

Puerfroy, Dulles insisted that the government arrest those Guatemalans who had taken refuge in foreign embassies and that "criminal charges" be brought against them to prevent them leaving the country, charges such as "having been covert Moscow agents". The Secretary of State argued that Communists should be automatically denied the right of asylum because they were connected with an international conspiracy. The only way they should be allowed to leave, he asserted, was if they agreed to be sent to the Soviet Union. But Castillo Armas refused to accede to Dulles' wishes on this particular issue, influenced perhaps by the fact that he, as well as some of his colleagues, had been granted political asylum in an embassy at one time or another.

One of those who sought asylum in the Argentine Embassy was a 25-year-old Argentine doctor named Ernesto "Che" Guevara. Guevara, who had been living in Guatemala since sometime in 1953, tried to spark armed resistance to the invading forces, but without any success. Guevara's experience in Guatemala had a profound effect upon his political consciousness. His first wife, Hilda Gadea, whom he met there, later wrote:

Up to that point, he used to say, he was merely a sniper, criticizing from a theoretical point of view the political panorama of our America. From here on he was convinced that the struggle against the oligarchic system and the main enemy, Yankee imperialism, must be an armed one, supported by the people.⁴¹

On 30 June, while the dust was still settling, Dulles summed up the situation in Guatemala in a speech which was a monument to coldwar speak:

[The events in Guatemala] expose the evil purpose of the Kremlin to destroy the inter-American system . . . having gained control of what they call the mass organizations, [the communists] moved on to take over the official press and radio of the Guatemalan Government. They dominated the social security organization and ran the agrarian reform program . . . dictated to the Congress and to the President . . . Arbenz . . . was openly manipulated by the leaders of communism . . . The Guatemalan regime enjoyed the full support of Soviet Russia . . . [the] situation is being cured by the Guatemalans themselves.⁴²

When it came to rewriting history, however, Dulles' speech had nothing on these lines from a CIA memo written in August 1954 and only for internal consumption no less: "When the communists were forced by outside pressure to attempt to take over Guatemala completely, they forced Arbenz to resign (deleted). They then proceeded to establish a Communist Junta under Col. Carlos Diaz."⁴³

In October, John Puerfroy sat before a Congressional committee and told them:

My role in Guatemala prior to the revolution was strictly that of a diplomatic observer . . . The revolution that overthrew the Arbenz government was engineered and instigated by those people in Guatemala who rebelled against the policies and ruthless oppression of the Communist-controlled government.⁴⁴

Later, Dwight Eisenhower was to write about Guatemala in his memoirs. The former president chose not to offer the slightest hint that the United States had anything to do with the planning or instigation of the coup, and indicated that his administration had only the most tangential of connections to its execution.⁴⁵

Thus it was that the educated, urbane men of the State Department, the CIA and the United Fruit Company, the pipe-smoking, comfortable men of Princeton, Harvard and Wall Street, decided that the illiterate peasants of Guatemala did not deserve the land which had been given to them, that the workers did not need their unions, that hunger and torture were a small price to pay for being rid of the scourge of communism.

The terror carried out by Castillo Armas was only the beginning. It was, as we shall see, to get much worse in time. It has continued with hardly a pause for over 30 years.

* * * * *

In 1955, the *New York Times* reported from the United Nations that "The United States has begun a drive to scuttle a section of the proposed Covenant of Human Rights that poses a threat to its business interests abroad." This section dealt with the right of peoples to self-determination and to permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources. Said the newspaper: "It declares in effect that any country has the right to nationalize its resources. . . ."⁴⁶

11. Costa Rica mid-1950s Trying to topple an ally, part 1

If ever the CIA maintained a love-hate relationship, it was with José Figueres, three times the head of state of Costa Rica.

On the one hand, Figueres, by his own admission in 1975, worked for the CIA "in 20,000 ways" . . . "all over Latin America" for 30 years.¹ "I collaborated with the CIA when we were trying to topple Trujillo," he divulged, speaking of the Dominican Republic dictator.²

¹ When Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev's memoirs were published in the West, the publisher saw fit to employ a noted Kremlinologist to annotate the work, pointing out errors of omission and commission.

“On the other hand, Figueres revealed that the Agency had twice tried to kill him.³ He did not elaborate, although he stated at the same time that he had tried for two years to get the Bay of Pigs invasion called off. This may have precipitated one or both of the assassination attempts.

The CIA also tried to overthrow the Figueres government. In 1964, the first significant exposé of the Agency, *The Invisible Government*, disclosed that:

in the mid-1950s CIA agents intruded deeply into the political affairs of Costa Rica, the most stable and democratic republic in Latin America. Knowledgeable Costa Ricans were aware of the CIA's role. The CIA's purpose was to promote the ouster of José (Pepe) Figueres, the moderate socialist who became President in a fair and open election in 1953.⁴

Figueres remained in office until 1958, in this his first term as president; he had headed a liberal junta in the late 1940s.

The Agency's “major grievance”, related the exposé, “was that Figueres had scrupulously recognized the right of asylum in Costa Rica — for non-Communists and Communists alike. The large influx of questionable characters complicated the agency's job of surveillance and forced it to increase its staff.”⁵

The CIA's problems with Figueres actually went somewhat deeper. Costa Rica was a haven for hundreds of exiles fleeing from various Latin American right-wing dictatorships, such as in the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, and Figueres was providing groups of them with material and moral support in their plans to overthrow these regimes.⁶ To Figueres, this was entirely in keeping with his anti-totalitarian beliefs, directed against the left as well as the right. The problem was that the targets for overthrow were all members in good standing in the United States' anti-Communist, “Free-World” club. (The American attitude toward Trujillo was later somewhat modified.) Moreover, Figueres had on occasion expressed criticism of the American policy of supporting such dictatorships while neglecting the economic and social problems of the hemisphere.

These considerations could easily outweigh the fact that Figueres had established his anti-Communist credentials, albeit not of the “ultra” variety, and was no more a “socialist” than Hubert Humphrey. Although Figueres spoke out strongly at times against foreign investment, as president he was eminently accommodating to Central America's *bêtes noires*, the multinational fruit companies.⁷

In addition to providing support to Figueres' political opponents,⁸ the CIA, reported *The Invisible Government*, tried:

to stir up embarrassing trouble within the Communist Party in Costa Rica, and to attempt to link Figueres with the Communists. An effort to produce evidence that Figueres had been in contact with leading Communists during a trip to Mexico was unsuccessful. But CIA agents had better luck with the first part of their strategy — stirring up trouble for the Communists. They succeeded in planting a letter in a Communist newspaper. The letter, purportedly from a leading Costa Rican Communist, put him on record in opposition to the Party

line on the [1956] Hungarian revolution.

Unaware that the letter was a CIA plant, the leading officials in the American Embassy held an urgent meeting to ponder its meaning. The political officer then dispatched a long classified report to Washington, alerting top policy makers to the possibility of a startling turn in Latin American Communist politics.⁹

In 1955 the Agency carried out an action against Figueres that was more immediately threatening. A deep personal and political animosity between Figueres and Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza had escalated into violence: an attempt against Somoza's life, launched from Costa Rica with Figueres' support, was countered by an invasion from Nicaragua by land and air. Figueres' biographer, Charles Ameringer, has related that:

Figueres accused the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency of aiding the Somoza movement against him. He claimed that the CIA felt indebted to Somoza for the help he had given in overthrowing the Arbenz regime. He asserted that the same pilots and planes (the F-47) that had participated in the attack upon Guatemala, afterwards came from Nicaragua and machine-gunned eleven defenseless towns in our territory. According to Figueres, at the same time that the U.S. Department of State arranged the sale of fighter planes for Costa Rica's defense, CIA planes and pilots were flying sorties for the rebels.¹⁰

It is interesting to note that during this period, when little had yet been revealed about such blatant CIA covert activities, the fact that the Agency had been caught red-handed tapping Figueres' telephone was worthy of condemnatory editorial comment by the *Washington Post* and a like statement by Senator Mike Mansfield on the floor of the Senate.¹¹

José Figueres did not regain the presidency of Costa Rica until 1970, at which time a renewed CIA effort to overthrow him was undertaken, for not very different reasons.

12. Syria 1956-1957 Purchasing a new government

“Neutrality,” proclaimed John Foster Dulles in 1956, “has increasingly become an obsolete conception, and, except under very exceptional circumstances, it is an immoral and shortsighted conception.”¹²

The short-sightedness of the neutralist government lay perhaps in its inability to perceive that its neutralism would lead to John Foster Dulles attempting to overthrow it.

Syria had shied away from US economic and military assistance because it feared the strings which came attached.* When the Syrians tried, in 1955, to purchase American tanks through commercial channels, the United States blocked the transaction. Syria then turned around and purchased Russian tanks from Czechoslovakia. Subsequently, when the Syrians endeavoured to make some military purchases directly from the US government, Dulles refused them, apparently for no other reason than moral indignation.³

Syria had not nationalized any American-owned companies, nor did it harbour any potent left-wing party or movement in or outside of parliament threatening to capture the reins of government. But the US Embassy had reports of "leftist tendencies" among some of the younger military officers, truly an incongruous phenomenon to the American mind. What exactly the motivations of these officers were, whether their objectives were more nationalistic than revolutionary, whether they were even anti-Western . . . none of this was terribly clear.⁴ What was clear was that the "leftist tendencies" button had been pushed in Washington, and that the Syrian government, although conservative and anti-Communist, could not be relied upon to do anything about the threat posed by these officers, who, in fact, had done nothing themselves.

In the formula-prone minds of the Secretary of State and other State Department officials, the Syrians were now in danger of becoming leftist, Communist, dependent upon the Soviet Union for military equipment, a Soviet satellite, and so on. Nor was this all. A leftist-oriented Syria would threaten American interests in neighbouring Turkey which, in turn, could outflank all the states of the NATO alliance, and so forth and so on.⁵ And the Soviet Union itself was not far away.

To this we add the usual Middle-Eastern intrigue: in this case, Iraq plotting with the British to topple the governments in both Syria and Nasser's Egypt; the British pressuring the Americans to join the conspiracy;⁶ and the CIA compromising — leave Nasser alone, at least for the time being, and we'll do something about Syria.⁷

An implausible scenario, scandalous, but in the time-honoured tradition of the Middle East. The British were old hands at it. Dulles and the Americans, still exulting in their king-making in Iran, were looking to further remake the oil region in their own image.

Wilbur Crane Eveland was a staff member of the National Security Council, the high-level inter-agency group in Washington which, in theory, monitors and

* The acceptance of military aid usually means the presence of American military advisers and technicians. Moreover, the US Mutual Security Act of 1955 specified that the recipient country agree to make a contribution to "the defensive strength of the free world". The Act also declared it US policy "to encourage the efforts of other free nations . . . to foster private initiative and competition . . ."

controls CIA clandestine activities. Because of Eveland's background and experience in the Middle East, the CIA had asked that he be lent to the Agency for a series of assignments there.

Archibald Roosevelt was, like his cousin Kermit Roosevelt, a highly-placed official of the CIA; both were grandsons of Teddy. Kermit had masterminded the overthrow of the Iranian government in 1953. Archie had fond hopes of doing the same in Syria.

Michail Bey Ilyan had once served as Syria's foreign minister. In 1956 he was the leader of the conservative Populist Party.

At a meeting of these three men in Damascus, Syria on 1 July 1956, as described by Eveland in his memoirs, Roosevelt asked Ilyan "what would be needed to give the Syrian conservatives enough control to purge the communists and their leftist sympathizers. Ilyan responded by ticking off names and places: the radio stations in Damascus and Aleppo; a few key senior officers; and enough money to buy newspapers now in Egyptian and Saudi hands."

"Roosevelt probed further. Could these things, he asked Ilyan, be done with U.S. money and assets alone, with no other Western or Near Eastern country involved?"

"Without question, Ilyan replied, nodding gravely."

On 26 July, Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser announced that his government was taking over the operation of the Suez Canal. The reaction of the British and French was swift and inflamed. The United States was less openly hostile, though it was critical and Egyptian government funds in the US were frozen. This unexpected incident put a crimp in the CIA's plans, for — as Ilyan explained to Eveland in despair — Nasser was now the hero of the Arab world, and collaboration with any Western power to overthrow an Arab government was politically indefensible.

Eventually the coup was scheduled for 25 October. The logistics, as outlined by Ilyan, called for senior colonels in the Syrian army to

take control of Damascus, Aleppo, Homs, and Hamah. The frontier posts with Jordan, Iraq, and Lebanon would also be captured in order to seal Syria's borders until the radio stations announced that a new government had taken over under Colonel Kabbani, who would place armored units at key positions throughout Damascus. Once control had been established, Ilyan would inform the civilians he'd selected that they were to form a new government, but in order to avoid leaks none of them would be told until just a week before the coup.

For this operation, money would have to change hands. Ilyan asked for and received half a million Syrian pounds (approximately \$167,000). This sum occasioned no problem for the CIA regional finance officer in Beirut. When Eveland put forth his request, the officer "hardly blinked": "Did I need new money, old money, a mixture? Bundled or boxed?" The officer suggested a combination of old and new Syrian bills from various banks in Syria, so that their Lebanese origin could not be traced from the bands on the bundles. "Give me two days," he said, "and I'll have it for you in a nice suitcase purchased in Damascus."

Ilyan further stipulated that to guarantee their participation the Syrian plotters would require assurance from the highest level of the American government that the US would both back the coup and immediately grant recognition to the new government. This, Ilyan explained, could be communicated as follows: in April, President Eisenhower had said that the United States would oppose aggression in the Middle East, but not without congressional approval. Could the president repeat this statement, in light of the Suez crisis, he asked, on a specified date when Ilyan's colleagues would be told to expect it? Eisenhower's words would provide proof of US support and intent to recognize the new government in Syria once it had been formed.

An affirmative reply to Ilyan's plan arrived in Damascus from Washington the next day. A proper occasion for the requested statement would have to be found and Secretary Dulles would be the one to use it. The scheme was for Dulles to make public reference to Eisenhower's statement between 16 and 18 October, thus giving Ilyan the week he needed to assemble his civilian team.

Ilyan accepted this proposal and received a nice suitcase filled with money.

Before long, John Foster Dulles held a press conference. In light of recent Israeli attacks on Jordan, one of the reporters present asked whether the United States might come to Jordan's aid per "our declaration of April 9".

Yes, replied the Secretary of State, repeating the reference to the April statement. The date was 16 October.

But following close on the heels of this was a message from Ilyan in Damascus to Eveland in Beirut postponing the date of the coup for five days to 30 October because Colonel Kabbani had told Ilyan that his people weren't quite ready.

The postponement was crucial. On the morning of the 30th, before dawn, Eveland was roused from his sleep by the persistent ringing of his doorbell. It was Michail Ilyan, his face flushed with anger. "Thanks to God I'm alive to see you," he cried, "and say what a terrible thing you and your government did." Eveland was startled but understood all too soon what had happened. "Last night," Ilyan continued, "the Israelis invaded Egypt and are right now heading for the Suez Canal! How could you have asked us to overthrow our government at the exact moment when Israel started a war with an Arab state?"⁸

By the following spring, however, the CIA officers in Beirut and Damascus had, apparently, nothing better to do than try their hands again at stage-managing a Syrian coup. On this occasion, Kermit Roosevelt, rather than cousin Archibald, was pulling the strings. He arranged for one Howard ("Rocky") Stone to be transferred to Damascus from the Sudan to be sure that the "engineering" was done by a "pro". Stone was, at thirty-two, already a legend in the CIA's clandestine service as the man who'd helped Kim Roosevelt overthrow the Iranian government four years earlier.

The proposed beneficiary of this particular plot was to be Adib Shishakly,

former right-wing dictator of Syria, living covertly in Lebanon. Shishakly's former chief of security, Colonel Ibrahim Hussein, now Syrian military attaché in Rome, was secretly slipped into Lebanon under cover of a CIA-fabricated passport. Hussein was then to be smuggled across the Syrian border in the trunk of a US diplomatic car in order to meet with key Syrian CIA agents and provide assurances that Shishakly would come back to rule once Syria's government had been overthrown.

But the coup was exposed before it ever got off the ground. Syrian army officers who had been assigned major roles in the operation walked into the office of Syria's head of intelligence, Colonel Sarraj, turned in their bribe money and named the CIA officers who'd paid them. Lieut. Col. Robert Molloy, the American army attaché, Francis Jeton, a career CIA officer, officially Vice Consul at the US Embassy, and the legendary Howard Stone, with the title of Second Secretary for Political Affairs, were declared *persona non gratae* and expelled from the country in August.

Col. Molloy was determined to leave Syria in style. As his car approached the Lebanese border, he ran his Syrian motorcycle escort off the road and shouted to the fallen rider that "Colonel Sarraj and his commie friends" should be told that Molloy would "beat the shit out of them with one hand tied behind his back if they ever crossed his path again."

The Syrian government announcement which accompanied the expulsion order stated that Stone had first made contact with the outlawed Social Nationalist Party and then with the army officers. When the officers reported the plot, they were told to continue their contacts with the Americans and later met Shishakly and Hussein at the homes of US Embassy staff members. Hussein reportedly told the officers that the United States was prepared to give a new Syrian Government between 300 and 400 million dollars in aid if the government would make peace with Israel.

An amusing aside to the affair occurred when the Syrian Defence Minister and the Syrian Ambassador to Italy disputed the claim that Hussein had anything to do with the plot. The Ambassador pointed out that Hussein had not been in Syria since 20 July and his passport showed no indication that he had been out of Italy since that time.

