On Sunday night, 24 hours before his announcement about delaying the legislation, Netanyahu summarily fired Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, opening a pandora’s box of anger and rage from the Israeli public. In Jerusalem, thousands of people spontaneously left their homes and gathered at 10PM outside his residence. They easily overwhelmed the small police force and handful of Shin Bet bodyguards there. It could have been a pivotal moment, a Tahrir Square-style event. The revolutionary vibes were certainly there. But the protesters didn’t storm the apartment building, even though they could have.
The single water cannon deployed by the police failed to push them back and quickly ran out of water and foam. But this wasn’t a violent protest. Despite the clear anger in the air. Instead, it was characteristic of the protests that have been ongoing for nearly three months now in Israel: angry, but peaceful. The protest movement gradually generated momentum on the streets and put pressure on the most critical parts of Israel's social, economic, and security fabric. A clever and bloodless campaign that has proved extremely efficient.
Netanyahu, on the other hand, didn’t grasp the situation from the very beginning. From January 4, when Justice Minister Yariv Levin presented his plan to suppress the Supreme Court, the Prime Minister and his allies have made a series of critical mistakes that have exhibited total disconnection from what has been happening in Israel.
Netanyahu’s first and foundational mistake was when he didn’t think it was necessary to prepare a public-relations plan which would accompany the judicial plan itself. It was probably due to a combination of over-confidence after having won the election and his personal sense of boredom with constitutional affairs.
His second mistake was when he didn’t realize that this wasn’t just another lefty protest movement. He failed to grasp that the economists, the business community, the tech sector and most crucially, the thousands of reservists, were all part of the Israeli mainstream who had joined the protests against his government. Unlike those who had protested against him in the past, these were capable of bringing Israel, its economy and security forces to a standstill.
Netanyahu’s third and final mistake was the firing of defense minister Yoav Gallant on Sunday night. His blatant disregard for the opinion of the chiefs of the security services, backed up by Gallant, put his detachment from Israeli reality on full display. It was what triggered the impromptu protests of Sunday night and convinced many senior Likudniks, including ministers, mayors and trade union leaders, that they had to make it clear to their party leader he needed to rein it in.
But even then, Netanyahu needed the unprecedented announcement of a joint strike by Israel’s labor unions and major businesses, for the lesson to start driving home: Israeli society was turning against him.
Lastly it was his own coalition, originally so adamant to pass the laws, which understood first the limits of its power. The ultra-Orthodox parties realized it first. They were originally fully behind the judicial overhaul, pushing Netanyahu further than he had even wanted to go. But the recent protest marches within their cities and the growing debate over their exemption from national service, caused the Haredi politicians to tell Netanyahu in private that they would accept a suspension of proceedings.
Netanyahu’s coalition may remain intact, for now, after his climbdown. The ministers are still getting used to their new offices, which they’ve occupied for less than three months. Giving up on power and plunging back into the uncertainty of elections isn’t an attractive option. But this has seriously weakened the ties that bind the coalition together. Their shared dream of putting the hated Supreme Court in its place once and for all is gone for now. And Netanyahu, the man that held them together because of his uncanny ability to build winning coalitions, has lost his magic.
Perhaps this is the most apt comparison to what happened in Egypt. Tahrir didn’t bring Mubarak down. Ultimately it was the powerful military and business circles in Cairo who realized the old president was no longer capable of guaranteeing their control over the country. They were the ones who ousted him.
Netanyahu still has many supporters in Likud and allies in other parties, but his failure to deliver this key policy and the way it has opened up parts of the coalition, especially the Haredi community, to an open conflict with the rest of Israeli society, means that his power is waning. He is still prime minister, but he is becoming a liability. It is always presumptuous to predict his political demise but the implosion of Netanyahu’s judicial overhaul could be a sign pointing in that direction.