What the U.S. National Security Community Is Getting Wrong About China
We need to get over the idea that somehow the U.S.-China relationship is a zero-sum conflict.
Photo Illustration by Elizabeth Brockway/The Daily Beast/Reuters
It is tempting to say we are at a crossroads in U.S.-China relations. Tempting. But wrong.
We have passed the crossroads and we are already, unfortunately, dangerously, well on our way down the wrong path.
As Edward Luce pointed out in an insightful column in the Financial Times, we are already effectively engaged in a Cold War with China.
“The consensus,” he writes, “is now so hawkish that it is liable to see
any outreach to China as weakness.” You could hear that hawkish
consensus in the words of U.S. intelligence chiefs as they testified
before the Congress during their annual threat assessment hearing on
Wednesday.
Director
of National Intelligence Avril Haines cited China’s ruling Communist
Party as the “most consequential” national security threat the U.S.
faces. Never mind domestic extremism, enabled by one of the two major
political parties. Never mind global warming. Never mind Russia waging
an active war in Europe while aggressively pumping out disinformation
and promoting authoritarianism worldwide.
No,
even while acknowledging the existence of threats posed by domestic
extremists, Russia, and global warming, the consensus of the
intelligence community, supported by leaders of both parties, is that
China is the enemy we need to keep an eye on.
Why? Why is it such a
great threat even though the country has no history of conquest beyond
its region in 5,000 years of history and is far from being able or
inclined to pose a direct threat of attack to the U.S.? According to
Haines, the reason focusing on China is the intel community's top
priority is that China is “increasingly challenging the United States
economically, technologically, politically, and militarily around the
world.” She continued, asserting that the goal of China’s President Xi
Jinping is to “continue efforts to achieve Xi’s vision of making China
the preeminent power in East Asia and a major power on the world stage.”
Let’s break that down.
Is
there something inherently wrong or dangerous about China seeking to
challenge the United States economically, technologically, or
politically? Isn’t that what all nations do? Don’t we believe in the
inherent superiority of our system? Don’t we believe in the benefits of
competition? (I thought that was fundamental to America’s national
identity and values.)
Challenging
us militarily is more worrisome, of course. But if their primary goal
is power in East Asia, if they have never projected force in any
meaningful way beyond their region, and if all nations seek to have
sufficient power that they cannot be bullied by global hegemons (and
let’s be realistic, we’re the only global hegemon in this conversation
at the moment), isn’t their desire to have military power consistent
with the size of their country, their economy, and their national
security interests what we should expect of them? Is that inherently a
threat to us?
It’s not if China does not seek to use that force to
attack us. And Haines herself noted that China’s leaders believe that
“it benefits most by preventing a spiraling of tensions and by
preserving stability in its relationship with the United States.”
None
of this is to say that China is a benign actor. It is not to minimize
our deep and wide-ranging differences with that country and its leaders.
Our principles and our interests demand that we challenge China’s human
rights abuses among the Uighurs in its Northwest or in Hong Kong. We
should continue to actively oppose China providing any assistance,
especially of the lethal variety, to Russia, to aid in that country’s
brutal and illegal war with Ukraine. And we should use all the means at
our disposal to keep China from projecting its power in dangerous or
inflammatory ways in its region. Notably, that means we must have
policies that provide Taiwan and our other regional allies with the kind
of support that we feel is consistent with our interests.
“Why
is it such a great threat even though the country has no history of
conquest beyond its region in 5,000 years of history and is far from
being able or inclined to pose a direct threat of attack to the U.S.?”
Does that necessarily mean going to war with China to defend Taiwan?
I
can understand why we continue to say it might, because preserving
democracy in Taiwan is in our interests. But we never talk about going
to war to preserve democracy when it is at risk in places like Hungary,
Turkey, India, or Mexico. What makes Taiwan a special case? We need to
ask ourselves whether that has to do with our predisposition to contain
Chinese power more than it has to do with a careful assessment of U.S.
national interests. (Especially as we are now finally taking steps to
reduce our unhealthy dependence on Taiwanese semiconductors.)
The
problem with the current apparent decision to treat China as an enemy
and an existential threat is that it can lead to distorted views on
certain issues—such as Taiwan. (We should help Taiwan the way we help
Ukraine, with military and financial aid, training and intelligence but
not more than that.) Such issues can become red lines or trigger points
for escalation in an unhealthy way.
