Europe has role to play in breaking U.S.-China deadlock
By leveraging its relationships, EU can help set guardrails on rivalry
Peter Mandelson is co-founder and chairman of strategic advisory firm Global Counsel. He was previously the European Trade Commissioner and U.K. first secretary of state.
In a world of geopolitical jitters, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken's visit to Beijing does not mean that a corner has been turned in the brittle U.S.-China relationship. But human contact matters.
China feels disrespected and has not held back in expressing its indignation. The U.S., for its part, believes China's rise will come at a cost to its position and that of its allies and that Beijing's ambition must therefore be contained.
The two sides disagree on where China is heading. America believes it needs to curb China's influence and the apparent attractiveness of its authoritarian model. China believes that American antipathy stems from a desire to protect its status as global hegemon.
Friends of both countries should help them understand the other's motivations and anxieties.
This is not a matter of taking sides. Of course, those of us who prize individual freedom and free elections have no difficulty knowing whose values we want to prevail. But we must first deal with the world as it is and do so urgently.
The longer we lack an international system capable of diffusing rivalry within established guardrails, the greater the risk of escalating confrontation, which will most likely start in the Asia-Pacific region.
Should Europe, with its closeness to the U.S. and its deeper historical understanding of China, play a greater role in breaking the deadlock? Given our relationships with each actor, and our stake in the outcome, the answer must be yes.
American and European perspectives on China have converged on the need to respond to China's economic weight and growing military power. But our interests are not the same, and I believe they will remain distinct.
The U.S., like all hegemons before it, takes issue with what China is -- that is, its competitor's rising power per se.
From Washington's perspective, China threatens to displace U.S. economic and military predominance first in the Pacific and then, inevitably, further afield. Measures to restrict trade in goods that could be used for military purposes, to curtail technological transfers and to dampen inward investment logically follow.
Europe, in contrast, objects to what China does: the manner in which it has used its economic clout for coercive ends. This has led to a more technocratic debate on how to curb alleged nonmarket trade practices and discriminatory business practices in China through legally binding commitments. Demands for greater transparency, fair regulation and enforcement for foreign businesses operating in China are being voiced in European capitals.
But it is obvious that Europe has no interest in imposing an economic cordon around China. In fact, the European Union is attempting to strike a balance between reducing its strategic dependence on China and maintaining its export opportunities.
European nations have different ideas about where the sweet spot lies. But none of them want the full-fat decoupling they fear may be the consequence, if not the aim, of current U.S. policies.
There is therefore a growing European consensus around two points. First, the EU must develop a distinctive and independent view of its own geopolitical interests. Second, these interests should include deep cooperation with China on a range of genuinely global challenges, such as the climate crisis, pandemic preparedness and debt relief.
European policy will be much closer to the U.S.'s on the so-called "de-risking" of supply chains in areas fundamental to national security, such as semiconductors and critical raw materials. But Europe will approach these issues on a case-by-case export control basis rather than as part of a wider strategy to degrade China's economic development.
There are two further potential points of difference between Europe and the U.S. that will play into these debates. In seeking to claw back its domestic manufacturing base, the administration of U.S. President Joe Biden has unleashed a wave of industrial subsidies through the Inflation Reduction Act and the CHIPS and Science Act.
These measures are vacuuming up investment from European and Asian companies in a manner that French President Emmanuel Macron has warned could "fragment the West." Although the EU has come up with a response in the form of the Green Deal Industrial Plan, debates on the impact of these policies will complicate trans-Atlantic relations for some time to come
Second, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz spoke wisely in calling for a degree of humility from the architects of the postwar international system because it does not currently reflect, and has not responded adequately to, today's changed balance of power. He and others believe that we need to reinvigorate the system to accept the reality of China's rise and to explicitly seek to manage competition rather than win a fight.
The U.S. and China must put a floor beneath their deteriorating relationship. There are positive signs that over time, they may do so. Progress will depend on the emergence of a longer-term strategic view in the U.S. and a demonstration from China that it is willing to consistently uphold the U.N. Charter and to assume responsibility to contribute to global stability, commensurate with its ambitions.
The rest of us should not accept that the current standoff, let alone conflict, between the U.S. and China, is predestined. New political cycles can emerge. It is time for other countries in Europe and Asia to help them take shape.