Ukraine's Counteroffensive Needs a Plan B
![A Ukrainian soldier works with a SPG model grenade launcher in the direction of Avdiivka as the war between Russia and Ukraine continues at the frontline Donbas in Donetsk Oblast on July 20, 2023. (Ercin Erturk—Anadolu Agency/ Getty Images)]()
America’s “Plan A” in Ukraine is on life support.
For months, U.S. officials had looked ahead to the Zelensky government’s long-planned counteroffensive as the best hope
for turning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine into a decisive failure,
forcing Putin to sue for peace. They posited that even if Ukraine
ultimately proved incapable of driving Russian forces off all of
Ukraine’s territory, the counteroffensive would give Kyiv significant
leverage at the diplomatic table. At a minimum, Ukraine would emerge
from the war as a strong and independent nation, boasting a
Western-backed military more than capable of blocking any new Russian
aggression for years to come.
Some six weeks into the
Ukrainian counteroffensive, things are not going as planned. Although
damage estimates vary, Ukraine has lost significant numbers of men and weapons, while making negligible progress against formidable Russian defenses.
Despite
vigorous recruiting and conscription efforts, Ukraine has too few
soldiers to muster the three-to-one manpower advantage generally
considered necessary for a successful offensive. Its supplies of
artillery shells and anti-aircraft missiles, vital to battlefield
success, are dwindling. As a result, Russia’s air force—which was
sparingly used last year in the face of effective Ukrainian air
Finger-pointing for this failure is already underway. Increasingly, Ukrainian officials openly blame the West for not providing enough armor, aircraft, artillery, missiles, and ammunition. Anonymous American officials blame the Ukrainians for not conducting Western-style combined arms operations to outmaneuver and outpace their plodding Russian opponents.
Regardless
of who is at fault, there are no fast or easy solutions to the problems
besetting the counteroffensive. Even if the United States and NATO had
sufficient volumes of weapons and ammunition to provide Ukraine, the
fundamental issue cannot be resolved simply by supplying Ukraine with
advanced weaponry. Combined arms operations are among the most
sophisticated endeavors in conventional warfare, and not learned on the
fly.
The
U.S. military, for example, has long relied on the tactical
flexibility, judgment, and initiative of non-commissioned officers
(NCOs) and junior officers. This concept, called “Mission Command,” is a
critical component of U.S. combined arms operations. It enables even
the most junior Marine or soldier adeptly to adjust on the battlefield
to build or maintain momentum, especially during combined arms
operations, which are highly dynamic and fluid. This approach has been
refined over the course of nearly 100 years of continuous development
and training.
By contrast, Ukraine has little
experience in Western-style combined arms operations and insufficient
time to train a large force in this approach to war. While it has begun
slowly to adapt, Ukraine’s military is still deeply rooted in Soviet-era offensive tactics
and culture, centralizing decision-making at the top while penalizing
subordinate soldiers who dare to deviate from the plan. In essence,
Ukraine needs to reconstitute its military and install a new philosophy
to conduct effective combined arms warfare.
But
even such an extensive transformation would still not resolve Ukraine’s
critical gap in this war: air power. According to the Congressional Research Service, Ukraine’s air force has 132 aircrafts, compared to 1,391 in Russia’s. Providing Ukraine with a couple of dozen F-16
fighters, whose complex maintenance requirements make the aircraft
ill-suited for conditions in Ukraine, will hardly bridge that gap. As
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Mark Milley, told Politico in May, “There are no magic weapons in war, F-16s are not, and neither is anything else.”
Given
such difficult circumstances, what are Kyiv’s choices? One option would
be to maintain its current course, betting that recent squabbling might
cause the Russian military—and ultimately the Putin regime—to crumble
from within. However, the risks of such a gamble would be significant.
If Ukraine continues its under-manned and under-supported assaults on
entrenched Russian defenses, it could exhaust its resources and leave
itself dangerously vulnerable to a Russian counterattack. This has
happened before—in 1943, the Battle of Kursk depleted the Wehrmacht of
Nazi Germany and allowed the Soviets to counterattack across a front
line too long for the Nazis to manage. The result was a massacre that
did not stop until the Red Army was in Berlin.
In
fact, Ukraine has a better option. By shifting their focus from offense
to defense while shortening and reinforcing their defensive lines, the
Ukrainians could force the Russian military to leave the security of its
defensive network. With less territory for Ukraine to defend, it could
mass troops at critical points across the battlespace, enabling its
commanders to maximize the effect of its armor and artillery while
preserving critical supplies of ammunition. Making this shift now could
enable Ukraine to hold onto areas of the Donbass region that Russia has
officially annexed but has yet to seize, putting Kyiv in a stronger
bargaining position than its failing counteroffensive is likely to
produce.
Playing defense is inherently easier
than mounting a large offensive, and Ukraine’s odds of military success
in such a shift would be high. Today’s Russian army is not the Red Army
of 1943, and it is far from clear that the Russians have the logistical
and organizational capacity to reach Kyiv. The Ukrainian military has
shown for nearly a year and a half that it is capable of stymying
Russia’s offensive operations, particularly with continued Western
support and encouragement.
Admittedly, a
Ukrainian shift to defense would not, by itself, drive Russia to the
bargaining table. But, if coupled with a diplomatic approach that
incentivizes Russia to end the fighting rather than prolong it to keep
Ukraine out of NATO, it could well prompt Russia to aim to secure its
still quite limited gains through a negotiated end to the war. It is
time to try.
