"Republicans and Democrats disagree on almost every issue under the sun, but getting tougher on China isn't one of them," writes DEFP fellow Daniel R. DePetris in a recent column at Newsweek.
And it's not just talk. "A flurry of China-related legislation has been introduced, debated, and voted on with renewed vigor," DePetris notes, much of it grounded in an "often unchallenged premise: The U.S. not only needs to outcompete Beijing but degrade China's economic and military development in the process."
The same assumption undergirds recent military and economic moves by the Biden administration. U.S. allies and partners including Japan and the Philippines are likewise repositioning with an eye toward military confrontation with Beijing, and Chinese President Xi Jinping is becoming more direct in his criticism of Washington.
But what if that premise is flawed—and what if the antagonism it produces is neither necessary nor prudent for U.S. security?
The consequences of groupthink
- DePetris isn't alone in perceiving this new China policy "groupthink," as columnist Fareed Zakaria describes it. And that dynamic is a real risk to U.S. security, Zakaria contends. [WaPo]
- "One could dismiss some of this more extreme rhetoric as the usual congressional grandstanding, but it creates a dynamic that makes rational policy difficult."
- "China is a serious strategic competitor, the most significant great-power challenger the United States has faced in many decades. That is all the more reason for Washington to shape a rational and considered foreign policy toward it—rather than one forged out of paranoia, hysteria, and, above all, fears of being branded as soft." [WaPo]
- "Increasingly, Sino-American relations are blighted by some of the worst aspects of [the Cold War]. By default, the other side's motives are assumed to be malign. Disputes are made intractable by flag-waving bombast, and by clashing accounts of reality." [The Economist]
Time for talk, not just "toughness"
- Beijing's recent behavior in diplomatic contexts has made productive negotiations more difficult and politically costly. [NYT / Edward Wong]
- Still, President Joe Biden should be calling Xi, argues columnist David Ignatius, because U.S.-China relations are near their "lowest point in modern times, prodded by hard-liners in both capitals who seem to believe confrontation is inevitable." [WaPo]
- Some will claim initiating a call looks weak, but "appearing weak shouldn't be such a worry for a U.S. whose military power dwarfs that of its rivals."
- Moreover, maintaining deterrence doesn't preclude pursuing diplomacy—far from it.
- It's smart to reach out now "because we are on the lip of a significant further deterioration in U.S.-China relations." [WaPo]
- A major omission from Biden's China policy "is good old-fashioned dialogue," DePetris agrees. One-off meetings "won't suffice" for this relationship. "Dialogue will need to be sustained, even as the politics of doing so get more difficult for both sides." [Newsweek]
- Also wise: "military-to-military exchanges and other confidence-building measures that could 'create a pathway for de-escalating a crisis if one begins,' [DEFP fellow Mike] Sweeney says. 'I'd still very much like us to have perspective—and for us not to go too far down the road into unnecessary confrontation.'" [CSM / Anna Mulrine Grobe]
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"Russia's invasion of Ukraine has belied many expectations, to say nothing of predictions. Still, this much, at least, can be said with certainty: We are nowhere near the end of this war. Despite mounting calls for a diplomatic settlement, no such breakthrough is on the horizon. Russia and Ukraine both continue to believe they will prevail if they keep fighting."
— DEFP Director of Grand Strategy Rajan Menon quoted in "Russia will be out of 'military tools' by spring, Ukraine's top military spy says." [USA Today / Kim Hjelmgaard]
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