moral loves and hates. From the perspective of unregulated sympathy, if someone is causally related to me, contiguous to me, or resembles me, I will esteem her good qualities – her loyalty – more strongly than someone who isn't associated with me in these ways. For example, I will love my friend more than the ancient Roman, Marcus Brutus, even though Brutus's loyalty is greater and more impressive. But by sympathizing with Brutus's narrow circle and by relying on general rules that specify the usual tendencies of character traits, I will be constrained to admire his loyalty.

One advantage of Hume's account of the moral point of view is that he provides a wholly naturalistic account of moral judgment. He begins with our more personal, variable, and violent loves and hatreds – feelings that aren't themselves moral – and he then describes the process whereby we transform them into moral loves and hates. The effect of taking up the general point of view and regulating our sympathetic responses is to make these violent, variable, and irregular loves and hatreds more calm, stable, and regular.

Another advantage of Hume's account of the general point of view and, in particular, the regulation of sympathy is that it brings a kind of impartiality and objectivity to our moral judgments. The regulation of sympathy ensures that we put to one side considerations of self-interest as well as considerations derived from the special ways we may be related to others, effectively excluding bias and partiality from the moral point of view. In judging others we discount not only the fact that they may be our rivals, but also that they resemble us in special ways or are related to us by contiguity or causality. In this sense, the judgments that result when we take up the general point of view are impartial.

The regulation of sympathy allows Hume to explain why there tends to be agreement in moral judgments. Although approval and disapproval are feelings, they are distinct from our mere likes or dislikes and from our more personal and violent loves and hatreds. Approval and disapproval are calm forms of love and hatred that arise when we survey people from the same perspective – through the eyes of the person's normal narrow circle, taking into account the usual or regular tendencies of people's character traits. In this sense, the judgments that result from the general point of view are objective.

Hume's conception of the general point of view enables him to generate an ideal of character, a picture of our moral selves that goes beyond what is given in experience (Brown 1994). The ideal element is brought in with the regulation of our sympathetic loves and hates. In the case of unregulated sympathy, we love or hate someone if their character traits are actually beneficial or harmful for their narrow circle. If someone is unable to exercise one of his character traits because of some misfortune, there will be nothing with which to sympathize, so we won't love them. But regulated sympathy may operate quite independently of the actual world. In the case of regulated sympathy, we respond sympathetically to the usual tendencies of a person's character for her normal narrow circle. In fact, we may be sympathizing with the non-existent pleasures of non-existent people.

According to Hume, the ultimate test of "merit and virtue" is this:

if there be no relation in life, in which I cou'd not wish to stand to a particular person, his character must so far be allow'd to be perfect. If he be as little wanting to himself as to others, his character is entirely perfect. (T 3.3.3.9)

We arrive at the ideal of character by surveying a person's character from various perspectives – that of friend, fellow-worker, neighbor, and fellow-citizen. The ideal of character that results is a picture of ourselves as essentially social beings. The effect of the regulating features is to idealize this picture. We imagine a person in all possible roles and relationships, and by relying on general rules we know what character traits usually have good effects. The ideal of character is a kind of artificial construct: an ideal of someone who is beneficial in all possible roles and relationships.

While it is true that moral character is an ideal construct, the ideal is not very exacting. This is especially true with respect to the natural virtues. On Hume's account of the natural virtues, the ideal does not demand that human nature be radically altered or reformed, or that our relationships must be impartial. Our sympathetic reactions are guided by what is normal and usual in human nature. Thus, it is normal and usual

for us to love our children better than our nephews, nephews better than cousins, and cousins better than strangers, where everything else is equal. Moreover, with respect to the natural virtues, Hume thinks that the best person acts from natural and spontaneous affections rather than from the motive of duty. From the perspective of the general point of view, human nature is lovable as it is.

The idealizing character shows up more in the artificial virtues. The duties that arise from the artificial virtues – respecting property rights, fidelity in promises, and obedience to government – are not owed to people because of any special relationship we might have with them, but simply because they are fellow-citizens. With respect to the artificial virtues, Hume holds that the usual and morally praiseworthy motive is the sense of duty.

