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Source: *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs*, Nov., 1973, Vol. 15, No. 4 (Nov., 1973), pp. 454-471

Published by: Cambridge University Press

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*DID THE UNITED STATES PLAN AN
INVASION OF MEXICO IN 1927?*

For many years the vague notion has circulated that the United States and Mexico were on the verge of war in 1927. Howard Cline (1965: 209) cited unspecified "Mexican sources" as purportedly revealing that Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg and Ambassador James R. Sheffield in Mexico City were "purposely trying to provoke some Mexican act that could be used as a pretext for American intervention." Former Mexican President Emilio Portes Gil (1964: 396) went further and insisted that American warships had actually mobilized for intervention, only to be thwarted by an "imperturbable" President Calles. These and other such assertions have never been thoroughly analyzed on the basis of available American diplomatic and military records. This article attempts to demonstrate that intervention was highly unlikely. Moreover, circumstantial evidence and logic combine to suggest that the administration of Calvin Coolidge never seriously considered such a move and that rumors of intervention were founded more upon Mexican suspicion and mistrust than upon realities in Washington.

To be sure, United States relations with Mexico had grown progressively worse during the regime of President Plutarco Elías Calles who took office in November 1924. Prolonged and

Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 15 No. 4, November 1973
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[454]

rancorous debate derived from Mexican restrictions on foreign land and subsoil rights, by legislation that the state department viewed as retroactive and confiscatory (United States Senate, 1926a, 1926b). The renewed Church-State conflict in Mexico generated further anxiety as two vocal American factions, one demanding intervention on behalf of the Church, the other enjoining hands-off, pressured the state department (Horn, 1969: 96-127; Rice, 1959: 56ff.). Apprehension multiplied owing to Mexican support for a Liberal revolt against the United States-backed Conservative government of Nicaragua. Some Americans now feared the specter of bolshevism, already raised by Mexican persecution of the Church, as a threat to Central America and the Panama Canal (Kamman, 1968; New York Herald-Tribune, 1926).

Events in January 1927 seemed to increase the possibility of a forceful resolution of these problems. Previous administrations had intervened in Mexico on several occasions, and Coolidge had just demonstrated his resolve by landing Marines in Nicaragua. On January 10, the president sent Capitol Hill an unexpected message accusing Mexico of seeking to establish in Nicaragua a government hostile to the United States (Congressional Record, 1927a). Two days later, Secretary Kellogg, appearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, charged Mexico with complicity in the Nicaraguan revolt and reiterated the dangers of a Mexican-bolshevist threat to the Panama Canal (New York Times, 1927a). These events caused some Mexican and American observers to conclude that the Coolidge administration was deliberately inciting hostility toward Mexico, possibly even preparing the ground for a serious confrontation (Excelsior, 1927; Literary Digest, 1927a). Despite appearances that the administration was losing patience with Mexico, several considerations favored a policy of conciliation.

Widespread public hostility to drastic measures against Mexico appears to have inhibited Washington's ability to use force. The administration faced mounting criticism of its Nicaraguan intervention both in Congress and in the press.

While some news sources supported Kellogg's charges of bolshevism, most editors voiced outrage, and some called for his resignation (*Literary Digest*, 1927b; *Baltimore Sun*, 1927). Nor would American opinion rally behind the sullied banner of the oil interests. Delays had postponed for years the trials of figures implicated in the Teapot Dome scandal of the Harding administration. The trials finally began, accompanied by intense publicity, just as the Mexican petroleum controversy reached a serious stage. Since scandal-tainted producers had large Mexican holdings, the outrage of Teapot Dome was frequently invoked on behalf of a hands-off policy toward Mexico, by journals like *The New Republic* (1927), *The Nation* (1927), *The Independent* (1927), and *The Christian Century* (1927). Walter Lippmann's editorials in the *New York World* (1927) intoned the same refrain. President Calles (1927: 152) observed the unpopularity of the oil men and reproached the "small group of capitalists who are trying to induce the State Department to aid them by force."

