

Caesarism, Circuses, and Monuments

THE MEMORY OF Julius Caesar has faded from the political consciousness of our time. Theodor Mommsen's picture of Caesar as the statesman of genius no longer attracts us. The great ancient historian saw Caesar in the image of a "people's Emperor" who worked for the rebirth of the nation and, we might add, protected private property.¹ This was the Caesar of a national-liberal in Wilhelmine times. Mommsen provides us with a good example of how, even for ancient historians, Caesar and Caesarism became part and parcel of political attitudes which had little connection with the realities of ancient Rome.

Caesarism as a concept is important in modern times because it became shorthand for a new political constellation arising during the nineteenth century. As a result of the French Revolution, political theorists began to distinguish between two kinds of democracy: the rule of representatives and the rule of the masses.² The concept of Caesarism became involved with the new importance given to the masses as a political force in the postrevolutionary age. Robert Michels, writing in 1915, explained that, while monarchy is irreconcilable with the principle of democracy, Caesarism may still claim this name if it is based upon the popular will.³ Whatever may have been the reality of Caesar's life, political theo-

rists were now convinced that his rule was based not on legality and tradition, but had grown out of the will of the people.

A discussion of Caesarism leads necessarily to an analysis of the rise of mass democracy: if not yet within the reality of historical development, then certainly as either a fear or hope in the minds of men concerned with the trend of the politics of their time. New political instruments and new political myths were being forged in order to cope with the new élan of the masses. Here we can only suggest the nature of this new politics with which Caesarism became involved. While some historians were creating their own Caesar, others were lifting the Roman ruler out of historical reality to serve their own purposes. This essay does not attempt to write the history of Caesarism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, that has been done to a certain extent in Friedrich Gundolf's books on the subject.⁴ Our aim is a much narrower one. We will attempt to illustrate Caesarism as a concept used to clarify the new politics which was coming into being. Historians have often dealt with the rise of the middle classes or the growth of representative government, but less with the nature of mass movements in European history. We can only proceed by a wide variety of examples over a broad time span. The selection of examples may seem arbitrary and episodic, but until more research is available, it seems best to point out some general trends and insights into the subject. Perhaps this will stimulate additional work in this much neglected field of Caesarism, mass movements, and spectacles. Because Caesarism is so much a part of this new politics, we will also have at times to leave the Roman behind us in order to illustrate the political problems and techniques which concerned those who used his name as example.

The German liberal historian Georg Gottfried Gervinus wrote in 1852 that the political movements of his age were supported by the instincts of the masses.⁵ At roughly the same time, from a different ideological viewpoint, Count Gobineau attempted to analyze his own civilization, and recoiled with horror from the confrontation of elite and mass which he saw taking place everywhere.⁶ The age of mass movements had begun, not as sporadic and spontaneous expressions of the crowd but as a prime factor sustaining political

parties and movements. Contemporaries of Gervinus and Gobineau believed that Europe was entering an age when the leader would face the masses without the traditional institutions which could mediate between the government and its people. Such men saw their nightmare come true in the plebiscitary régime of Napoleon III. Between 1852 and 1854, for example, when Napoleon III took over and consolidated his power, Pierre Joseph Proudhon wrote his long and dreary work on Caesarism and Christianity. "Caesarism" was the word Proudhon used to express his fear of this new kind of democracy. He saw Napoleon-Caesar as a despot who maintained his hegemony through corruption, cunning, and terror. The multitude of people was reduced to an ignorant and miserable mass.⁷

This was one way of looking at the new political constellation, and it was shared by Gobineau, who saw in such Caesarism the inevitable approach, in this case, of racial degeneration. For the French conservative Charles Maurras at the end of the century, the matter was still plainer: "The liberties which a hundred years of Caesarism and Anarchy have made us lose are the liberties that our forefathers conquered for us in days gone by under the rule of the house of Capet."⁸

