The fragile foundations of the partnership 'without limits'
China and Russia: The Weight of History
The fragile foundations of the partnership 'without limits'
Jul 23
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This year marks the 60th anniversary of the split between the Soviet Union and the Peoples Republic of China bursting out into the open with some bitter polemics. Unsurprisingly this anniversary has not excited much comment. The hostility between the two communist giants eased during the 1980s. The Soviet Union no longer exists and its legatee, the Russian Federation, now claims a close friendship with China. It’s possible that this piece of international history has not registered with many policy-makers. They might therefore assume the Sino-Russian relationship to be on far firmer foundations than is the case and so miss the opportunities for some creative Western diplomacy.
A bit more history: Nixon’s China diplomacy
By the end of the Cold War, the point at which history may start for many of the current generation of think-tankers and policy-makers, relations between Moscow and Beijing were relatively calm and cordial. Before that, however, there had been a period of great tension.
When the split first became apparent in 1963, triggered by Moscow’s reluctance to help Beijing develop its own nuclear weapons, American officials were nonplusssed. Up to that point they had always spoken of a ‘Sino-Soviet bloc’ to underscore the combined power of international communism. Now the conflict between the two could not be ignored. By 1969 it was so deep that they appeared to be close to war, with border skirmishing where the Amur and Ussuri rivers come together. Moscow made it known that it was contemplating launching a preventive strike before China had an operational nuclear arsenal. This crisis passed but during the 1970s both the Soviet Union and China developed their armed forces with each other in mind as much as the ‘imperialist’ Americans.
At first American sympathies were largely with the Soviets in this argument, as they began to work on arms control while China descended into the convulsions of the Cultural Revolution. At the start of the 1970s the calculations changed. China was exhausted by perpetual chaos and regular purges, and uncomfortable in its comparatively isolated international position. President Richard Nixon and his national security advisor Dr Henry Kissinger saw an opportunity. If they could play off the Soviets and the Chinese against each other then they could gain greater leverage over both.
For Nixon this meant ditching his Republican Party’s long-standing support of the Kuomintang, the Chinese Nationalists occupying only Taiwan but still laying claim to being the rightful government of all of China and occupying the Chinese seat on the UN Security Council. Reversing this position recognised the reality of the situation. Despite efforts of the US to stop this, the General Assembly expelled Taiwan from the UN. This was when the core US position, followed by every administration since Nixon’s, was established.
The US supported Beijing’s view, which also happened in principle to be Taipei’s, that the two entities were part of the same country. The US acknowledged ‘that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain that there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China,’ while noting the need for a peaceful resolution to the dispute between the two. Secretary of State Blinken re-iterated this view when he visited Beijing in early June. The US also confirms that it would defend Taiwan should Beijing seek to take control by force. Both stances demonstrate how the weight of the past continues to shape Sino-US relations.
Nixon’s opening to China was seen as being bold as well as overdue. He was able to begin his 1972 re-election campaign with historic visits, first to Beijing and then to Moscow. One purpose was to demonstrate to Hanoi that both of its communist friends had their own interests to pursue whatever the state of the war and so push it to return to peace talks in Paris. (The same strategy also involved bombing North Vietnamese cities, and mining the port of Haiphong.) In this respect Nixon was successful. By the start of the next year Kissinger was able to negotiate a deal to end the war, although the deal itself was insufficient to protect the South Vietnamese government when the North went on the offensive again in 1975.
Kissinger’s bargaining position was enhanced because as he worked to normalise relations with the Chinese he was also pursuing a far-reaching détente with the Soviet leadership, regularising East-West relations in Europe and negotiating arms control.
Now the situation is quite different. Washington’s relations with China are only slowly easing while those with Moscow are deeply antagonistic and unlikely to recover until Vladimir Putin ends his war in Ukraine, and probably until he is no longer in power. Nor are Beijing and Moscow about to fall out sufficiently badly to provide Blinken with an opportunity to emulate Kissinger’s diplomatic triumph.