Led by mettlesome Senator William E. Borah, chairman of the powerful Committee on Foreign Relations, congressmen from both sides of the aisle applauded the manifesto of Democratic Representative George Huddleston of Alabama who declared: "I am not willing that a single American boy shall be conscripted and sent to Mexico to lose his life in order that the oil companies may pay dividends (*Congressional Record*, 1927b). The ubiquity of this theme was further evidenced by such literary manifestations as Samuel Hopkins Adams's, novel *Revelry* (1926), Joseph Hergesheimer's novel *Tampico* (1926), and George S. Brooks and Walter B. Lester's play *Spread Eagle* (1928: 105). Thus, the glare of publicity given to their previous misdeeds caught the oil men in a state of indecent exposure at the height of their dispute with Mexico.

While Coolidge is often pictured as the friend of business, he did not receive the solid endorsement of businessmen on this issue. Only the *Wall Street Journal* (1927a, for example) and *Barron's* (1926) strongly supported his intervention in Nicaragua, and neither sought a similar course in Mexico. An

examination of the business and commercial press elicits more criticism than praise. The *New York Journal of Commerce* (1927a), for example, noted the marked lack of enthusiasm in the press for Kellogg's policies, **accused the secretary of trying to provoke war with Mexico, and called for arbitration of the issues.** The *Commercial and Financial Chronicle* (1927), fearful of intervention, similarly observed more opposition than support in the nation for the administration's policies. While most business journals were silent on the issue, Coolidge could find small comfort from these reputed allies.¹ Moreover, liberal and Protestant opposition to some American Catholic demands for intervention in Mexico made the administration wary lest it appear to be the "tool of Rome" (Denny, 1928: 67-68).

Of course, it is difficult to determine precisely the extent to which public opinion affected policy. Nevertheless, evidence indicates that public officials were sensitive to public opinion and on occasion attempted to shape it. Ambassador Sheffield repeatedly urged publication of the details of cases on file in the state department with a view to inspiring public demands for a firmer policy. When Secretary Kellogg responded that there was no support for a policy more vigorous than the department's, Sheffield replied:

You feel the American people would not support a movement for armed intervention in Mexico. I quite agree with you so long as we conceal from them the facts. But what would be their position if they knew the truth about Mexico, . . . [?] (Sheffield to Kellogg, July 1, 1926, Sheffield MSS).

In late October 1926, Sheffield's lawyer friend Chandler P. Anderson, perennial advocate in Washington for Conservative Nicaraguan governments, reported a conversation with Kellogg in which the secretary explained why the department could not go further than it had in dealing with Mexico. Kellogg believed that Congress would not support even withdrawal of recognition much less anything more drastic. He lamented the lack of press support, singled out several newspapers for their hostility, cited the opposition of the American Federation of Labor, and

noted that even the Ku Klux Klan supported Mexico because of its religious policies (Anderson Diary, October 29, 1926, Anderson MSS). If public opinion weighed significantly, nothing had changed by early 1927 except that the opponents of the administration had increased in number and in vigor. Moreover, after a favorable report from Borah's Committee, on January 25, the Senate unanimously passed the Robinson Resolution calling upon the administration to arbitrate its dispute with Mexico (Congressional Record, 1927c). In sum, it appears that Kellogg recognized that he lacked support for any coercive policy toward Mexico.

With the state department at a loss for which way to turn, a bizarre episode helped select a less hazardous course. In late February the Calles regime disconcerted American officials by handing them copies of about 350 documents stolen from the United States Embassy in Mexico City. The collection included official correspondence between the ambassador and the secretary of state, consular dispatches, reports of the military attaché, and apparently some forgeries. When the state department requested an explanation, Calles responded through Ambassador Manuel Téllez in Washington, bypassing Ambassador Sheffield. The Mexican president explained that the papers had come to him unsolicited during the course of the last two years. When he realized that some of them pertained to current issues he informed President Coolidge, eschewing official channels because they appeared to be responsible for the situation. Calles concluded that evil forces attempted to create misunderstanding between the two countries (Morones, 1957a; Alvarez Sepulveda, 1966: 127-130).