Hume's theory also has the resources to explain why we try to live up to the moral ideal. Sympathy ensures that we will inherit other people's moral judgments about us, which, in turn, pressures us to see ourselves as others see us. If we fall short of the moral ideal by having a trait that is harmful or disagreeable to others, but not to ourselves, sympathy will get us to disapprove of it. Sympathy may go so far as to make us disapprove of our own vices, even when they are beneficial to us.

And this sympathy we sometimes carry so far, as even to be displeas'd with a quality commodious to us, merely because it displeases others, and renders us disagreeable in their eyes. (T 3.3.1.26)

The capacity to survey ourselves as others do may be developed to the point where we come to see ourselves not just as we actually appear to others, but as we *would* appear to them. According to Hume, we may respond sympathetically to what we anticipate someone else would feel, if they were aware that an event or action was occurring or was about to occur. The internalization of the moral judgments of others may thus have the effect that even the *idea* that others would disapprove of us may make us hateful in our own eyes. In this way, we come to see ourselves through the eyes of someone who fully regulates her sympathy – from the general point of view.

The result is that we will be lovable in our own eyes only if we are or would be morally lovable in the eyes of others. Being morally loveable in our own eyes is an important ingredient of happiness since it gives us peace of mind. Both our sense of ourselves as a lovable person and our happiness are dependent upon living up to the ideal of character. When a person is aware that he falls short of the character ideal, he

may hate himself upon that account and may perform the action without the motive, from a certain sense of duty, in order to acquire by practice, that virtuous principle. (T 3.2.1.8)

The motive of duty arises when our self-conception clashes with the ideal of character. We hate ourselves for failing to live up to the character ideal and this makes us unhappy. We may thus be motivated to cultivate the virtues. In this way, we move from being a spectator who surveys his own character to being an agent who is motivated to live up to the moral ideal.

There are several other advantages Hume's account of morality has over his rationalist opponents and his sentimentalist predecessors. Clarke and Hutcheson failed to explain why we are able to perceive people's characters and their actions in moral terms. Clarke simply asserts that reason perceives the relations of fitness and unfitness, while Hutcheson asserts that we possess a unique moral sense. By tracing the moral sentiments to sympathy, Hume is able to produce an explanation of how we come to have the moral sentiments, one that explains many other aspects of our lives, such as our social tendencies. More importantly, he explains sympathy in terms of the even more fundamental associative principles of resemblance, contiguity, and causality. Our capacity to see the world in moral terms, on Hume's view, is not an arbitrary or merely contingent feature of our lives, but is something that is deeply rooted in us. If we lacked the capacity to respond sympathetically to others, along with these other associative tendencies, we would be unimaginatively different than we are.

In the concluding section of the *Treatise*, Hume describes one other advantage his account of morality has over Clarke's and Hutcheson's. He remarks that "all lovers of virtue" must be pleased to see the distinction between virtue and vice traced to such a noble source as sympathy. He thinks "it requires but very little knowledge of human affairs to perceive, that a sense of morals is a principle inherent in the soul," which has powerful effects on us (T 3.3.6.3). He continues by saying that:

This sense must certainly acquire new force, when reflecting on itself, it approves of those principles, from which it is deriv'd, and finds nothing but what is great and good in its rise and origin. Those who resolve the sense of morals into original instincts of the human mind, may defend the cause of virtue with sufficient authority [*Hutcheson*]; but want the advantage, which those possess who account for that sense by an extensive sympathy with mankind [*Hume*]. According to the latter system, not only virtue must be approv'd of, but also the sense of virtue: And not only that sense, but also the principles from whence it is deriv'd. So that nothing is presented on any side, but what is laudable and good. (T 3.3.6.3)

When the moral sense reflects on itself, it approves both its source and its workings. When we reflect on the origins of the moral sentiments and come to understand their basis in sympathy, we have no reason to want to reject our nature as moral creatures. We come to accept the moral sentiments along with the deep and fundamental principles of human nature in which it is rooted. Hume's account of morality is reflectively stable (Rawls 2000: 99–100; Baier 1991: 277–88; Korsgaard 1996: 51–66).

See also 9 "Hume's Indirect Passions"; 28 "Hume's Metaethics: Is Hume a Moral Noncognitivist?"

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