Caesarism became a shorthand term for the new politics. The Roman ruler exemplified the symbiosis of leader and people which left no room for traditional institutions or individualism of any kind. But such confrontation needed its own political techniques to go beyond the plebiscite as both Napoleons had understood it. Such techniques became a secular religion within which Caesarism could play the role of unifying symbol of leadership. It is necessary for us to examine the creation of these new political instruments in order to understand how Caesar's image could become so important. Modern terms like "totalitarianism," with which Caesarism is often associated, are meaningless in this context. Caesarism was never merely a matter of leader and followers facing each other. Mass democracy and mass movements were, in this Caesarism, opposed to representative institutions as the mediating element between government and governed, but they could not in fact dispense with such devices. The fears which such a mass democracy engendered were fears about formlessness in political life—it was an anarchy that demanded form. Spengler, as we shall see, went

directly to Caesarism in order to make this point. But new institutions, different from those associated with parliamentary or corporate representation, came to the fore. Historians have ignored these forms in their emphasis upon the leaders' power and their frequent use of terror and oppression.

In reality, a secular religion mediated between people and leaders, providing at the same time the instrument of social control over the masses. Public festivals are of key importance in any analysis of the nature of such democratic politics. Jean-Jacques Rousseau first put forward a theory of public festivals and stressed their purpose. He invoked the republican festivals of antiquity as the models for uplifting public and private morals. But festivals were supposed to go beyond such moral purposes; they were designed to make the people love the Republic and to ensure the maintenance of order and public peace. Festivals would be a rededication to national unity, but in order to achieve this purpose they had to be filled with symbolisms which would replace those of the Church. The Jacobins put this theory into practice: the tree of liberty, the goddess of reason, and even the early morning rays of the sun, were annexed as concrete symbols for the abstract concept of a Republic of virtue.⁹

These festivals were different from the Roman carnivals that Goethe had praised. Goethe believed that the carnivals were festivals which the people gave to themselves and which were not guided politically from above.¹⁰ But the festivals of Rousseau and the Jacobins had collapsed. It was this tradition which was to survive and continue. Ludwig Friedrich Jahn in Germany advocated such festivals in 1810 as an expression of the new nationalism, and for him also they gave concrete character and direction to the aims of the people as a primeval political force, without any representative intermediaries to help accomplish their purpose. Festivals guided from above were also encouraged during the French Restoration in order to produce an outpouring of monarchical loyalty. But, typically enough, under a hereditary monarchy, the theory of festivals could not develop to its fullest extent.

For example, the court officials in charge of arranging "spectacles" for Charles XII held that such festivals far surpassed those of the ancients, on which they were modeled, for they were able to cater to a wider spectrum of people. They were designed to renew

the link between the people and their monarch, and to make them forget, for a short time, the misfortunes and sorrows of the human flesh. Under Charles XII one of the main concerns of those who arranged the festivals was the maintenance of "decency." This concern with decorum during the celebrations was in the forefront, but little is said about the symbolism which was needed to make theory concrete. But then, Claude Ruggieri, Charles XII's pyrotechnist, had a living symbol in the king, though he may have been nowhere in sight.¹¹ These festivals were popular diversions rather than liturgical rites centered on a national symbol. Here the theory of festivals as part of politics is not yet fully developed; Caesarism required more than the mere maintenance of decency.

Bonet-Maury, a Protestant theologian and church historian during the third French Republic, summed up the development of festivals as instruments of popular democracy. They must lead to virtue and contentment, he said, sentiments with which Rousseau would have agreed. But above all, they must cement the national spirit in a Republic troubled by a weak executive. The liturgical element was uppermost in his mind. Joan of Arc might provide the central figure for such festivals, but so could the tombs of soldiers on Decoration Day.¹² The concrete national symbol was of cardinal importance to the ceremonies, which should be centered on it. Festivals meant emphasis upon national cohesion, not only because of the growth of the national spirit but also because of the fear of political anarchy. Rousseau had already stressed contentment as one of the results which public festivals should produce. The longing to give form to the inchoate "masses" always implied the ideal of stability and order. As we shall see, the idea of Caesarism became involved in this quest.

