French
police firing water cannons on a demonstrator at a Palestinian
solidarity march in Paris, May 2021 [photo credit: michaeloberg]
The illegal settler occupation has been going on for decades,
incrementally taking land from Palestinians. But equally water has been
taken. Can we go back to 1993 and the Oslo Accord as a starting point
for how the theft of Palestinian water was formalised?
The Oslo Accords really formed the basis of who controls water in
Israel and Palestine today which, in some sense, is remarkable because
when they were signed in 1993, these agreements were only meant to be
temporary. But instead, this framework has lasted almost 30 years. The
agreements ended up giving Israel 80% of the water from the West Bank
aquifer, and then it gave the rest to Palestinians. The agreement has
actually no limits on the amount of water that Israel can take. But it
does put limits on the amount of water that the Palestinians can take.
And after this agreement was put in place, the Palestinians weren't able
to get to that limit of water that was agreed to because of some
technical reasons. And according to the Israeli group that is selling
(water) right now, Palestinians are only getting around 14% of the water
in the aquifer.
So at this point, you have a situation where the Israeli water
company is taking the majority of this shared water source, and then
selling it back to the Palestinians. They are providing more water than
was agreed to in the Oslo agreement, actually about double. But the
water that they're getting is still really insufficient on a per capita
basis. And it's much less than the Israelis are getting on a per capita
basis. And there's one other point which is that the agreement also
established a joint water committee that was supposed to serve as a way
to coordinate water distribution between the Israelis and the
Palestinians. And it had equal membership between both sides. But at
this point, the committee has been completely dysfunctional. And over
the years, the Palestinians have accused the committee of essentially
being biased in approving Israeli water projects at lower rates. The
Palestinians have said that it's difficult for them to get anything
through the committee in a timely manner. And I think for Palestinians,
the impacts of this are felt on a day to day basis where people simply
don't have enough water. And they need licences in the West Bank (which
they are not getting) in order to drill more wells to meet their huge
water deficit. And meanwhile, Israeli forces are destroying
unauthorised wells and cisterns
And is it the case that the Palestinians just didn't negotiate
well, or is it a case of bad faith post the negotiations by the
Israelis, or is it a combination of those factors?
I think both factors are at play here. When you look at the joint
water committee, I think it's important to realise that it (failed) out
of dysfunction. And there have been numerous boycotts by the Palestinian
authorities of that committee. But at the same time, the starting point
was unfair. So you're entering into this committee on unequal footing.
In practical terms, and you touched upon this a little bit, what
does it mean for Palestinians, that the Israelis effectively control 85%
of the water in the West Bank?
On a very practical level, it means that this is affecting the
economy. It's affecting people's health. It's affecting the way that
people live. Palestinians in the West Bank, they look around and they
see people living in settlements beside them. They see flourishing
gardens and swimming pools. And there's this huge contrast with their
own lives. So during past instances of drought, the per water capita
consumption of water of Israelis was about 10 times the water
consumption of Palestinians. And in some cases, in some Palestinian
villages, the per capita consumption actually fell below the limit that
the World Health Organisation recommends.
You made the point in your article that the Palestinians,
although they did have a presence at COP 27, have been pretty much
side-lined in climate change conferences and conversations. What impact
is that having?
When you're engaging in negotiations with a framework that actually
denies your right to control the water resources below your feet, I
think the Palestinians are asking themselves whether their participation
would actually legitimise an overall system that they feel is unfair.
And the mere fact that Palestinians are absent from these agreements,
actually threatens them even more. The group EcoPeace that started
initiatives between Israel and Jordan that we saw come up at COP 27,
initially conceived of it as a deal that would include the Palestinians.
And so this was really supposed to be a way of helping them get their
water rights, but in reality, it's almost a continuation and potentially
a legitimising of the status quo.
Which is, as you say, unequal. Now, you mentioned Jordan, Jordan
is also caught in the web of an unequal treaty, the peace deal signed in
1994. Can you go through the details on the Israel-Jordan peace treaty
pertaining to water and how it impacts on Jordan?
The treaty between Israel and Jordan, I think it should be said, is
still functioning even though there has been a fair amount of turbulence
between the two countries. And this treaty also provided for a joint
water committee which was able to work properly, and even had some
successes in navigating previous instances of drought between Israel and
Jordan. So it's important to view the treaty in the context of this
overall relationship. But at the same time, when it entered into this
agreement, Israel had the upper hand when we're talking about water;
Israel has really advanced water technology. And they're also located
upstream from Jordan. So the agreement has a set amount of water that is
allocated to Israel. And then it says that Jordan gets the rest of the
flow. And it's interesting that they chose to take this approach,
instead of doing a percentage. And I think people now are looking
towards the future and they're seeing the impacts of climate change,
they're seeing the reduced precipitation. And I think they're worrying
about how much water will be left after Israel takes its overall cut.
