When Modi meets Biden
The Indian leader’s visit to Washington this week reflects the growing complexity of the emerging multipolar system, with realpolitik considerations holding sway
LEON HADAR
SOON after US President Joe Biden entered office, one of his central foreign-policy initiatives seemed to be the worldwide advancement of liberal democracy. This included the convening of two summits, to which India, also known as “the largest world democracy”, was invited.
The global democracy agenda acquired more force in the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and against the backdrop of growing US tensions with China. The Biden administration then promoted a narrative under which a US-led bloc of democracies confronted an axis of authoritarian regimes headed by Moscow and Beijing.
Which raised the question of how India fits into Biden’s so-called “alliance of democracies”
No one denies that India continues to hold free and democratic elections. But under India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his ruling Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), India seems to be sliding into the status of what political scientists refer to as an “illiberal democracy”.
Indeed, under Modi there have been growing restrictions on the courts and the media, while members of the country’s large Muslim minority have been treated as second-class citizens.
At the same time, India regards China as an adversary, and in order to contain that Asian power, it has strengthened its strategic ties with the US. India has also maintained friendly and even close relations with the other authoritarian power, Russia, and resisted Washington’s pressure to punish Moscow for its aggression in Ukraine
That global reality, under which considerations of interests tend to trump adherence to democratic values, explains why the relationship between India and the US is so complex. That would be on full display in Washington this week during Modi’s visit when Biden will throw a formal banquet for him at the White House and the Indian leader will be invited by Republican and Democratic lawmakers to address a joint session of the US Congress for the second time. He first spoke to US lawmakers in 2016.
In simple terms, Biden’s democracies-versus-authoritarian-regimes narrative just doesn’t align with today’s reality of an evolving multipolar global system in which India, while not necessarily a full-blown democracy, has emerged as one of the leading geo-strategic and geo-economic powers.
Modi may not be a Jeffersonian democrat, but under his leadership, India has grown as the world’s fifth-biggest economy, with a young workforce and powerful industrial policy. It is now attracting many American businesses at a time when they are becoming weary about operating in China and want to diversify their supply chains from an economy with which the US has had an increasingly fraught relationship in recent years.
From a geo-strategic perspective, India, with its large population and growing economic and military power, is seen in Washington as a natural counterweight to China’s power in the so-called “Indo-Pacific” region. This comes as Beijing, according to the prevailing strategic axiom, is regarded as America’s leading global adversary.
China and India, long-time regional rivals, were involved in border clashes just three years ago; Beijing continues to back Pakistan, India’s old foe. New Delhi’s expanding ties with Washington are clearly part of India’s strategy to try to contain the Chinese.
Indeed, India is part of the “Quad”. While the security partnership, which includes also the US, Australia and Japan, insists that it is not an “Asian Nato”, its purpose is clearly to constrain China’s growing military power.
Moreover, India and the US are expected to announce new defence agreements that could be signed during Modi’s visit to Washington. They could include deals regarding industrial-defence cooperation in developing air combat and armoured vehicles, that were discussed during American defence secretary Lloyd Austin’s recent visit to India.
The deals are part of an American effort to help India reduce its dependency on Russia as its largest arms supplier, from which it receives most of its armoured vehicles and combat aircraft and with which it co-produces warships and submarines.
India’s robust ties with Russia explain in part why, notwithstanding the growing economic and strategic ties between New Delhi and Washington, the relationship probably isn’t going to evolve into a strategic alliance anytime soon.
The close relationship between India and Russia is partly a legacy of the Cold War era, during which the Soviet Union emerged as a close partner of the Indians, while the Americans were regarded as allies of archrival Pakistan.
At that time, India declared itself to be a “non-aligned” nation and pursued an anti-American foreign policy that reflected the sentiments of the then ruling left-leaning Congress Party.
In contrast, the nationalist Modi and his right-wing party don’t adhere to anti-American attitudes. If anything, America’s large India-born population of about close to three million immigrants has become a powerful political force in the US, represented symbolically by the current US Vice President Kamala Harris and a leading Republican presidential candidate, Nikki Haley. The Indian-American diaspora has played an important role in strengthening the ties between the two nations.
Yet India under Modi continues to pursue the traditional Indian policy of refusing to join the camp of any of the world’s major powers, whether it is the US or Russia – an approach that reflects its pragmatic strategy.
Hence, India has rejected American appeals that it join the West in punishing Russia for invading Ukraine and even refused to condemn Moscow for the aggression.
Indeed, following the invasion of Ukraine, India now receives nearly half of its oil from Russia, which also remains its major arms supplier. India’s stance has strengthened its international position, as together with South Africa and Brazil, it now plays the role of leading power in the so-called Global South and has expressed willingness to act as a peace mediator between Russia and Ukraine.
In a way, India’s refusal to commit itself to America’s key strategic goal of diplomatically and economically isolating Russia as well as to its democratic agenda – while its leader is being welcomed in Washington this week as an indispensable global partner – reflects the growing complexity of the emerging multipolar system where transactional ties, as opposed to ideological leanings, determine the foreign policies of the great powers.