Why Did China Help Saudi Arabia and Iran Resume Diplomatic Ties?
On
Friday, March 10, Saudi Arabia and Iran announced their agreement to
reestablish diplomatic relations based on talks held in Beijing. China
has
portrayed itself as the broker of the agreement, and China’s senior
diplomat congratulated the two countries on their “wisdom.”
Q1: Why did the two countries reestablish relations now?
A1: The agreement seems to have been moved forward
during President Ebrahim Raisi’s visit to Beijing last month. For
months, Saudi Arabia has put pressure on Iran through its reported
support for Iran International, a foreign-based Persian-language
broadcaster critical of the regime that is received in Iran. Since
President Raisi took office in August 2021, he announced it was a
priority to reduce tensions with regional neighbors. Saudi Arabia and
Iran have had a wide variety of differences throughout
the region, often fought through proxies. They span from Lebanon to
Syria to Iraq to Yemen. Iran has supplied weapons to Houthi forces in
Yemen that have threatened Saudi populations both on the border and in
interior areas. Saudi Arabia has been increasingly
interested in finding a way to end the conflict in Yemen, and this
agreement is likely to move that forward.
Q2: What is the importance of China’s role, and what does this mean for China’s presence in the Gulf?
A2: Appearing to facilitate the negotiations adds to
Chinese prestige. The not-so-subtle message that China is sending is
that while the United States is the preponderant military power in the
Gulf, China is a powerful and rising diplomatic
presence. This adds to a perception of Chinese power and influence
around the world, and it contributes to a narrative of a shrinking U.S.
global presence.
Iraq had sought to play a role brokering Saudi-Iranian talks, and Prime
Minister Emmanuel Macron of France actively sought to support
rapprochement as well. China was well-placed economically to engage with
both sides. China alone represents about 30 percent
of Iran’s total international trade, so it is vital to Iran. China is
Saudi Arabia’s largest oil export market, and Saudi Arabia is often
China’s largest oil supplier. When President Xi Jinping visited Saudi
Arabia in December, Iranians complained bitterly
that he had tilted toward Saudi Arabia in his statements and actions.
Given Iran’s international isolation, though, there wasn’t much Iran
could do in protest.
Q3: What does this mean for the United States and its role in the Gulf?
A3: The United States could not have brokered this
agreement because it does not have direct contact with Iran. Former
Iraqi prime minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi’s departure from office in
October 2022 removed the possibility that this would be
consummated under Iraqi good offices, which had the quiet backing of
the U.S. government. The Biden administration has spoken about the
importance of regional security dialogues and is presumably supportive
of this agreement, at least in general terms. But
the fact that Saudi Arabia struck the agreement in a way that seems to
have entirely excluded the United States sends a message that the Saudis
are seeking to diversify their bets on security and not rely wholly on
the United States. The U.S. government is
of two minds on that; it wants the Saudis to take increasing
responsibility for their own security, but it does not want Saudi Arabia
freelancing and undermining U.S. security strategies.
Q4: What does this reveal about Saudi diplomacy?
A4: The Saudis seem to have structured these
negotiations in a way that purposively left the United States far away
from the agreement. Yet almost simultaneously, the Saudis leaked to the
Wall Street Journal that they are open to negotiating
diplomatic normalization with Israel and revealed some of the terms.
The message from Saudi Arabia is that it will not be passive in regional
diplomacy, and it will take its own measure of how to balance its
interests. Saudi skepticism of Iran runs very deep,
and Iranian hostility toward Saudi Arabia is similarly ingrained. Both
countries expect that they will remain adversarial, but they believe
that more direct channels of communication will serve their interests.
Still, the Saudis feel enduring threats from
Iran. Sustaining U.S. security guarantees against Iranian aggression,
reportedly seeking U.S. agreement to some nuclear enrichment, and
deepening security understandings with Israel, are part of a broader
strategy against what Saudis see as an enduring Iranian
threat.
Jon
B. Alterman is a senior vice president, holds the Zbigniew Brzezinski
Chair in Global Security and Geostrategy, and is director of the Middle
East Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in
Washington, D.C.
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