The State Department categorized the Syrian charge as "complete fabrications" and retaliated by expelling the Syrian Ambassador and a Second Secretary and recalling the American Ambassador from Syria. It marked the first time since 1915 that the United States had expelled a chief of mission of a foreign country.⁹

In the wake of the controversy, the *New York Times* reported that:

There are numerous theories about why the Syrians struck at the United States. One is that they acted at the instigation of the Soviet Union. Another is that the Government manufactured an anti-U.S. spy story to distract public attention from the significance of Syria's negotiations with Moscow.¹⁰

In the same issue, a *Times* editorial speculated upon other plausible-sounding explanations.¹¹ Neither in its news report nor in its editorial, did the *New York*

Times seem to consider even the possibility that the Syrian accusation might be true.

President Eisenhower, recalling the incident in his memoirs, offered no denial to the accusation. His sole comment was: "The entire action was shrouded in mystery but the suspicion was strong that the Communists had taken control of the government."¹²

* * * * *

Syria's neutralism continued to obsess the United States; indeed, Washington still worries about it today, though Syria has not yet "gone communist". As an example, in 1962, President Kennedy and British Prime Minister Macmillan agreed, according to a CIA report, on "Penetration and cultivation of disruptive elements in the Syrian armed forces, particularly in the Syrian army, so that Syria can be guided by the West."¹³

13. The Middle East 1957-1958 The Eisenhower Doctrine claims another backyard for America

On 9 March 1957, the United States Congress approved a presidential resolution which came to be known as the Eisenhower Doctrine. This was a piece of paper, like the Truman Doctrine and the Monroe Doctrine before it, whereby the US government conferred upon the US government the remarkable and enviable right to intervene militarily in other countries. With the stroke of a pen, the Middle East was added to Europe and the Western hemisphere as America's field of play.

The resolution stated that "the United States regards as vital to the national interest and world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East." One month later, as we have seen, the CIA initiated its operation to overthrow the government of Syria.

The business part of the resolution was contained in the succinct declaration that the United States "is prepared to use armed forces to assist" any Middle East country "requesting assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism". Nothing was set forth about non-communist or anti-communist aggression which might endanger world peace.

Wilbur Crane Eveland, the Middle East specialist working for the CIA at the time, was present at a meeting in the State Department two months earlier called to discuss the resolution. Eveland read the draft which stated that "many,

if not all" of the Middle East states "are aware of the danger that stems from international communism". Later he wrote:

I was shocked. Who, I wondered, had reached this determination of what the Arabs considered a danger? Israel's army had just invaded Egypt and still occupied all of the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip. And, had it not been for Russia's threat to intervene on behalf of the Egyptians, the British, French, and Israeli forces might now be sitting in Cairo, celebrating Nasser's ignominious fall from power.¹

The simplistic and polarized view of the world implicit in the Eisenhower Doctrine ignored not only anti-Israeli sentiments but currents of nationalism, pan-Arabism, neutralism and socialism prevalent in many influential quarters of the Middle East. The framers of the resolution saw only a cold-war battlefield and, in doing so, succeeded in creating one.

In April, King Hussein of Jordan dismissed his prime minister, Suleiman Nabulsi, amidst rumours, apparently well-founded, of a coup against the King encouraged by Egypt and Syria and Palestinians living in Jordan. It was the turning point in an ongoing conflict between the pro-West policy of Hussein and the neutralist leanings of the Nabulsi regime. Nabulsi had announced that in line with his policy of neutralism, Jordan would develop closer relations with the Soviet Union and accept Soviet aid if offered. At the same time, he rejected American aid because, he said, the United States had informed him that economic aid would be withheld unless Jordan "severs its ties with Egypt" and "consents to settlement of Palestinian refugees in Jordan", a charge denied by the State Department. Nabulsi added the commentary that "communism is not dangerous to the Arabs".

Hussein, conversely, stated his position as one "to keep Arab land for the Arabs and to stand in the way of new ideas and beliefs that are not required in the Arab world where we have our religion and traditions and history." He accused "international communism and its followers" of direct responsibility for "efforts to destroy my country". When pressed for the specifics of his accusation, he declined to provide any.

When rioting broke out in several Jordanian cities, and civil war could not be ruled out, Hussein showed himself equal to the threat to his continued rule. He declared martial law, purged the government and military of pro-Nasser and leftist tendencies, and abolished all political opposition. Jordan soon returned to a state of relative calm.

The United States, however, seized upon Hussein's use of the expression "international communism" to justify rushing units of the Sixth Fleet to the eastern Mediterranean — a super aircraft carrier, two cruisers, and 15 destroyers, followed shortly by a variety of other naval vessels and a battalion of marines which put ashore in Beirut — to "prepare for possible future intervention in Jordan".²

Despite the fact that nothing resembling "armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism" had taken place, the State Department openly invited the King to invoke the Eisenhower Doctrine.³ But

Hussein, who had not even requested the show of force, refused, knowing that such a move would only add fuel to the fires already raging in Jordanian political life. He survived without it.

Sometime during this year the CIA began making secret annual payments to King Hussein, initially in the millions of dollars per year. The practice was to last for 20 years, with the Agency providing Hussein female companions as well. As justification for the payment, the CIA later claimed that Hussein allowed American intelligence agencies to operate freely in Jordan. Hussein himself provided intelligence to the CIA and distributed part of his payments to other government officials who also furnished information or cooperated with the Agency.⁴

A few months later, it was Syria which occupied the front stage in Washington's melodrama of "International Communism". The Syrians had established relations with the Soviet Union via trade, economic aid, and military purchases and training. The United States chose to see something ominous in this although it was a state of affairs engendered in no small measure by John Foster Dulles, as we saw in the previous chapter. American antipathy toward Syria was heightened in August 1957 following the Syrian government's exposure of the CIA-directed plot to overthrow it.

Washington officials and the American media settled easily into the practice of referring to Syria as a "Soviet satellite" or "quasi-satellite". This was not altogether objective or spontaneous reporting. Kenneth Love, a *New York Times* correspondent in close contact to the CIA, later disclosed some of the background:

The US Embassy in Syria connived at false reports issued in Washington and London through diplomatic and press channels to the effect that Russian arms were pouring into the Syrian port of Latakia, that 'not more than 123 Migs' had arrived in Syria, and that Lieutenant Colonel Abdel Hameed Serraj, head of Syrian intelligence, had taken over control in a Communist-inspired coup. I travelled all over Syria without hindrance in November and December [1956] and found there were indeed 'not more than 123 Migs'. There were none. And no Russian arms had arrived for months. And there had been no coup, although some correspondents in Beirut, just a two-hour drive from Damascus, were dispatching without attribution false reports fed to them by embassy visitors from Damascus and a roving CIA man who worked in the guise of a US Treasury agent. Serraj, who was anti-Communist, had just broken the clumsy British-US-Iraqi-supported plot. Syria was quiet but worried lest the propaganda presage a new coup *d'état* or a Western-backed invasion.⁵

As if to further convince any remaining sceptics, Eisenhower dispatched a personal emissary, Loy Henderson, on a tour of the Middle East. Henderson, not surprisingly, returned with the conclusion that "there was a fear in all Middle East countries that the Soviets might be able to topple the regimes in each of their countries through exploiting the crisis in Syria".⁶ He gave no indication as to whether the Syrians themselves thought they were going

through a crisis.

In early September, the day after Henderson returned, the United States announced that the Sixth Fleet was once again being sent to the Mediterranean and that arms and other military equipment were being rushed to Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq and Turkey. A few days later, Saudi Arabia was added to the list. The Soviet Union replied with arms shipments to Syria, Egypt and Yemen.

The Syrian government accused the US of sending warships close to her coast in an "open challenge" and said that unidentified planes had been flying constantly over the Latakia area day and night for four days. Latakia is a Syrian seaport where supplies arrived from the Soviet Union.

Syria further claimed that the US had "incited" Turkey to concentrate an estimated 50,000 soldiers on Syria's border. The Syrians ridiculed the explanation that the Turkish troops were only on manoeuvres. Eisenhower later wrote that the troops were at the border with "a readiness to act" and that the United States had already assured the leaders of Turkey, Iraq and Jordan that if they "felt it necessary to take actions against aggression by the Syrian government, the United States would undertake to expedite shipments of arms already committed to the Middle Eastern countries and, further, would replace losses as quickly as possible." The president had no quarrel with the idea that such action might be taken to repel, in his words, the "anticipated aggression" of Syria, for it would thus be "basically defensive in nature". (Emphasis added.)⁷

The American role here was apparently more active than Eisenhower suggests. Under-Secretary of State Christian Herter, later to replace an ailing John Foster Dulles as Secretary, "reviewed in rueful detail" to author and administration colleague Emmet John Hughes, "some recent clumsy clandestine American attempts to spur Turkish forces to do some vague kind of battle with Syria".⁸

Dulles gave the impression in public remarks that the United States was anxious to somehow invoke the Eisenhower Doctrine, presumably as a "justification" for taking further action against Syria. But he could not offer any explanation of how this was possible. Certainly Syria was not going to make the necessary request.

The only solution lay in Syria attacking another Arab country which would then request American assistance. This appears to be one rationale behind the flurry of military and diplomatic activity directed at Syria by the US. Indeed, a study carried out for the Pentagon some years later concluded that in "the 1957 Syrian crisis . . . Washington seem(ed) to seek the *initial* use of force by 'target'".⁹ (Emphasis added; "target" is used for Syria in the socio-political jargon of the study.)

Throughout this period, Washington officials alternated between striving to enlist testimonials from other Arab nations that Syria was indeed a variety of Soviet satellite and a threat to the region, and assuring the world that the United States had received a profusion of just such testimony. But Jordan, Iraq and Saudi Arabia all denied that they felt threatened by Syria. Egypt, Syria's closest ally, of course concurred. At the height of the "crisis", King Hussein of

Jordan left for a vacation in Europe; the Iraqi premier declared that his country and Syria had arrived at a "complete understanding";¹⁰ and King Saud of Saudi Arabia, in a message to Eisenhower, said that US concern over Syria was "exaggerated" and asked the president for "renewed assurances that the United States would refrain from any interference in the internal affairs of Arab states". Saud added that "efforts to overturn the Syrian regime would merely make the Syrians more amenable to Soviet influence", a view shared by several observers on all sides.

At the same time, the *New York Times* reported that "From the beginning of the crisis over Syria's drift to the left, there has been less excitement among her Arab neighbors than in the United States. Foreign diplomats in the area, including many Americans, felt that the stir caused in Washington was out of proportion to the cause."

Eventually, Dulles may have been influenced by this lack of support for the American thesis, for when asked specifically to "characterize what the relation is between Soviet aims in the area and the part that Syria adds to them", he could only reply that "The situation internally in Syria is not entirely clear and fluctuates somewhat". Syria, he implied, was not yet in the grip of international Communism.

The next day, Syria, which had no desire to isolate itself from the West, similarly moderated its tone by declaring that the American warships had been 15 miles offshore and had continued "quietly on their way".¹¹

It appears that during this same restless year of 1957, the United States was also engaged in a plot to overthrow Nasser and his troublesome nationalism, although the details are rather sketchy. In January, when King Saud and Iraqi Crown Prince Abdul Illah were in New York at the United Nations, they were approached by CIA Director Allen Dulles and one of his top aides, Kermit Roosevelt, with offers of CIA covert planning and funding to topple the Egyptian leader whose radical rhetoric, nebulous though it was, was seen by the royal visitors as a threat to the very idea of monarchy.*

"Abdul Illah", wrote Eveland, "insisted on British participation in anything covert, but the Saudis had severed relations with Britain and refused. As a result, the CIA dealt separately with each: agreeing to fund King Saud's part in a new area scheme to oppose Nasser and eliminate his influence in Syria; and to the same objective, coordinating in Beirut a covert working group composed of representatives of the British, Iraqi, Jordanian, and Lebanese intelligence services."¹³

* Nasser and other army officers had overthrown King Farouk of Egypt in 1952. Ironically, Kim Roosevelt and the CIA have traditionally been given credit for somehow engineering this coup. However, that they did this is by no means certain.¹²

The conspiracy is next picked up in mid-spring at the home of Ghosn Zogby in Beirut. Zogby, of Lebanese ancestry and name, was the chief of the CIA Beirut station. He and Kim Roosevelt, who was staying with him, hosted several conferences of the clandestine planners. "So obvious", Eveland continued, "were their 'covert' gyrations, with British, Iraqi, Jordanian and Lebanese liaison personnel coming and going nightly, that the Egyptian ambassador in Lebanon was reportedly taking bets on when and where the next U.S. coup would take place." At one of these meetings, the man from the British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) informed the gathering that teams had been fielded to assassinate Nasser.

Shortly afterwards, Eveland learned from a CIA official that John Foster Dulles, as well as his brother Allen, had directed Roosevelt to work with the British to bring down Nasser. Roosevelt now spoke in terms of a "palace revolution" in Egypt.¹⁴

From this point on we're fishing in murky waters, for the events which followed produced more questions than answers. With the six countries named above, plus Turkey and Israel apparently getting in on the act, and less than complete trust and love existing amongst the various governments, a host of plots, sub-plots and side plots inevitably sprang to life; at times it bordered on low comedy, though some would call it no more than normal Middle East "diplomacy".

Between July 1957 and October 1958, the Egyptian and Syrian governments and media announced the uncovering of what appears to be at least eight separate conspiracies to overthrow one or the other government, to assassinate Nasser, and/or prevent the expected merger of the two countries. Saudi Arabia, Iraq and the United States were most often named as conspirators, but from the entanglement of intrigue which surfaced it is virtually impossible to unravel the particular threads of the US role.¹⁵

Typical of the farcical going-ons, it seems that at least one of the plots to assassinate Nasser arose from the Dulles brothers taking Eisenhower's remark that he hoped "the Nasser problem could be eliminated" to be an order for assassination, when the president, so the story goes, was merely referring to improved US-Egyptian relations. Upon realizing the error, Secretary Dulles ordered the operation to cease.¹⁶ (Three years later, Allen Dulles was again to "misinterpret" a remark by Eisenhower as an order to assassinate Patrice Lumumba of the Congo.)

Official American pronouncements during this entire period would have had the world believe that the Soviet Union was the *eminentia grise* behind the strife in Jordan, the "crisis" in Syria, and unrest generally in the Middle East; that the Soviet aim was to dominate the area, while the sole purpose of US policy was to repel this Soviet thrust and maintain the "independence" of the Arab nations. Yet, on three separate occasions during 1957 — in February, April and September — the Soviet Union called for a four-power (US, USSR, Great Britain and France) declaration renouncing the use of

force and interference in the internal affairs of the Middle Eastern countries. The February appeal had additionally called for a four-power embargo on arms shipments to the region, withdrawal of all foreign troops, liquidation of all foreign bases, and a conference to reach a general Middle East settlement.

The Soviet strategy was clearly to neutralize the Middle East, to remove the threat it had long felt from the potentially hostile control of the oil region by, traditionally, France and Great Britain, and now the United States which sought to fill the "power vacuum" left by the decline of the two European nations as Middle East powers.

History does not relate what a Middle East free from big-power manipulation would have been like, for neither France, Great Britain nor the United States was amenable to even calling the Soviet "bluff" if that, indeed, was what it was. The *New York Times* summarized the attitude of the three Western nations to the first two overtures as one that "depreciated the Soviet proposals as efforts to gain recognition of a Soviet right to a direct voice in the affairs of the Middle East. They have told the Russians to take up their complaints through the United Nations."

Following the September proposal, John Foster Dulles, replying to a question at a press conference, said that "the United States is skeptical of these arrangements with the Soviet Union for 'hands-off'. What they are apt to mean is our hands off and their hands under the table." This appears to be the only public comment that the US Government saw fit to make on the matter.¹⁷

It may be instructive to speculate upon the reaction of the Western nations if the Soviet Union had announced a "Khrushchev Doctrine", ceding to itself the same scope of action in the Middle East as that stipulated in the Eisenhower Doctrine.

In January 1958, Syria and Egypt announced their plans to unite, forming the new nation of the United Arab Republic (UAR). The initiative for the merger had come from Syria who was motivated in no small part by her fear of further American power plays against her. Ironically, under the arrangement the Communist Party, already outlawed in Egypt, was dissolved in Syria, an objective which a year and a half of CIA covert activity had failed to achieve.

Two weeks after the birth of the UAR, and in direct response to it, Iraq and Jordan formed the Arab Union, with the United States acting as midwife. This union was short lived, for in July a bloody coup in Iraq installed a new regime which promptly renounced the pact. The trumpets of Armageddon could once more be heard distinctly in the Oval Office. "We feared the worst", wrote Eisenhower. "This somber turn of events could, without vigorous response on our part, result in a complete elimination of Western influence in the Middle East."¹⁸

Where Iraq, once the gunsmoke cleared, would land on the international political spectrum could not be predicted with any certainty at that moment. But the United States did not wait to find out.

The time for a mere show of force was over. The very next day, the marines, along with the American navy and air force, were sent in — not to Iraq, but to Lebanon.

