[Salon] Beyond the First Battle: Overcoming a Protracted Blockade of Taiwan

[Chas Freeman <cwfresidence@gmail.com>]

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-maritime-reports/26/

U.S. Naval War CollegeU.S. Naval War College
U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons
CMSI China Maritime Reports China Maritime Studies Institute
3-2023
China Maritime Report No. 26: Beyond the First Battle: Overcoming a Protracted Blockade of Taiwan
Lonnie D. Henley
Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-maritime-reports

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Summary
If there is a war over Taiwan, an extended Chinese blockade is likely to determine the outcome.
While a blockade might include intercepting ships at sea, the primary focus would be on sealing
airfields and ports, particularly on the west coast of Taiwan. China could sustain that type of
blockade indefinitely. Penetrating a prolonged blockade and keeping Taiwan alive would require a
serious U.S. investment in systems and operational concepts that we currently do not have. Unless
we make that investment, we may win the first battle, defeating an attempted landing. But we cannot
win the war.
Introduction
Maneuvers by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in August 2022 marked the first time the
PLA has openly signaled that a blockade of Taiwan is among the military courses of action for which
it plans and trains. Chinese forces established closure areas near Taiwan’s major ports for what the
Chinese media called “joint blockade and joint support operations” (联合封控和联合保障行动).1
Training events included establishing air superiority and conducting maritime and land strikes and
anti-submarine warfare, with explicit reference to Taiwan targets and Taiwan forces, and the need to
interdict U.S. forces deploying into the area.2 Chinese commentators emphasized that both the
proximity to Taiwan ports and the encirclement of Taiwan were unprecedented for PLA exercises3.
There is danger that the exercises we observed will foster a false belief that breaking a Chinese
blockade would be a straightforward task easily within the capability of current and projected U.S.
forces. It would not be. In a serious military conflict over Taiwan, the kind of blockade China would
impose would be vastly more difficult to counter. In this author’s assessment, nothing the United
States armed forces are doing or planning to do is sufficient to prevail in that conflict.
The Blockade in China’s Calculus
An integrated air, maritime, and information blockade of Taiwan appears in four different forms in
the PLA’s range of options against Taiwan.
As a coercive measure. We may divide potential Chinese military attacks against Taiwan into two
major categories: on the one hand, actions to punish and coerce Taiwan, forcing it to change its
behavior back to ways that are more acceptable to Beijing; and on the other hand, actions to conquer
Taiwan and compel its unification with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In that first category
of coercive measures, the menu of options includes saber-rattling exercises (as seen last August);
seizure of small Taiwan-controlled islands; limited air and missile strikes; and a limited,
demonstrative blockade of Taiwan.
1 李秉宣 [Li Bingxuan] and 韩学扬 [Han Xueyang], 东部战区接续开展联合演训组织联合封控和联合保障行动 [“The
Eastern Theater Conducts Successive Joint Exercises to Organize Joint Blockade and Control and Joint Support
Operations”], 新华社 [Xinhua News Agency], August 9, 2022, www.mod.gov.cn/topnews/2022-
08/09/content_4917758.htm.
2 Liu Xuanzun, “PLA extends ‘Taiwan encirclement’ exercises with anti-submarine warfare, showcases unrivaled area
denial capability; ‘drills will not stop until reunification’, Global Times, August 8, 2022,
https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202208/1272446.shtml.
3 央视新闻客户端 [CCTV News Client], 解放军历次台海演习中力度最大一次 专家：迫近合围台岛 前所未有 [“The
PLA’s Most Powerful Taiwan Strait Exercise yet. Expert: The Proximity to and Encirclement of Taiwan is
Unprecedented.”], 央视新闻 [China Central Television News], August 6, 2022, http://www.news.cn/tw/2022-
08/06/c_1128895175.htm.

