The war in Ukraine has served as the geopolitical equivalent of an X-ray machine, revealing a range of dynamics that currently characterize the international system. The conflict has demonstrated the depth of solidarity among the U.S. and it trans-Atlantic allies, which quickly mobilized comprehensive sanctions against Russia while arming Ukraine with state-of-the-art weaponry. It has also exposed the limits of China’s willingness to fully consummate its “no-limits partnership” with Russia, with Beijing providing Moscow with diplomatic and especially economic cover, while insisting on its “neutrality” in the war to appease Europe.
Crucially, the crisis has also made clear the preference among many postcolonial states of the Global South for conducting foreign policies based on what can be called multi-alignment. India, for instance, has unabashedly championed this approach in justifying its refusal to align with fellow democracies against Moscow, a top defense partner and major source of energy; to the contrary, new Delhi has ramped up its purchase of deeply discounted Russian oil since the beginning of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
Similarly, the war in Ukraine has been particularly disruptive for Vietnam. Hanoi has been heavily dependent on Russian weapons systems for its decades-long military modernization program. At the same time, Vietnam has also courted closer security ties with the U.S. and Europe, amid booming trade relations over the past decade. This approach has paid off in recent years, as both Russia and the West have proved to be crucial partners for Vietnam with regard to growing tensions with China in the South China Sea. But even as Hanoi keeps a wary eye on China, it seeks to push back against Beijing’s newfound assertiveness without jeopardizing lucrative economic ties or risking conflict with its neighbor.
This complicated balance made Hanoi particularly vulnerable during the first months of the crisis over Ukraine. In response, Vietnam has doubled down on its own proactive strategy of multi-alignment, by simultaneously courting closer relations not only with the U.S. and China, but also with likeminded regional powers and neighbors like India, Australia, Japan, Indonesia and the Philippines. As a result, Vietnam has forged a new strategic sweet spot for itself, allowing it to enhance its defensive capabilities by leveraging a wide network of partnerships.
Dancing With Great Powers
Vietnam emerged from the Cold War traumatized by Soviet abandonment toward the end of the Indo-China Wars and embittered by the 1979 war and subsequent skirmishes with its former Chinese ally. Vietnam’s leadership therefore adopted the “Four No’s” doctrine in the post-Cold War period, by which Hanoi refused to: negotiate a mutual defense alliance with any foreign power; host any foreign troops on its territory; side with any superpower against another; and deploy force to achieve foreign policy goals. This was coupled with Hanoi’s Doi Moi, or open door, policy, which allowed the country’s communist regime to tap into the global trade regime.
In the first two decades of the 21st century, however, Vietnam has had to once again confront China, amid festering disputes in the South China Sea. Hanoi responded by gradually courting the West, particularly Washington, which was intent on constraining Beijing’s ambitions in the region. Vietnam joined the negotiations for membership in the Trans-Pacific Partnership free trade deal, while pursuing a strategic partnership with Washington to deepen security and defense ties.
Over the past decade, Vietnam has reaped the fruits of its strategic gamble. Trade with the West has increased exponentially; bilateral trade with the U.S. alone reached $139 billion last year, compared to less than $1 billion in 1999, with Vietnam even surpassing the United Kingdom to become the United States’ No. 7 trading partner. Meanwhile, Washington began to relax decades-old sanctions against Hanoi, paving the way for their expanded defense partnership. As part of this rapprochement, the U.S. designated Vietnam a “cooperative maritime partner” in the Indo-Pacific, culminating in the USS Carl Vinson aircraft carrier’s historic goodwill visit to Vietnam in 2018.
Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Vietnam has doubled down on its strategy of multi-alignment, simultaneously courting closer relations with the U.S. and China, as well as likeminded regional powers.
Nevertheless, despite recurring commentary that Hanoi is drifting into Washington’s orbit, Vietnam has refused to fully align with the U.S., especially amid disagreements with both the White House and the U.S. Congress over its human rights record in recent years. If anything, U.S. President Joe Biden’s “democracy agenda” spooked Vietnam’s communist leadership, which bemoaned its exclusion from the inaugural Summit for Democracy held virtually in December 2021. Moreover, bilateral defense deals remain for the most part modest, with Vietnam continuing to rely primarily on Russia for sophisticated weaponry until recently.
