Washington Can't Turn Back the Clock on China-Arab Relations
If Netanyahu thinks that he can threaten America through his visit to China, he ought to remember which country supplies Israel with both automatic diplomatic backing in the international arena and the equipment essential to its ongoing fight against Iran
Zvi Bar'el
Hareetz - Jun 30, 2023
Next month, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will take a joint photo with Chinese President Xi Jinping similar to those of him and Russian President Vladimir Putin seen on election campaign billboards in 2019.
"Netanyahu, a different league," they read.
But unfortunately, both Netanyahu and Putin have been relegated – now featured on the ignominious list of leaders that it's best not to be seen with in public.
If Netanyahu thinks a visit with Xi will stick it to U.S. President Joe Biden and show the Israeli public the range of other options Israel has, he better think again. Granted, China is a major U.S. rival, perhaps the foremost in the battle for global hegemony – but Israel isn't the strategic asset China needs to solidify its international influence. Visit or no visit, China has already garnered significant diplomatic and economic capital in the Middle East – including chunks of the Israeli economy.
In early June, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken visited Saudi Arabia in an effort to halt Riyadh's drift toward China. Blinken was not short for words in describing America's commitment to deepening its partnership with the kingdom, expressing gratitude for the reception he received and for the Saudis' contribution to the fight against ISIS. But his counterpart Prince Faisal bin Farhan's took a different tone. Faisal made it clear that cooperation with China is "likely to grow" as "China's economic impact in the region and beyond" grows. But, Faisal said, "we still have a robust security partnership with the U.S."
If any doubt remained regarding the kingdom's intention to diversify its foreign relations – or in other words, step away from the traditional binary view of a world divided between those aligned with the United States and those against it – the Arab-China Business Conference held in Riyadh just a few days after Blinken's departure made things even clearer.
On the first day of the conference attended by representatives of 23 countries and around 1,200 Chinese delegates, memorandums of understanding were signed for investments totaling some $10 billion – including $6 billion for manufacturing Chinese electric cars in Saudi Arabia and then exporting them overseas. Less than three weeks later, a 24-person Saudi delegation attended the Summer Davos conference in China, including six ministers and deputy ministers.
Bilateral trade between Saudi Arabia and China surged to $116 billion in 2022, up from $87 billion the year before, and Chinese activities in the kingdom range from genomics company BGI opening a research lab to plans by Haichang Ocean Park Holdings to open a massive amusement park.
China also conducts extensive trade with the United Arab Emirates, signed an agreement with Qatar to buy $60 billion worth of natural gas by 2050, and is a major investor in developing Iraq's oil and gas fields, plans to build refineries, power plants, schools and residential neighborhoods. In 2021, Iraq was the top target of Chinese investment as part of the country's Belt and Road Initiative. Currently, 30 percent of Iraq's oil exports are to China, making it the country's third-largest oil supplier.
China’s economic presence in Iraq managed to spark a major political rift in the government. A “Silk Road” coalition was formed in the Iraqi parliament, comprised of representatives of Shi’ite militias pushing to expand cooperation with China. Opposing it is a coalition of parties that object to Iraq’s growing dependence on China, led by the influential separatist preacher Muqtada al-Sadr.
When the government decided to award the contract for building the Grand Faw Port in Iraq to a South Korean company instead of a Chinese one, members of the Silk Road coalition organized large demonstrations that showed that ties with China aren’t just an economic issue.
The political fighting in Iraq over China is connected to China’s close ties with Iran, with which it signed an investment agreement pledging an unprecedented $400 billion in investments over 25 years. In exchange, China will receive licenses to develop oil and gas fields, a supply of oil at an extremely low price and active involvement in protecting the oil fields. In other words, a Chinese military presence in Iran.
Implementing this agreement to its full potential remains dependent on the U.S. lifting its sanction on Iran, as China has no desire to openly violate them. But should Russia decide to sell Iran Su-35 fighter jets, China will presumably join the party.
As a rule, China isn’t actively involved in military conflicts in the Middle East. Unlike the U.S. and Russia, China has never sent troops over and there are no "pro-China" militias in Syria, Iraq or Yemen. Its arms sales to the region, though growing, have so far been non-strategic. Instead, it buys its influence using the yuan to undermine the dollar's status. It reached agreements with the UAE and Saudi Arabia to use the yuan in certain bilateral deals, and has done the same in Iran – thereby enabling Tehran to circumvent sanctions that prevent it from clearing dollars through U.S. banks.
Nevertheless, China's economic strategy of control in the region requires it to avoid conflicts that could inhibit its ability to navigate or spawn political rivalries. China has thus begun investing in its global image: "embracing" media outlets and journalists, cultivating influencers and contributing to civil activities in an effort to paint itself as a "good citizen." So far, it seems to be working. The results of a poll published this month by Dubai-based public relations firm Asda'a BCW shows that China is more popular than both the United States and Russia among young Arabs. The poll, which surveyed 3,600 individuals age 18 to 24 in 18 Arab countries reflects the views of the Arab world's next generation.
Granted, the poll did find that the U.S. is still seen as the most influential country in the Middle East, and while 72 percent of respondents also view it as an ally – a significant portion would like to see less American involvement in the region. For China, the most important and interesting finding is that only four percent of respondents see China as influential in the region, which shows that Chinese efforts to build influence without being seen as a meddler trying to dictate policy have worked.
This status allows China to mediate between countries when it serves its interests. Its most impressive of such efforts was in March, when it brought an end to the long and violent conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia. It's too early to know how this reconciliation will affect the broader Middle East, but it has already led to an extension of the cease-fire in Yemen, the dismantling of an Arab coalition against Iran involving the U.S. and Israel, and possibly provided a push for the resumption of indirect talks between the U.S. and Iran on a new nuclear deal.
Israel isn’t a party to any of these big moves, nor does it have such a status of influence. Its cooperation with China, especially in the fields of military and technology, is limited by U.S. terms and conditions that seek to keep its allies in its own camp and views any deviation as causing intolerable damage to the partnership.
If Netanyahu thinks that he can brandish a threatening fist at America through his visit to China, he ought to remember which country supplies Israel with both automatic diplomatic backing in the international arena and the equipment essential to its ongoing fight against Iran. All the same, this visit won't be causing a rift in U.S.-Israel relations, as that rift is already a fact. Washington has grasped that a dichotomy between the American sphere and the Chinese sphere is no longer practical. In a speech at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy in May, U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan listed five principles that guide U.S. policy in the Middle East – “partnerships, deterrence, diplomacy and de-escalation, integration, and values.”
Experts advising the White House believe America can cooperate with China on some of these principles without undermining the basis of its influence. That is certainly true when it comes to regional diplomacy, where the U.S. hasn’t had any impressive achievements, and in preventing regional escalation, which will serve China's economic interests and ensure it its uninterrupted supply of energy products.
Washington also realizes that it can’t turn the clock back or undo the extensive cooperation that now exists between Arab states and China. Nor can it dictate unequivocal rules of behavior, even to its closest allies.