This pre-history is still however relevant because it reminds us that there are many good reasons why the friendship without ‘limits’ proclaimed by Putin and Xi Jinping in early February 2022 is turning out to have very tangible limits. Even at that time there were grounds for doubting its durability. The course of Russia’s war with Ukraine, about which Xi apparently was not given advance warning, has added to the stress. Instead of assuming the strength of the Sino-Russia relationship it is worth considering its potential fragility.
1963 and 2023
To explore the continuities and change in relations between Moscow and Beijing we can compare the positions in 1963 and 2023.
The trigger of the 1963 split is no longer relevant as China is now a mature nuclear power. Another of the underlying causes does not apply. Then Chinese leader Mao Zedong felt that there was no reason why he should accept a subordinate position in the international communist movement to the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev or his successor Leonid Brezhnev. When Mao came to power in 1949 he knew he could not put himself above Josef Stalin, a man who had so ruthlessly maintained his power, led his country through its great struggle with the Nazis, and had then refused to grant an inch to the US imperialists and their lackeys during the early years of the Cold War.
Mao could not think of Stalin’s successors as being of the same revolutionary stature and suspected them of being too ready to make their accommodations with imperialism. China’s current leader Xi Jinping in principle (and to a degree in practice) is, like Mao, a Marxist-Leninist ‘with Chinese characteristics.’ Putin may have some lingering regard for the old Bolshevik methods for political control and dealing with rivals, but his ideology is intensely and romantically nationalist and statist, with no obvious theoretical underpinnings. The shared ideology of the two men does not extend much beyond illiberalism and a desire to deny the US a dominant role in world affairs. The latter in particular has provided a compelling argument for working together, but there is no pretence that Putin and Xi represent two strands of a great movement capable of inspiring the global masses.
The geographical and historical factors that weighed heavily in the 1960s are still very much present. The Soviet Far East is resource rich but with few people and far away from the main centres of Russia’s population. The neighbouring Chinese population is large, and Moscow has long feared that Beijing may hanker after seizing some of that land. China’s claims to much of this territory have not eased these concerns. In the 19th century and into the 20th, Russia was just another imperialist power taking advantage of China’s weakness to seize territory and impose their will on Chinese governments. Beijing’s historical grudge about this period has not gone away. Moreover, Russia considered itself an essentially European country and looked upon the Chinese with disdain, a feeling reciprocated by the Chinese.
The big change is in the balance of power between the two. In 1963 the Soviet Union was the world’s second largest economy, with industrial and military strength to rival that of the United States and a formidable geo-political position in both Europe and Asia. China’s claim to great power status depended on its huge, largely rural, population. But its people were poor and its economy was in a dire state because of the errors of the previous decade (the ‘Great Leap Forward’).
Fast forward six decades and the differences are startling. The Soviet Union has gone, broken up into 15 pieces, and Russia, the most substantial piece, is now engaged in a gruelling and thus far inconclusive war with the second most substantial piece, Ukraine. Three of the smaller pieces (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) are now, along with the former Soviet allies in Europe, part of the EU and NATO. Only Belarus is still with Russia, but this is mainly because Putin has kept its dictator, Aleksandr Lukashenko, in power. The Central Asian states (the ‘Stans’) do not look to the West but they are unavoidably drawn to China’s superior economic power to the East.
Russia is no longer in the top ten economies and its position is falling, due to a combination of inherent failings, a disastrous war, and western sanctions. The long-term demographics are awful. Many of its brightest people have fled to avoid repression and conscription. It is led by a collection of old spies who struggle to understand the world around them and whose grip on power now looks less sure after the Wagner mutiny. The war is squandering their military assets, built up over two decades. Their army in particular will take years to reconstitute. Meanwhile China has surged into a position to rival American economic power and is now hurriedly building up its military power to match. It is also using its economic strength to gain international influence, particularly among developing countries. It has found ways to develop and harness advanced technology.
