The sixth session of the National Assembly of the STC, in Hadhramaut governorate, Yemen [photo credit: STC]
The ’Southern National Charter’
issued by the May Aden meeting is uncompromising, reiterating the call
for a southern state according to the pre-1990 People's Democratic
Republic of Yemen (PDRY) borders, demanding separate negotiations for
peace and insisting that this issue must take priority over others in
the crisis. Its broad and undifferentiated anti-northern rhetoric fails
to describe the Huthi movement as the prime enemy, suggesting that it
may consider the IRG with equal hostility.
Overall, for the STC these moves have achieved the formal integration
of a few separatist groupings, and the inclusion of some leading
southern personalities in its leadership, in particular two members of
the PLC. While the involvement of Faraj Bahsani (former governor of
Hadhramaut) only caused minimal surprise given his less than principled
political positions in recent years, that of Al Mahrami (leader of most
of the Amaliqa military brigades) is widely attributed to significant
pressure from the UAE authorities and their shared commitment to
‘quietist’ Salafism as well as his family’s residence there. These
changes have been praised in the UAE, but many well-known and
influential southern figures, separatist and other, have explicitly
rejected the STC moves, thus demonstrating the fact that the STC only
represents, at best, a significant fraction of the southern separatist
movement. It also means that three of the eight members of the PLC are
now among the leadership of the STC, an untenable situation.
The Saudis promptly responded to this challenge to its leadership of
the coalition. Having initially prevented the STC-UAE supported forces
from taking over military positions in the Hadhramaut interior, the
Saudi authorities summoned a wide range of important Hadhrami officials and community leaders to Riyadh where they engaged in a month of negotiations to reach a common platform. The new ‘Hadhramaut National Council’
issued a ‘political and human rights’ document signed by hundreds of
Hadhrami personalities on 19 June, representing a broader section of
positions. Unlike the STC sponsored documents, this one makes no claim
to secession, but calls for clear political, economic and social
autonomy within a united Yemen.
It was presented to the public at a meeting attended by the Saudi
ambassador Mohammed al-Jaber who is widely perceived to play a major role in decision-making within Yemen. Formal endorsement by President Rashad al Alimi was followed by his arrival in Mukalla
on 24 June, accompanied by a large team of senior Yemeni officials,
where he stated his intention of spending Eid al Adha in the
governorate.
Further discussions are taking place to expand the inclusivity of
this grouping by reaching out to Mahri and Shabwani politicians and
civil society elements. Should these succeed and create a single entity
for these three governorates, it would cover one of the regions
originally promoted in the 2014 proposal for a federal state.
These developments are clearly part of an ongoing process and have by
no means reached their conclusion; many Hadhrami personalities and
factions have not committed to either of these groupings. The struggle
between STC secessionists and those supporting the IRG in Hadhramaut and
the east of the country will continue. Military confrontation is still
possible. Should the situation worsen, it would also reflect further
deterioration in relations between the Saudis and the Emiratis. While
the Emiratis also support non-separatist elements in Yemen, in
particular Tareq Saleh’s National Resistance Forces, they are still very
active on the southern front, having most recently sent reinforcements
of materiel to Shabwa and still remaining in control of Mukalla’s Riyan
airport despite demands by the governor that it be put under the control
of local authorities. The Saudis have increased their military
involvement in recent months through support for the ‘Shield’ forces
which are deployed throughout the south and east of the country.
Meanwhile, the economic war is continuing, mostly between the Huthis
and the IRG. Here, the lack of financial support from the Saudis and the
Emiratis to their allies raises questions about their real concerns and
objectives. In the competition for control of Hadhramaut and other
parts of the former PDRY, salary payments to the armed forces are a
crucial element, particularly as Eid al Adha, with its major demands on
household finances is on 28 June. To give an indication of the extent of
arrears in salary payments, the Sana’a authorities have just paid the
salaries of civil servants for the second half of August 2018, while in
early June, the IRG stated that it will run out of funds for salary payments in less than 90 days.