At the same time, this agreement is also pretty old, and it's out of
touch with the water demands of today. Jordan's population has exploded
as refugees entered the country. Jordan is becoming even more dependent
on the Jordan River basin to feed its population, while Israel is
increasingly using desalination to cover its water needs. And so the
result is that Jordan is now paying Israel for more water because it's
in such a desperate situation. Meanwhile, Israel can actually afford to
spare some water because of its ability in desalination. And so in
addition to having to spend more money, people in Jordan are feeling the
impacts of not having enough water while also having their population
grow by a lot. There's water rationing in place here, especially in some
communities that have high populations of refugees and that are low
income. And similar to the situation in the West Bank, people are
turning to other really, really expensive places to get their water.
What about the Jordan-Israel water for energy deal? What is it and how vulnerable has that deal left Jordan?
The water energy deal was pioneered by this group called EcoPeace,
which I mentioned earlier, that has offices in Israel, Jordan and
Palestine. And the group of engineers and environmentalists had this
idea for a water/energy nexus, which has also been called the Green Blue
deal. But essentially, it would establish a solar energy community
between Jordan, Israel and Palestine. And the idea was that Israel and
Palestine would produce desalinated water and sell it to Jordan, while
Jordan would sell Palestine and Israel renewable energy. And the
rationale behind it was that each partner would be able to use its
competitive advantage. Jordan has this competitive advantage being able
to produce solar power at a cheaper rate than Israel. And at the same
time, the organisation was arguing that this could actually help
Palestine to become more independent from Israel by having it take
control over desalination.
So the larger vision was diplomatic, that this would result in
sustainable and long-term peace. But the issue is that this idea when
it's actually being put into practice is pretty different from what was
articulated by EcoPeace. Towards the end of 2021, Jordan, Israel and the
UAE signed an agreement saying that they were going to work towards
this kind of water/energy exchange, where Israel was going to provide
desalinated water and Jordan was going to provide solar power, with the
solar technology being supplied by an Emirati firm. But the major
difference here, of course, is that the initial version had the
Palestinians as a key player, and this arrangement left out the
Palestinians completely. And this same arrangement was then affirmed at
COP 27 without Palestinian involvement.
Going back to your question about Jordan, the current model of the
deal gives Israel significantly more leverage than Jordan. Jordan would
be supplying about 2% of Israel's overall power, while Israel would be
supplying water that's equivalent to about 20% of Jordan's water usage.
So that's a huge proportion for Jordan. But I also want to make the
point that without the deal, Jordan is very much at risk too. The
country does not have enough water. And even while it's trying to build
up its own desalination capacity, it's pretty unlikely to reach its
water requirements in any sustainable and cost-effective manner without
getting some big portion of water resources from Israel. So in some
sense, Jordan really lacks alternatives.
Now, given what you're telling us, what should be the response of the international community, and most particularly the US?
First of all, I want to say that I think these climate deals are
really urgently needed, especially for Jordan, because it simply doesn't
have enough water for its population. But the key point here is that
these deals are establishing new environmental infrastructure in the
region. And we should also look at the political narrative that it's
supporting. So in this case, when the governments of Israel and Jordan
come together, and they imagine a water/energy nexus, we have to
recognize that water and power infrastructure is really expensive. And
it takes a lot of time. So in theory, we're talking about something that
could have really long-term consequences. And I think it should be
viewed by American politicians and diplomats as an opportunity where
they can help work towards a Palestinian state, and re-imagine the
control of water resources. One bright spot here is that Israel has a
lot of desalination capacity at this point, which it didn't have in the
1990s. And so Israel has a surplus from its desalination plants. So
this desalination policy can actually be viewed in the context of
Jordan's massive population surge, and show us more flexibility. It’s
actually time to revisit these water agreements.
But how likely is it that this will happen?
Biden has historically been a very, very pro-Israel politician who's
typically reluctant to get involved in Israeli domestic politics. It is
important, though, that he did speak out about what Netanyahu has
planned to compromise the independence of Israel's judiciary. So the
Biden administration is maybe beginning to realise how extremist the
government of Netanyahu can be. But at the same time, it's hard to deny
just how ingrained the denial of Palestinian water rights has become. So
it seems like a very distant possibility that the Biden administration
will push the Israelis hard, or in any meaningful way, to restore water
rights to the Palestinians.
And there is surely a question to be asked about the Palestinian Authority
Of course, the Palestinian Authority also has a role to play and the
water infrastructure in Palestine is also pretty lacking. USAID has come
into to help them update some of their water infrastructure. So I'm
hopeful that things can get better from that perspective.