China, of course, is not without its own problems. Its demographics are also awful: the ‘one-child’ policy left it with an aging population and a shortage of women. Its economy is in a bad way, with 20% youth unemployment, and a dysfunctional real estate sector. Recent figures show its recovery to be slowing. It faces serious environmental challenges. It boasted about the success of its Covid strategy and then had to abandon it abruptly as it was not working and was leading to serious social unrest. Xi has prioritised consolidating his power and extending the Communist party’s control over the population and failed to encourage a dynamic private sector. While many in the West worry about Beijing’s expansionist urges, especially when directed against Taiwan, in practice the domestic agenda looks to be difficult and demanding.
It may be that Beijing is starting to appreciate that its policies have been counterproductive, making life too difficult and uncertain for companies that want to do business in China, and encouraging western countries to adopt similar positions vis-a-vis China, when it had been hoping to expose differences between the US and the EU. While we can expect no compromises on core security issues, a faltering economy may encourage a less strident approach to the West.
Putin and Xi
Though there may be reasons to doubt the narrative of an inexorable Chinese rise to becoming the world’s dominant power, while Russia’s decline is palpable. Here the balance of power has shifted irreversibly in China’s favour. This became painfully evident last March when Xi visited Putin in Moscow. The neediness of Putin was evident, but whatever he wanted from XI he didn’t get it, or if he did there was no reference to any concessions in the communique, which contained no mention of arms transfers or even the much-touted second gas pipeline from Russia to China. While China is happy to purchase more oil and gas from Russia, and so ignore sanctions, it is also pleased to get a good price. The relationship is lopsided: China is Russia’s biggest source of imports and its biggest export market, but only 11th in the list of Beijing’s trade partners.
In retrospect the most consequential moment was when then two men confirmed that nuclear weapons should not be used, thus adding yet another reason for Putin not to ‘go nuclear’ unless this war really does turn into a direct fight with NATO. It is worth noting that this is also another area where the Russia-China balance of power has shifted. Not that long ago Putin would describe China as an ‘economic superpower’ while noting that Russia was a ‘nuclear superpower’, but now when measured by missile numbers China is catching up fast.
Most worrying for Moscow is the position in Russia’s Far East. Central Asia countries have been increasingly keeping their distance, unconvinced that Russia can provide it now with either security or economic benefits. China inaugurated its own China-Central Asia Summit last May. One interesting development concerns Russia’s most eastern city of Vladivostok, the home of its Pacific Fleet, annexed from China in the 19th Century. Beijing’s view is that this is still a Chinese city. In February a Chinese ministry abruptly announced that it should now be referred to as Heishenwai.
In May came an announcement that China would be able to use Vladivostok as a transit port, which will make a substantial difference to its regional trade. In practice Vladivostok will soon become – de facto – a Chinese city. The talk is now of Russia becoming China’s ‘vassal state’ (President Macron’s description) For many Russians this is a miserable prospect. They have considered themselves European rather than Asian and now Europe is closed off to them. Putin cannot suddenly pivot to the West to reduce his dependence on China because he is now a pariah and still has a war to win. But precisely because of his lack of geopolitical options he has little leverage over Xi. For now China can take what it wants from the relationship, economically and diplomatically.
Against this backdrop it would be a blow to Russia if China’s relations with the US improved. To the extent that it has a grand strategy at the moment, it depends on a continuation of the intense rivalry between the US and China. One favoured narrative in Moscow supposes that Washington’s main priority is to prepare for war with China, so that Ukraine is something of a distraction and one that is eating away at its own military preparedness as so much equipment and ammunition is being donated to Kyiv. To be fair, at times talk in Washington has supported this view. But since the G20 meeting in Indonesia last November, when serious though still tentative conversations began again between Chinese and Western leaders, it has become apparent that the US now accepts that it must deny Russia a victory in Ukraine, and will do what it can to bring about its defeat.
