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Both Iran and the U.S. are flexing their muscles in the region.
By: Caroline D. Rose
Tensions are
rising as Iran and the United States beef up their presence in Middle
Eastern waters. The Pentagon said it would deploy a destroyer, the USS
Thomas Hudner, and F-35 fighter jets to the Gulf of Oman and Strait of
Hormuz, having deployed F-16 fighter jets, an A-10 attack aircraft, and a
guided-missile destroyer, the USS McFaul, last week. Washington has yet
to indicate how long these vessels will be in the region, saying they
are there to monitor security and support protection efforts for local
shipping lanes.
Iran responded by
staging not-so-subtle military exercises simulating an attack in the
strait. Far offshore deep into central Iran, the exercise included more
than 90 aircraft, including fighter jets, drones and bombers, pulling
heavily from Bandar Abbas base, which sits at the mouth of the Strait of
Hormuz, hinting that the drills could help personnel prepare for
attacks against foreign actors protecting commercial vessels passing
through and monitoring the Gulf of Oman.
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Aside from the
general tension and distrust that characterize U.S.-Iran relations, the
recent buildup started after Iran attempted to seize two oil tankers in
the Strait of Hormuz – one of the most strategic chokepoints in the
world. Conflict here would wreak havoc on global supply chains, sending
supply costs and energy prices through the roof. Iran acknowledges the
strait’s importance and has sought to leverage its proximity
accordingly, periodically threatening and outright seizing
foreign-flagged tankers. In just two years alone, Tehran has seized more
than five commercial vessels (that we know of). But the recent incident
was different. As the two vessels approached the strait, Iranian
personnel opened fire. When the USS McFaul arrived, the Iranian ships
reportedly ran off, and the fact now is that the U.S. and its allies
feel the urgent need to provide air cover in this crucial energy hub.
The sudden
escalation shows that despite all de-escalatory measures of the past,
tensions are still fraught, and both countries’ interests remain
divergent. It also demonstrates new risk-accepting behavior from Iran in
a sign that the government means to build leverage against the U.S.,
its partners and regional actors to pursue its interests, all while
keeping the door open for normalization and de-escalation through
dialogue with traditional rivals in the Gulf.
Tehran is
building on a delicate balancing act. Hampered by years of Western
sanctions and resulting commercial isolation, it's searching for
immediate sanctions relief. The U.S. and its partners will consider
lifting sanctions only if Iran moderates its behavior and offers
concessions related to its nuclear program and/or forward presence of
proxy militias that threaten U.S. interests throughout the Levant. While
Iran has approached the negotiating table countless times, it has
stopped short of the permanent changes the U.S. and its partners demand,
at least partly because it can’t afford to lose credibility at home.
The government is fresh off of months of nationwide, anti-government
demonstrations over the killing of Mahsa Amini – the largest challenge
to Iranian leadership since the revolution of 1979. Though the current
leadership has been able to maintain its grip on power through a curated
mix of internet blackouts, crackdowns, mass arrests and executions, its
grip is still tenuous, convincing the government that it cannot back
down, implement major reforms that appease the opposition, or look weak
in the face of Western offenses.
Attempts are
still being made to revive talks over Iran’s nuclear program, but they
aren’t working. Just this week, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken
and Qatari Foreign Minister Mohammad bin Abdulrahman Al Thani spoke on
the phone to discuss ways to bring new momentum to the talks, and a
flurry of diplomatic activity has meanwhile taken place between Iran and
Arab Gulf states to ease tension, prompted by a decreased U.S. presence
over time and long-term questions about regional security. Though
attempts are frequent, discussions have gone nowhere as both sides’ red
lines remain largely unchanged. This has created greater space for
bolder behavior and limited escalation, particularly for Iran, which
wants to break out of its economic isolation, exploit regional hotspots
where U.S. presence is winding down, and maintain its influence abroad.
Neither wants a
direct, large-scale conflict, but with dead-end nuclear talks and
slow-moving regional normalization efforts, there are fewer constraints
and a greater imperative to rattle some sabers. For the next few months,
expect limited escalations like these, wars of words between diplomats,
maritime posturing and frequent tanker seizures in the Gulf of Oman,
and tit-for-tat strikes between U.S. personnel and Iran-aligned militias
in the Levant.
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