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As a prelude to invasion. If Beijing is determined to conquer Taiwan, then a major amphibious
landing is one of its main options. Setting favorable conditions for the landing would require at least
partial air, maritime, and information superiority around the landing operation. A limited blockade
would be among the supporting lines of effort.
Exhibit 1. A PLA Navy Warship Operates Near Taiwan (August 5, 2022)4
As an alternative to invasion. A landing of the size required to conquer Taiwan, especially in the face
of vigorous U.S. military intervention, would be of unprecedented scale and complexity with a high
chance of failure. An alternative course of action would be to forego the landing and impose the
tightest blockade possible, slowly strangling Taiwan until it submits or collapses. Unlike the previous
two forms, this blockade would continue for as long as necessary for China to prevail.
As the fallback after a failed invasion. War with the United States would entail enormous costs for
China and endanger every other national objective, including the Communist Party’s hold on power.
That is true even if China wins, and the threat to regime survival is even greater if it is seen to have
lost. Chinese leaders might be able to sell Party elites and the general public an interpretation where
China had achieved a political victory despite the military failure, and in that case, it might be
possible to reach some formula to end the conflict. If not, however, the PLA would continue the fight
by whatever means available, meaning an indefinite blockade to eventually compel surrender.
The discussion below will focus on the latter two options, where the blockade becomes the primary
battlefield for the remainder of a long conflict. This report will argue that while a Chinese blockade
might begin with traditional stop-and-search actions, readily countered by a superior naval force,
both Chinese operational doctrine and the military and geographic situation will drive them to a
concept of operations vastly more difficult for U.S. forces to counter.
4 东部战区继续在台岛周边海空域开展实战化联合演训 [“The Eastern Theater Command Continues to Conduct
Realistic Joint Exercises on the Sea and in the Air Around Taiwan”], 新华社 [Xinhua News Agency], August 5, 2022,
www.mod.gov.cn/gfbw/qwfb/4917443.html

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How the Chinese Discuss Blockade
Chinese theoretical writings discuss strategic blockade (战略封锁) as a major type of operation, on
par with island landing operations, strategic counter-air attack, and space warfare.5 Studies of
international law and historical blockades examine the First and Second World Wars, the Cuban
Missile Crisis, the U.S.-Vietnam War, the Falklands War, and others.6 Many of the studies focus on
traditional operations to intercept and board merchant ships, including the inevitable mathematical
calculations of how large an area an intercept force can cover.7 (There is a strong current of
operations research number-crunching among Chinese military academics.)
PLA doctrinal writings, on the other hand, describe a more robust and multi-faceted operation. The
2006 Science of Campaigns from the PLA National Defense University describes a joint blockade
campaign (联合封锁战役) as a large-scale, long-term operation asserting air, maritime, and
information dominance in the blockade zone, involving all PLA services as well as the People’s
Armed Police and People’s Militia. In addition to traditional intercept-and-board operations at sea,
the joint blockade campaign involves firepower strikes against key facilities in Taiwan, destruction
of ports and airfields, mining of maritime approaches, and both kinetic and non-kinetic attacks on
information systems and infrastructure.8 It notes that operations in a strait allow extensive use of
land-based weapons and forces and that navigation is severely restricted.9 In sum, U.S. forces
attempting to penetrate the blockade from the mainland side of the Taiwan Strait would operate in a
tightly constrained and heavily contested maneuver zone.
Of note, Chinese articles about the August 2022 exercises used a new term for joint blockade, lianhe
fengkong (联合封控).10 The only time they used the traditional term for blockade—fengsuo (封锁)—
was when quoting Western observers. Officially translated as “blockade and control,” fengkong had
5 肖天亮 [Xiao Tianliang], editor-in-chief, 战略学 [The Science of Military Strategy] (Beijing: National Defense
University Press, 2020), p. 228. Translated by the U.S. Air Force China Aerospace Studies Institute (CASI),
https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/CASI/Display/Article/2913216/in-their-own-words-2020-science-of-military-strategy/.
6杨辉 [Yang Hui], 第一次世界大战期间英国对海上封锁国际法的创制 [“The British Creation of International Law on
Maritime Blockade during World War I”], 安阳师范学院学报 [Journal of Anyang Normal University], no. 3 (2021), pp.
70-76; 葛汉文 [Ge Hanwen], 海上封锁：历史经验、战略功用与当下效应 [“Maritime Blockade: Historical Experience,
Strategic Utility and Current Effects”], 世界经济与政治论坛 [Forum of World Economics & Politics], no. 1 (2022), pp.
77-95; 朱振光 [Zhu Zhenguang] and 李成刚 [Li Chenggang], 浅析马岛战争中英军联合海上封锁作战的经验教训
[“Experiences and Lessons of the Joint Maritime Blockade Operations by British Forces in the Malvinas Islands War”], 军
事历史 [Military History], no. 1 (2013), pp. 39-42; 李健 [Li Jian], 海空封锁--马岛登陆作战 [“Air and Sea Blockade:
Malvinas Landing Operation”], 军事科技 [Military Science and Technology], September (2013),
https://www.81.cn/jskj/2013-09/18/content_5512815.htm.
7 宋小艺 [Song Xiaoyi], 战时台湾地区的管控问题研究 [Research on the Management and Control of Taiwan in
Wartime], Master’s Thesis for East China University of Political Science and Law, May 2021; 高辅刚 [Gao Fugang] and
张高 [Zhang Gao], 海上封锁拦截行动效能分析 [“Analysis of the Effectiveness of Maritime Blockade and Interception
Operations”], 军事运筹于系统工程 [Military Operations Research and Systems Engineering], Vol. 28, No. 1 (March
2014), pp. 30-32, 60.
8 张玉良 [Zhang Yuliang], ed., 战役学 [Science of Campaigns], (Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2006), p.
292 in original, p. 329 in English translation by CASI available here:
https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Translations/2020-12-
02%20In%20Their%20Own%20Words-%20Science%20of%20Campaigns%20(2006).pdf
9 Zhang, Science of Campaigns, pp. 40-42 in CASI translation.
10 Li and Han, “The Eastern Theater Conducts Successive Joint Exercises to Organize Joint Blockade and Joint Support
Operations.”