Of all the Arab states, Lebanon was easily the United States' closest ally. She alone had supported the Eisenhower Doctrine with any enthusiasm or unequivocally echoed Washington's panic about Syria. To be more precise, it was the president of Lebanon, Camille Chamoun, and the foreign minister Charles Malik, a Harvard Ph.D. in philosophy, who had put all their cold-war eggs into the American basket. Chamoun had ample reason to be beholden to the United States. The CIA apparently played a role in his 1952 election,¹⁹ and in 1957 the Agency, with the approval of the National Security Council, furnished generous sums of money to Chamoun to use in support of candidates in the Chamber of Deputies (Parliament) June elections who would back him and, presumably, US policies. Funds were also provided to specifically oppose, as punishment, those candidates who had resigned in protest over Chamoun's adherence to the Eisenhower Doctrine.

As is customary in such operations, the CIA sent an "election specialist", one Van Deluer, to Beirut to assist in the planning. American officials in Washington and Lebanon proceeded on the assumption, they told each other, that Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia would also intervene financially in the elections. The American Ambassador to Lebanon, Donald Heath, argued as well, apparently without ironic intention, that "With both the president and the new chamber of deputies supporting American principles, we'd also have a demonstration that representative democracy could work" in the Middle East.

To what extent the American funding helped, or even how the money was spent, is not known, but the result was a landslide for pro-government deputies; so much so, that it caused considerable protest within Lebanon, including the charge that Chamoun had stacked the parliament in order to amend the constitution to permit him to seek an otherwise prohibited second six-year term of office the following year.²⁰

By late April 1958, tensions in Lebanon had reached bursting point. The inordinate pro-American orientation of Chamoun's government and his refusal to dispel rumours that he would seek a second term incensed both Lebanese nationalists and advocates of the Arab nationalism which Nasser was promoting throughout the Middle East. Demands were made that the government return to the strict neutrality provided for in the National Pact of 1943 at the time of Lebanon's independence from France.

A rash of militant demonstrations, bombings and clashes with police took place, and when, in early May, the editor of an anti-government newspaper was murdered, armed rebellion broke out in several parts of the country, and US Information Agency libraries in Tripoli and Beirut were sacked. Lebanon contained all the makings of a civil war.

"Behind everything," wrote Eisenhower, "was our deep-seated conviction that the Communists were principally responsible for the trouble and that President Chamoun was motivated only by a strong feeling of patriotism."

The president did not clarify who or what he meant by "Communists". However, in the next paragraph he refers, without explanation, to the Soviet Union as "stirring up trouble" in the Middle East. On the following page, the old soldier writes that "there was no doubt in our minds" about Chamoun's charge that "Egypt and Syria had been instigating the revolt and arming the rebels".²¹

In the midst of the fighting, John Foster Dulles announced that he perceived "international communism" as the source of the conflict and for the third time in a year the Sixth Fleet was dispatched to the eastern Mediterranean; police supplies to help quell rioters, as well as tanks and other heavy equipment, were airlifted to Lebanon.

At a subsequent news conference, Dulles declared that even if international Communism were not involved, the Eisenhower Doctrine was still applicable because one of its provisions stated that "the independence of these countries is vital to peace and the national interest of the United States. That is certainly a mandate," he said, "to do something if we think that our peace and vital interests are endangered from any quarter."²² Thus did one of the authors of the doctrine bestow upon himself a mandate.

Egypt and Syria, from all accounts, certainly supported the rebels' cause with arms, men and money, in addition to inflammatory radio broadcasts from Cairo. The extent of the material support is difficult to establish. A UN Observation Group went to Lebanon in June at the request of Foreign Minister Malik, with no objection in the UN from either the UAR or the Soviet Union, and reported that they found no evidence of UAR intervention of any significance. A second UN report in July confirmed this finding. It is open to question, however, what degree of reliance can be placed upon these reports, dealing as they do with so thorny an evaluation and issued by a body in the business of promoting compromise.

In any event, the issue was whether the conflict in Lebanon represented a legitimate, home-grown civil war, or whether it was the doing of the proverbial "outside agitators". On this point, historian Richard Barnet has observed:

No doubt the Observation Group did minimize the extent of UAR participation. But essentially they were correct. Nasser was trying to exploit the political turmoil in Lebanon, but he did not create it. Lebanon, which had always abounded in clandestine arsenals and arms markets, did not need foreign weapons for its domestic violence. Egyptian intervention was neither the stimulus nor the mainstay of the civil strife. Once again a government that had lost the power to rule effectively was blaming its failure on foreign agents.²³

Camille Chamoun had sacrificed Lebanon's independence and neutrality on the altar of personal ambition and the extensive American aid that derived from subscribing to the Eisenhower Doctrine. Lebanese Muslims, who comprised most of Chamoun's opposition, were also galled that the Christian president had once again placed the country outside the mainstream of the Arab world, as he had done in 1956 when he refused to break relations with France and Great Britain following their invasion of Egypt.

Chamoun himself had admitted the significance of his pro-American alignment in a revealing comment to Wilbur Crane Eveland. Eveland writes that in late April,

I'd suggested that he might ease tensions by making a statement renouncing a move for reelection. Chamoun had snorted and suggested that I look at the calendar. March 23 was a month behind us, and no amendment to permit another term could legally be passed after that date. Obviously, as he pointed out, the issue of the presidency was not the real issue; renunciation of the Eisenhower Doctrine was what his opponents wanted.²⁴

Instead of renouncing the doctrine, Chamoun invoked it. Although scattered fighting, at times heavy, was continuing in Lebanon, it was the coup in Iraq on 14 July that tipped the scales in favour of Chamoun making the formal request for military assistance and the United States immediately granting it. A CIA report of a plot against King Hussein of Jordan at about the same time heightened even further Washington's seemingly unceasing sense of urgency about the Middle East.

Chamoun had, by this time, already announced his intention to step down from office when his term expired in September. He was now concerned about American forces helping him to stay alive until that date, as well as their taking action against the rebels. For the previous two months, fear of assassination had kept him constantly inside the presidential palace, never so much as approaching a window. The murder of the Iraqi king and prime minister during the coup was not designed to make him feel more secure.

The Eisenhower Doctrine was put into motion not only in the face of widespread opposition to it within Lebanon, but in disregard of the fact that, even by the doctrine's own dubious provisions, the situation in Lebanon did not qualify: it could hardly be claimed that Lebanon had suffered "armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism". If further evidence of this were needed, it was provided by veteran diplomat Robert Murphy who was sent to Lebanon by Eisenhower a few days after the US troops had landed. Murphy concluded, he later wrote, that "communism was playing no direct or substantial part in the insurrection".²⁵

Yet, Eisenhower could write that the American Government "was moving in accord with the provisions of the Middle East Resolution, but", he added, "if the conflict expanded into something that the Resolution did not cover, I would, given time, go to the Congress for additional authorization".²⁶ Apparently, the president did not place too much weight on Dulles having already determined that the Resolution's mandate was open-ended.

Thus it was that American Marines and Army forces were dispatched to Lebanon, totalling over 14,000 at peak strength, more than the entire Lebanese Army and gendarmerie combined. Some 70 American naval vessels and hundreds of aircraft took part in the operation, many remaining as part of the visible American presence.

"In my [radio-TV] address," wrote Eisenhower, "I had been careful to use the term 'stationed in' Lebanon rather than 'invading',"²⁷ a distinction lost upon

many Lebanese, both high and low, supporters of the rebels and supporters of the government, including government tank forces who were prepared to block the entrance into Beirut of US troops; only the last-minute intercession on the spot by the American Ambassador may have averted an armed clash.²⁸

At a meeting between Robert Murphy and Lebanese Commander-in-Chief General Faud Chehab, related by Eveland who was briefed by Murphy afterwards, the American diplomat was warned that the Lebanese people were "restless, resentful, and determined that Chamoun should resign and U.S. troops leave at once. Otherwise the general could not be responsible for the consequences. For fifteen years his officers had acted behind his back; now, he feared, they might revolt and attack the American forces."²⁹

Murphy had listened patiently, "and then escorted the general to a window overlooking the sea. Pointing to the supercarrier *Saratoga*, swinging at anchor on the horizon, the President's envoy had quietly explained that just one of its aircraft, armed with nuclear weapons, could obliterate Beirut and its environs from the face of the earth. To this, Murphy quickly added that he'd been sent to be sure that it wouldn't be necessary for American troops to fire a shot. Shehab [Chehab], he was certain, would ensure that there were no provocations on the Lebanese side. That, Murphy told me, ended the conversation. It now seemed that the general had 'regained control' of his troops."²⁹

Civil warfare in Lebanon increased in intensity during the two weeks following the American intervention. During this period, CIA transmitters in the Middle East were occupied in sending out propaganda broadcasts of disguised origin, a tactic frequently employed by the Agency. In the case of one broadcast which has been reported, the apparent aim was to deflect anti-US feelings on to the Soviet Union and other targets. But the residents of the Middle East were not the only ones who may have been taken in by the spurious broadcast, for it was picked up by the American press and passed on to an unwitting American public; the following appeared in US newspapers:

BEIRUT, July 23 (UPI) — A second mysterious Arab radio station went on the air yesterday calling itself the 'Voice of Justice' and claiming to be broadcasting from Syria.

Its program heard here consisted of bitter criticism against Soviet Russia and Soviet Premier Khrushchev. Earlier the 'Voice of Iraq' went on the air with attacks against the Iraqi revolutionary government.

The 'Voice of Justice' called Khrushchev the 'hangman of Hungary' and warned the people of the Middle East they would suffer the same fate as the Hungarians if the Russians got a foothold in the Middle East.³⁰

On 31 July, the Chamber of Deputies easily chose General Chehab to succeed Chamoun as president in September, an event that soon put a damper on the fighting in Lebanon and marked the beginning of the end of the conflict which, in the final analysis, appears to have been more a violent protest than a civil war. Tension was further eased by the US announcement shortly afterwards of its intention to withdraw a Marine battalion as a prelude to a general withdrawal.

The last American troops left Lebanon on 25 October without having fired a shot in anger. What had their presence accomplished?

The authors of the Pentagon study referred to earlier concluded: "A balanced assessment of U.S. behavior in the Lebanon crisis is made difficult by the suspicion that the outcome might have been much the same if the United States had done nothing. Even Eisenhower expressed some doubt on this score."³¹

The case of Iraq, where no intervention took place, can only reinforce such suspicions. Eisenhower, we have seen, "feared the worst" about Iraq. Yet, only a few days after the coup, the president noted that Iraq expressed a "desire to protect commercial and other commitments and to establish good terms" with the United States and Great Britain, and "had been cooperative in protecting United States and British lives and property when we evacuated some of our nationals."³² Ten days later, the US recognized the new Iraqi regime.

The significance of the Lebanese intervention, as well as the shows of force employed in regard to Jordan and Syria, extended beyond the immediate outcomes. In the period before and after the intervention, Eisenhower, Dulles and other Washington officials offered numerous different justifications for the American military action in Lebanon: protecting American lives; protecting American property; the Eisenhower Doctrine, with various interpretations; Lebanese sovereignty, integrity, independence, etc.; US national interest; world peace; collective self-defence; justice; international law; law and order; fighting "Nasserism" . . . the need to "do something" . . .³³

In summing up the affair in his memoirs, President Eisenhower seemed to settle upon one rationale in particular, and this is probably the closest to the truth of the matter. This was to put the world — and specifically the Soviet Union and Nasser — on notice that the United States had virtually unlimited power, that this power could be transported to any corner of the world with great speed, that it could and would be used to deal decisively with any situation with which the United States was dissatisfied, for whatever reason.³⁴

At the same time, it was a message to the British and the French that there was only one Western superpower in the post-war world, and that their days as commanding powers in the Middle East were over.

14. Indonesia 1957-1958 War and pornography

"I think it's time we held Sukarno's feet to the fire", said Frank Wisner, the CIA's Deputy Director of Plans (covert operations), one day in autumn 1956.¹ Wisner was speaking of the man who had led Indonesia since its struggle for independence from the Dutch following the war. A few months earlier, in May, Sukarno had made an impassioned speech before the US Congress asking for more understanding of the problems and needs of developing nations like his own.²

The ensuing American campaign to unseat the flamboyant leader of the fifth most populous nation in the world was to run the gamut from large-scale military manoeuvres to seditious sexual intrigue.

A year earlier, Sukarno had organized the Bandung Conference as an answer to the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), the US-created political-military alliance of area states to "contain communism". At Bandung, the doctrine of neutralism had been proclaimed the faith of the underdeveloped world. To the men of the CIA station in Indonesia the conference was heresy, so much so that their thoughts turned toward assassination as a means of sabotaging it.

In 1975, the Senate committee which was investigating the Agency heard testimony that CIA officers stationed in an East Asian country had suggested that an East Asian leader be assassinated "to disrupt an impending Communist Conference in 1955".³ (In all likelihood, the leader referred to was either Sukarno or Chou En-lai of China.) But, said the committee, cooler heads prevailed at CIA headquarters in Washington and the suggestion was firmly rejected.*

Elsewhere the committee reported that it had "received some evidence of CIA involvement in plans to assassinate President Sukarno of Indonesia", and that planning had proceeded to the point of identifying an agent whom it was believed might be recruited for the job.⁵ Whether the two items referred to the same assassination plan or two separate ones is not clear. (The committee

* Nevertheless, a plane carrying eight members of the Chinese delegation, a Vietnamese, and two European journalists to the Bandung Conference crashed under mysterious circumstances. The Chinese government claimed that it was an act of sabotage carried out by the US and Taiwan, a misfired effort to murder Chou-En lai. (See Notes for further discussion.)⁴

noted that at one time, those at the CIA who were concerned with possible assassinations and assassination methods were known internally as the "Health Alteration Committee".)

To add to the concern of American leaders, Sukarno had made trips to the Soviet Union and China (though to the White House as well), he had purchased arms from Eastern European countries (but only after being turned down by the United States),⁶ he had nationalized many private holdings of the Dutch, and, perhaps most disturbing of all, the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) had made impressive gains electorally and in union-organizing, thus earning an important role in the coalition government.

It was a familiar Third World scenario, and the reaction of Washington policy-makers was equally familiar. Once again, they were unable, or unwilling, to distinguish nationalism from pro-communism, neutralism from wickedness. By any definition of the word, Sukarno was no communist. He was an Indonesian nationalist and a "Sukarnoist" who had crushed the PKI forces in 1948 after the independence struggle had been won.⁷ He ran what was largely his own show by granting concessions to both the PKI and the Army, balancing one against the other. As to excluding the PKI, with its more than one million members, from the government, Sukarno declared: "I can't and won't ride a three-legged horse."⁸

To the United States, however, Sukarno's balancing act was too precarious to be left to the vagaries of the Indonesian political process. It mattered not to Washington that the Communist Party was walking the legal, peaceful road, or that there was no particular "crisis" or "chaos" in Indonesia, so favoured as an excuse for intervention. Intervention there would be.

It would not be the first. In 1955, during the national election campaign in Indonesia, the CIA had given a million dollars to the Masjumi party, a centrist coalition of Muslim organizations, in a losing bid to thwart Sukarno's Nationalist Party as well as the PKI. According to former CIA officer Joseph Burkholder Smith, the project "provided for complete write-off of the funds, that is, no demand for a detailed accounting of how the funds were spent was required. I could find no clue as to what the Masjumi did with the million dollars."⁹

In 1957, the CIA decided that the situation called for more direct action. It was not difficult to find Indonesian colleagues-in-arms for there already existed a clique of army officers and others who, for personal ambitions and because they disliked the influential position of the PKI, wanted Sukarno out, or at least out of their particular islands. (Indonesia is the world's largest archipelago, consisting of some 3,000 islands.)

The military operation the CIA was opting for was of a scale that necessitated significant assistance from the Pentagon, which could be secured only for a political action mission approved by the National Security Council's "Special Group" (the small group of top NSC officials who acted in the President's name, to protect him and the country by evaluating proposed covert actions and making certain that the CIA did not go off the deep end; known at other times as the 5412 Committee, the 303 Committee, the 40 Committee, or

the Operations Advisory Group).

The manner in which the Agency went about obtaining this approval is a text-book example of how the CIA sometimes determines American foreign policy. Joseph Burkholder Smith, who was in charge of the Agency's Indonesian desk in Washington from mid-1956 to early 1958, has described the process in his memoirs: instead of first proposing the plan to Washington for approval, where "premature mention . . . might get it shot down".

We began to feed the State and Defense departments intelligence that no one could deny was a useful contribution to understanding Indonesia. When they had read enough alarming reports, we planned to spring the suggestion we should support the colonels' plans to reduce Sukarno's power. This was a method of operation which became the basis of many of the political action adventures of the 1960s and 1970s. In other words, the statement is false that CIA undertook to intervene in the affairs of countries like Chile *only after* being ordered to do so by . . . the Special Group. . . . In many instances, we made the action programs up ourselves after we had collected enough intelligence to make them appear required by the circumstances. Our activity in Indonesia in 1957-1958 was one such instance.¹⁰ (Emphasis in original.)

