Economists use the term "moral hazard" to refer to taking on excessive risk because of assurances that someone else will cover your losses or, if worse comes to worse, will be there to bail you out. It is the same with alliances. Thus, whatever the merits of the Ukraine war, it would be a mistake to allow Kyiv to join NATO in the near term since it would increase the odds of the West becoming embroiled in a war with Russia. Ukraine's recent actions against Russia have become bolder and have raised the stakes of an escalating conflict. Kyiv is widely assumed to have been behind the latest attack on the Kerch Bridge that links Crimea to the rest of Russia. Ukrainian agents were also suspected of being behind the recent assassination of a Russian ex-navy commander who was killed while jogging in a park in the Russian city of Krasnodar. In addition, Ukraine has been implicated in the September 2022 sabotage of the Nord Stream pipelines in the Baltic Sea that carried natural gas supplies from Russia to Germany. Although Washington was reportedly tipped off in advance about the plan by Dutch military intelligence and warned Kyiv not to conduct it, its demands were ignored. These Ukrainian actions should be borne in mind in any discussion of whether Kyiv should join NATO. NATO's own rules stipulate that countries may not join if they are actively involved in a conflict. But Ukraine's record of provocative behavior ― and the "moral hazard" it poses to the alliance ― makes its membership highly problematic. Troublesome "client" states have always posed a dilemma for foreign policymakers since their actions could trigger major conflicts. The most famous case is Serbia, a client state of Russia when it engineered the assassination of the Austro-Hungarian Archduke Franz Ferdinand in 1914. Moscow saw no choice but to back Belgrade in response to threats from Vienna and the world was plunged into World War I. Washington faced a similar dilemma in dealing with Seoul in the period before the Korean War. It constantly needed to restrain Syngman Rhee from his plans to "March to the North" to reunify the Korean Peninsula and deprived him of heavy weaponry as a result. In the 1970s, the U.S. intervened to stop Park Chung-hee from building a nuclear bomb. At the recent NATO summit in Vilnius, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy slammed NATO for not being willing to outline a timeline for joining the alliance. Nonetheless, NATO has been edging closer and closer to giving Ukraine some sort of de facto membership. Although membership has not yet been granted, something virtually akin to it is now the case. Another example of a moral hazard posed by an ally is the recent statements by Polish President Andrej Duda, who urged Washington to deploy tactical nuclear weapons to his country despite the risk that this could promote an escalation from Russia. While NATO appears to be united on Ukraine, fissures are nevertheless appearing. Although Ukraine's bid for membership is strongly supported by East European and Baltic states, there is much less enthusiasm for it among core West European NATO countries, who worry about NATO's expanding border with Russia following the recent inclusion of Finland. There are signs of impatience with Ukraine's constant demands for weapons. When presented by Zelenskyy on the margins of the NATO summit with a long wish list of new weapons systems, British Defense Secretary Ben Wallace reportedly snapped, "What do you think we are, Amazon?" He intimated that a little bit of gratitude might go a long way. President Yoon Suk Yeol should bear this situation in mind as he steps up support for Ukraine. His recent unannounced visit to Kyiv was made with the obvious goal of raising Korea's profile and seeking favor with Washington. Yoon seems to want to create a NATO-like structure in East Asia. He offered a big package of "non-lethal" aid reconstruction assistance to Ukraine, which is in line with Seoul's stated policy of refusing to supply weapons to countries at war. But there are reports that Ukrainian forces are using 155mm artillery shells and howitzers from Korea on the battlefield. These were likely provided by Poland, which has become a big arms market for Seoul. The two countries last year signed a $13.7 billion arms deal, which included Chunmoo rocket launchers. K2 tanks, K9 self-propelled howitzers and FA-50 fighter aircraft over the next decade. This will also allow Poland to re-export the older Russian-style equipment it has to Ukraine. Yoon's move risks a sharp Russian reaction. Moscow has already threatened Seoul that it would reciprocate with new military support for Pyongyang should Korean weaponry appear in Ukraine. It should be noted that North Korea's latest ICBM, the Hwasong-18, is almost a near carbon copy of Russia's Topol-M, able to carry several warheads. This challenges the U.S. deterrence policy to defend its Korean ally.
John Merrill is a visiting scholar at the Institute of Korean Studies at George Washington University.