4
previously appeared in PLA writings about border defense operations, but not in connection with sea
blockade.11 This author’s tentative conclusion is that fengkong combines the concepts of maritime
blockade with establishing air, sea, and information control, but this awaits further evidence.
Military Terrain
The principal factor shaping a potential blockade of Taiwan is the geography of Taiwan itself.12
There are few deep-water ports, and those on the east coast are isolated from the rest of the island by
steep mountains and narrow, low-capacity roads that are easily severed. The central mountain range
separating separate east from west climbs to over 12,000 feet within 30 miles of the east coast. See
Exhibit 2 below.
Yilan (宜蘭) is the only east coast city with a major highway to Taipei, and has one modest-sized
port, but the four-lane National Freeway 5 features multiple long tunnels (including the 13-kilometer
Hsuehshan tunnel) and stretches of highly elevated roadway.13 The highway is an engineering marvel,
but it would be easily cut in a military conflict. The two alternatives are National Highway 9 across
the mountains and National Highway 2 around the coast. Both are low capacity with many
vulnerable points.
Hualien (花蓮), halfway down the east coast, has a small port, but the two roads connecting Hualien
to the western half of Taiwan, while spectacularly scenic, are of extremely low capacity and difficult
to keep in service. National Highway 8 climbs the Taroko Gorge and is notorious for extremely
narrow stretches, hairpin turns, and sheer drops.14 It is frequently closed altogether for years on end
due to earthquakes and landslides.15 The Hualien-Yilan stretch of National Highway 9 has sections
literally carved into the cliff face.
Keelung (基隆) on Taiwan’s short northern coast has a good port and better highways to Taipei, but
those roads run through densely urbanized terrain and squeeze through several narrow bottlenecks
between mountains. Once combat operations are underway, especially after the PLA has achieved air
superiority, those lines of communications will be in extremely poor condition. In addition, Keelung
is nearly as exposed to Chinese shore-based strike assets as the west coast ports are.
11 袁志强 [Yuan Zhiqiang], 边境联合封控行动组织指挥问题浅探 [“A Brief Exploration of the Organizational
Command of Joint Border Closure and Control Operations”], 国防 [National Defense], No. 1 (2017), pp. 23-25; 中国人民
解放军军语 [PLA Dictionary of Military Terms] (Beijing, Academy of Military Science Press, 2011), pp. 133, 165.
12 The terrain analysis below is based on the author’s examination of available geographic and geologic resources.
13 “Taiwan,” World Port Source, www.worldportsource.com/ports/TWN.php; Caroline Gluck, “Asia's longest road tunnel
opens,” BBC Taipei, June 16, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/5086548.stm; Huang Tzu-ti, “Freeway No. 5 to
be toll-free Sept. 21, 25 for Moon Festival,” Taiwan News, September 20, 2019,
https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3534145; Flickr,
www.flickr.com/photos/136372730@N04/24575422250/in/photostream/lightbox/
14 “Driving the infamous Taroko Gorge Road in Taiwan,” Dangerous Roads,
https://www.dangerousroads.org/asia/taiwan/70-taroko-gorge-road-taiwan.html.
15 “Taiwan: Authorities close sections of district roads 7 and 8 in Yilan and Hualien counties as of Oct. 19 due to
landslides,” October 9, 2022. https://crisis24.garda.com/alerts/2022/10/taiwan-authorities-close-sections-of-district-roads-
7-and-8-in-yilan-and-hualien-counties-as-of-oct-19-due-to-landslides?origin=fr_riskalert; Wang Chun-chi and Jake Chung,
“Hualien tunnel to partly reopen,” Taipei Times, February 6, 2016,
https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2016/02/06/2003638955.