While the full details of the intrigue cannot be related here, Calles used the documents to embarrass the embassy from which they had been stolen, and his actions implied distrust of Kellogg and Sheffield. Furthermore, if Ambassador Téllez' telegraphed report to the Mexican Foreign Office (quoted in a partisan Mexican source) is authentic, Téllez actually told Coolidge and Kellogg that Calles had instructed him to say that the Mexican president had for two years considered requesting

Sheffield's retirement but had not done so to avoid embarrassing President Coolidge (Morones, 1957b). Obviously, the Calles government wanted to be rid of Sheffield.

The United States ambassador knew nothing of the nature of the papers involved until he was informed by his counselor, H. F. Arthur Schoenfeld, then in Washington, who reported seeing "at least seven huge envelopes" containing dozens of papers. Others were reportedly under examination in military intelligence. Schoenfeld added that he had seen genuine documents dating back to early 1926. He recognized many obvious forgeries, but he admitted that Mexico had "managed to do fairly well in the genuine line" (Schoenfeld to Sheffield, February 27, 1927, Sheffield MSS).

The embarrassing nature of the documents is evident in an unsigned state department memorandum containing summaries of the documents with brief notations on their implications. A report from the military attaché (Lieutenant Colonel Edward Davis, June 17, 1926) on armed or semiarmed Mexican forces available for mobilization in event of war was labeled "implications embarrassing." Other reports of the attaché were labeled "possibly embarrassing," and some simply "embarrassing" (Records of the Department of State, March 12, 1927, 124.126 S.P., hereinafter cited as R.D.S. and file numbers). Embassy First Secretary Arthur Bliss Lane also reported on the implications of the stolen papers. After one document summary, he added: "What a thing for the Mexican Cabinet to read!" (Davis, G-2 Report 1202, November 3, 1926, Lane MSS). Following another document, Lane remarked: "Worst thing that Calles could have read, . . . God help us . . ." (Davis, G-2 Report 1176, Lane MSS).

An example of a report considered embarrassing ought to be detailed. Davis's Report No. 1297, December 31, 1926, entitled "A concise review of the year 1926 in Mexico," reviewed Calles's internal problems. Examples of the military attaché's comments include the following:

That the white man is somewhat disliked is natural but if the Mexican people are ever so fortunate as to be blessed with American

intervention and administration this alleged bitter hatred of Americans will be proved a fake of the thinnest type. . . . The year has proved that Mexico has little if any hope of developing into a self-supporting, respectable member of the community of Nations unless she received from the outside something she has never really had, that is to say extended training in actual self-government combined with education for the masses and proper economic development [Military Intelligence Division records, 2064-511, hereinafter cited as MID and file numbers].

Obviously the administration was anxious that the episode not be publicized. Had the American press published documents like the one above, opponents of the administration would have been furious. Furthermore, there was no way of knowing whether or not Calles had forwarded all of the documents in his possession and, if not, what the others might have contained.

The American press reported the episode on March 28 after receiving sketchy dispatches from correspondents in Mexico City. Its coverage emphasized the role forgeries played in leading Calles to believe that the United States was inciting a war or backing a revolution in Mexico. The United States state department's communiqué of April 16 finally admitted the thefts but gave no details. Mexican officials maintained their silence, and neither the Mexican nor American people ever learned the whole story. (See, for example, the *New York Times*, 1927b.)

