Sharing this only for the limited purpose of showing the plans for expanding the war against Russia, Iran, and China, hereafter, “RIC.” All of whom we’re already at war against collectively, using DOD definitions of “war,” and have been since Trump took office, though in the case of Iran, concealed as “clandestine war,” per the NYT. And in the case of Russia, concealed under cover, ironically, by his opponents with the meme of Trump as “Putin’s Puppet. And by his friends/other liars like Tucker Carlson and TAC’s fabrication of “non-interventionist Conservatives, refined into “Right-wing Peaceniks.”
None of which I say in defense of the Goldwaterite Biden administration with their full embrace of Cold War era “Traditional Conservative National Security Policy” of "spend, spend, spend on the military,” as always exceeded by about 10% more by the Republicans (It's Tradition!). But someone has to rebut the serial lies being put out by the New Right of the mythical “Right-wing Peaceniks."
The article at bottom is entirely war incitement, of the kind Tucker Carlson put out about China for years, with neither worth reading or listening to. But sharing this for these two paragraphs, which are revealing of the "subversive new strategy” of money intensive “fighting the blob” of USMC Commandant GEN Berger touted so heavily by The American Conservative and Responsible Statecraft.
Quote: "A new maritime strategy should begin with the reality of Eurasian competition and recognize three overlapping threats: China, Russia and Iran. It needs to articulate the Navy’s role in containing all three threats, both through deterrence and, in the event of combat, by keeping sea lines of communication open and deploying combat power to the Eurasian rimland, particularly the Indo-Pacific.
"The chief’s engagement in strategic development is critical. Delegation to subordinates would kill the enterprise. Each military service needs an advocate—particularly the sea services given the Pentagon’s landward bureaucracy. Gen. David Berger, commandant of the Marine Corps, recognizes this and has crafted a strategic concept he can defend. The Navy should follow his example.”
Add to that, the enormous costs of USMC Commandant Berger’s “subversive new strategy” for his “battle with the blob” so touted by the “Non-interventionist right-wing peaceniks:
BLUF: "However, recent reductions in land operations in the Central Command area of responsibility (TP-heralded in TAC as Trump “ending the endless wars” :-), and the Marine Corps’ renewed focus on naval expeditionary operations, have created opportunities to reevaluate our role in the High North of Europe, as well as in the western Pacific.
"Much of our effort in the High North in the past several years has involved relearning effective expeditionary operations in the unique conditions of the region. Trident Juncture 2018—the largest NATO exercise in the North Atlantic since the end of the Cold War—retaught lessons about operating in Arctic conditions. Marine Corps’ operations in Norway are part of the joint force and NATO contact layer in day-to-day strategic competition with Russia, and not simply a remnant of legacy Cold War contingency requirements. It may be in the contact layer—and in the transition to blunt layer activities—that the Marine Corps can have its greatest effect.”
God, how must the “Blob” hate this “subversive new strategy,” with all that money pouring into their coffers such a distraction from their . . . “Peace-niking,” with the Trump/DeSantis (New Right)/Republicans:
"That doesn’t mean House Republicans are giving up on a supplemental, though. Armed Services Chair Mike Rogers(R-Ala.) is making the case for extra spending aimed at China, beyond what the debt deal allows.
“It is premature to be talking about a supplemental right now,” Rogers said. “But we will need a supplemental later this year, for China specifically.”
"Rogers added that he doesn’t see his approach as contradicting what McCarthy said.”
Of course not, Republicans always demand and get more money for the military and its wars, and have my entire life as I saw with my voracious reading of newspapers and newsmagazines since I was a kid. It’s their “Tradition,” as I know full well.
The likely new chief of operations faces a challenging environment abroad and at home.
By Seth Cropsey
It came as a surprise when Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin recommended that President Biden name Adm. Samuel Paparo, commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, as chief of naval operations. The nod was expected to go to Adm. Lisa Franchetti, the vice chief.
Adm. Paparo is a commendable choice. He understands the threat China poses to U.S. pre-eminence in the Pacific. “A pacing threat” was how he described China in a 2021 speech to the U.S. Naval Institute and the Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association.
If he is appointed, he will face a uniquely difficult strategic environment. China’s army is preparing for a major war, European security still hangs in the balance as Russia seeks to swallow Ukraine, and Iran threatens to overturn the Middle Eastern balance. Domestically, a centralized Pentagon remains committed to transformation with no future vision, the services fight for Indo-Pacific roles absent a strategy, Congress views the Navy as strategically recalcitrant, and partisan politics threaten defense spending.