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Exhibit 2. Taiwan’s Military Terrain (Map source: www.marinetraffic.com)
The one remaining piece of flat land on the east coast, Taitung (臺東), has only a tiny port. Its cross-
island highway, National Route 20, rivals the Taroko Gorge highway for spectacular beauty and
extreme fragility. It recently reopened after a 13-year closure.16
In sum, the east coast ports are as useless for U.S. blockade running as they are for a Chinese
invasion. Any effort to get more than trivial amounts of cargo into Taiwan therefore has to go
through the west coast ports.
Air delivery also faces severe geographical challenges, driven by the proximity to the Chinese
mainland. Advanced surface-to-air missiles along China’s coast can range most of Taiwan, and the
few airfields that are sheltered are all on the east coast, facing the same land transportation
constraints as the eastern ports.17 Taiwan’s proximity to the mainland also allows ample time to
scramble fighter jets to reinforce an air blockade when U.S. cargo aircraft are approaching.
16 Wayne Chang, “One of Taiwan's most beautiful roads has reopened,” CNN Travel, May 6, 2022,
https://www.cnn.com/travel/article/taiwan-southern-cross-island-highway-reopens-intl-hnk/index.html.
17 These include the Russian-built S-400 (SA-21, 400 km range) and S-300PMU (SA-20, 200 km range) and Chinese-built
HQ-9B (300 km range). Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China: 2022 Annual
Report to Congress, U.S. Department of Defense, November 2022, pp. 61-62; Kenneth W. Allen and Cristina L. Garafola,
70 Years of the PLA Air Force (Montgomery, AL: China Aerospace Studies Institute, 2021), p. 98.