To further complicate matters, some Mexican sources to this day insist that a United States invasion of Mexico had been imminent and that Calles's sending the documents to Coolidge caused its cancellation. While these accounts disagree on the details, they generally concur that the stolen documents indicated that Sheffield and Kellogg were conspiring to intervene in Mexico, that the documents included plans for such an invasion, and that ships had actually left American bases but were recalled by President Coolidge. The major proponents of these allegations are Mexican officials: Luis Morones, secretary of industry, commerce and labor under Calles; Emilio Portes Gil, at that time governor of Tamaulipas, later secretary of Gobernación under Calles and eventually president; and General

José Alvarez, an aide to Calles (Jefe del Estado Mayor Presidencial).²

The evidence supporting these invasion stories is not convincing. Morones (1957c), for example, quoted two secret military intelligence reports. The first, dated July 17, 1924, concerned a United States military plan to cut Mexico in two parts in the event of invasion. The second, dated October 15, 1926, alleged that a group of Mexican revolutionaries of divergent opinions had sacrificed self-interest to unite against the "bolshevik" regime in power. In the event of success they promised to reform those articles of the Constitution and to abolish all government decrees that had antagonized foreign nations previously more cordial. They supposedly asked the state department to lift the arms embargo decreed in 1924 so that they might obtain weapons. All of the evidence that this author examined indicates that the state department at no time took such reports seriously, and it did nothing to lift the arms embargo. Nevertheless, Mexican officials who read them might have been alarmed by Sheffield's requests that the embargo be lifted.³

Morones (1957d) also cited as evidence, documents in which petroleum interests promised to pay United States income tax on Mexican oil as remuneration for protection of their properties. Morones added that when Mexico refused to extend the deadline for compliance with the Petroleum Law, the companies hoped that a threatening note from the state department and lifting of the arms embargo would encourage discontented Mexicans to rebel, thereby offering an excuse for American intervention.

Mexican sources continue to the effect that in the tense state of affairs in the early weeks of 1927, press reports in the United States (which this author has been unable to discover) indicated that two warships had disembarked from their ports destined for Tuxpan and Tampico under the pretext of protecting American lives and interests. These events coupled with material in the stolen documents purportedly led Calles to conclude that an invasion was in fact imminent and that the time was ripe to

use the incriminating documents. Therefore, he telegraphed President Coolidge that he was sending some important documents that the president ought to read before invading Mexico (Morones, 1957e; Portes Gil, 1964: 396; Alvarez Sepulveda, 1966: 140).

In the meantime, Emilio Portes Gil (1964: 396) and Aarón Sáenz (1961: 132) concur that Calles instructed Portes Gil to go to Tampico and in the event of invasion, he and his chief of operations, Lázaro Cárdenas, were to set fire to the entire Huasteca Petroleum zone and refineries so that the flames could be seen in New Orleans, and the invaders would find nothing but ashes.⁴ This courageous act on Calles's part allegedly persuaded Coolidge to recall the ships and to request Sheffield's resignation. While Morones placed these events in the first months of 1927, Portes Gil leads one to believe that they came after Calles's address to the Mexican Congress on September 1, 1927. This date would have been after Sheffield had already resigned and when American sources indicate that events had turned in a more cordial direction. At least with respect to timing, Portes Gil's account seems untenable.

Another important question is whether or not the stolen documents did in fact contain plans for an invasion. Some military attaché reports quoted by Morones referred to a Special Plan Green dealing with intervention in Mexico. Military records in the United States verify that such a plan did exist, but that it was merely a contingency plan made less significant by the existence of similar plans for the invasion of Canada, England, and Japan, for example. It was part of a series of "rainbow plans" developed after World War I and primarily aimed at calculating what would be done to meet a threatened attack on American territory (Conn and Fairchild, 1960: 7). With regard to Canada and Mexico, the plans probably included provisions for preventing intervention by a foreign enemy. Unfortunately, Special Plan Green is part of a record group that has not been declassified and is inaccessible even to scholars with security clearance.⁵

