[photo credit: Ribale Sliman-Haidar]
Türkiye has been taking much more water out of these transboundary
rivers than has Iran. Flows down the Euphrates into Iraq have suffered
as a result. But Iranian use has had a very harmful impact on some parts
of Iraq, notably eastern Kurdistan, Diyala Governorate and Basra.
Not only has there been a fall in the volume of water flowing into
Iraq from Türkiye and Iran – the quality of the water has declined as
well. This is important, as water polluted beyond a certain point cannot
be safely used.
Iraq’s growing water crisis has another cause, too, namely, the extreme inefficiency with which water is used in Iraq.
Iraq’s water security looks set to get even more precarious in
future. There are six main reasons for this. The first is that Türkiye’s
use of water from the Tigris and Euphrates will increase as its
South-East Anatolia Project (GAP) proceeds. The next leap in Turkish use
of transboundary water will come when the irrigation schemes associated
with the Cizre dam on the Tigris come into operation within the next
few years.
The second reason is that Iran’s extractions will also increase: Iran
hasn’t yet exhausted the full potential to use the water which still
flows into Iraq. Thirdly, reconstruction in Syria, when it happens, will
mean the use of more water from the Euphrates and to a lesser extent
from the Tigris. Fourthly, the increased use for irrigation by upstream
countries (Türkiye, Syria and Iran) will further undermine water
quality.
The fifth reason is the looming monster of climate change.
Projections suggest that, by 2050, there could be a 20-30% reduction in
the flow of rivers entering Iraq. Moreover, higher temperatures will
mean greater losses of water to evaporation, while crops will need more
water per unit of output.
Lastly, within Iraq, population growth, reconstruction and economic
development will all create more demand. There will be stiffer
competition for less water.
What can Iraq do about all this? In terms of getting its upstream
neighbours to allow more water to flow into Iraq on a permanent basis,
perhaps not much. Türkiye has professed itself willing to negotiate with
Iraq but only on its own terms. Baghdad has been able to get Ankara to
provide Iraq with more water at times of severe shortage but Iraq
has had to be sure to ask politely. And such provision is temporary and
leaves Türkiye in full control of the flow of the Euphrates and Tigris
into Iraq.
Until very recently, Iran had simply declined to engage with Iraq in
any serious way over transboundary water. It is too soon to tell whether
an apparent change of attitude
displayed during the Baghdad Water Conference in May by the Iranian
Minister of Energy, Ali Akbar Mehrabian, represents a breakthrough or
just some fine-sounding but hollow words.
Iraq might be able to offer incentives to Türkiye and Iran to make
nice over water. What both Ankara and Tehran would most value from
Baghdad would be the suppression of Kurdish opposition groups in Iraq.
But this is in Erbil’s gift rather than Baghdad’s – and Iraqi Kurdish
leaders would find it politically impossible to act against their fellow
Kurds. Alternatively, Baghdad could offer Türkiye discounted oil and
gas. This would probably only be acceptable to Ankara – if at all – as a
temporary measure until Türkiye’s economy has recovered from its
present difficulties.
Iraq doesn’t have a military option either. Both Türkiye and Iran are
stronger militarily than Iraq. And Iran has penetrated the Iraqi
political system so thoroughly that no Iraqi government could take
measures against Iran over water – or anything else for that matter.
Legal remedies might seem appealing. But neither Türkiye nor Iran has
acceded to the relevant UN conventions on the subject. And there are no
agreements covering the whole of the basin or even three out of the
four riparian states. The threat by Iraq’s then Minister of Water to
take Iran to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) over water in 2021
was not backed by the rest of the Baghdad government and has turned out
to be empty rhetoric.
The situation is rapidly reaching the point of no return. That is,
Türkiye and Iran will soon have put in place all the dams and irrigation
schemes which, from their perspective, make economic sense. Iraq will
then be unable to do more than to try to persuade Türkiye and Iran to
operate their dams in ways which guarantee a certain level of flow in
the rivers they share. So far, there has been no sign of willingness on
the part of either country to offer such guarantees. In years of low
flow, it is likely that Ankara and Tehran will prioritise their own
needs over those of Iraq.
Given the likelihood of lower flows from its upstream neighbours in
future, the most effective thing Iraq could do to enhance its water
security would be to improve the efficiency of its irrigated
agriculture. There is undoubtedly plenty of scope for improvement, Iraqi
irrigation techniques having hardly advanced since Sumerian times.
However, formidable obstacles stand in the way of such an endeavour,
notably a lack of capacity among officials in both central and
provincial government, governmental dysfunction and incoherence more
generally and endemic corruption.
If Iraq can successfully address these challenges, it will still be
able to save something of its agricultural sector. If not, then the
prospects for farming in this part of the ancient Fertile Crescent will
be poor indeed. Food insecurity could be added to water insecurity.