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How a Blockade Might Unfold
If the PLA were attempting an invasion of Taiwan, the initial blockade would focus on setting the
conditions for a landing—gaining air superiority to protect the landing fleet, isolating Taiwan to
prevent U.S. reinforcement and resupply, and disrupting Taiwan communications for both
operational and psychological purposes. In this phase, the PLA would be seeking to capture ports and
airfields for use by PLA forces, so firepower strikes would be limited to the degree necessary to seize
and then reopen the facilities under PLA control. The PLA also would need to clear obstacles
emplaced by Taiwan or U.S. forces, potentially including mines and deliberate damage to port
facilities inflicted by defending forces.18
If the invasion failed, however, or if Beijing chose blockade as a primary course of action without
attempting an invasion, then the PLA calculus would be different. With no incentive to keep ports
and airfields open, PLA forces would mine the approaches and the ports themselves, damage port
facilities and the routes for onward movement of materiel, and sink or scuttle vessels in shipping
channels.
The battle for air superiority would begin with PLA Rocket Force suppression of Taiwan air defenses,
followed by the Air Force operating under the protection of long-range surface-to-air missiles along
the Chinese coast. The PLA could not prevent incursions by advanced U.S. stealth aircraft, but it
could readily attack any cargo aircraft attempting to land in Taiwan and subject all possible landing
strips to repeated bombardment. Unless U.S. forces were able to dismantle the PLA integrated air
defense system, this author’s assessment is that the PLA could sustain the air blockade for months if
not years without exhausting its inventory of air-to-air or surface-to-air weapons.
The PLA would attempt to sever all modes of communication off the island and disrupt
communications within Taiwan. The initial missile and air strikes would include long-haul
communications facilities such as satellite ground stations and undersea cable landing sites. Counter-
space targeting would include jamming or destructive attacks on communications satellites. Follow-
on strikes would prosecute mobile and backup communications equipment, with air superiority
enabling the use of PLA reconnaissance aircraft and drones to track and target a dwindling number of
mobile systems.
What it Would Take to Penetrate a Blockade
The maritime blockade might include traditional efforts to intercept, board, or destroy cargo ships at
sea. The Chinese exercises in August 2022 highlighted such operations, and, as mentioned above,
PLA writings address technical details such as the number of ships required for a given ocean area.19
If a landing operation had already failed, however, it is not likely that the PLA would have many
warships left for the task. And if the blockade were the main PLA line of effort, with no preceding
invasion attempt, then the initial battle probably would feature U.S. forces destroying the PLA fleet
east of Taiwan. Unfortunately, that would not end the war, and conditions for the remainder of the
conflict strongly favor China.
18 The following description of a Chinese invasion operation is drawn from multiple analyses by Western observers.
Examples include Ian Easton, The Chinese Invasion Threat: Taiwan’s Defense and American Strategy in Asia (Arlington,
VA: Project 2049 Institute, 2017), pp. 77-124; Lonnie Henley, “PLA Operational Concepts and Centers of Gravity in a
Taiwan Conflict,” testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, February 18, 2021;
Michael Casey, “Firepower Strike, Blockade, Landing: PLA Campaigns for a Cross-Strait Conflict,” in Joel Wuthnow,
Derek Grossman, Phillip C. Saunders, Andrew Scobell, Andrew N.D. Yang, eds., Crossing the Strait: China’s Military
Prepares for War with Taiwan (Washington, D.C., National Defense University Press, 2022), pp. 113-138.
19 Gao and Zhang, “Analysis of the Effectiveness of Maritime Blockade and Interception Operations,” pp. 30-32, 60.

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After U.S. forces won the first battle—whether by defeating the invasion or by sinking the Chinese
fleet—they still would face the requirement to get hundreds of tons of cargo into Taiwan, day after
day, month after month. How much of what is an unanswered question; there does not seem to have
been any rigorous assessment of Taiwan’s wartime consumption rates, domestic production, strategic
reserves, or expected losses to Chinese fire strikes. But the materiel requirements are certain to be
large, not to mention the psychological importance of regularly penetrating the blockade to sustain
Taiwan’s will to fight.
That means that U.S. forces must get cargo ships into the west coast ports on a regular basis, in the
face of extensive mining and hostile fire, close to China and under conditions of Chinese air
superiority. After weeks or months of conflict, it might be that the PLA had exhausted its magazine
of long-range weapons, but its much larger inventory of short-range strike assets would remain
largely untapped. Long-range artillery, land-based anti-ship missiles, patrol boats with missiles or
torpedoes, even older third generation fighters dropping gravity bombs would pose a significant
threat. China could reseed minefields between U.S. incursions using a wide variety of platforms.
Each cargo vessel the PLA managed to stop would become part of the obstacle array the next one
had to navigate.
Resupply by air could be symbolically important if it were feasible, but that seems extremely
unlikely. Whatever wizardry U.S. stealth and electronic warfare can achieve, there is no way to hide
a large cargo jet or make it anything but a fat, slow, and extremely vulnerable target. Even in an
uncontested environment, airlift would be woefully inadequate for the volume of fuel and other
essentials Taiwan needs to survive. With the Chinese air defense array in place and the PLA Air
Force operating over Taiwan, air resupply in the volumes required is simply impossible.
Counter-Blockade and Cost Imposition
At this point in the discussion, U.S. interlocutors often posit that the United States could seal off
China’s access to international markets, particularly its access to imported fuels. With or without a
specific U.S. blockade, there is no doubt that a war would severely disrupt China’s foreign trade and
cause massive damage to its economy (and everyone else’s as well). It has long been this author’s
contention that the economic, political, and diplomatic cost of a war are among the main factors that
deter Beijing from attacking Taiwan, in addition to and probably more important than the military
balance. If seizing Taiwan were easy and cheap, they would have done it long ago. If Chinese leaders
decide to attack anyway, it will be because they have consciously accepted that enormous cost. The
question then becomes how long the world’s second largest economy can sustain the conflict in the
face of a U.S. blockade. That is hard to answer, but the easy part seems to be, a heck of a lot longer
than Taiwan can. We are not on the winning end of that cost-imposition contest.
Implications for Force Design, Operational Concepts, and War Preparations
In this author’s observation, U.S. thinking about a potential Taiwan conflict focuses on winning the
first battle, either thwarting a landing attempt or stripping away a PLA Navy blockade effort east of
Taiwan. (This presumably was the thought behind U.S. Pacific Fleet commander Admiral Paparo’s
“resounding yes” on whether his forces could break a Chinese blockade.20) There has been much less
thought about what happens after that, about how to keep Taiwan alive through months if not years
of a close-in Chinese blockade.
20 John Feng, “Superior U.S. Forces Could Break China's Blockade of Taiwan: Navy Commander,” Newsweek, October 5,
2022, https://www.newsweek.com/china-taiwan-blockade-invasion-us-navy-pacific-fleet-admiral-samuel-paparo-1749139.