When the Communist Party did well again in local elections held in July, the CIA viewed it as "a great help to us in convincing Washington authorities how serious the Indonesian situation was. The only person who did not seem terribly alarmed at the PKI victories was Ambassador Allison. This was all we needed to convince John Foster Dulles finally that he had the wrong man in Indonesia. The wheels began to turn to remove this last stumbling block in the way of our operation."¹¹ John Allison, wrote Smith, was not a great admirer of the CIA to begin with. In early 1958, after less than a year in the post, he was replaced as ambassador by Howard Jones, whose selection "pleased" the CIA Indonesia staff.¹²

On 30 November 1957, several hand grenades were tossed at Sukarno as he was leaving a school. He escaped injury, but 10 people were killed and 48 children injured. The CIA in Indonesia had no idea who was responsible, but it quickly put out the story that the PKI was behind it "at the suggestion of their Soviet contacts in order to make it appear that Sukarno's opponents were wild and desperate men". As it turned out, the culprits were a Muslim group not associated with the PKI or with the Agency's military plotters.¹³

The theme of Sukarno's supposed hand-in-glove relationship with Communists was pushed at every opportunity. The CIA decided to make capital of reports that a good-looking blonde stewardess had been aboard Sukarno's aircraft everywhere he went during his trip in the Soviet Union and that the same woman had come to Indonesia with Soviet President Kliment Voroshilov and had been seen several times in the company of Sukarno. The idea was that Sukarno's well-known womanizing had trapped him in the spell of a Soviet female agent. He had succumbed to Soviet control, CIA reports implied, as a result of her influence or blackmail, or both.

"This formed the foundation of our flights of fancy," wrote Smith. "We had as a matter of fact, considerable success with this theme. It appeared in the

press around the world, and when *Round Table*, the serious British quarterly of international affairs, came to analyze the Indonesian revolt in its March 1958 issue, it listed Sukarno's being blackmailed by a Soviet female spy as one of the reasons that caused the uprising."

Seemingly, the success of this operation inspired CIA officers in Washington to carry the theme one step further. A substantial effort was made to come up with a pornographic film or at least some still photographs that could pass for Sukarno and his Russian girl friend engaged in "his favourite activity". When scrutiny of available porno films (supplied by the Chief of Police of Los Angeles) failed to turn up a couple who could pass for Sukarno (dark and bald) and a beautiful blonde Russian woman, the CIA undertook to produce its own films, "the very films with which the Soviets were blackmailing Sukarno".¹⁴ One outcome of this effort was a film produced for the Agency by Robert Maheu, former FBI agent and intimate of Howard Hughes. Maheu's film started an actor who resembled Sukarno. The ultimate fate of the film, which was entitled "Happy Days", has not been reported.¹⁵ The CIA also developed a full-face mask of the Indonesian leader which was sent to Los Angeles where the police were to pay some porno-film actor to wear it during his big scene. This project resulted in some photographs, although they apparently were never used.¹⁶ In other parts of the world, at other times, the CIA has done better in this line of work, having produced sex films of target subjects caught *in flagrante delicto* who had been lured to Agency safe-houses by female agents.*

Sex could be used at home as well to further the goals of American foreign policy. Under the cover of the US foreign aid programme, at that time called the Economic Cooperation Administration, Indonesian policemen were trained and then recruited to provide information on Soviet, Chinese and PKI activities in their country. Some of the men singled out as good prospects for this work were sent to Washington for special training and to be softened up for recruitment. Like Sukarno, reportedly, these police officers invariably had an obsessive desire to sleep with a white woman. Accordingly, during their stay they were taken to Baltimore's shabby sex district to indulge themselves.¹⁸

The Special Group's approval of the mission was forthcoming in November, 1957.¹⁹ The CIA's paramilitary wheels began to spin. In this undertaking, as in so many others, the Agency enjoyed the advantage of the United States' far-flung military empire. Headquarters for the operation were established in neighbouring Singapore; training bases set up in the Philippines; airstrips laid out in various parts of the Pacific to prepare for bomber and transport missions;

* In 1960, Col. Truman Smith, US Army Ret., writing in *Reader's Digest* about the KGB, declared: "It is difficult for most of us to appreciate its menace, as its methods are so debased as to be all but beyond the comprehension of any normal person with a sense of right and wrong." One of the KGB methods the good colonel found so debased was the making of sex films to be used as blackmail. "People depraved enough to employ such methods," he wrote, "find nothing distasteful in more violent methods . . ."¹⁷

Indonesians, Filipinos, Taiwanese, Americans, and other "soldiers of fortune" were assembled in Okinawa and the Philippines along with vast quantities of arms and equipment.

For this, the CIA's most ambitious military operation to date, tens of thousands of rebels were armed, equipped and trained by the US Army. US Navy submarines, patrolling off the coast of Sumatra, the main island, put over-the-beach parties ashore along with supplies and communications equipment. The US Air Force set up a considerable Air Transport force which air-dropped many thousands of weapons deep into Indonesian territory. And a fleet of fifteen B-26 bombers was made available for the conflict after being "sanitized" to ensure that they were "non-attributable" and that all airborne equipment was "deniable".

In the early months of 1958, rebellion began to break out in one part of the Indonesian island chain, then another. CIA pilots took to the air to carry out bombing and strafing missions in support of the rebels. In Washington, Col. Alex Kawilarang, the Indonesian military attaché, was persuaded by the Agency to "defect". He soon showed up in Indonesia to take charge of the rebel forces. Yet, as the fighting dragged on into spring, the insurgents proved unable to win decisive victories or take the offensive, although the CIA bombing raids were taking their toll.

Sukarno later claimed that on a Sunday morning in April, a plane bombed a ship in the harbour of the island of Ambon — all hands aboard going down — as well as hitting a church, which demolished the building and took the lives of all those inside. He stated that 700 casualties resulted from this single run.

On 15 May, a CIA plane bombed the Ambon marketplace, killing a large number of civilians on their way to church on Ascension Thursday. The Indonesian government had to act to suppress public demonstrations.

Three days later, during another bombing run over Ambon, a CIA pilot, Allen Lawrence Pope, was shot down and captured. Thirty years old, from Perrine, Florida, Pope had flown 55 night missions over Communist lines in Korea for the Air Force. Later he spent two months flying through Communist flak for the CIA to drop supplies to the French at Dienbienphu. Now his luck had run out. He was to spend four years as a prisoner in Indonesia before Sukarno acceded to a request from Robert Kennedy for his release.

Pope was captured carrying a set of incriminating documents, including those which established him as a pilot for the US Air Force and the CIA airline C.A.T. Like all men flying clandestine missions, Pope had gone through an elaborate procedure before taking off to "sanitize" him, as well as his aircraft. But he had apparently smuggled the papers aboard the plane, for he knew that to be captured as an "anonymous, stateless civilian" meant having virtually no legal rights and ran the risk of being shot as a spy in accordance with custom. A captured US military man, however, becomes a commodity of value for his captors while he remains alive.

The Indonesian government derived immediate material concessions from the United States as a result of the incident. Whether the Indonesians thereby agreed to keep silent about Pope is not known, but on 27 May, the pilot and his

documents were presented to the world at a news conference, thus contradicting several recent statements by high American officials.²⁰ Notable amongst these was President Eisenhower's declaration on 30 April concerning Indonesia: "Our policy is one of careful neutrality and proper deportment all the way through so as not to be taking sides where it is none of our business."²¹

And on 9 May, an editorial in the *New York Times* had stated:

It is unfortunate that high officials of the Indonesian Government have given further circulation to the false report that the United States Government was sanctioning aid to Indonesia's rebels. The position of the United States Government has been made plain, again and again. Our Secretary of State was emphatic in his declaration that this country would not deviate from a correct neutrality . . . the United States is not ready . . . to step in to help overthrow a constituted government. Those are the hard facts. Jakarta does not help its case, here, by ignoring them.

With the exposure of Pope and the lack of rebel success in the field, the CIA decided that the light was no longer worth the candle, and began to curtail its support. By the end of June, Indonesian army troops loyal to Sukarno had effectively crushed the dissident military revolt.

The Indonesian leader continued his adroit balancing act between the Communists and the army until 1965, when the latter, likely with the help of the CIA, finally overthrew his regime.

15. Western Europe 1950s and 1960s

Fronts within fronts

At the British Labour Party conference in 1960, Michael Foot, the party's future leader and a member of its left-wing, was accused of being a "fellow traveller" by then-leader Hugh Gaitskell. Foot responded with a reference to Gaitskell and others of the party's right wing: "But who," he asked, "are they travelling with?"¹

They, it turned out, had been travelling with the CIA for some years; fellow passengers were Frenchmen, Germans, Dutch, Italians, and a host of other West Europeans; all taking part in a CIA operation to win the hearts and minds of liberals, social democrats, and assorted socialists, to keep them from the clutches of the Russian bear.

It was an undertaking of major proportions. For some 20 years, the Agency used dozens of American foundations, charitable trusts and the like, including a

few of its own creation, as conduits for payments to all manner of organizations in the United States and abroad, many of which, in turn, funded other groups. So numerous were the institutions involved, so many were the interconnections and overlaps, that it is unlikely that anyone at the CIA had a grasp of the full picture, let alone exercised broad control over it or proper accounting. (See Appendix I for a partial organizational chart.)

The ultimate beneficiaries of this flow of cash were political parties, magazines, news agencies, journalists' unions, other unions and labour organizations, student and youth groups, lawyers' associations, and any other enterprises already committed to "The Free World" which could be counted upon to spread the gospel further if provided with sufficient funding.

The principal front organization set up by the CIA in this period was the grandly-named Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF). In June 1950, prominent literati and scientists of the United States and Europe assembled in the Titiana Palace Theatre, in the US Zone of Berlin, before a large audience to launch the organization whose purpose was to "defend freedom and democracy against the new tyranny sweeping the world".² The CCF was soon reaching out in all directions with seminars, conferences and a wide programme of political and cultural activities in Western Europe as well as India, Australia, Japan, Africa and elsewhere. It had, moreover, some 20 periodicals under its financial wing, including *Socialist Commentary*, *Censorship, Survey* (a Soviet affairs quarterly), and *Encounter* in Great Britain (the last appearing also in Spanish and German editions), *Der Monat* in Germany, *Preuves* and *The China Quarterly* in Paris, *Forum* in Vienna, *Tempo Presente* in Rome, and *Vision* in Switzerland, as well as *The New Leader*, *Africa Report*, and *Atlas* in New York, *Thought* and *Quest* in India, and *El Mundo Nuevo* in Latin America³ — well-written, political and intellectual magazines which, in the words of former CIA executive Ray Cline, "would not have been able to survive financially without CIA funds".⁴

Amongst the other media-related organizations subsidized by the CIA in Europe at this time were the West German news agency DENA (later known as DPA),⁵ the international association of writers PEN, located in Paris, certain French newspapers,⁶ the International Federation of Journalists, and Forum World Features, a news feature service in London whose stories were bought by some 140 newspapers around the world, including about 30 in the United States, amongst which were the *Washington Post* and four other major dailies. The Church committee of the US Senate reported that "major U.S. dailies" which took the service were informed that Forum World Features was "CIA-controlled". *The Guardian* and *The Sunday Times* of Great Britain also used the service which earlier had been called Forum Service. By 1967, according to one of Forum's leading writers, the news service had become perhaps "the principal CIA media effort in the world", no small accomplishment when one considers that the CIA, in its heyday, was devoting a reported 29 percent of its budget to media and propaganda.⁷

Another important recipient of CIA beneficence was Axel Springer, the West German press baron who was secretly funnelled about \$7 million in the

early 1950s to help him build up his vast media empire. Springer, until he died in 1985, was the head of the largest publishing conglomerate in Western Europe, one which still stands as a tower of pro-Western and anti-Communist sentiment. The publisher of the influential weekly *Der Spiegel*, Rudolph Augstein, has observed: "No single man in Germany, before or after Hitler, with the possible exception of Bismarck or the two emperors, has had so much power as Springer." His relationship with the CIA reportedly continued until at least the early 1970s.⁸

The originator of the American programme, the head of the CIA's International Organizations Division, Tom Braden, has said that the Agency placed one agent in the CCF and that another became an editor of *Encounter*;⁹ presumably there was at least one CIA agent or officer in each of the funded groups. Braden states that "The agents could . . . propose anti-Communist programs to the official leaders of the organizations." He adds that it was a policy to "protect the integrity of the organization by not requiring it to support every aspect of official American policy."¹⁰

The Cultural Freedom journals appealed to the non-Marxist left (Forum, by contrast, was conservative), generally eschewing the class struggle and excessive nationalization of industry. They were proponents of Daniel Bell's "the end of ideology", the *raison d'être* of which was that since no one could call for dying for capitalism with a straight face, the idea of dying for socialism had to be discredited. At the same time, the journals advocated a reformed capitalism, a capitalism with a human face.

To the cold warriors in Washington who were paying the bills, however, the idea of reforming capitalism was of minimal interest. What was of consequence was the commitment of the magazines to a strong, well-armed, and united Western Europe, allied to the United States, which would stand as a bulwark against the Soviet bloc; support for the Common Market; advancing the cause of NATO, accompanied by warnings of the growing danger of international communism; scepticism of the disarmament, pacifism, and neutralism espoused by the likes of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) in Great Britain. Criticism of US foreign policy took place within the framework of cold-war assumptions; for example, that a particular American intervention was not the most effective way of combatting communism, not that there was anything wrong with intervention *per se* or that the US was supporting the wrong side.

"Private" publications such as these could champion views which official US government organs like the Voice of America could not, and still be credible. The same was true of the many other private organizations on the CIA payroll at this time.

In 1960, CND and other elements of the Labour Party's left-wing succeeded in winning over the party's conference to a policy of complete, unilateral nuclear

disarmament and neutrality in the cold war. In addition, two resolutions supporting NATO were voted down. Although the Labour Party was not in power at the time, the actions carried considerable propaganda and psychological value. Washington viewed the turn of events with not a little anxiety, for such sentiments could easily spread to the major parties of other NATO countries.

The right-wing of the Labour Party, which had close, not to say intimate, connections to the Congress for Cultural Freedom, *Encounter*, *New Leader*, and other CIA fronts, undertook a campaign to reverse the disarmament resolution. The committee set up for the purpose issued an appeal for funds, and soon could report that many small donations had been received, together with a large sum from a source that wished to remain anonymous. Over the next year, there was sufficient funding for a permanent office, a full-time, paid chairman and paid staff, field workers, travelling expenses, tons of literature sent to a large mailing list within the movement, a regular bulletin sent free, etc.

Their opponents could not come close to matching this propaganda blitz. At the 1961 conference, the unilateralist and neutralist decisions were decisively overturned and the Labour Party returned to the NATO fold.¹¹

Supporters of the CIA have invariably defended the Agency's sundry activities in Western Europe on the grounds that the Russians were the first to be so engaged there and had to be countered. Whatever truth there may be in this assertion, the fact remains, as Tom Braden has noted, that the American effort spread to some fields "where they [the Russians] had not even begun to operate".¹² Braden doesn't specify which fields, but it seems that political parties was one: the CIA had working/financial relationships with leading members of the West German Social Democratic Party, two parties in Austria, the Christian Democrats of Italy, the Liberal Party, in addition to the Labour Party, in Britain,¹³ and probably at least one party in every other Western European country, all of which purported to be independent of either superpower, something the various Communist parties, whether supported by the Soviet Union or not, could never get away with.

The media provides another case in point. Neither Braden, nor anyone else apparently, has cited examples of publications or news agencies in Western Europe — pro-Communist or anti-Nato, etc. — which, ostensibly independent, were covertly funded by the Soviet Union.

More importantly, it should be borne in mind that all the different types of enterprises and institutions supported by the CIA in Western Europe have been supported by the Agency all over the Third World for decades on a *routine* basis without a Russian counterpart in sight. The growing strength of the left in post-war Europe was motivation enough for the CIA to develop its covert programmes, and this was a circumstance deriving from World War II and the economic facts of life, not from Soviet propaganda and manipulation.

16. British Guiana 1953-1964

The CIA's international labour mafia

For a period of eleven years, two of the oldest democracies in the world, Great Britain and the United States, went to great lengths to prevent a democratically elected leader from occupying his office.

The man was Dr Cheddi Jagan. The grandson of indentured immigrants from India, Jagan had become a dentist in the United States, then returned to his native Guiana. In 1953, at the age of 35, he and the People's Progressive Party (PPP) were elected by a large majority to head the government of the British colony. Jagan's victory was due in part to the fact that Indians comprised about 46 percent of the population; those of African origin made up about 36 percent.

The PPP's programme in office was hardly revolutionary. It encouraged foreign investment in the mining sectors and attempted to institute liberal reforms such as strengthening the rights of unionists and tenant farmers, and removing a ban on the import of "undesirable" publications, films and records. But the British Conservative government was not prepared to live with a man who talked suspiciously like a socialist. The government and the British media subjected the Jagan administration to a campaign of red-scare accusations and plain lies in the fashion of Senator McCarthy whose -ism was then all the rage in the United States.

Four-and-a-half months after Jagan took office, the government of Winston Churchill flung him out. The British sent naval and army forces, suspended the constitution and removed the entire Guianese government. At the same time, they drew up some papers which the Queen signed, so it was all nice and legal.¹

"Her Majesty's Government," said the British Colonial Secretary during a debate in Parliament, "are not prepared to tolerate the setting up of Communist states in the British Commonwealth."²

The American attitude toward this slap in the face of democracy can be surmised by the refusal of the US government to allow Jagan to pass in transit through the United States when he tried to book a flight to London to attend the parliamentary debate. According to Jagan, Pan Am would not even sell him a ticket.³ (Pan Am has a long history of collaboration with the CIA, a practice initiated by the airline's president, Juan Trippe, the son-in-law of Roosevelt's Secretary of State, Edward R. Stettinius.)

By this time the CIA had already got its foot in the door of the British Guiana labour movement, by means of the marriage of the Agency to the American

Federation of Labor in the United States. One of the early offshoots of this union was the Inter-American Regional Labor Organization (ORIT from the Spanish). In 1953, ORIT was instrumental in the conversion of the leading confederation of unions in Guiana, the Trades Union Council, from a militant labour organization to a vehicle of anti-communism.⁴ This was to have serious repercussions for Jagan in later years.

