Alexander Gabuev on China’s strategic calculations after the turmoil in Russia (economist.com)
Xi Jinping has no other option than to support Vladimir Putin—or someone like him
Jul 3rd 2023
As the rebels of the Wagner Group, led by Yevgeny Prigozhin, closed in on Moscow on June 24th, China watched closely—and said nothing. The aborted mutiny was over in 24 hours, but that was enough to expose the fragility of Vladimir Putin’s power system. Despite having limited means to directly influence the outcome of battles inside its giant neighbour, China will go to great lengths, including efforts to keep the Russian economy afloat, to prevent a revolution from taking hold there. It is firmly in China’s interests to keep Mr Putin in the Kremlin—or at least a leader who is just as anti-American and friendly to China.
China has learned from experience that where unpredictable Russia is concerned, it is better to wait and see. When, in August 1991, a group of senior figures attempted to seize power in Moscow and save the Soviet Union, putting Mikhail Gorbachev under house arrest and calling in troops to the capital, China rushed to establish ties with the putschists. China’s ambassador to Moscow visited Gennady Yanayev, the junta’s official leader, and congratulated him on seizing power. But within two days the desperate attempt to breathe life into the corpse of the Soviet regime was over, and the putschists were arrested.
This helps to explain why China’s official reaction to the Wagner debacle was so muted. On June 25th, once it was clear that the mutiny was over, Russia’s deputy foreign minister, Andrei Rudenko, who happened to be in Beijing on a previously planned visit, was granted a weekend audience with China’s foreign minister, Qin Gang. Mr Qin, according to a Russian read-out of the meeting, expressed support for the maintenance of stability in Russia. Subsequent interactions between the two governments proceeded as usual: a Chinese delegation visited Moscow to discuss joint missile defence, and Russia’s deputy prime minister visited Beijing to discuss industrial co-operation, something Moscow badly needs amid crippling Western sanctions.
The broader strategic question is: will China continue its current approach of providing stealth support to the Kremlin, or will buyer’s remorse over the “no-limits partnership” announced last year set in, prompting China to distance itself? If Xi Jinping’s approach to Russia so far is a guide, the Chinese state won’t withdraw its support from Mr Putin, and might even increase it to keep his regime afloat.
China is not blind to the growing weakness of its partner or the unpredictable trajectory of Mr Putin’s regime. Chinese Russia-watchers blame him for building an unstable system that erodes central government’s control over the gun. Mr Xi is aware of the magnitude of problems that Russia faces, and those it has created for China along the way—starting with Mr Putin’s failure to communicate his decision to invade Ukraine to Mr Xi, although he had met him a few weeks earlier at the Beijing Winter Olympics.
Despite expressing support for international norms such as territorial integrity and sovereignty, China has never criticised the Kremlin’s aggression and its annexation of Ukrainian territory. Indeed, Beijing has doubled down on its partnership with Moscow: trade between the two countries grew by 30% last year, topping $190bn.
The main reason for this level of support is China’s own strategic rivalry with America. Sino-American relations are at their worst for many years, and in Mr Xi’s view nothing short of Chinese capitulation will satisfy leaders in Washington. Should he throw Mr Putin under the bus, America would simply pocket the concession and continue to squeeze its only peer-rival. Moreover, Mr Putin’s downfall and his replacement with an anti-Chinese government is Mr Xi’s nightmare. It would leave China strategically encircled.
Mr Putin’s Russia gives China something it would otherwise lack. Beijing has nothing remotely resembling American-led alliances, and badly needs partners. Not only is Russia deeply anti-American but it can also bring to the table many elements that China needs to gain the upper hand in its rivalry with America, including its vast nuclear arsenal; its degraded but still considerable conventional capabilities (which require America to spend heavily on deterrence in Europe); some advanced military technologies; Russia’s voice as a permanent member of the UN Security Council; and natural resources that Russia can supply to China overland at hefty discounts.
The war in Ukraine is gradually turning Russia into China’s junior partner, since Mr Putin’s system is surviving the hardships of war and sanctions by selling more natural resources to Beijing, importing Chinese technology and using the yuan to settle trade and manage the exchange rate. Distancing itself from Mr Putin now would deny China the opportunity to cement its senior role in the relationship, as well as potentially paving the way to chaos or a democratic, pro-Western government next door.
For now, Mr Putin appears to be in charge. China will be partially reassured by his moves to fix the damage: through the orchestration of demonstrations of public and elite support and a crackdown on Wagner sympathisers in the armed forces. Since the Sino-Russian relationship depends on the rapport between Messrs Xi and Putin, the high-level interaction is likely to continue.
China does not have the tools to help Mr Putin directly should he face another coup attempt. What it can and will do is make sure that Russia is not pushed to the brink of revolution by either economic downturn or defeat in Ukraine. For this reason, trade with Russia will continue, including the technology exports that keep Mr Putin’s war machine humming. Another avenue of support is the export of new high-tech tools of repression, such as cutting-edge surveillance systems, which is on the increase. The sale of these systems, especially when seen in the context of China’s broader support for Mr Putin’s regime through trade and access to the yuan, amounts to unprecedented Chinese interference in Russian domestic affairs. The hope in Beijing is that it will keep Russia on its current, self-diminishing course.
Mr Putin will not be around forever. The Wagner mutiny, and above all the president’s decision to launch a disastrous war against Ukraine, might hasten his departure. For this reason, China is busy cultivating its network of contacts in the Russian establishment, including top officials, generals and oligarchs. It is trying to make sure that, whoever emerges as the ruler in the Kremlin after Mr Putin, China knows that person and has good ties to them. The only notable blind spot in this careful campaign of network-building is Russia’s democratic opposition. ■
Alexander Gabuev is the director of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Centre in Berlin.