It is no coincidence that at the same time as Bonet-Maury was writing about festivals in France, the *Sedanzfest*, celebrating the German victory over France at Sadowa, was instituted in Germany. Public festivals multiplied at the end of the century. In France, the national fête of July 14 began in 1880 with a ceremony at the statue representing the city of Strasbourg. The memory of France's defeat was to lead a resurgence of the national spirit.¹³

Typically enough, in 1897 German nobles and big business started a "national festival society." The existence of a hereditary em-

peror was no longer sufficient as a symbol to control the emotions of a people who were being increasingly drawn into political life. Festivals to be given at regular intervals were designed in part to overcome class differences, for people would take part in them regardless of social status. But they were also supposed to concentrate the people's political emotions upon *Reich* and *Volk*. They would stress sports and gymnastics, for many of the festival society's leaders were associated with gymnastic associations (*Turner*), which since the days of Father Jahn had always propagated a national purpose. Typically, also, other members of the festival committee belonged to the Pan-German Association. Once more this was an effort at social control through festivals which would channel the energies of the Volk into a "simple patriotism." According to the society, such a means of social and political control was urgently needed, since the public festival in remembrance of Sedan had not caught on. Indeed, the committee itself referred to Father Jahn's plea for the necessity of such public festivals.¹⁴ Ultimately, however, the attempted creation of a "national festival" was also a failure.

Festivals could not be artificially created as part of the effort to unite the people behind their leaders. It is significant that the secular festivals of the French Revolution collapsed once the leadership had ceased to function effectively. Writing about the French Revolution, Albert Soboul quite rightly distinguished between "imposed cults" like the goddess of reason, and the spontaneous transference of popular religious impulse. As an example of spontaneity, he cited the festival of the martyrs of the revolution, which transposed into the secular realm the pomp and liturgy the Church had lavished on its martyrs.¹⁵ Much later the Nazis promoted such a festival, celebrating the dead in the Hitler *putsch* as symbols of the movement. This distinction was understood quite clearly during the Weimar Republic, which never succeeded in creating successful festivals on its own behalf. Constitution Day was a miserable failure. At that time one writer quite correctly criticized the Republic's inability to symbolize its ideals, to create form out of formlessness. A knowledge of the spirit of the people was lacking.¹⁶ Earlier, Péguy had made a similar criticism of the Third French Republic which, he asserted, was devoid of a mystique.¹⁷

Republics experienced the greatest difficulties in creating and maintaining institutions which, on the basis of a shared history, tradition, and myth, would cement together a true community. Their community was symbolized instead by Parliament. The advocates of liberal parliamentary government were as opposed to the new politics as were the conservatives whose fears we have cited earlier.

Successful festivals, as Father Jahn had realized, must embody transcendent ideals symbolized by the nation or the movement. They must link themselves with traditions still alive among the people and penetrate the unconscious. The theory behind the successful Nazi festivities is worth recalling in this context. The dedication of party flags by the leader, for example, was designed to provide a symbol penetrating the innermost region of the soul because it activated the desire to do battle.¹⁸ Much earlier, Georges Sorel had already pointed out the importance of such myths in rousing people to action. Lofty moral convictions, he wrote, never depend on reason, but on a state of war in which men voluntarily participate and which finds its expression in well-defined myths.¹⁹ The myth of battle fulfilled this purpose. However, the nature of the myth was not the only ingredient which could ensure a festival's success. Equally central was the conviction that everyone must be involved: there could be only participants and no spectators.