Now, with Western sanctions heavily undermining Vietnam’s ties with Russia, Hanoi has engaged in a charm campaign to ease tensions with Beijing. In doing so, it has fallen back on its tried-and-true strategy, seeking to “enmesh China in a web of bilateral ties” and a “series of agreements that stress comprehensive cooperation through party-to-party, state-to-state and military-to-military ties.”
As part of these efforts, Communist Party of Vietnam Secretary-General Nguyen Phu Trong became the first foreign dignitary to visit Chinese President Xi Jinping following the latter’s historic re-selection as chairman of the Chinese Communist Party last year. The Nguyen-Xi meeting culminated in the signing of more than a dozen deals, which underscored the two sides’ commitment to effectively manage border and trade disputes.
Keeping Options Open
Nguyen’s visit to Beijing last year was not an isolated event, but instead reflected a significant shift in Hanoi’s strategic calculus. In fact, Vietnam has openly signaled its refusal to take sides in the strategic rivalry between the U.S. and China on multiple occasions since Biden took office in January 2021. In a high-profile meeting in August 2021, Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh assured China’s ambassador to Vietnam that Hanoi would not enter into an alliance with Washington targeting China, just hours before hosting U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris in Hanoi.
Vietnam pulled a similar maneuver earlier this year, when Truong Thi Mai—the first woman in recent memory to join the CPV’s top decision-making body—traveled to Beijing just days after U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken had visited Hanoi to mark the 10th anniversary of the U.S.-Vietnam comprehensive strategic partnership. In a meeting with Xi while in Beijing, Truong underscored her country’s commitment to “long-term stability” and “good-neighborly friendship” between the two communist regimes.
Other Vietnamese leaders have consistently emphasized ideological solidarity during their visits to Beijing in the past year, with both sides expressing concern over the West’s alleged use of regime-change and “color revolutions” to target adversaries. However, the ideological turn in Sino-Vietnamese diplomatic engagement should not obscure the brutal realism that underscores Hanoi’s national defense strategy.
If anything, Vietnam is engaging in a classic case of “hedging.” Uncertain about the intentions and reliability of the two superpowers, Vietnam has been courting both of them simultaneously.
What makes Vietnam’s multi-alignment strategy particularly interesting, however, is Hanoi’s efforts to simultaneously expand defense ties with middle powers and likeminded regional states. Back in 2016, Vietnam was the world’s eighth-largest arms importer, largely thanks to big-ticket purchases from Russia, including submarines and fighter jets. Although far from complete, Vietnam’s military modernization program has provided the country with minimum deterrence capabilities against China.
Amid growing sanctions on Russia, however, Vietnam will likely need to expand ties with alternative partners, especially India, which has offered warships and cost-effective weapons systems, such as BrahMos anti-ship cruise missiles, as well as Japan, which has offered defense aid and maritime security assistance in recent years. Vietnam’s burgeoning defense ties with the European Union as well as Australia should be seen through this prism as well.
Closer to home, Vietnam has also been pursuing long-term strategic cooperation with fellow Southeast Asian nations. Vietnam and Indonesia recently concluded a historic maritime delimitation deal to demarcate their exclusive economic zones, which may serve as a template for similar agreements among Southeast Asian claimants in the South China Sea. Vietnam is also rekindling strategic ties with the Philippines, which under President Ferdinand Marcos is seeking new partnerships to keep China’s ambitions in adjacent waters in check.
Thanks to its proactive multi-alignment strategy, Vietnam has managed to mitigate its vulnerability in the wake of the war in Ukraine by refusing to take sides in that conflict. Instead it is courting competing superpowers and expanding its network of partnerships for maximal strategic gains. And in so doing, it is blazing a trail that could prove equally effective for other middle powers and small states seeking to navigate an increasingly complex global landscape.
Richard Javad Heydarian is a global affairs columnist, academic and policy adviser. He is currently a senior lecturer at the University of the Philippines’ Asian Center, and has written for the The New York Times, The Washington Post, The Guardian and Foreign Affairs, among other outlets. His forthcoming book is “China’s New Empire” (Melbourne University Press).