Those classified military and naval records that can be

studied by researchers with security clearance reveal some sketchy information verifying the existence of the plan and giving clues to its contents. For example, requests for information to update navy department records mentioned plans for naval supervision of the port of Guaymas prior to army occupation, interception by the army of the railroad at Empalme, attempts to keep the Yaqui Indians friendly, blockading supplies from Guatemala, and occupation of the oil fields by a marine expeditionary force supported by the fleet (Secretary of War to Secretary of Navy, "Mission of the Navy, War Plan Green," June 3, 1920, General Records of the Navy Department, Record Group 80, Planning Division, Files of CNO, P.D. 18607:1, hereinafter cited as GRND and file numbers; Chief of Naval Operations to Naval Officer present, Coast of Mexico, May 18, 1920, GRND P.D. 186-11). Apparently these plans were being continually updated and some of these reports were among the records stolen from the office of the military attaché in the United States Embassy. Some of these documents could have aroused speculation about an impending intervention. One memorandum from Davis dated June 7, 1926, reminded embassy personnel that in the event of invasion small arms should be distributed among the officials (Morones, 1957f). Then, in December 1926, Mexican officials obtained the previously cited bulletin dated October 15 regarding the unification of dissident rebel groups. By then they were also aware of Sheffield's advocacy of lifting the arms embargo (Morones, 1957g). Since Morones quoted these particular documents at length, either he believed them the best evidence for his case, or else he had no others in his personal possession.⁶

In sum, a contingency plan for the invasion of Mexico did exist and parts of it were in Mexican hands, possibly buttressing Calles's fears of intervention. The mere fact that Mexico was aware of American military thinking regarding an invasion was certainly embarrassing. On the other hand, evidence exists that no such invasion was contemplated and that Calles may have purposely exaggerated his fears.

At the height of the crisis in February 1927, the chief of staff of the Latin American section, G-2 (military intelligence), requested that Davis furnish information for updating handbooks and studies called for in Special Plan Green. The chief of staff seemed unaware of any urgency, for he added: "The information is not available here, therefore it must be obtained, and while the time element is important, it is not compelling" (Lt. Col. Marion Howze to Davis, February 24, 1927, MID 242-9-A[1]). After an exhaustive search, this author has been unable to find any evidence in state department, military, or naval files that intervention had ever been contemplated. The additional charge that Sheffield and Kellogg were personally conspiring to provoke an incident is apparently groundless since the correspondence between the two officials reveals a wide gulf between their thinking. Kellogg had repeatedly rebuffed Sheffield's entreaties for a firmer policy, including lifting the arms embargo. Since Calles had access to much of the Sheffield-Kellogg correspondence, he should have been aware of their differences.

As noted above, widespread opposition to the administration in Congress and in the press would have made any drastic policy difficult to implement. The only specific evidence that this point was an important consideration in policy formulation is a memorandum by Assistant Secretary of State William R. Castle, a man with considerable influence on Secretary Kellogg. Castle indicated that a state department officer had told newsmen at the time of the petroleum crisis that "public opinion was set, that any drastic attitude toward Mexico was pretty near impossible" (Castle Memorandum, February 1, 1927, R.D.S. 711.12/1102). Furthermore, the significance of domestic opposition to the Coolidge administration's policies should not have escaped Calles. The Mexican press had paid close attention to its American counterpart and to congressional reactions, and Mexican papers reprinted numerous expressions of American public opinion throughout the early months of 1927. Perhaps the impact of this American press sentiment was best expressed by a correspondent for *The Economist* (1927) during the midst of the crisis:

... that our intentions are pacific seems certain. In fact, part of the difficulty may arise from Mexican appreciation of the fact that there is very little sentiment favourable to intervention in this country.

Mexican agents in the United States sent similar reports to Calles. One agent who signed his name "KAY" frequently informed the Mexican government on the situation in the United States (Archivo General de la Nación [ACN], Ramo Obregón-Calles, Paq. 5, Exp. 101-R-2-1). Another informant who kept the Calles government abreast of events in the petroleum zone, V. E. Dillon, authored several memoranda found in Mexican archives. Dillon was probably on the Mexican payroll, for his reports are numerous and date from as early as 1925 through 1927. Morones cited Dillon's dispatches as the basis for some of his information on petroleum company practices in Mexico. In February 1927 Dillon reported that Coolidge was vacillating on Mexican policy and that the petroleum interests were exerting their utmost pressure through their paid press and political representatives as well as through American Catholics in order to obtain the aid of Coolidge and weaken the opposition in the United States Senate. But, Dillon added, the general sentiment of the American people opposed all ruthless methods, and despite the efforts of Mexico's enemies, aided by the money they had extracted from Mexico, "there is no danger of an armed intervention" (AGN, Obregón-Calles, Paq. 15-1, Exp. 104-P1-T-5). The previous August, Kellogg had written Coolidge (August 26, 1926, Kellogg MSS): "we are not in a position to serve any ultimatums on Mexico at this time."