In 1957, Jagan, running on a programme similar to that of four years earlier, won the election again. This time the British deemed it wiser to employ more subtle methods for his removal and the CIA was brought into the picture, one of the rare instances in which the Agency has been officially allowed to operate in a British bailiwick. The CIA has done so, unofficially, on numerous occasions, to the displeasure of British authorities.

The CIA set to work to strengthen those unions which already tended somewhat toward support of Jagan's leading political opponent, Forbes Burnham of the African Party. One of the most important of these was the civil servants' union, dominated by blacks.

Consequently, the CIA turned to Public Services International (PSI) in London, an international trade union secretariat for government employees, one of the international networks which exist to export the union know-how of advanced industrial countries to less-developed countries.

According to a study undertaken by *The Sunday Times* (London), by 1958 the PSI's "finances were low, and its stocks were low with its own parent body, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. It needed a success of some kind. The financial crisis was resolved, quite suddenly, by the PSI's main American affiliate union, the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME)." Its boss, Dr Arnold Zander, told the PSI executive that he had "been shopping" and had found a donor.

"The spoils were modest at first — only a couple of thousand pounds in 1958. It was, the kind donor had said, for Latin America. The money went towards a PSI 'recruiting drive' in the northern countries of Latin America by one William J. Doherty, Jr., a man with some previous acquaintance of the CIA." (Doherty was later to become the Executive Director of the American Institute of Free Labor Development, the CIA's principal labour organization in Latin America.)

"The donor was presumably pleased, because next year, 1959, Zander was able to tell the PSI that his union was opening a full-time Latin American section in the PSI's behalf. The PSI was charmed."

The PSI's representative, said Zander, would be William Howard McCabe (a CIA labour apprentice).

MCCabe, a stocky, bullet-headed American, appeared to have no previous union history, but the PSI liked him. When he came to its meetings, he distributed cigarette lighters and photographs of himself doling out food parcels to the peasants. The lighters and the parcels were both inscribed 'with the compliments of the PSI'.⁵

In 1967, in the wake of numerous revelations about CIA covert financing,

the new head of AFSCME admitted that the union had been heavily funded by the Agency until 1964 through a foundation conduit. It was revealed that AFSCME's International Affairs Department, which had been responsible for the British Guiana operation, had actually been run by two CIA "aides".⁶

CIA work within Third World unions typically involves a considerable educational effort, the basic premise of which is that all solutions will come to working people under a system of free enterprise, class co-operation and collective bargaining, and by opposing communism in collaboration with management and government, unless, of course, the government, as in this case, is itself "communist". The most promising students, those perhaps marked as future leaders, are singled out to be sent to CIA schools in the United States for further education.

The CIA, said *The Sunday Times*, also "appears to have had a good deal of success in encouraging politicians to break away from Jagan's party and government. Their technique of financing sympathetic figures was to take out heavy insurance policies for them."⁷

During the 1961 election campaign, the CIA's ongoing programme was augmented by ad hoc operations from other American quarters. The US Information Service took the most unusual step of showing its films, depicting the evils of Castroism and communism, on street corners of British Guiana. And the Christian Anti-Communist Crusade brought its travelling road show down and spent a reported \$76,000 on electoral propaganda which lived up to the organization's name.⁸ One historian has described this as "a questionable activity for a private organization, which the State Department did nothing to discourage".⁹ On the other hand, the activities of US government agencies in British Guiana were no less questionable.

Despite the orchestrated campaign directed against him, Jagan was re-elected by a comfortable majority of legislative seats, though with only a plurality of the popular vote.

A month later, at his request, Jagan was received at the White House in Washington. He had come to talk about assistance for his development programme. President Kennedy and his advisers, however, were interested in determining where Jagan stood on the political spectrum before granting any aid. Oddly, the "interview", as described by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. who was present, seemed to be conducted as if the Kennedy men were totally unaware of American destabilization activities in British Guiana.

To Jagan's expressed esteem for the politics of British Labour leader Aneurin Bevan, those in the room "all responded agreeably".

To Jagan's professed socialism, Kennedy asserted that "We are not engaged in a crusade to force private enterprise on parts of the world where it is not relevant."

But when Jagan, perhaps naively, mentioned his admiration for the scholarly, leftist journal, *Monthly Review*, he crossed an ideological line which silently and effectively sealed his country's fate.¹⁰

No economic aid was given to British Guiana while Jagan remained in power, and the Kennedy administration pressured the British to delay granting

the country's independence, which had been scheduled to occur within the next year or two.¹¹ Not until 1966, when Jagan no longer held office, did British Guiana become the independent nation of Guyana.

In February 1962, the CIA helped to organize and finance anti-Jagan protests which used the newly announced budget as a pretext. The resulting strikes, riots and arson were wholly out of proportion to the alleged instigation. A Commonwealth Commission of Enquiry later concluded (perhaps to the discomfort of the British Colonial Office which had appointed it) that:

There is very little doubt that, despite the loud protestations of the trades union leaders to the contrary, political affinities and aspirations played a large part in shaping their policy and formulating their programme of offering resistance to the budget and making a determined effort to change the government in office.¹²

The CIA arranged, as it has on so many similar occasions, for North American and Latin American labour organizations, with which it had close ties, to support the strikers with messages of solidarity and food, thus enhancing the appearance of a genuine labour struggle.¹³

The centrepiece of the CIA's programme in British Guiana was the general strike (so called, although its support was considerably less than total) which began in April 1963. It lasted for 80 days, the longest general strike in history it is said.¹⁴

This strike, as in 1962, was called by the Trades Union Council (TUC) which, as we have seen, was a member in good standing of the CIA's international labour mafia. The head of the TUC was one Richard Ishmael who had been trained in the US at the CIA's American Institute of Free Labor Development along with other Guianese labour officials.

The strike period was marked by repeated acts of violence and provocation, including attacks on Jagan's wife and some of his ministers. Ishmael himself was later cited in a secret British police report as having been part of a terrorist group which had carried out bombings and arson attacks against government buildings during the strike.¹⁵

No action was taken against Ishmael and others in this group by British authorities who missed no opportunity to exacerbate the explosive situation, hoping that it would culminate in Jagan's downfall.

Meanwhile, CIA agents were giving "advice to local union leaders on how to organize and sustain" the strike, the *New York Times* subsequently reported. "They also provided funds and food supplies to keep the strikers going and medical supplies for pro-Burnham workers injured in the turmoil. At one point, one of the agents even served as a member of a bargaining committee from a Guiana dike workers union that was negotiating with Dr. Jagan." This agent was later denounced by Jagan and forbidden to enter the country.¹⁶ This is probably a reference to Gene Meakins, one of the CIA's main labour operatives, who had been serving as public relations advisor and education officer to the TUC. Meakins edited a weekly paper and broadcast a daily radio programme by means of which he was able to generate a great deal of anti-Jagan propaganda.¹⁷

The *Sunday Times* study concluded that:

Jagan seems to have thought that the unions could hold out a month. But McCabe was providing the bulk of the strike pay, plus money for distress funds, for the strikers' daily 15 minutes on the radio and their propaganda, and considerable travelling expenses. All over the world, it seemed brother unions were clubbing together.

The mediator sent from London, Robert Willis, the general secretary of the London Typographical Society and a man not noted for his mercy in bargaining with newspaper managements was shocked. 'It was rapidly clear to me that the strike was wholly political', he said. 'Jagan was giving in to everything the strikers wanted, but as soon as he did they erected more demands'.¹⁸

Financial support for the strike alone, channelled through the PSI and other labour organizations by the CIA, reached the sum of at least one million dollars.

American oil companies provided a further example of the multitude of resources the US can bring to bear upon a given target. The companies cooperated with the strikers by refusing to provide petroleum, forcing Jagan to appeal to Cuba for oil. During Jagan's remaining year in office, in the face of a general US economic embargo, he turned increasingly to the Soviet bloc. This practice of course provided ammunition to those critics of Jagan in British Guiana, the United States and Great Britain who insisted that he was a communist and thus fraught with all the dangers that communists are fraught with.

The strike was maintained primarily by black supporters of Forbes Burnham and by employers who locked out many of Jagan's Indian supporters. This inevitably exacerbated the already-existing racial tensions, although *The Sunday Times* asserted that the "racial split was fairly amicable until the 1963 strike divided the country". Eventually, the tension broke out into bloodshed leaving hundreds dead and wounded and "a legacy of racial bitterness".¹⁹

Jagan was certainly aware, to some extent at least, of what was transpiring around him during the general strike. After it was over he charged that:

The United States, in spite of protestations to the contrary by some of its leaders, is not prepared to permit a Socialist government or a government committed to drastic and basic reforms to exist in this hemisphere, even when this government has been freely elected . . . It is all too clear that the United States will only support a democratic government if it favors a classic private enterprise system.²⁰

In an attempt to surmount the hurdle of US obsession with the Soviet Union and "another Cuba in the western hemisphere", Jagan proposed that British Guiana be "neutralized" by an agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, as the two powers had done in the case of Austria. Officials in Washington had no comment on the suggestion.²¹

Cheddi Jagan's government managed to survive all the provocations and humiliations. With elections on the agenda for 1964, the British and their American cousins turned once again to the gentlemanly way of the pen.

The British Colonial Secretary, Duncan Sandys, who had been a leading party to the British-CIA agreement, cited the strike and general unrest as proof that Jagan could not run the country or offer the stability that the British government required for British Guiana to be granted its independence. (Sandys was the founder, in 1948, of the European Movement, a CIA-funded cold-war organization.)²²

This was, of course, a contrived position. Syndicated American columnist Drew Pearson, writing about the meeting between President Kennedy and British Prime Minister Macmillan in the summer of 1963, stated that "the main thing they agreed on was that the British would refuse to grant independence to Guiana because of a general strike against pro-Communist Prime Minister, Cheddi Jagan. That strike was secretly inspired by a combination of U.S. Central Intelligence money and British intelligence. It gave London the excuse it wanted."²³

The excuse was used further to justify an amendment to the British Guiana constitution providing for a system of proportional representation in the election, a system that appeared certain to convert Jagan's majority of legislative seats into a plurality. Subsequently, the British-appointed Governor of British Guiana announced that he would not be bound to call on the leader of the largest party to form a government if it did not have a majority of seats, a procedure in striking contrast to that followed in Great Britain.

When, in October 1964, the Labour Party succeeded the Conservative Party to power in Great Britain, Jagan had hopes that the conspiracy directed against him would be squashed, for several high-ranking Labour leaders had stated publicly, and to Jagan personally, their opposition to the underhanded and anti-democratic policy of their Conservative Party foes. Within days of taking office, however, the Labour Party dashed these hopes.²⁴ "Bowing to United States wishes," the *New York Times* disclosed, the Labour Party "ruled out early independence for British Guiana" and was going ahead with the proportional representation elections. Secretary of State Dean Rusk, it was reported, had left the new British Foreign Secretary, Gordon Walker, "in no doubt that the United States would resist a rise of British Guiana as an independent Castro-type state."²⁵ On a previous occasion, Rusk had urged Walker's Conservative predecessor, Lord Home, to suspend the British Guiana constitution again and "revert to direct colonial government".²⁶

The intensive American lobbying effort against British Guiana (the actual campaign of subversion aside), led Conservative MP and former Colonial Secretary, Iain Macleod, to observe in the House of Commons: "There is an irony which we all recognize in the fact of America urging us all over the world towards colonial freedom except when it approaches her own doorstep."²⁷

The day before the election of 7 December, a letter appeared in a British Guiana newspaper — a bogus pro-Communist letter, a tactic the CIA has used successfully the world over. The letter was purportedly written by Jagan's wife Janet to Communist Party members, in which she stated: "We can take comfort in the thought that the PNC [Burnham's party] will not be able to stay in power long . . . our communist comrades abroad will continue to help us win eventual total victory."²⁸

Ms Jagan quickly retorted that she would not be so stupid as to write a letter like that, but, as in all such cases, the disclaimer trailed weakly and too late behind the accusation.²⁸

As expected, Jagan won only a plurality of the legislative seats, 24 of 53. The Governor then called upon Forbes Burnham, who had come in second, to form a new government. Burnham had also been named as a terrorist in the British police report referred to earlier, as had several of his new government ministers.

Jagan refused to resign. British Army troops were put on full alert in the capital city of Georgetown. A week later, Her Majesty's Government waved its hand over a piece of paper, thereby enacting another amendment to the British Guiana constitution and closing a loophole which was allowing Jagan to stall for time. He finally surrendered to the inevitable.²⁹

17. Soviet Union late 1940s to 1960s From spy planes to book publishing

Information . . . hundreds of young Americans and émigré Russians gave their lives so that the United States could amass as much information as possible about the Soviet Union . . . almost any information at all about the land Churchill had described as "a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma".

There is no evidence, however, that any of the information collected ever saved any lives, or served any other useful purpose for the world. Today, tons of files stuffed with reports, volumes of computer printouts, tapes, photographs, etc., lie in filing cabinets, gathering dust in warehouses in the United States and West Germany. Probably a good part of the material has already been burnt. Much of it has never been looked at, and never will be.

Beginning in the late 1940s, the US military, the CIA and the National Security Agency regularly sent aircraft along the borders of the Soviet Union to collect visual, photographic and electronic data of a military or industrial nature, particularly to do with Soviet missile and nuclear capability. The increasingly sophisticated planes and equipment, as well as satellites, submarines, and electronic listening posts in Turkey and Iran, produced vast amounts of computer input. At times, the planes would unintentionally drift over Soviet territory. At other times, they would do so intentionally in order to photograph a particular target, or to activate radar installations so as to capture their signals, or to evaluate the reaction of Soviet ground defences against an attack. It was a dangerous game of aerial "chicken" and on many occasions the planes were met by anti-aircraft fire or Soviet fighter planes.

In 1950 and 1951, two espionage airplanes, each with a crew of 10, were shot down, with no survivors. In 1969, a crew of 31 was lost, this time to North Korean fighters over the Sea of Japan. During the intervening years, there were dozens of air incidents involving American aircraft and Communist firepower, arising from hundreds, if not thousands, of espionage flights. Some of the spy planes made it safely back to base (which might be Turkey, Iran, Greece, Pakistan, Japan or Norway) after being attacked, and even hit; others were downed with loss of life or with crew members captured by the Soviets.¹ To this day, there are at least 20 of these men still held prisoner in the Soviet Union.²

The most notable of these incidents was of course the downing of the U-2 piloted by Francis Gary Powers on 1 May 1960. The ultra high-flying U-2 had been developed because of the vulnerability to being shot down of planes flying at normal altitudes. The disappearance of Powers and his U-2 somewhere in the Soviet Union ensnared the United States government publicly in an entanglement of a false cover story, denials, and amendments to denials. Finally, when the Russians presented Powers and his plane to the world, President Eisenhower had no alternative but to admit the truth. He pointedly added, however, that flights such as the U-2's were "distasteful but vital", given the Russian "fetish of secrecy and concealment".³ One of Eisenhower's advisers, Emmet John Hughes, was later to observe that it thus took the administration only six days "to transform an unthinkable falsehood into a sovereign right".⁴

Over the years, the Soviet Union had lodged numerous complaints about the overflights, both to the United States and the United Nations (as had other East European nations, and even Austria and Switzerland, about flights over their own territories), and many of these had been reported in the US press, but this incident marked the first official American confirmation that the government engaged in air espionage; the first time, it has been said, that the American government had admitted to any kind of spying since the case of Nathan Hale in 1776. The resulting embarrassment led to a discontinuation of U-2 flights over the USSR, but not of other spy planes. Such are the niceties and logic of international politics.

The United States, on the other hand, had protested to the Soviet Union on several occasions about Soviet attacks on American planes which were not actually over Soviet territory, but over the Sea of Japan for example. Though engaged in espionage, such flights, strictly speaking, appear to be acceptable under international law.

The most serious repercussion of the whole U-2 affair was that it doomed to failure the Eisenhower-Khrushchev summit meeting which took place two weeks later in Paris, and upon which so much hope for peace and detente had been placed by people all over the world.

Was the U-2 affair the unfortunate accident of timing that history has made it out to be? Col. L. Fletcher Prouty, US Air Force, Ret. suggests otherwise. From 1955 to 1963, Prouty served as the liaison between the CIA and the Pentagon on matters concerning military support of "special operations".⁵ In his book, *The Secret Team*, Prouty suggests that the CIA and certain of the

Agency's colleagues in the Pentagon sabotaged this particular U-2 flight, the last one scheduled before the summit. They did this, presumably, because they did not relish a lessening of cold-war tensions, their *raison d'être*.

