Many observers believed that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 would thwart the United States’ efforts to reorient its strategic focus to the Indo-Pacific region amid China’s resurgence. For now, though, Washington may actually be accelerating its long-sought rebalance.
For more than two decades, successive administrations have sought to recalibrate the center of gravity of U.S. foreign policy away from the Middle East and toward the Indo-Pacific. While the Bush, Obama and Trump administrations each registered a number of achievements to that end, they nonetheless found it difficult to accomplish the larger goal: prioritizing a region that they assessed would be increasingly central to the United States’ strategic outlook.
The attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, compelled the Bush administration to make its principal focus counterterrorism. Syria’s descent into civil war in the early 2010s as well as the Islamic State’s rise to prominence consumed much of the Obama administration’s bandwidth. And while the Trump administration made strategic competition with China a linchpin of its foreign policy, its “America First” framework unnerved even those of Washington’s regional allies and partners that shared the administration’s concerns about Beijing’s behavior and ambitions.
U.S. President Joe Biden took office pledging to anchor his administration’s foreign policy in the Indo-Pacific. In a national security strategic guidance document that it released in March 2021, the administration cited it as the first of three areas—Europe and the Western Hemisphere being the other two—where Washington’s “vital national interests compel the deepest connection.” It appointed a National Security Council whose largest directorate focused on the Indo-Pacific. And on Feb. 11, 2022, it launched a strategy focused specifically on the Indo-Pacific, concluding that “no region will be of more consequence to the world and to everyday Americans.”
Less than two weeks after that strategy was released, Russia invaded Ukraine, prompting a raft of commentary speculating that the U.S. attempt to rebalance had once more hit a snag.
In retrospect, though, U.S. efforts to reorient Washington’s focus toward the Indo-Pacific arguably registered more progress last year than in any other year this century. That outcome mainly owes to two factors: first, the Biden administration’s tenacity, and second, the anxiety that Russia’s aggression in Ukraine has stoked in Asia, where many of China’s neighbors are increasingly anxious about the possibility of a Chinese attack on Taiwan. Speaking at last year’s Shangri-La Dialogue, Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio expressed a commonly shared sentiment across Asia, saying, “I myself have a strong sense of urgency that Ukraine today may be East Asia tomorrow.”
In May 2022, Biden hosted the ASEAN-U.S. Special Summit, marking the first time that the leaders of the member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations had convened in Washington. Later that month, the U.S. announced the formation of a 14-country economic bloc, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, which accounts for roughly 40 percent of global GDP. Perhaps the most notable feature of the new grouping—structured around the pillars of trade, supply chains, clean energy and anti-corruption—is its inclusion of seven ASEAN member states. The following month saw the launch of a “Partners in the Blue Pacific” initiative with the United Kingdom, Australia, Japan and New Zealand.
Counterintuitively, the war in Ukraine has thus far advanced the Biden administration’s objective of prioritizing the Indo-Pacific.
In addition, the leaders of the member states of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue—known as the Quad, comprising the U.S., Australia, India and Japan—convened twice last year, the first time for a virtual meeting in March and the second time for an in-person meeting in May. The grouping’s foreign ministers also met in September. These gatherings produced a broad range of cooperation agreements across multiple areas, including pandemic preparedness, climate change and emerging technologies. The U.S. also signed agreements to deepen military and intelligence cooperation with Australia, India, Japan and South Korea, and all five countries pledged to increase defense spending.
Counterintuitively, then, the war in Ukraine has thus far advanced the Biden administration’s objective of prioritizing the Indo-Pacific. Even so, a range of factors could still undercut the rebalance going forward.
To begin with, a bipartisan shift away from free-trade agreements, or FTAs, limits Washington’s ability to extend its economic footprint in Asia. The U.S. is not a signatory to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, or CPTPP, with former President Donald Trump having abandoned the original Trans-Pacific Partnership in 2017 as one of his first acts upon taking office. Neither is it part of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, the world’s largest FTA, which encompasses 15 countries—including China—and accounts for roughly 30 percent of global GDP.
To be sure, China faces serious economic challenges, including demographic decline, slowing economic growth and a “new development concept” that seeks to enhance the Chinese Communist Party’s influence vis-à-vis that of the private sector. In addition, with the twin shocks of the coronavirus pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine war having clarified the risks of overdependence on any single country’s market, many major multinational corporations—including technology giants Apple and Google—are redoubling efforts to relocate production from China to India and Vietnam.
For now, though, China’s economic power continues to grow. Its exports and trade surplus both reached record levels last year. Its centrality to trade in Asia has substantially grown since the Trump administration began its tariff campaign against Beijing in 2018. And China’s GDP, currently about 73 percent as large as that of the U.S. in nominal value, is projected to be about 87 percent as large by 2027.
As with its three predecessors, the Biden administration must contend with the possibility that crises might arise outside of the Indo-Pacific that will divert its attention. While the Russia-Ukraine war has thus far facilitated America’s reorientation toward the region, that process could slow down if the conflict drags on and escalates indefinitely, as seems likely. Indeed, having largely been decoupled from the West, Russia is not as concerned about escalating its aggression against Ukraine. Sadly, the prospects of a diplomatic resolution are dwindling because Moscow, Kyiv, Washington and Brussels all view the war in existential terms. Elsewhere, the decreasing odds of reviving the Iran nuclear agreement increase the risk of a new conflict in the Middle East, which would further destabilize global energy markets.
An indefinite deterioration of U.S.-China relations is another potential impediment to the rebalance. That trend would unnerve ASEAN’s member states, which worry that the Quad could supplant the regional bloc as the core plank of Asia’s regional security architecture. They are increasingly concerned, in addition, that great-power competition could constrict their foreign policy agency. Singaporean Foreign Minister Vivian Balakrishnan made the point vividly last September, saying, “There can be no good outcome for us in Asia if our countries are forced into two camps with a line in between.”
Finally, Washington’s domestic political oscillations loom large. U.S. allies and partners in Asia must weigh the possibility—indeed, the likelihood—that another “America First” administration will eventually take office. That consideration could limit their willingness to join Washington in contesting Beijing. After all, while the degree of U.S. focus on the Indo-Pacific may vary from one administration to the next, the fact of China’s influence—if for no other reason than geography—will endure. The extent to which the U.S. can mitigate apprehensions about its inconsistent regional engagement will therefore play a major role in determining the long-term success of the U.S. rebalance to the Indo-Pacific.
Ali Wyne is a senior analyst with Eurasia Group’s Global Macro-Geopolitics practice. He is the author of “America’s Great-Power Opportunity: Revitalizing US Foreign Policy to Meet the Challenges of Strategic Competition” (Polity, 2022).