It would appear then that the Coolidge administration recognized that it lacked support for any drastic action against Mexico, and that the Calles regime perceived Coolidge's dilemma. Thus, Calles's offer to arbitrate the dispute and his blaming the oil men for diplomatic problems were attempts to take advantage of this situation. It may thus be doubted that Calles actually feared direct intervention and that his transmitting the stolen documents to Coolidge was intended not to forestall intervention but rather (1) to put the United States

further on the defensive by threatening to publish the documents; (2) to remove Kellogg and Sheffield, particularly the ambassador, whose replacement he viewed as essential in order to end confrontation diplomacy; and (3) to demonstrate his sincerity and willingness to be more friendly toward the United States. By this time, it is evident that both administrations were anxious to tone down their policies—Coolidge because of his domestic opponents, Calles because he was in severe economic straits.

By 1927 Calles certainly appeared more conservative and less dedicated to carrying out the letter of the Mexican Constitution. While this appearance may have been due to a change in philosophy as some Mexican radicals claimed, it may also have been a practical necessity. In failing to synchronize his assaults, Calles found himself on more fronts than he had forces to muster. His nationalistic diplomacy and anticlerical policies may have been partly designed to draw attention away from economic failures and to keep the military busy. Economic distress had been apparent for some time. An economic boycott by Mexican Catholics had not hurt very badly, but it was coupled with heavy expenditures for military campaigns against the Cristeros and the Yaqui Indians. One of the major sources of government revenue had been taxes on petroleum production, but the output of crude oil had declined from 193 million barrels in 1921 to 64 million barrels six years later. American sources noted that production in 1926 alone dropped 21 percent below that of the previous year. Consequently, production and export duties had fallen precipitately from 86 million pesos in 1922 to 19 million pesos in 1927. Calles had not reduced the expenses of his internal reform program, however (Scheider, 1928: 88; Eloy Pedroza, 1927: 86; *Wall Street Journal*, 1927b). The diminishing oil production was intimately related to the diplomatic controversy, for in the uncertainty over their holdings, many companies had ceased new drilling and called a halt to new investment. Mexican authorities had issued no new drilling permits to recalcitrant firms, and some producers were withdrawing in whole or in part

to other fields. Other factors included a depression in the world price of oil and increased yield in the United States (Ellis, 1961: 40; New York Journal of Commerce, 1927b). The fear had earlier gripped American business and government circles that domestic petroleum reserves might one day be exhausted, touching off intense petroleum searches in the post-World War I period. That search began to bear fruit by 1924 with the discovery of vast new deposits in Oklahoma, Texas, Louisiana, and California. Companies investing abroad had also begun moving their operations into Colombia and Venezuela which soon replaced Mexico as the major foreign sources for petroleum (Denny, 1928: 90; Fanning, 1947: 3-7, 53; Nash, 1968: 82). Thus, by 1927 the oil scarcity had become an oil surplus making Mexican oil less consequential, diminishing the administration's concern, and concomitantly weakening Calles's bargaining position vis-à-vis foreign interests.

What is more, military intelligence reports indicated that new capital investment in Mexico from other sources had practically ceased (Davis to G-2, December 1, 1925, MID 10641-268[7]; August 27, 1926, MID 2655-G-161[3]; November 9, 1926, MID 2655-F-161[2]). Agricultural production had declined severely and Mexico was in the midst of an exchange crisis. To worsen matters, the price of silver on the international market had declined to its lowest level in years. The Mexican economy was also shaken by this silver crisis, for silver was her second most important export (Wall Street Journal, 1926; Bradstreet's, 1926). Consequently, while Calles was apparently more amenable to compromise, the Coolidge administration was in a similar mood. Robert F. Smith (1972: 241-259) has also demonstrated that the New York bankers played a major role in discouraging intervention and guiding the administration out of its impasse with Mexico. Anxious for Mexico to repay its foreign debt, the banker's representatives tactfully displayed understanding and respect for Mexican national aspirations. Their quiet, compromising diplomacy proved more efficacious than did threat and intimidation.