The method employed, Prouty surmises, was remarkably simple. The U-2's engine needed infusions of liquid hydrogen to maintain the plane's incredible altitude which placed it outside the range of Soviet firepower and interceptor aircraft. If the hydrogen container were only partly filled upon takeoff from Turkey, it would be simply a matter of time — calculable to coincide with the plane being over Soviet territory — before the U-2 was forced to descend to a lower altitude. At this point, whether the plane was shot down or Powers bailed out, allowing it to crash, is not certain. The Soviet Union claimed that it had shot down the U-2 at its normal high altitude with a rocket, but this was probably a falsehood arising from four years of frustrating failure to shoot a single U-2 from the sky. In any event, the Russians were able to present to the world a partially intact spy plane along with a fully intact spy pilot, complete with all manner of incriminating papers on him, and an unused suicide needle. The presence of identification papers was no oversight, says Prouty: deliberately, "neither pilot nor plane were sanitized on this flight as was required on other flights".⁶

In light of the furor raised by the shooting down of a South Korean commercial airliner by the Soviet Union in 1983, which the Russians claimed was spying, it is interesting to note that Prouty also makes mention of the United States at one time using "a seemingly clean national commercial airline" of an unspecified foreign country "to do some camera spying or other clandestine project".⁶

To the Russians, the spy planes were more than simply a violation of their air space, and they rejected the notion put forth by the US that the flights were just another form of espionage ("intelligence collection activities are practiced by all countries").⁷ The Russians stated that they viewed the flights as particularly provocative because airplanes are a means of conducting warfare, they can be considered as the beginning of hostilities, and may even be carrying bombs. The Russians could not forget that the Nazis had preceded their invasion of the Soviet Union with frequent reconnaissance overflights. Neither could they forget that in April 1958, US planes carrying nuclear bombs had flown over the Arctic in the direction of the USSR due to a false warning signal on American radar. The planes were called back when only two hours flying time separated them from the Soviet Union.⁹

No American plane dropped bombs on the Soviet Union but many of them dropped men assigned to carry out hostile missions. The men who fell from the

* At the time of the U-2 affair in 1960, the *New York Times* reported that, according to informed sources, there had been no indication of Soviet flights over the continental United States. Whether any such flights had been made over Alaska was not mentioned.⁸

sky were Russians who had emigrated to the West where they were recruited by the CIA and other Western intelligence organizations.

The leading émigré organization was known as National Alliance of Russian Solidarists, or the National Union of Labor (NTS). It was largely composed of two distinct groups of émigrés: the sons of the Russians who had gone to the West following the revolution, and those Russians who wound up in Western Europe at the close of the Second World War after the Germans had occupied their town or taken them prisoner. Both groups had collaborated with the Nazis during the war. Although NTS was generally classified in the right-wing of the various émigré organizations, the collaboration had been motivated more by anti-Stalinism than by pro-Nazi sentiments.

NTS was based primarily in West Germany where, throughout the 1950s, the CIA was the organization's chief benefactor, often its sole support. At a CIA school set up in Bad Hamburg, under the imposing name of the Institute for the Study of the USSR, as well as at schools in Great Britain and the United States, the Agency provided NTS members with extensive training before airdropping them into Soviet territory; the men landed on their native soil elaborately equipped, with everything from weapons to collapsible bicycles, frogmen suits, and rubber mats for crossing electrically-charged barbed-wire fences.

The Russians were returned to their homeland for a variety of reasons: to gather intelligence about military and technological installations; to commit assassinations; obtain current samples of identification documents; assist Western agents to escape; engage in sabotage, for which they were well-trained (methods of derailing trains and wrecking bridges, actions against arms factories and power plants, etc.); set up spy rings or instigate armed political struggle against Communist rule by linking up with supposed "resistance movements" — a wholly unrealistic goal, but one which some NTS fanatics swore by.

It will never be known just how many men the CIA infiltrated into the Soviet Union, not only by air but by border crossings and by boat as well; many hundreds at least. As to their fate . . . the Soviet Union published a book in 1961 called *Caught in the Act* (= CIA), in which were published the names and other details of about two dozen infiltrators the Soviet Union claimed to have captured, often almost immediately upon landing; some were executed, others received prison sentences. The book asserts that there were many more caught who were not listed. This may have been a self-serving statement, although it was a relatively simple matter for the Russians to infiltrate the émigrés' ranks and learn the entire operation.

The Russians claimed that some of those smuggled in were furnished with special radio beacons to guide planes where to land other agents, and which could also be used to direct US bombers in the event of war; one of the captured émigrés, the book said, was an individual who had taken part in a mass execution of Jews in German-occupied Soviet territory.

Some of the émigrés made it back to Western Europe with their bits and pieces of information, or after attempting to carry out some other assignment;

others, provided with a complete set of necessary documents, were instructed to integrate themselves back into Soviet society and become "agents in place"; still others, caught up in the emotions of being "home", turned themselves in (once again, "the human factor", which no amount of training or indoctrination can get around); the Soviet government made this choice easier by announcing, in January 1960, an amendment to the criminal code which read:

A citizen of the U.S.S.R. enlisted by a foreign intelligence service to conduct hostile activities against the U.S.S.R. shall not be liable to criminal prosecution if he has committed no acts in pursuance of the criminal assignment given to him and has voluntarily reported to the authorities about his connections with a foreign intelligence service.¹⁰

No American operation against the Soviet Union would be complete without its propaganda side: bringing the gospel to the heathen, in a myriad of ways that displayed the creativity of the CIA and its team of émigrés.

Novel mechanisms were developed to enable airplanes and balloons to drop anti-Communist literature over the Soviet Union. When the wind was right, countless leaflets and pamphlets were scattered across the land; or quantities of literature were floated downstream in waterproof packages.

Soviet citizens coming to the West were met at every turn by NTS people handing out their newspapers and magazines in Russian and Ukrainian. (To facilitate contact, NTS at times engaged in black market operations and opened small shops which catered to Russians at cheap prices.) From North Africa to Scandinavia, the CIA network confronted Soviet seamen, tourists, officials, athletes, even Soviet soldiers in East Germany, to present them with the Truth as seen by the "Free World", as well as to pry information from them, to induce them to defect, or to recruit them as spies. Hotel rooms were searched, phones tapped, bribes offered, or blackmail threatened in attempts to reach these ends. Actions were also undertaken to entrap or provoke Soviet diplomatic personnel so as to cause their expulsion and/or embarrass the Soviet Union.¹¹

The propaganda offensive led the US government into the book publishing business. Under a variety of arrangements with American and foreign publishers, distributors, literary agents and authors, the CIA and the United States Information Agency produced, subsidized or sponsored "well over a thousand books" by 1967 which were deemed to serve a propaganda need.¹² Many of the books were sold in the United States as well as abroad. None bore any indication of US government involvement. Of some, said the USIA, "We control the things from the very idea down to the final edited manuscript."¹³ These were books "that would not otherwise be put out, especially those books with a strong anti-communist content."¹⁴

Other books were published, and at times written, only after the USIA or the CIA agreed to purchase a large number of copies. There is no way of determining what effect this financial incentive had upon a publisher or author concerning a book's tone and direction. In some cases, Washington released classified information to an author to assist him in writing the book.

In 1967, following revelations about CIA domestic activities, this practice purportedly came to an end in the US although it continued abroad. A Senate committee in 1976 stated that during the preceding few years, the CIA was connected with the publication of some 250 books, mostly in foreign languages.¹⁵ Undoubtedly, some of these were later reprinted in the United States.

The actual identity of most of the books, however, is still classified. Among those which have been revealed are: *The Dynamics of Soviet Society* by Walt Rostow, *The New Class* by Milovan Djilas, *Concise History of the Communist Party* by Robert A. Burton, *The Foreign Aid Programs of the Soviet Bloc and Communist China* by Kurt Muller, *In Pursuit of World Order* by Richard N. Gardner, *Peking and People's Wars* by Major General Sam Griffith, a parody of the quotations of Mao, entitled *Quotations from Chairman Liu*, *The Politics of Struggle: The Communist Front and Political Warfare* by James D. Atkinson, *From Colonialism to Communism* by Hoang Van Chi, *Why Vietnam?* by Frank Trager, and *Terror in Vietnam* by Jay Mallin. In addition, the CIA financed and distributed throughout the world the animated cartoon film of George Orwell's *Animal Farm*.¹⁶

The most pervasive propaganda penetration of the socialist bloc was by means of the airwaves: numerous transmitters, tremendous wattage, and often round-the-clock programming brought Radio Liberty and Radio Free Russia to the Soviet Union, Radio Free Europe and Radio in the American Sector to Eastern Europe, and the Voice of America to all parts of the world. With the exception of the last, the stations were ostensibly private organizations financed by "gifts" from American corporations, donations from the American public, and other private sources. In actuality, the CIA covertly funded almost all of the costs until 1971; exposure of the Agency's role in 1967 (although it had been widely assumed long before then) led to Congress eventually instituting open governmental financing of the stations.

The stations served the purpose of filling in some of the gaps and correcting the falsehoods of the Communist media, but presented a picture of the world, both East and West, shot through with their own omissions and distortions . . . "emphasizing whatever can make the puppet regimes look bad" is the way Sanche de Gramont, the Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist, described the programming . . . "to many in the CIA," wrote Victor Marchetti, former senior official of the Agency, "the primary value of the radios was to sow discontent in Eastern Europe and, in the process, to weaken the communist governments".¹⁷

The Russians claimed that Voice of America broadcasts to the Soviet Union were provocative and hostile, and grossly distorted Soviet foreign policy, but that this was not the case with Radio Moscow's broadcasts to the United States. This, said the Russians, constituted a violation of the agreement between the two countries that the broadcasts "were to promote friendly relations between both countries and ease international tension".¹⁸

Many of the Russians who worked for the various stations, which broadcast at length about freedom, democracy and other humanitarian concerns, were

later identified by the US Justice Department as members of Hitler's notorious *Einsatzgruppen* which rounded up and killed numerous Jews in the Soviet Union. One of these worthies was Stanislaw Stankevitch, under whose command a mass murder of Jews in Byelorussia was carried out in which babies were buried alive with the dead, presumably to save ammunition. Stankevitch wound up working for Radio Liberty. German war criminals as well were employed by the CIA in a variety of anti-Soviet operations.¹⁹

By every account, the sundry programmes to collect strategic information about the Soviet Union, particularly via infiltration into the country and encountering Soviet nationals in the West, were a singular flop. The information reported was usually trivial, spotty, garbled, or out-of-date. Worse, it was often embellished, if not out and out fraudulent. Many post-war émigrés in Western Europe made their living in the information business. It was their most saleable commodity. From a real or fictitious meeting with a Soviet citizen they would prepare a report which was often just ordinary facts with a bit of political colour added on. At times, as many as four versions of the report would be produced, differing in style and quantity of "facts"; written by four different people, the reports would then be sold separately to US, British, French and West German intelligence agencies. The CIA's version contained everything in the other three versions, which were eventually transmitted to the Agency by the other countries without their source being revealed. Analysis of all the reports tended to bring the CIA to the conclusion that the NTS was giving them the fullest picture of all, and that the information all tallied. NTS looked good, and the files grew thick.²⁰

The CIA's Russian files in Washington, meanwhile, approached mountainous proportions with the data acquired from opening mail between the Soviet Union and the United States, a practice begun in the early 1950s and continued at least into the 1970s.²¹ (Said a Post Office counsel in 1979: "if there was no national security mail cover program, the FBI might be inhibited in finding out if a nation was planning war against us.")²²

Former CIA officer Harry Rositzke, who was closely involved with anti-Soviet operations after the war, later wrote that the primary task of the émigrés infiltrated into the Soviet Union during the early years — and the same could probably be said of the overflights — was to provide "early warning" of a Soviet military offensive against the West, an invasion which, in the minds of cold-warriors in the American government, appeared "imminent". This apprehension was reminiscent of the alarms sounded following the Russian Revolution, and similarly flourished despite the fact of a Russia recently devastated by a major war and hardly in a position to undertake a military operation of any such magnitude. Nevertheless, wrote Rositzke, "It was officially estimated that Soviet forces were capable of reaching the English Channel in a matter of weeks . . . It was an axiom in Washington that Stalin was plotting war. When would it come?"²³ A secret report of the National Security Resources Board of January 1951 warned: "As things are now going, by 1953 if not 1952, the

Soviet aggressors will assume complete control of the world situation."²⁴

Rositzke, although a committed anti-Communist, recognized the unreality of such thinking. But, as he explained, his was a minority opinion in official Washington:

The facts available even at the time suggested the far greater likelihood that Moscow's postwar strategy, including the conversion of Eastern Europe into a western buffer, was basically defensive. I argued this thesis with some of the CIA analysts working on Soviet estimates and with some Pentagon audiences, but it was not a popular view at the time. It is nonetheless a simple fact that no scenario was written then, nor has it been written since, to explain why the Russians would want to conquer Western Europe by force or to bomb the United States. Neither action would have contributed in any tangible way to the Soviet national interest and would have hazarded the destruction of the Soviet state. This basic question was never raised, for the Cold War prism created in the minds of the diplomatic and military strategists a clear-cut world of black and white; there were no grays.²⁵

Several years were to pass, Rositzke pointed out, before it became clear to Washington that there were no warnings to report. This, however, had no noticeable effect upon the United States' military build-up or cold-war propaganda.

18. Italy 1950s to 1970s Supporting the Cardinal's orphans and techno-fascism

After the multifarious extravaganza staged by the United States in 1948 to exorcise the spectre of Communism that was haunting Italy, the CIA settled in place for the long haul with a less flamboyant but more insidious operation.

A White House memorandum, prepared after the 1953 election, reported that "Neither the Moscow war stick nor the American economic carrot was being visibly brandished over the voters in this election."¹ Covert funding was the name of the game. Victor Marchetti, former executive assistant to the Deputy Director of the CIA, has revealed that in the 1950s the Agency "spent some \$20 to \$30 million a year, or maybe more, to finance its programs in Italy." Expenditures in the 1960s, he added, came to about \$10 million annually.²

The CIA itself admits that between 1948 and 1968, it paid a total of \$65,150,000 to the Christian Democrats and other parties, to labour groups, and to a wide variety of other organizations in Italy.³ It also spent an undisclosed

amount in support of magazines and book publishers and other means of news and opinion manipulation, such as planting news items in non-American media around the world which cast unfavourable light upon Communism, then, arranging for these stories to be reprinted in friendly Italian publications.⁴

It is not known when, if ever, the CIA ended its practice of funding anti-Communist groups in Italy. Internal Agency documents of 1972 reveal contributions of some \$10 million to political parties, affiliated organizations, and 21 individual candidates in the parliamentary elections of that year;⁵ and in January 1976 it was disclosed that the CIA had funnelled at least \$6 million to political leaders in Italy during the previous month for the coming June elections. Moreover, the largest oil company in the United States, Exxon Corp., admitted that between 1963 and 1972 it had made political contributions to the Christian Democrats and several other Italian political parties totalling \$46 million to \$49 million. Mobil Oil Corp.'s contribution to the system, of free and open elections came to an average of \$500,000 a year from 1970 through 1973. There is no report that these corporate payments derived from persuasion by the CIA or the State Department, but it seems rather unlikely that the firms would engage so extravagantly in this unusual sideline with complete spontaneity.⁶

Much of the money given by the CIA to Italian political parties since World War II, said a former high-level US official, ended up "in villas, in vacation homes and in Swiss bank accounts for the politicians themselves".⁷

A more direct American intervention into the 1976 elections was in the form of propaganda. Inasmuch as political advertising is not allowed on Italian television, the US Ambassador to Switzerland, Nathaniel Davis, arranged for the purchase of large blocks of time on Monte Carlo TV to present a daily "news" commentary by the editorial staff of the Milan newspaper *Il Giornale Nuovo* which was closely associated to the CIA.* Davis also arranged for news items which had been placed in other newspapers by the Agency to be read on Monte Carlo TV and Swiss TV, both of which are received in Italy. The programmes were produced in Milan by Franklin J. Tonnini of the US Diplomatic Corps, and Michael Ledeen, a reporter on *Il Giornale Nuovo*.⁸ (Ledeen, an American, was later a consultant to the Reagan administration and a senior fellow at the conservative think-tank of Georgetown University in Washington, the Center for Strategic and International Studies.)

The relentless fight against the Italian Communist Party took some novel twists. One, in the 1950s, was the brainchild of American Ambassador Clare Booth Luce. The celebrated Ms. Luce (playwright and wife of *Time*

* It was this newspaper that, in May 1981, set in motion that particular piece of international disinformation known as "The KGB Plot to Kill the Pope". The *Daily American* of Rome, for decades the leading English-language newspaper of Italy, has been reported by the leftist press to have (had) equally close ties to the Agency.

magazine publisher Henry Luce) decided to make it known that no US Department of Defense procurement contracts would be awarded to Italian firms whose employees had voted to be represented by the Communist-controlled labour union. In the case of Fiat, this had dramatic results: the Communist union's share of the vote promptly fell from 60 percent to 38 percent.⁹

Then there was the case of Cardinal Giovanni Battista Montini, another beneficiary of CIA largesse. The payments made to him reveal something of the Agency's mechanistic thinking about why people become radicals. It seems that the good Cardinal was promoting orphanages in Italy during the 1950s and 1960s and, says Marchetti, "The thinking was that if such institutions were adequately supported, many young people would be able to live well there and so would not one day fall into Communist hands."¹⁰

In a 1974 interview, the former CIA executive also spoke of the training provided by the Agency to the Italian security services:

They are trained, for example, to confront disorders and student demonstrations, to prepare dossiers, to make the best possible use of bank data and tax returns of individual citizens, etc. In other words, to watch over the population of their country with the means offered by technology. This is what I call technofascism...¹¹

William Colby, later Director of the CIA, arrived in Italy in 1953 and devoted the next five years of his life to financing and advising centre/right organizations for the expressed purpose of inducing the Italian people to turn away from the leftist bloc, more specifically the Communist Party, and keep it from taking power in the 1958 elections. In his account of that period he justifies this programme on the grounds of supporting "democracy" or "centre democracy" and preventing Italy from becoming a Soviet satellite.