One writer at the beginning of the twentieth century summed this up: the festivals of the *Ancien Régime* were the gift of the sovereign; the plebs of Rome had its *panem et circenses*, but the entire populace is involved in Republican fêtes. He cited as example the "Ode Triomphale de la République" which was staged in 1889. Nine hundred people took part in Augusta Holme's spectacle. They represented all the arts and professions of the times, and in their midst a Marianne, symbolizing the Republic and proclaiming its virtue.²⁰ Yet, no more than in attempting to create a national monument (as we shall see), did the Third Republic make the breakthrough to truly successful national festivals and symbols.

The climax of the use of this instrument of mass politics comes once again in Nazi Germany. On the Nazi Party's Day of Martyrs, so it was said, every man must himself become a living symbol of

the community by carrying the flag and wearing the swastika and the brown shirt.²¹ Sorel's theory of the myth of battle was made concrete. We know how great were the numbers who actually participated in the Nuremberg rallies. They were actors in carefully staged liturgical rites, and this was equally true of those who appeared as a soldier or merchant in Augusta Holme's "Ode." It should be added that many of these festivals were connected with ancient folk customs: the summer solstice, the harvest festival, or the gathering of the Germanic *Thing*.

The cult element in these national festivals constituted a new secular religion. They furthered the consciousness of oneness. As Saint-Simon, himself the founder of a secular religion, had asserted: there must be no division between Church and State, God and Caesar.²² This unity was transposed onto the nation not only through festivals as liturgical rites but also through brick and mortar in national monuments. We are not concerned with monuments to dynasts and princes but with what Thomas Nipperdey has called the national monument of a democratically controlled nation. The political self-representation of the nation, he explained, was expressed through an objectification of the ideal for which that nation claimed to stand. But the ideal made concrete explains itself through symbolisms, and these were for the most part taken from ancient mythology. The gigantic forms which were used to construct such monuments, Nipperdey wrote, were an attempt to anchor the nation in the elemental, the irrational, and the absolute.²³ The goal was to represent the nation as human destiny and as the object of a cult. Much the same could be said about the public festivals.

The heyday of the national monument came after 1870, not only because of the war of that year but also because of the accelerating influence of mass politics. The German national monument on the Niederwald in the Rhineland, for example, was supposed to celebrate the memory of the founding of the German Reich. Completed by 1878, it relied on imitation of the Greeks, now pictured in modern dress. The sword of the huge statue of Germania pointed to the earth, symbolizing the peace which had been achieved. Here also, broad popular participation in the construction of such monuments was of primary importance. The allegorical repre-

sentations which surrounded the Germania were donated by war veterans' organizations and by German students through collections.²⁴ Such participation on an even vaster scale facilitated the construction of the most famous German national monument, that of Hermann the German (or Armin) in the Teutoburger Forest, who had defeated the Roman legions sent to conquer the north. This monument was begun in 1838 through the dedicated efforts of the sculptor Ernst von Bandel. But his work was continually interrupted by lack of funds, and by 1846 the project was virtually abandoned. It was finally saved through a new money-raising effort seventeen years later; in 1863, Bandel wrote to the best student in each German school (Primus) asking for financial support, and got an excellent response. Finally the king of Prussia made a contribution, and after 1870 the Reichstag allocated funds. By the time the monument was finished in 1875, a broad cross section of the population had contributed to the huge figure of Armin, with his raised sword symbolizing national preparedness. The massive pedestal on which he stood was taken in its turn to symbolize the barbaric power of this conqueror of Rome. Such symbolism parallels Oswald Spengler's Caesarism, which was also interpreted as a symbol of unity, strength, and power. The site of the monument on a hilltop, in the midst of a forest, introduced a romantic note. The German forest became the symbol of the German soul, and the hilltop was supposed to awaken association with the sacred mountains of pagan antiquity. The *Hermannsdenkmal* as a "symbol of our youthful force" had indeed captured the imagination of a large cross section of German youth.²⁵