It also has little appetite for a war with China, although Biden will not resile from past commitments to Taiwan. The Chinese have said that stabilising relations with the US is a ‘top priority.’ If the US can follow up Blinken’s visit to Beijing with a Biden-Xi summit (despite Biden calling Xi injudiciously, but not wholly inaccurately, a ‘dictator’) then this will be highly significant for a range of reasons, and weaken Russia’s position further. To this one might add India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s state visit to Washington as another example of Washington trying to keep relations with non-aligned countries in good repair, including those who have declined to take a strong position on Russian aggression.
On 13 July Blinken met up with China’s top diplomat, Wang Yi, in Jakarta. According to the State Department Blinken’s meeting:
‘was part of ongoing efforts to maintain open channels of communication to clarify U.S. interests across a wide range of issues and to responsibly manage competition by reducing the risk of misperception and miscalculation.’
This followed a visit to Beijing by Treasury Secretary Janet L. Yellen and then Climate Envoy John F. Kerry. Most symbolically, Henry Kisisnger, continuing his 100th burthday celebrations, returned to the scene of one of his greatest diplomatic triumphs, and symbolically was granted an audience with Xi. ‘We never forget our old friends’, said Xi, adding that ‘China and the United States are once again at the crossroads of where to go, and the two sides need to make a choice again.’ He urged Kissinger and like-minded Americans to ‘continue to play a constructive role in bringing China-US relations back to the right track.’
This is at least a signal that better relations are possible although what this means in practice is les clear. Competition is still more in evidence than cooperation. After meeting with Wang, Blinken went to the Vilnius NATO summitt which confirmed that the alliance now considers China to be a security threat. Meanwhile, timed to coincide with Yellen’s visit, and in response to US restrictions on exports of high-performing chips, Beijing announced that exports of the vital metals gallium and germanium would require official approval from August. So this is hardly yet a full rapprochement - at most tentative steps to ease tensions.
A Chinese ‘peace’ diplomacy?
China is the country with the options, able to talk to both Russia and the US. It is best placed to play a role in any peace effort that might start to develop once it is possible to assess the success or otherwise of the Ukrainian offensive. Xi has already had a direct conversation with Volodymyr Zelensky, after months refusing to take his calls. Prior to the full-scale war China had perfectly good relations with Ukraine, including purchases of grain, and will not want to lose out on any major reconstruction effort once circumstances allow this to start in earnest. Tellingly after Russia backed out of the Black Sea grain initiative last week, the Chinese Foreign Ministry was urging its continuation.
Zelensky was quicker than most Western governments to recognise the potential of China’s own peace proposals, published last February to mark the first anniversary of the war. By staying close to the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity, the UN Charter, and International Humanitarian Law, they logically lead to the conclusion, not made explicit, that Russia must abandon its illegal occupation for there to be a lasting peace. Western governments now appreciate the role played by Xi in getting Putin to calm his nuclear rhetoric. They recognise that it is possible for China to take a constructive role in international affairs, for example in easing Iranian-Saudi tensions, and accept that only China can put any additional pressure on Russia in current circumstances. Should the moment come, there is no reason in principle why China and the West could not cooperate on a cease-fire initiative.
There are three big questions. The first is how to get China’s relations with the West on a sensible path. Even more so than with Russia, there is no point in spending much time speculating on regime change or some inner collapse, not because change is impossible but because it cannot be engineered from outside. On current trends China faces some big challenges and hard choices (don’t we all) but the only realistic course is to assume continuity of leadership. Unlike Russia, there is at least one strong institution - the Communist Party - through which any succession issues can be managed should they arise.