Colby perceived all virtue and truth to be bunched closely around the centre of the political spectrum, and the Italian Communist Party as an extremist organization committed to abolishing democracy and creating a society modelled after the (worst?) excesses of Stalinist Russia. He offers no evidence to support his conclusion about the Communists, presumably because he regards it as self-evident, as much to the reader as to himself. Neither, for that matter, does he explain what was this thing called "democracy" which he so cherishes and which the Communists were so eager to do away with.¹²

William Colby was a technocrat who carried out the orders of his "side" and mouthed the clichés of the party line without serious examination. When Oriana Fallaci, the Italian journalist, interviewed him in 1976, she remarked at the close of a frustrating conversation, "Had you been born on the other side of the barricade, you would have been a perfect Stalinist." To which, Colby replied: "I reject that statement. But... well... it might be. No, no. It might not."¹³

American policy makers dealing with Italy since Colby's time there have not suffered any less than he from hardening of the categories. Colby, after all, took pains to point out his *liberal* dealings. Yet, all these years, the Italian

Communist Party was proceeding along a path revisionist enough to make Lenin turn in his grave if he were in one. The path has been marked by billboards proclaiming the "democratic advance to socialism" and the "national road to socialism", the abandonment of "the dictatorship of the proletariat" and denunciation of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. The party has vaunted its "national" role as responsible opposition, participated in "the drive for productivity", affirmed its support for a multiparty system and for Italy remaining in the Common Market and in NATO, and has been second to none in its condemnation of any form of terrorism. It has been the principal political force in numerous city governments including Rome, Florence and Venice, without any noticeable return to barbarism, and has been a *de facto* participant in the running of the Italian state. (The Socialist Party, a prime target of the United States in the 1948 elections, has been a formal member of the government for much of the 1960s to the present.)

In the files of the State Department and the CIA lie any number of internal reports prepared by anonymous analysts testifying to the reality of the Communist Party's "historic compromise" and the evolution of its estrangement from the Soviet Union known as "eurocommunism".

In the face of this, however — in the face of everything — American policy has remained rooted in place, fixed in a time that is no longer, and probably never was; a policy that has had nothing to do with democracy (by whatever definition) and everything to do with the conviction that a Communist government in Italy would not be the supremely pliant cold-war partner that successive Christian Democrat regimes were for over three decades. It would not be enough for such a government to be independent of Moscow. The problem is that it would probably attempt to adopt the same position towards Washington.

19. Vietnam 1950 to 1973 The Hearts and Minds Circus

Contrary to repeated statements by Washington officials during the 1960s that the United States did not intervene in Vietnam until, and only because, "North Vietnam invaded South Vietnam" — variously designated as having occurred from the late 1950s to the early 1960s — the US was deeply and continually involved in that woeful land from the year 1950 onwards.

The initial, fateful step was the decision to make large-scale shipments of military equipment (tanks, transport planes, etc.) to the French in Vietnam in the spring and summer of 1950. In April, Secretary of State Dean Acheson had

told French officials that the United States government was set against France negotiating with their northern-based Vietnamese foes, the Vietminh¹ (also spelled Viet Minh or Viet-Minh; the name was short for League for the Independence of Vietnam, a broadly-based nationalist movement led by Communists). Washington was not particularly sympathetic to France's endeavour to regain control of its colony of 100 years* and had vacillated on the issue, but the rise to power of the Communists in China the previous autumn had tipped the scale in favour of supporting the French. To the Truman administration, the prospect of another Communist government in Asia was intolerable. There was a secondary consideration as well at the time: the need to persuade a reluctant France to support American plans to include Germany in West European defence organizations.

American bombers, military advisers and technicians by the hundreds were to follow; and over the next few years direct American military aid to the French war effort ran to about a billion dollars a year. By 1954, the authorized aid had reached the sum of \$1.4 billion and constituted 78% of the French budget for the war.³

The extensive written history of the American role in Indochina produced by the Defense Department, later to be known as "The Pentagon Papers", concluded that the decision to provide aid to France "directly involved" the United States in Vietnam and "set" the course for future American policy.⁴ There had been another path open. In 1945 and 1946, Vietminh leader Ho Chi Minh had written at least eight letters to President Truman and the State Department asking for America's help in winning Vietnamese independence from the French. He wrote that world peace was being endangered by French efforts to reconquer Indochina and he requested that the four powers (US, USSR, China and Great Britain) intervene in order to mediate a fair settlement, and bring the Indochinese issue before the United Nations.⁵ (This was a remarkable repeat of history. In 1919, following the First World War, Ho Chi Minh had appealed to US Secretary of State Robert Lansing for America's help in achieving basic civil liberties and an improvement in the living conditions for the colonial subjects of French Indochina. This plea, too, was ignored.)⁶

Despite the fact that Ho Chi Minh and his followers had worked closely with the American OSS (the forerunner of the CIA) during the recently-ended world war, while the French authorities in Indochina had collaborated with the Japanese, the United States failed to answer any of the letters, did not reveal that it had received them, and eventually sided with the French. In 1950, part of the publicly stated rationale for the American position was that Ho Chi Minh was not really a "genuine nationalist" but rather a tool of "international

* During World War II, the Japanese had displaced the French. Upon the defeat of Japan, the Vietminh took power in the north. The British occupied the south but soon turned it back to the French. Said French General Jean Leclerc in September 1945: "I didn't come back to Indochina to give Indochina back to the Indochinese."² Subsequently, the French emphasized that they were fighting for the "free world" against communism, a claim made in no small part to persuade the United States to increase its aid to them.

communism", a conclusion that could be reached only by deliberately ignoring the totality of his life's work. He and the Vietminh had, in fact, been long-time admirers of the United States. Ho was said to have a picture of George Washington and a copy of the American Declaration of Independence on his desk, and according to a former OSS officer Ho sought his advice on framing the Vietminh's own declaration of independence. The actual declaration of 1945 begins with the familiar "All men are created equal. They are endowed by their creator with certain unalienable rights, among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness."⁷ But it was the French who were to receive America's blessing. Ho Chi Minh was, after all, some kind of communist.

The United States viewed the French struggle in Vietnam and their own concurrent intervention in Korea as two links in the chain aimed at "containing" China. Washington was adamantly opposed to the French negotiating an end to the war which would leave the Vietminh in power, at least in the northern part of the country, and, at the same time, free the Chinese to concentrate exclusively on their Korean border. In 1952, the US exerted strong pressure upon France not to pursue peace feelers extended by the Vietminh, and a French delegation, scheduled to meet with Vietminh negotiators in Burma, was hastily recalled to Paris.

Bernard Fall, the renowned French scholar on Indochina, believed that the cancelled negotiations "could perhaps have brought about a cease-fire on a far more acceptable basis" for the French "than the one obtained two years later in the shadow of crushing military defeat".⁸

Subsequently, to keep the French from negotiating with the Vietminh, the United States used the threat of a cessation of their substantial economic and military aid.⁹ (This prompted a French newspaper to comment that "the Indochina War has become France's number one dollar-earning export".)¹⁰ In November 1953, the omnipresent CIA airline, CAT, helped the French air force airlift 16,000 men into a fortified base the French had established in a valley in the north called Dien Bien Phu. When the garrison was later surrounded and cut off by the Vietminh, CAT pilots, flying US Air Force C-119's, often through anti-aircraft fire, delivered supplies to the beleaguered French forces, in this their Waterloo.¹¹

By 1954, the *New York Times* could report that "The French Air Force is now almost entirely equipped with American planes."¹² The United States had also constructed a number of airfields, ports and highways in Indochina to facilitate the war effort, some of which American forces were to make use of in their later wars in that area.

In April 1954, when a French military defeat was apparent and negotiations at Geneva were scheduled, the National Security Council urged President Eisenhower "to inform Paris that French acquiescence in a Communist takeover of Indochina would bear on its status as one of the Big Three" and that "U.S. aid to France would automatically cease".¹³

A Council paper recommended that "It be U.S. policy to accept nothing short of a military victory in Indo-China" and that the "U.S. actively oppose any negotiated settlements in Indo-China at Geneva". The Council stated

further that, if necessary, the US should consider continuing the war without French participation.¹⁴

The Eisenhower administration had for some time very seriously considered committing American combat troops to Vietnam. Apparently this move was not made only because of uncertainty about Congressional approval and the refusal of other countries to send even a token force, as they had done in Korea, to remove the appearance of a purely American operation.¹⁵ "We are confronted by an unfortunate fact," lamented Secretary of State John Foster Dulles at a 1954 Cabinet meeting. "Most of the countries of the world do not share our view that Communist control of any government anywhere is in itself a danger and a threat."¹⁶

In May, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Arthur Radford, sent a memorandum to Defense Secretary Charles Wilson on "Studies With Respect to Possible U.S. Actions Regarding Indochina" which stated that "The employment of atomic weapons is contemplated in the event that such course appears militarily advantageous."¹⁷ (General Charles Willoughby, MacArthur's director of intelligence, put it a bit more poetically when he advocated the use of atomic bombs "to create a belt of scorched earth across the avenues of communism to block the Asiatic hordes".)¹⁸

By this time, two American aircraft carriers equipped with atomic weapons had been ordered into the Gulf of Tonkin, in the north of Vietnam,¹⁹ and Dulles is, in fact, reported to have offered his French counterpart, Georges Bidault, atomic bombs to save Dien Bien Phu. Bidault was obliged to point out to Dulles that the use of atomic bombs in a war of such close armed conflict would destroy the French troops as well as the Vietnam.²⁰

Dulles regularly denounced China, in the ultra-sanctimonious manner he was known for, for assisting the Vietnam, as if the Chinese had no cause or right to be alarmed about an anti-Communist military crusade taking place scant miles from their border. As the Geneva conference approached, a CIA propaganda team in Singapore began to disseminate fabricated news items to advance the idea that "the Chinese were giving full armed support to the Viet-Minh" and to "identify" the Viet-Minh "with the world Communist movement". The CIA believed that such stories would strengthen the non-Communist side at the Geneva talks.²¹

Joseph Burkholder Smith was a CIA officer in Singapore. His "press asset" was one Li Huan Li, an experienced local journalist. It is instructive to note the method employed in the creation of one such news report about the Chinese. After Smith and Li had made up their story, Li attended the regular press conference held by the British High Commissioner in Singapore, Malcolm MacDonald. At the conference, Li mentioned the report and asked the Commissioner if he had any comment. As expected, MacDonald had nothing to say about it one way or the other. The result was the following news item:

MORE CHINESE SUPPLIES AND TROOPS SPOTTED EN ROUTE TO HAIPHONG. At the press conference of the British High Commissioner for Southeast Asia today,

reports of the sightings of Chinese naval vessels and supply ships in the Tonkin Gulf en route from Hainan to Haiphong were again mentioned.

According to these reports, the most recent of many similar sightings occurred one week ago when a convoy of ten ships were spotted. Among them were two armed Chinese naval vessels indicating that the convoy consisted of troops as well as arms and supplies.

High Commissioner Malcolm MacDonald would not elaborate further about these reports.²²

The story was put on to a wire service in the morning, and by the evening had gone around the world, coming back to Singapore on the European relay to Asia.

The Geneva conference, on 20 July 1954, put a formal end to the war in Vietnam. The United States was alone in refusing to sign the Final Declaration, purely because it was peeved at the negotiated settlement which precluded any further military effort to defeat the Vietnam. There had been ample indication of American displeasure with the whole process well before the end of the conference. Two weeks earlier, for example, President Eisenhower had declared at a news conference: "I will not be a party to any treaty that makes anybody a slave; now that is all there is to it."²³ But the US did issue a "unilateral declaration" in which it agreed to "refrain from the threat or the use of force to disturb" the accords.²⁴

The letter and the spirit of the ceasefire agreement and the Final Declaration looked forward to a Vietnam free from any military presence other than Vietnamese or French, and free from any aggressive operations. While the conference was still in session in June, however, the United States began assembling a paramilitary team inside Vietnam. By August, only days after the close of the conference, the team was in place. Under the direction of CIA leading-light Edward Lansdale*, fresh from his success in the Philippines, a campaign of military and psychological warfare was carried out against the Vietnam. Over the next six months, this clandestine team executed such operations as the following:

- Encouraged the migration of Vietnamese from the north to the south through "an extremely intensive, well-coordinated, and, in terms of its objective, very successful . . . psychological warfare operation. Propaganda slogans and leaflets appealed to the devout Catholics with such themes as 'Christ has gone to the South' and the 'Virgin Mary has departed from the North'."²⁵
- Distributed other bogus leaflets, supposedly put out by the Vietnam, to instill trepidation in the minds of people in the north about how life would be under Communist rule. The following day, refugee registration to move south

* Lansdale's various activities in Vietnam were later enshrined in two semi-fictional works, *The Ugly American* and *The Quiet American*.

tripled. (The exodus of Vietnamese to the south during the "regrouping" period that followed the Geneva Accords was often cited by American officials in the 1960s, as well as earlier, as proof of the fact that the people did not want to live under communism. "They voted with their feet" was the catchphrase.) Still other: "Vietminh" leaflets were aimed at discouraging people in the south from returning to the north.

- Infiltrated paramilitary forces into the north under the guise of individuals choosing to live there.
- Contaminated the oil supply of the bus company in Hanoi so as to lead to a gradual wreckage of the bus engines.
- Took "the first actions for delayed sabotage of the railroad (which required teamwork with a CIA special technical team in Japan who performed their part brilliantly) . . ."
- Instigated a rumour campaign to stir up hatred of the Chinese, with the usual stories of rapes.
- Created and distributed an almanac of astrological predictions carefully designed to play on Vietnamese fears and superstitions and undermine life in the north while making the future of the south appear more attractive.
- Published and circulated anti-Communist articles and "news" reports in newspapers and leaflets.
- Attempted, unsuccessfully, to destroy the largest printing establishment in the north because it intended to remain in Hanoi and do business with the Vietminh.
- Laid some of the foundation for the future American war in Vietnam by: sending selected Vietnamese to US Pacific bases for guerrilla training; training the armed forces of the south who had fought with the French; creating various military support facilities in the Philippines; smuggling into Vietnam large quantities of arms and military equipment to be stored in hidden locations; developing plans for the "pacification of Vietminh and dissident areas".²⁶

At the same time, the United States began an economic boycott against the North Vietnamese and threatened to blacklist French firms which were doing business with them.²⁷

Another development during this period that had even more profound consequences for the coming tragedy was the cancellation of the elections that would have united north and south Vietnam as one nation.

The Geneva Accords specified that elections under international supervision were to be held in July 1956, with "consultations" to prepare for them to be held "from 20 July 1955 onwards". The United States, in its unilateral declaration, had reiterated this pledge: "In the case of nations now divided against their will, we shall continue to seek to achieve unity through free elections supervised by the United Nations to insure that they are conducted fairly."

The elections were never held. On 16 July 1955, four days before the consultations were scheduled to begin, President Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam issued a statement that made it clear that he had no intention of engaging in the consultations, much less the elections.²⁸ Three days later, North Vietnam sent Diem a formal note calling for the talks, but Diem remained firm in his position. Efforts by France and Great Britain to persuade Diem to begin the talks were to no avail.

The reason for Diem's intransigence is well known. He, like President Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles, knew that Ho Chi Minh would be a certain winner of any national elections. A CIA National Intelligence Estimate in the autumn concluded that the Diem regime (which Lansdale himself called "fascistic")²⁹ "almost certainly would not be able to defeat the communists in country-wide elections".³⁰ Later, Eisenhower was to write in his memoirs: "I have never talked or corresponded with a person knowledgeable in Indochinese affairs who did not agree that had elections been held as of the time of the fighting, possibly 80% of the population would have voted for the Communist Ho Chi Minh as their leader rather than Chief of State Bao Dai."³¹ (The latter was Diem's predecessor.)

The Pentagon study cited "State Department cables and National Security Council memorandums indicating that the Eisenhower Administration wished to postpone the elections as long as possible and communicated its feelings to Mr. Diem."³²

This was support that Diem could not have done without, for, as the Pentagon historians point out: "Without the threat of U.S. intervention, South Vietnam could not have refused to even discuss the elections called for in 1956 under the Geneva settlement without being immediately overrun by the Vietminh armies."³³

The public statements of Diem and Dulles spoke only of their concern that the elections would not be "free" — which served to obscure the fact that Ho Chi Minh did not need to resort to fraud in order to win — as well as ignoring the announcements of both the United Nations and the International Control Commission (set up in Vietnam by the Geneva Accords) that they were ready to supervise the elections.

In any event, Diem's commitment to free elections may be surmised from a referendum he held later in the year in South Vietnam, to invest his regime with a semblance of legality, in which he received 98.2% of the vote. *Life* magazine later reported that Diem's American advisers had told him that a 60% margin would be quite sufficient and would look better, "but Diem insisted on 98%".³⁴

With the elections cancelled, the nation still divided, and Diem with his "mandate" free to continue his heavy, tyrannical rule, the turn to violence in South Vietnam became inevitable.

As if in knowledge of and preparation for this, the United States sent 350 additional military men to Saigon in May 1956, an "example of the U.S. ignoring" the Geneva Accords, stated the Pentagon study.³⁵ Shortly afterwards, Dulles confided to a colleague: "We have a clean base there now, without a taint of colonialism. Dienbienphu was a blessing in disguise."³⁶

The Later Phase

"If you grab 'em by the balls, the hearts and minds will follow" . . . "Give us your hearts and minds or we'll burn down your goddam village" . . . the end result of America's anti-communist policy in Vietnam; also its beginning and its middle.