Nipperdey has also seen spontaneous popular expression of feeling at work in the construction of Bismarck towers all over Germany; a token of gratitude to the dismissed chancellor. The appeal for such memorials issued by the German student organization called for the building of towers or columns in direct imitation of the ancient Saxons and Normans, who had erected similar monuments over the graves of their heroes.²⁶ This too proved successful. In the creation of monuments or festivals, the role of the state was far less important than the Volk and its mystique; the people worshipped themselves and their own myths and symbols. The leaders, whether Armin or Bismarck, were merely the focal point of the myth. Gustave Le Bon had already summarized in 1895 the theory

of leadership which reflected the growth of such cults and faiths: the leader has himself been hypnotized by the ideas whose apostle he has become.²⁷

In Le Bon's own country, the Third Republic faced greater difficulties in constructing a mystique for itself. The principal French national monument was the "Triomphe de la République" at the Place de la Nation, constructed by Jules Dalou between 1880 and 1899. It was, in the words of one contemporary, the first time the "*Idee synthétique de la République*" had been expressed with completeness and precision.²⁸ Like the German monuments, it uses the same classical tradition, the allegories of virtue and work. The Triomphe de la République is crowned by a huge figure of Marianne which could have been a Germania. But here the similarity ends. Marianne has no sword in her hand, nor is she dressed in armor. Peace walks behind her chariot, scattering in her wake fruits and flowers. Liberty pulls the chariot and Marianne is resting on a *fasci* symbolizing the law. The Republic's triumph is a triumph of peace and liberty; Jules Dalou was not a fierce nationalist like Ernst von Bandel, who had made the monument in the Teutoburger Forest his life's work. He was a former communitard, a man of working-class origin who abhorred war. His monument was financed by the City-Council of Paris and not by a wide segment of the populace. It symbolized not a military triumph but the victory of the Republic over its Boulangist and anti-Dreyfusard enemies. Its inauguration in 1899 was the occasion for a huge Republican demonstration of some 30,000 Parisians, mostly working class.²⁹

But Dalou's monument was unable to capture and hold the popular imagination. Here, once more, it is in contrast with the national monuments on the other side of the Rhine. It proved to be the symbol of one part of the nation only; the other part worshipped at the statue of Joan of Arc. Nor did Dalou have much use for history and tradition. As he said about his proposed monument symbolizing the workers of France: "the future has arrived, that is, a form of worship which is destined to replace older mythologies." Typically enough, he sculpted the monument on the tomb of the anarchist Auguste Blanqui free of charge.³⁰ Apart from Marianne, reminiscent of the French Revolution, his symbols on the Triomphe de la République were contemporary: riches, peace, liberty, labor, and justice—none of them appealed to the historical

memory of his audience. But then, the Republic could not very well project itself into the distant past in the manner of ancient Germans, victorious over Rome, or the Bismarck towers.

Dalou's failure documents once more Péguy's stricture that the Republic failed to project a mystique to its people. The German Republic after 1918 was in much the same position. The new political institutions of the age of the masses failed to develop as part of government policy. Such failures lead us back to Caesarism. During the Weimar Republic, the nation seemed fragmented and no instrument of cohesion seemed to be in sight. Some of those who longed for unity and who were aware of the power of the masses turned to Caesarism as a symbol of their hopes and fears. What greater contrast than that between Caesar the popular leader and the supposed degeneration of republican institutions and society? These lacked any compelling symbolism and were unable to focus attention upon a single powerful myth like the nation. But Caesarism, conceived as a theory of leadership set on a mass base, could be used to symbolize the dynamic of "the people" whom the leader both faced and represented in his person. It took its place as the idea of those who wanted to renew Germany. Such appeals to Caesarism came shortly after Germany's defeat in 1918 and the crises of the first years of the Republic. Later on, this symbol would mean little to those mass political parties which had managed to establish themselves.