Nor is there need for naïveté about China’s readiness to engage in espionage or seek to influence our debates and technological development. This was made clear by the UK Parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee in a recent report. We do not need to pretend that we are ever going to be comfortable with its political system and approach to human rights or its readiness to redraw maps in its favour. At the same time it is a country with enormous economic clout, military strength, and diplomatic influence that is hard to ignore. There is much to discuss when it comes to trade and climate change. And there are areas where interests might align. Under Xi China has adopted a far more assertive foreign policy but the assertiveness has not always got results. There is a possibility that he sees the need for a more balanced approach to relations with the West. This is therefore a good time to start talking, but without expecting quick breakthroughs.
Second, is China prepared to put pressure on Russia? Before the war it clearly suited China to have a friendly Russia as a source of weapons and diplomatic support. Together they made for a powerful partnership, capable of challenging the West’s global position and its talk of a rules-based order, for example by looking to reduce the international role of the dollar. Xi and Putin were key figures in a club of ‘strong men’ that believed themselves to be resisting western forms of decadence and chaotic democracy. On several issues their interests remain aligned. But on the war itself China has taken a neutral stance, pointed out that it is not in a formal alliance with Russia, and has never endorsed Putin’s ‘special military operation.’ It may have shared the widespread belief that Kyiv could be conquered in a matter of days, and if that had happened it would have noted the boost to Russia’s standing and the blow to the West, and then carried on as before.
Even a war that was dragging on had some advantages in keeping the US preoccupied and with less time to spend on Indo-Pacific issues. But this war has no obvious upsides. It has for now unified the West, suggested that their weapons are superior to Russia’s, and undermined the credibility of China’s own threats to Taiwan by demonstrating the pitfalls likely to affect any attack on a resistant entity. Xi would rather not be seen to be backing a loser. It is hard to know whether he will have been more appalled by the fact that Yevgeny Prigozhin’s Wagner mutiny was allowed to occur or the fact that Prigozhin was let off so gently in its aftermath. He will also keep such thoughts to himself, not wishing it to be supposed that his partnership with Putin lacks any foundation or that initiatives such as this can be abandoned as soon as the going gets tough. He would find alarming a catastrophic Russian defeat and Putin being forced from power. So for now he is only likely to step up his engagement with the issue if Moscow signals that it wants a way out.
This leads to a third question, which is whether even Xi can extricate Putin from the diplomatic hole he is in. The visits to Kyiv (where they had to take shelter from Russian drones) and Moscow by a high-level African delegation, led by South Africa’s Cyril Ramaphosa, indicates the problem. This delegation was not hostile to Russia, and from a part of the world where Putin’s diplomats have expended a lot of effort recently trying to gain sympathy and support. Their ideas for peace, also founded on the UN Charter, are not radically different from China’s.
Yet Putin interrupted the African leaders as they spoke and treated them to a lecture of his own, including his tendentious claims about how a peace deal had been scuppered by Ukraine and the West in April 2022. Since then South Africa has given up trying to find a way for Putin to attend the BRICS summit because Pretoria cannot guarantee that he won’t be arrested for war crimes.
Putin has no interest in a deal based on the UN charter because it would leave him with nothing to show for the whole wretched enterprise. With the African leaders he stuck with his demand that the only basis for peace was for Kyiv to hand over the four oblasts notionally annexed last autumn, even though Russian forces did not occupy all of them then and now risk losing even more control. Until Russia indicates that it recognises that these territories are really Ukrainian it is hard to see how any serious negotiations can begin.
Which takes us back to the position we have been in for some time, waiting to see whether the Ukrainian offensive can prosper and its impact, if any, on the Kremlin’s decision-making. Nonetheless, it is important to keep the wider context in view. Russia has turned definitively away from the West and is not going to turn back for some time. In doing so it turned towards China. After at first getting an enthusiastic embrace it is now being treated to warm words of little practical value while its dependence, and its inability to resists China’s encroachments and demands, is now becoming painfully evident. Among the many costs of this war for Russia, becoming China’s junior partner, tolerated more than respected, is by no means the least.
© 2023 Sam Freedman
548 Market Street PMB 72296, San Francisco, CA 94104
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