There was little serious effort to win the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese people, even less chance of success, for the price of success was social change, of the kind that Diem was unwilling to accept in Vietnam, the kind the United States has not been willing to accept anywhere in the Third World. If Washington had been willing to accept it, there would have been no need to cancel the elections, no need for intervention in the first place. There was, consequently, no way the United States could avoid being seen by the people of Vietnam as other than the newest imperialist occupiers, following in the footsteps of first the Chinese, then the French, then the Japanese, then the French again.

We will not go into a detailed recounting of all the horror, all the deceptions, the destruction of a society, the panorama of absurdities and ironies; only a selection, a montage . . . lest we forget.

To the men who walked the corridors of power in Washington, to the military men in the field, Indochina — nay, south-east Asia — was a single, large battlefield.

Troops of South Vietnam were used in Laos and Cambodia.

Troops of Thailand were used in Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam.

Thailand and the Philippines were used as bases from which to bomb the three countries of Indochina.

CIA-supported forces carried out incursions and invasions into China from Laos, Burma and Taiwan.

When there was a (much-publicized) pause in the bombing of North Vietnam, more American planes were thus available to increase the bombing of Laos.

And so it went.

From 1955 to 1959, Michigan State University (MSU), under a US Government contract, conducted a covert police training programme for the South Vietnamese. With the full knowledge of certain MSU officials, five CIA operatives were concealed in the staff of the programme and carried on the university's payroll as its employees. By the terms of a 1957 law, drawn up by the MSU group, every Vietnamese 15 years and older was required to register with the government and carry ID cards. Anyone caught without the proper identification was considered as a National Liberation Front (Vietcong) suspect and subject to imprisonment or worse. At the time of registration, a full set of fingerprints was obtained and information about the person's political beliefs was recorded.³⁷

When popular resistance to Ngo Dinh Diem reached the level where he was more of a liability than an asset he was sacrificed. On 1 November 1963, some of Diem's generals overthrew him and then murdered both him and his brother after they had surrendered. The coup, wrote *Time* magazine "was planned with the knowledge of Dean Rusk and Averill Harriman at the State Department, Robert S. McNamara and Roswell Gilpatrick at the Defense Department and the late Edward R. Murrow at the U.S. Information Agency."³⁸

Evidently Washington had not planned on assassinations accompanying the coup, but as General Maxwell Taylor, President Kennedy's principal military adviser, has observed: "The execution of a coup is not like organizing a tea party; it's a very dangerous business. So I didn't think we had any right to be surprised when — when Diem and his brother were murdered."³⁹

Donald Duncan was a member of the Green Berets in Vietnam. He has written about his training, part of which was called "countermeasures to hostile interrogation", ostensibly how Americans captured by Communists could deal with being tortured; translations of an alleged Soviet interrogation manual were handed out to the class. The manual described in detail such methods as the "Airplane Ride" (hanging by the thumbs), the Cold-Hot Water Treatment, and the lowering of a man's testicles into a jeweller's vise, while the instructor, a Sergeant Lacey, explained some variations of these methods. Then a student had a question:

"Sergeant Lacey, the name of this class is 'Countermeasures to Hostile Interrogation,' but you have spent most of the period telling us there are no countermeasures. If this is true, then the only reason for teaching them [the torture methods], it seems to me, is so that we'll know how to use them. Are you suggesting we use these methods?"

The class laughs, and Lacey looks down at the floor creating a dramatic pause. When he raises his head, his face is solemn but his deep set eyes are dancing. "We can't tell you that, Sergeant Harrison. The Mothers of America wouldn't approve." The class bursts into laughter at the sarcastic cynicism. "Furthermore," a conspiratorial wink, "we will deny that any such thing is taught or intended."⁴⁰

At the US Navy's schools in San Diego and Maine during the 1960s and 1970s, the course had a different name. There, the students were supposedly learning about methods of "survival, evasion, resistance and escape" which they could use as prisoners of war. There was in the course something of survival in a desert, where students were forced to eat lizards, but the naval officers and cadets were also subjected to beatings, jarring judo flips, "tiger cages" — hooded and placed in a 16-cubic-foot box for 22 hours with a coffee can for their extremity — and a torture device called the "water board": the subject strapped head down on to an inclined board, a towel placed over his face, and cold water poured over the towel; he would choke, gag, retch and gurgle as he experienced the sensation of drowning, just as was done to Vietcong prisoners in Vietnam, along with the tiger cages.

A former student, navy pilot Lt. Wendell Richard Young, claimed that his back was broken during the course and that students were tortured into spitting, urinating and defecating on the American flag, masturbating before guards, and, on one occasion, engaging in sex with an instructor.⁴¹

Fabrications were required to support the varied State Department claims about the nature of the war and the reasons for the American military actions. A former CIA officer, Philip Liechty, stated in 1982 that in the early 1960s he saw written plans to take large amounts of Communist-bloc arms, load them on a Vietnamese boat, fake a battle in which the boat would be sunk in shallow water, then call in Western reporters to see the captured weapons as proof of outside aid to the Vietcong. This is precisely what occurred in 1965. The State Department's "white paper", "Aggression From the North", which came out at the end of February 1965 relates that a "suspicious vessel" was "sunk in shallow water" off the coast of South Vietnam on 16 February 1965 after an attack by South Vietnamese forces. The boat was reported to contain at least 100 tons of military supplies "almost all of communist origin, largely from Communist China and Czechoslovakia as well as North Vietnam." The white paper noted that "Representatives of the free press visited the sunken North Vietnamese ship and viewed its cargo."

Liechty said that he had also seen documents involving an elaborate operation to print large numbers of postage stamps showing a Vietnamese shooting down a US Army helicopter. The former CIA officer stated that this was a highly professional job and that the very professionalism required to produce the multicolour stamps was meant to indicate that they were produced by the North Vietnamese because the Vietcong would not have had the capabilities. Liechty claimed that letters in Vietnamese were then written and mailed all over the world with the stamp on them "and the CIA made sure journalists would get hold of them". *Life* magazine, in its issue of 26 February 1965, did in fact feature a full colour blow-up of the stamp on its cover, referring to it as a "North Vietnam stamp". This was just two days before the State Department's white paper appeared.

In reporting Liechty's statements, the *Washington Post* noted:

Publication of the white paper turned out to be a key event in documenting the support of North Vietnam and other communist countries in the fighting in the South and in preparing American public opinion for what was to follow very soon: the large-scale commitment of U.S. forces to the fighting.⁴²

Perhaps the most significant fabrication was that of the alleged attack in August 1964 on two US destroyers in the Tonkin Gulf off the coast of North Vietnam. President Johnson used the incident to induce a resolution from Congress to take "all necessary steps, including the use of armed forces" to prevent further North Vietnamese aggression. It was a blanket endorsement for escalation heaped upon escalation. Serious enough doubts were raised at the

time about the reality of the attack, but over the years other information has come to light which has left the official story in tatters.⁴³

And probably the silliest fabrication: the 1966 US Army training film, "County Fair", in which the sinister Vietcong are shown in a jungle clearing heating gasoline and soap bars in a vicious communist invention called napalm.⁴⁴

The Johnson administration's method of minimizing public concern about escalation of the war, as seen by a psychiatrist:

First step: Highly alarming rumors about escalation are 'leaked'.

Second step: The President officially and dramatically sets the anxieties to rest by announcing a much more moderate rate of escalation, and accompanies this announcement with assurances of the Government's peaceful intentions.

Third step: After the general sigh of relief, the originally rumored escalation is gradually put into effect.

The succession of 'leaks', denials of leaks, and denials of denials thoroughly confuses the individual. He is left bewildered, helpless, apathetic.

The end result is that the people find themselves deeply committed to large-scale war, without being able to tell how it came about, when and how it all began.⁴⁵

Senator Stephen Young of Ohio was reported to have said that while he was in Vietnam he was told by the CIA that the Agency disguised people as Vietcong to commit atrocities, including murder and rape, so as to discredit the Communists. After the report caused a flurry in Washington, Young said that he had been misquoted, that the CIA was not the source of the story. Congressman Cornelius Gallagher, who had accompanied Young on the trip, suggested that it "may well be that he [Young] spoke to a Vietcong disguised as a CIA man".⁴⁶

From a speech by Carl Oglesby, President of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) during the March on Washington, 27 November 1965:

The original commitment in Vietnam was made by President Truman, a mainstream liberal. It was seconded by President Eisenhower, a moderate liberal. It was intensified by the late President Kennedy, a flaming liberal. Think of the men who now engineer that war — those who study the maps, give the commands, push the buttons, and tally the dead: Bundy, McNamara, Rusk, Lodge, Goldberg, the President himself.

They are not moral monsters. They are all honorable men. They are all liberals.⁴⁷

During the heat of the fighting in 1966-67, the Soviet Union sold to the United States over \$2 million worth of magnesium — a metal vital in military aircraft production — when there was a shortage of it in the United States. This

occurred at a time when Washington maintained an embargo on supplying Communist nations with certain alloys of the same metal.⁴⁸ At about the same time, China sold several thousand tons of steel to the United States in South Vietnam for use in the construction of new Air and Army bases when no one else could meet the American military's urgent need; this, while Washington maintained a boycott on all Chinese products; even wigs imported into the US from Hong Kong had to be accompanied by a certificate of origin stating that they contained no Chinese hair. The sale of steel may have been only the tip of the iceberg of Chinese sales to the United States at this time.⁴⁹

In 1975, a Senate investigating committee began looking into allegations that the CIA had counterfeited American money during the Vietnam war to finance secret operations.⁵⁰

"Two Vietcong prisoners were interrogated on an airplane flying toward Saigon. The first refused to answer questions and was thrown out of the airplane at 3,000 feet. The second immediately answered all the questions. But he, too, was thrown out." Variations of the water torture were also used to loosen tongues or simply to torment. "Other techniques, usually designed to force onlooking prisoners to talk, involve cutting off the fingers, ears, fingernails or sexual organs of another prisoner."⁵¹

It is not clear whether these particular Vietnamese were actual prisoners of war, i.e., captured in combat, or whether they were amongst the many thousands of civilians arrested as part of the infamous Phoenix Program. Phoenix was the inevitable consequence of fighting a native population: you never knew who was friend, who was enemy. Anyone was a potential informer, bomb-thrower, or assassin. Safety demanded that, unless proved otherwise, everyone was to be regarded as the enemy, part of what the CIA called the Vietcong infrastructure (VCI).

In 1971, CIA officer William Colby, the director of Phoenix, was asked by a Congressman: "Are you certain that we know a member of the VCI from a loyal member of the South Vietnam citizenry?" "No, Mr. Congressman," replied Colby, "I am not."⁵²

Phoenix was a co-ordinated effort of the United States and South Vietnam to wipe out this infrastructure. Under the programme, Vietnamese citizens were rounded up and jailed, often in tiger cages, often tortured, often killed, either in the process of being arrested or subsequently. By Colby's records, during the period between early 1968 and May 1971, 20,587 alleged Vietcong cadres met their death as a result of the Phoenix Program.⁵³ A similar programme, under different names, had existed since 1965 and been run by the United States alone.⁵⁴

Colby claims that more than 85 percent of the 20,587 figure were actually killed in military combat and only identified afterward as members of the VCI.⁵⁵ It strains credulity, however, to think that the tens of thousands of Vietcong

killed in combat during this period were picked over, body by body, on the battlefield, for identification and that their connection to the VCI was established.

The South Vietnam government credited Phoenix with 40,994 VCI deaths.⁵⁶ The true figure will probably never be known.

A former US military-intelligence officer in Vietnam, K. Barton Osborn, testified before a House Committee that suspects caught by Phoenix were interrogated in helicopters and sometimes pushed out. He also spoke of the use of electric shock torture and the insertion into the ear of a six-inch dowel which was tapped through the brain until the victim died.⁵⁷

Osborn's colleague, Michael J. Uhl, testified that most suspects were captured during sweeping tactical raids and that all persons detained were classified as Vietcong. None of those held for questioning, said Osborn, had ever lived through the process.⁵⁸

Osborn later helped to found an organization of former intelligence officers which stood opposed to Colby's designation as CIA Director, calling his appointment "nothing more than rewards for his having been the CIA's apologist for Phoenix to Congress... Mr. Colby's professional qualifications as a mass murderer are not in question here, his appointment to a powerful Government position is."⁵⁹

Arthur Sylvester, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, was the man most responsible for "giving, controlling and managing the war news from Vietnam". One day in July 1965, Sylvester told American journalists that they had a patriotic duty to disseminate only information that made the United States look good. When one of the newsmen exclaimed: "Surely, Arthur, you don't expect the American press to be handmaidens of government," Sylvester replied, "That's exactly what I expect," adding: "Look, if you think any American official is going to tell you the truth, then you're stupid. Did you hear that? — stupid." And when a correspondent for a New York paper began a question, he was interrupted by Sylvester who said: "Aw, come on. What does someone in New York care about the war in Vietnam?"⁶⁰

Meanwhile, hundreds of US servicemen in Asia and Europe were being swindled by phoney American auto dealers who turned up to take down payments on cars which they never delivered. Commented an Illinois Congressman: "We cannot expect our servicemen to fight to protect the free enterprise system if the very system which they fight to protect takes advantage of them."⁶¹

On 27 January 1973, in Paris, the United States signed the "Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam". Among the principles to which the United States agreed was the one stated in Article 21 of the Agreement:

In pursuance of its traditional policy, the United States will contribute to healing the wounds of war and to postwar reconstruction of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam [North Vietnam] and throughout Indochina.

Five days later, 1 February, President Nixon sent a message to the Prime Minister of North Vietnam reiterating and expanding upon this pledge. The first two principles put forth in the President's message were:

- (1) The Government of the United States of America will contribute to postwar reconstruction in North Vietnam without any political conditions.
- (2) Preliminary United States studies indicate that the appropriate programs for the United States contribution to postwar reconstruction will fall in the range of \$3.25 billion of grant aid over 5 years. Other forms of aid will be agreed upon between the two parties. This estimate is subject to revision and to detailed discussion between the Government of the United States and the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.⁶²

Since that time, the only aid given to any Vietnamese people by the United States has been to those who have left Vietnam and those who have been infiltrated back in to stir up trouble.

Are the victims of the Vietnam war also to be found in generations yet unborn? Tens of millions of pounds of herbicide were unleashed over the country; included in this were quantities of dioxin which has been called the most toxic man-made substance known; three ounces of dioxin, it is claimed, in the New York City water supply could wipe out the entire populace. Studies in Vietnam since the war have pointed to abnormally high rates of cancers, particularly of the liver, chromosomal damage, birth defects, long-lasting neurological disorders, etc. in the heavily-sprayed areas. The evidence collected is not yet conclusive. The statistics that have been kept in the devastated land that is Vietnam are not up to the standards of certain developed nations. But thousands of American veterans of Vietnam have fought for years to receive disability compensation, claiming irreparable damage from simply handling the toxic herbicides. In 1984, several herbicide manufacturers finally agreed to a settlement.

After the Second World War, the International Military Tribunal convened at Nuremberg, Germany. Created by the Allies, the Tribunal sentenced to prison or execution numerous Nazis who pleaded that they had been "only following orders". In an opinion handed down by the Tribunal, it declared that "the very essence of the [Tribunal's] Charter is that individuals have international duties which transcend the national obligations of obedience imposed by the individual state."

During the Vietnam war, a number of young Americans refused military service on the grounds that the United States was committing war crimes in Vietnam and that if they took part in the war they too, under the principles laid down at Nuremberg, would be guilty of war crimes.

One of the most prominent of these cases was that of David Mitchell of Connecticut. At Mitchell's trial in September 1965, Judge William Timbers dismissed his defence as "tommyrot" and "degenerate subversion", and found the Nuremberg principles to be "irrelevant" to the case. Mitchell was sentenced to prison.

Conservative columnist William F. Buckley, Jr., not celebrated as a champion of draft resistance, noted shortly afterward:

I am glad I didn't have Judge Timbers' job. Oh, I could have scolded Mr. Mitchell along with the best of them. But I'd have had to cough and wheeze and clear my throat during that passage in my catechism at which I explained to Mr. Mitchell wherein the Nuremberg Doctrine was obviously not at his disposal.⁶³

In 1971, Telford Taylor, the chief United States prosecutor at Nuremberg, suggested rather strongly that General William Westmoreland and high officials of the Johnson administration such as Robert McNamara and Dean Rusk could be found guilty of war crimes under criteria established at Nuremberg.⁶⁴ Yet every American court and judge, when confronted by the Nuremberg defence, had dismissed it without according it any serious consideration whatever.

The West has never been allowed to forget the Nazi holocaust. For 40 years there has been a continuous outpouring of histories, memoirs, novels, feature films, documentaries, television series . . . played and replayed, in every Western language; museums, memorials, remembrances, ceremonies . . . Never Again! But who hears the voice of the Vietnamese peasant? Who can read the language of the Vietnamese intellectual? What was the fate of the Vietnamese Anne Frank? Where, asks the young American, is Vietnam?

20. Cambodia 1955 to 1973 Prince Sihanouk walks the high-wire of neutralism

John Foster Dulles had called on me in his capacity as Secretary of State, and he had exhausted every argument to persuade me to place Cambodia under the protection of the South-East Asia Treaty Organization. I refused . . . I considered SEATO an aggressive military alliance directed against neighbors whose ideology I did not share but with whom Cambodia had no quarrel. I had made all this