It was against this background that Oswald Spengler's use of Caesarism was influential. Writing his *Decline of the West* during World War I, Spengler was obsessed with the death of old forms of political and moral life. All institutions, however carefully maintained, were for him destitute of meaning and weight. Caesarism, for Spengler, was that government which is utterly formless, regardless of any constitutional form it might claim. Caesarism seemed to be brute power exercised by a leader devoid of any moral restraints. Such a leader the people were bound to follow; their only role was duty and service. But this Caesar is not merely the feared despot of Gobineau's and Maurras's imagination. Liberties might vanish along with the high ideals of chivalry and honor, but Spengler's Caesar is still a unifying force, the only one that can

transcend the decline of the West. This Caesar destroys in order to create.³¹

What he creates is a new kind of unity into which the people can integrate themselves. For Caesar does fill that formless void which at first he symbolizes. His leadership develops the "form filled power of blood and suppression of Megalopolis rationalism." For Spengler, Caesar as the unifying myth represented the same primitive and barbaric force that others saw exemplified in the *Hermandenkmal*. Caesarism is the force which manages to destroy existing liberal institutions and to produce a new unity of political form pointing to the future. *The Decline of the West* is, in reality, an apotheosis of the new politics in which masses and leader interact without any intervening quasi-independent institutions. Caesarism, Spengler tells us, "grows on the soil of democracy, but its roots thread deeply into the underground of blood tradition."³² The leader works upon the most basic instinct of the people, now stripped of higher culture in an age of decline. Indeed, Spengler's Caesar is a pragmatist who knows how to manipulate the masses and to use existing society for the purpose of its own destruction. Ideally the amorphous mass will be integrated into a higher unity through the strong will of the leader who, though also a practical man, is able to activate their deeper longings. Le Bon also believed that such a leader must represent a mixture of activism and faith. His analysis of the crowd and the leader, and Spengler's vision of Caesarism, are both based on the realization that new political forms must supersede old and moribund institutions. To be sure, Spengler's reign of the Caesars opens an era of permanent civil war, murder, and rape, but from it will emerge a higher unity which he continues to characterize (in medieval fashion) as honor, chivalry, inward nobility, and selfless duty.

Many people in the aftermath of the war saw a need for ruthless leadership, but also for symbols and myths (race, in the German case) which could forge a new engine of politics. Soon after Spengler had published his *Decline of the West*, Friedrich Gundolf published his *Caesar* (1924). Here we have another approach to Caesar, coming from a source which Spengler would have thought decadent indeed. Gundolf was the leading disciple of the poet Stefan

George. George wanted to renew the German nation through an ideal of beauty and aesthetic form. His circle was intoxicated with power, but this was the poetic power of the seer who would change the nation through heroic youth, the good and the beautiful. For George, the rebirth of the nation would come from the inner strength of the soul, but this strength was quite different from Spengler's brutal vision. What George called the "secret Germany" labored to transform the nation through an élite of those who understood its meaning. The élite was held together by an eros figure, which even in outward appearance symbolized that aesthetic concern that they attempted to transform into a political force. The content of this aesthetic, this ideal of beauty, was taken from Greece. It was a classical ideal which, on another level of symbolism, we have seen operating as part of the sculpture of national monuments.

Certainly, for all their differences, the George circle shared with Spengler a concept of irrationalism, and of paganism as well. Ancient Germanic myths and Hellenism must form a new unity. For this circle of intellectuals went in for pagan rites which had something of the Dionysian ecstasy about them. Their festivals centered on living and concrete symbols of beauty (such as the boy Maximin) but with a national purpose which gave direction to this "secret Germany." George believed that the festivals of the group must be sacred occasions which, for all their paganism (such as the cult of the sun and beauty), paralleled religious observances. Indeed, by 1902 a firm ritual had developed for the admission of new adepts to the circle. This ceremonial praised a lifestyle and a life rhythm which would cement the community as the secret saviour of the Volk.³³ Such festivals are in the tradition of secret societies, but with their symbolism and their national purpose they also have links with the public festival as a political institution.