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The requirements for running a blockade differ markedly from those for defeating a landing. The
latter has two key aspects: protecting U.S. ships and aircraft from China’s long-range weapons, and
sinking as many as possible of the ships carrying Chinese forces across the strait. Both tasks are
extremely difficult, but the requirements are straightforward and play to the strengths of the U.S.
military-industrial complex. Running a blockade, in contrast, presents extreme operational challenges
for which the solution is not obvious, and furthermore runs contrary to deeply held beliefs about what
kind of operations U.S. forces should prepare for.
In order to succeed, U.S. Navy escorts must operate in a tightly constrained and fiercely contested
battlespace west of Taiwan, protecting cargo ships and themselves from a wide variety of
simultaneous threats. They must perform extensive mine clearing and obstacle removal under fire,
with their backs to the Chinese coast; get the cargo ship into port and unloaded; then get it out again
and safely away so that it does not become another obstacle. They must do this not once but
repeatedly, many times per week, for as long as the conflict continues. This requires a different force
structure and different operational concepts.
The Chinese integrated air defense system is a key enabler for Chinese forces in this battle. Disabling
that system would not solve the problem, but it would significantly reduce the strain on U.S. forces
operating in the Strait. If the air defenses were down, U.S. airpower could help protect warships and
cargo ships from attack, and Chinese airpower would be a correspondingly smaller factor. Disabling
the integrated air defense system would also create a more balanced air fight over Taiwan, making air
resupply difficult rather than impossible, though still of limited capacity.
Blockade-running requires that cargo ships go deep into harm’s way, constituting a planning and
force development challenge on its own. Obtaining the ships would be relatively easy if the U.S.
government were willing to indemnify ship owners for all financial losses, including loss of the ship
itself. This could be arranged on short notice if the funds were available. Crewing the ships would be
more problematic, however, requiring revitalization of the U.S. Merchant Marine as a warfighting
force to operate the cargo fleet under combat conditions. Taiwan-owned ships, and possibly their
crews, might be available without an indemnity, but those details would need to be negotiated.
All of this requires that Taiwan be able to bear the pain China will inflict. Part of the capacity to
endure hinges on U.S. supplies of critical weapons and munitions, but the vast majority is in the
hands of Taiwan’s government and people. Taiwan could increase its resilience by hardening
facilities, shifting to mobile rather than fixed systems, increasing stockpiles of critical munitions and
materials, working out what its wartime consumption requirements would be under strict rationing,
conducting regular continuity of operations drills, and opening the discussion with its own people
about how the society could stand up to extended deprivation and Chinese punishment.
Psychological resilience is as important as physical preparations.