By April 1927 Chief Justice Taft wrote his friend Sheffield of

his conversation with Secretary Kellogg who believed that the situation in Nicaragua was clearing up and that the Mexican government now seemed more disposed to reason (April 13, 1927, Sheffield MSS). Thus a combination of factors worked to moderate the tone of American diplomacy: the winding down of the Nicaraguan crisis, mounting press and congressional criticism, Kellogg's realization that little support existed for coercing Mexico, the embarrassing stolen documents, the influence of the New York bankers, and corresponding temperateness on the part of President Calles. The subsequent resignation of Ambassador Sheffield and the appointment of his more famous and sympathetic successor, Dwight Whitney Morrow, helped effect the eventual compromise (Ross, 1958).

Little Mexico, watchful of its sovereignty and intensely nationalistic about its Revolution, understandably feared the "Northern Colossus" that had several times violated its borders and threatened its experiment. Calles's commitment to Mexican sovereignty conflicted almost ineluctably with the Coolidge administration's position that Americans abroad were entitled to the full protection of their government. The contentious diplomacy and menacing events of 1926-1927 had generated suspicion and apprehension. Yet the evidence presented here supports the conclusion that such fears were founded more upon rumor, nervousness, and a misreading of Washington's intentions. The authors discussed above are generally correct in their assessment of the depths to which relations had deteriorated by 1927, but they need to reconsider their claims that an imminent invasion of Mexico was only narrowly averted.

NOTES

1. In addition to journals cited in the text, the author examined a number of other sources of business opinion. Not a single editorial one way or another appeared between mid-1926 and mid-1927 in the following journals: *Dun's Review*, *The United States Investor*, *Bradstreet's*, *Railway Age*, *Rand McNally Bankers' Monthly*, *The Northwestern Miller* and *American Baker*, or *Nation's Business*.

2. See Portes Gil (1950, 1964: 396-397, 1968); Morones (1956, 1957b); Alvarez Sepulveda (1966: 110-146); Sáenz (1961: 132); other Mexican sources that refer to these allegations are Taracena (1963: 161-165); Torres (1943); Valadés (1937: 17-19); Correa (1950, 1953); Zorilla (1966: 408); and Meyer (1968: 172-175).

3. Sheffield advised lifting the arms embargo on several occasions as a means of applying pressure to Mexico, but the state department rejected his advice (see, for example, Sheffield to Kellogg, July 1, 1926, Sheffield MSS).

4. Ambassador Sheffield informed Kellogg that 5,000 Mexican troops had been ordered into the Huasteca oil region near Tampico (Sheffield to Kellogg, January 11, 1927, R.D.S. 812.00/28170).

5. The author requested security review of two files in Record Group 80 (GRND) pertaining to war plans with Mexico, 1919-1926. I was informed that "The Office of Naval Intelligence recommends retention of the respective classifications assigned to the documents in the two files" (Herman G. Goldbeck [Assistant Director, Modern Military Records Division, National Archives] to author, April 21, 1970). Earlier Mr. Goldbeck wrote: "Since you were particularly interested in finding information regarding a claim . . . concerning a plan . . . to invade Mexico during the period January-March 1927, we searched the classified files in Record Group 80, but we did not find any documentation on this subject" (Goldbeck to author, February 4, 1970).

6. The documents in Mexican hands, or at least some of them, were evidently in Morones's possession since he is the only Mexican writer to quote from them *verbatim*. Alvarez Sepulveda (1966: 146) noted that his attempts to see the documents failed when, shortly after his interview with Morones, Morones died without giving him access to the papers or knowledge of their whereabouts.

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