We saw that when then House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan last year. Now, it is reported that the U.S is planning to welcome Taiwan’s president to the U.S.
How
does doing so help us? Do the benefits of standing shoulder-to-shoulder
outweigh the risks of escalation? Are we thinking about this clearly?
Let’s be real for a moment.
What
really bothers us about China’s rise is that they are quite open about
the fact that they want to challenge our influence in the world. We want
to be No. 1. We don’t like being challenged.
But isn’t it
reasonable for China to want such influence? After all, throughout world
history until the start of the industrial revolution, China had the
world’s largest economy and it is now resuming that role. That doesn’t
mean we shouldn’t seek to expand our influence, to be more prosperous,
to enhance the security and quality of life of all Americans. It just
means we need to get over the idea that somehow the U.S.-China
relationship is a zero-sum conflict, the way the U.S.-Soviet Union
relationship was.
It’s not. Our economies are intertwined. Over
70,000 U.S. companies are active in China. There is not a single major
global issue we can resolve without cooperating with China. On many of
them, our interests intersect. On some of them, they overlap.
In
such a world, choosing enmity with an essential sometime
partner/sometime influential rival is dangerous and contrary to our
interests. Further, even if our goal is to maximize our influence and
our piece of the global economic pie, we need to carefully weigh whether
a Cold War and ballooning military expenditures are the best way to
balance our interests. It can be argued that overspending on defense has
and will cost us influence and undercut the dynamism of our economy.
Shouldn’t
we at least consider that investing in our people, our infrastructure,
our schools, our research facilities, and our overall competitiveness is
a better choice? Shouldn’t we consider that growing stronger from
within should be our top priority now? That a Cold War stance or one
that seeks to decouple from the Chinese economy (or isolate it to the
point of exacerbating deep tensions between our economies) is the
biggest possible mistake we could make?
And, we must also ask,
isn’t it in our interest for China to grow more prosperous, to be able
to draw on Chinese industry and creativity to help drive progress?
But,
the hawks may ask, isn’t China the one being more bellicose? That was
the reading many gave to remarks given this week by both President Xi
and by his foreign minister, Qin Gang. The Wall Street Journal reported
that Xi “issued an unusually blunt rebuke of U.S. policy on Monday,
blaming what he termed a Washington-led campaign to suppress China for
recent challenges facing his country.” He asserted that the U.S. had
been at the forefront of an effort to contain, encircle, and suppress
China. He went on to point out that Western efforts to cut off the
supply of advanced technologies to China cause “unprecedentedly severe
challenges to our country’s development.”
Being called out by the
Chinese leader may have been uncomfortable for the U.S. But, as it
happens, everything Xi said was true. The U.S. is actively seeking to
contain China and impede its ability to develop key technologies.
China’s foreign minister said,
“If the United States does not hit the brakes but continues to speed
down the wrong path, no amount of guardrails can prevent derailing and
there will surely be conflict and confrontation.” That too, as it
happens, is true.
Indeed, it is a warning that we in the U.S.
should not simply dismiss as the rhetoric of a foreign minister just
doing his job pumping out his country’s line.
Just as some of the
greatest real threats the U.S. faces come from within our own borders,
so are some of the greatest threats we face internationally driven or
exacerbated by domestic factors.
China
is a rival. China threatens a wide variety of U.S. interests. We should
believe in our hearts that our values and system serve the world better
than theirs do and we should seek to persuade the world of that.
“There
is not a single major global issue we can resolve without cooperating
with China. On many of them, our interests intersect. On some of them,
they overlap.”
But if our goal is really to
emerge from the period ahead of us stronger, with our people and our
world better off, it would serve us well to heed Qin’s words. We have, I
fear, entered a period in which the self-interested search of our
defense establishment and our political classes for an international
enemy are pushing us into misreading and mishandling the most important
bilateral relationship in the world. We are applying old models and
obsolescent frameworks to something new. We are mistaking our own
bellicosity for strength. We are underestimating our strengths and our
rival’s weaknesses. We are relying on reflex, when what we need is
creativity.
China’s rise poses real risks, presents genuine
conundrums, and demands difficult choices. Managing our relations with
the People’s Republic of China will be the defining foreign policy
challenge of our age. Given the stakes, we owe it to ourselves to
retrace our steps back to that fork in the road we seem to have passed
through, to reject the Cold War framework that is no one’s interests,
and to seek new ideas and approaches for this new era.