| |
The Kremlin’s focus will be closer to home from here on.
By: Caroline D. Rose
Last month, the
leader of Russia’s private military company the Wagner Group led an
unsuccessful revolt against Russia’s military elite. Yevgeny Prigozhin
directed his forces to launch a military takeover in what was
essentially the culmination of a public feud between Wagner and Russia’s
top military brass that had been escalating for months. For weeks
before the mutiny, Prigozhin had blamed Moscow’s hesitation to provide
logistical support and supplies for Wagner’s massive casualty count –
totaling more than 20,000, according to him – in the offensive on the
eastern Ukrainian city of Bakhmut.
Though Prigozhin
asserted that his issue was not with Vladimir Putin himself but rather
with the military command, it was still an embarrassing blow to the
Russian president, exposing key gaps rivals could exploit to undermine
public confidence in the regime. Wagner will very likely be disbanded
and its leadership purged. Prigozhin was supposedly exiled to Belarus,
though the Belarusian leader recently said he was back in Russia. Much
has been said about how this incident will shape the war in Ukraine, but
what hasn’t received nearly as much attention is how Wagner’s collapse
will change Russia’s footprint farther afield.
Everywhere All at Once
Since its
establishment, Wagner has played a considerable role in Russia’s forward
military posture. For Moscow, a key advantage of Wagner was that the
group could help advance the Kremlin’s foreign policy goals, which
include countering the U.S. presence in regions across the globe while
providing a level of plausible deniability. With a far-reaching presence
through mercenaries who were essentially instructed by Moscow, Russia
developed a subtle, creeping influence in areas it considered
geopolitically vital.
Wagner forces
were deployed around the world, including in Ukraine, Venezuela, Sri
Lanka, the Central African Republic, Sudan, Mali, Libya and Syria. They
carried out missions such as protecting gold and diamond mines, securing
authoritarian regimes and countering armed terrorist organizations.
Russia also used Wagner forces in these regions to counter its
international rivals, including most notably the United States. Wagner’s
activities were seen as aiding Russia’s goal of cultivating dependent
clientele among governments and local security groups in far-flung
regions to expand Russia's influence.
![]()
(click to enlarge)
But Wagner’s
recent misadventure meant that Putin could no longer rely on the group
to do his bidding. In the fallout from the insurrection, Moscow has
sought to publicly take out the Wagner leadership and disassemble the
group as a whole.
Putin’s Playbook
Unsurprisingly,
Putin immediately tried to neutralize the group’s leader, issuing an
arrest warrant for Prigozhin on June 24 and allowing him to flee to
Belarus. The Russian government has also reportedly cracked down on
ministry officials closely associated with Wagner, such as Aerospace
Forces Commander-in-Chief Sergei Surovikin and Deputy Defense Minister
Yunus-bek Yevkurov, who have been absent since the insurrection, in an
effort to further stifle competition from within Wagner and the Russian
armed forces.
![Wagner's March on Moscow]()
(click to enlarge)
The mutiny has
also reinforced incentives for the Russian Ministry of Defense to reduce
the agency of military contractors as a whole and merge them with
Russia’s armed forces. Even before Prigozhin's fated march on Moscow,
the Russian government had introduced a rule that all private
contractors must enlist in the Russian military by July. Still, it’ll
take time to integrate the mercenaries. While some fought alongside
Russian troops and shared with them similar goals, Wagner mercenaries
received different training and had different battlefield experiences
than their counterparts in the military. The two sides also competed for
resources and credit for battlefield successes – which will make a
merger even harder to deliver. Wagner forces voiced frustration with how
the Ministry of Defense handled the war in Ukraine, saying it suffered
from logistics, supply and personnel mismanagement, while the leadership
of the Russian armed forces perceived Wagner as a rival with a
dangerous degree of autonomy on the battlefield. It will no doubt be a
bumpy road ahead for the Kremlin as it seeks to mitigate these divisions
and fully integrate Wagner forces.
Another factor
that will chip away at Wagner’s global posture is the Kremlin’s renewed
inward focus. The insurrection attempt was a wakeup call for Putin and
his advisers, demonstrating that opposition forces could exploit gaps in
Russian security and public cohesion. That Wagner was able to push its
way so close to Moscow was an indication that the Kremlin had lowered
its guard. Thus, it’s likely that Russia will now focus on bolstering
internal security. Putin and his top military brass will seek to shore
up additional support for the war effort in Ukraine, accelerating its
offensive in the east and pushing for decisive victories to demonstrate
to the public and rivals that the Russian military can perform
successfully without Wagner. Because of this dual focus on regime
security and operational performance in Ukraine, it’s likely that Russia
won’t seek to immediately fill the gaps Wagner mercenaries are leaving
behind in Libya, Syria and Central Asia. Though Moscow still wants
access to things like resources and ports as well as influence in these
areas, regime continuity and a win in Ukraine will be bigger priorities
as the Kremlin moves on from Prigozhin's failed campaign.
Wagner’s
dissolution – whether formal or informal – impacts not only Russia’s
internal security landscape but also its global footprint. As Wagner
leaders are purged and personnel absorbed into the armed forces,
potential vacuums will open up in active and latent conflict zones
including Libya, Syria, the Sahel and Central Asia. And with this will
come new opportunities for competing actors. |