Charting a course forward requires four steps from the new chief of naval operations:
• Develop a coherent maritime strategy. The Navy has lacked one for 40 years. Its last successful strategy, formulated in 1982, was framed in terms of the threat from the Soviet Union. The explicit linkage between threat and capabilities ensured the Navy’s ability to identify its role in national defense and defend its budgets and force structure.
A new maritime strategy should begin with the reality of Eurasian competition and recognize three overlapping threats: China, Russia and Iran. It needs to articulate the Navy’s role in containing all three threats, both through deterrence and, in the event of combat, by keeping sea lines of communication open and deploying combat power to the Eurasian rimland, particularly the Indo-Pacific.
The chief’s engagement in strategic development is critical. Delegation to subordinates would kill the enterprise. Each military service needs an advocate—particularly the sea services given the Pentagon’s landward bureaucracy. Gen. David Berger, commandant of the Marine Corps, recognizes this and has crafted a strategic concept he can defend. The Navy should follow his example.
The future of naval combat as a concept is too complex to understand absent serious long-term reflection and intensive war gaming. The new chief of naval operations would benefit from creating a Project Solarium-style set of high-level assessment exercises that would include naval leadership, senior commanders and expert civilians. These would ensure that the Navy has the intellectual heft to contend with the Pentagon bureaucracy.
• Freeze ship retirements. Any strategic concept the chief develops will require more ships than are currently in the fleet. Budgetary pressures and simple shipyard constraints complicate this.
Submarines in particular must be kept in service. They will be the primary offensive implement against China’s reconnaissance-strike network, the key to allowing more-detectable U.S. assets to apply their combat power. But the U.S. Navy’s attack-submarine fleet is around a quarter to a third understrength because of maintenance and repair backlogs. In this state, it is unacceptable for the Navy to retire more submarines than it builds, as it plans to do until the early 2030s, when the Virginia-class pipeline begins to grow the fleet after Los Angeles-class retirements.
The new chief of operations should ensure that every ship has a role—even those less than fit for modern high-end combat, particularly the Littoral Combat Ship, which can be used for presence missions, those whose purpose is to show the flag and demonstrate the ability to project power. The fast Independence-class LCSs could deploy forces within areas where China has the ability to discern and strike targets.
• Take his case to Congress. The Navy still has bipartisan allies in the House and Senate Armed Services committees. Congressional hostility to the Navy stems from the service’s inability to articulate a strategic concept and provide a matching budget request, not from legislative aversion to a strong Navy. If the new chief of operations can make the case for a larger fleet and more funding derived from a clear strategic concept and maritime strategy, he may not find support in the Biden administration, but he will level the ground for future congressional beneficence.
• Support a major recapitalization of the defense and maritime industrial base. This should include advocacy of public-private partnerships that create new repair facilities and expanded long-term munitions contracts to ensure a weapons pipeline for the Navy and the military more broadly. It requires significant pressure on the Transportation Department and the U.S. Maritime Administration to fulfill their responsibilities as advocates of American sea power. A strong chief of naval operations can force these measures.
While Ukraine’s experience reminds us that the Navy will take damage during a major war, many attacks against ships won’t destroy them. Absent enough repair facilities, limited damage becomes a de facto mission kill for months or years. The only way to ensure a repair system is by supporting a dual-use maritime industrial base. The chief of operations should be the military voice of the effort.
History is an uninterrupted repetition of peace followed by war. Deterring another major war, one fought over dominance in Eurasia, ought to be American statesmen’s first goal. This can’t be accomplished without naval supremacy. A strong chief of naval operations is essential to the maritime defense that the U.S. requires by virtue of its geography, strategy and interest in international order. Let’s hope that Adm. Paparo makes the changes that American security needs.
Mr. Cropsey is founder and president of the Yorktown Institute. He served as a naval officer and as deputy undersecretary of the Navy and is author of “Mayday” and “Seablindness.”
Advertisement - Scroll to Continue
2:10
0:03 / 3:48
Review and Outlook: Beijing’s war hawks are making it harder to improve relations with the U.S. Images: AFP/Getty Images/Global News Composite: Mark Kelly