Why, then, Gundolf's preoccupation with Caesar? The longing for a leader who, as against parliamentary institutions, would symbolize a powerful myth was once more to the fore. George had also worshipped the heroic, the superman who could arrest decline because he retained the primeval human substance. This was at times defined as a substance of the blood, which derived from pagan mythology, but it was always conceived as a combination of

bodily and inward beauty. Such an individual is the potential saviour of society though society itself seems to ignore him. Caesar was such a man. His figure, larger than life, had endured in history, and even a powerful ruler like Napoleon I still lived in its shadow. Caesar symbolized the hero who stood beyond space and time. It was Friedrich Nietzsche, Gundolf wrote, who broke with the historicism of his time and reawakened to life the great world spirits of the past among whom Caesar was the chief representative, resolving the contradictions between Hellenism and the ideal of chivalry. Caesar becomes the symbol for a unifying force in a fragmented world. The universal monarchy of Rome led by a statesman of these dimensions becomes the model for a utopia, reflecting a longing for leadership. Moreover, as Gundolf was careful to point out, Caesar was the first Roman to be elevated to godhead not by functionaries, but by the people themselves.³⁴

In spite of the historical analysis running throughout Gundolf's books on that subject, Caesar as a historical figure has been left far behind. Such, Gundolf writes, "are the great men of history whose own particular purpose contains the essential ingredient which is the will of the world spirit." Caesar has here reached his apotheosis as the incarnation of Hegel's world spirit. Gundolf quotes Hegel himself to this purpose, but in his version Hegel's praise of Caesar becomes a charter for the future during the Weimar Republic. That Caesar was no poet concerned with the renewal of Rome through aesthetic concepts was irrelevant; Gundolf avoids the difficulty by turning once more to Nietzsche, who had also exalted Caesar and fashioned him, as Gundolf puts it, into a "healthy Zarathustra."³⁵

Caesar as a historical figure had been elevated into a powerful myth. The George circle, with its élitism and its belief in a "secret Germany," shared with Spengler the longing for a leader in times when existing systems of government had supposedly become decadent. The tie between leader and led was a sacred one; the pagan rituals so popular among the circle symbolized on their aesthetic and intellectual level what public festivals symbolized on the popular level: a secular religion as the surrogate for traditional political institutions. Ernst Kantorowicz, the historian, himself a member of the George circle, realized this when he wrote in the

dedicatory epistle to his famous biography of Emperor Frederick II: "interest is now beginning to stir in the figures of great rulers—now, in this age which is so un-emperor-like."³⁶

But the age was, in reality, not un-emperor-like at all. The new politics as we have defined them substituted leader and led, festivals and symbols, for the traditional institutions of Europe. Caesar became a symbol for this situation both for those who feared it and for those who longed for unity outside and replacing existing political institutions. The Caesars who arrived in power after 1918 were not the embodiments of Gundolf's hopes, nor were they like Spengler's barbarians. They had to operate within a framework of historical reality, to adjust and to make compromises. But their basic techniques and the politics they exemplified were built upon the control of the masses. Caesarism is indeed a political concept which can be understood only through its involvement with modern mass politics.

The French Right and the Working Classes: *Les Jaunes*

THE EUROPEAN RIGHT has of late been receiving increased attention from historians. The simple stereotypes have given way to a more sophisticated analysis, which attempts to provide a conceptual framework for rightist thought and action, and gives us a better understanding of the role of the Right in the growth of European mass politics and mass democracy in our own century. There is one aspect of the European Right that needs more attention, namely, the extent to which it struck roots among the population generally. Its social structure is usually discussed in terms of marginal farmers, small shopkeepers, self-employed artisans, underemployed professionals, white-collar workers, and underpaid civil servants. These are the classes said to be involved in the counterrevolution, while working-class support is assigned only to those industries which depended on government subsidies and tariffs.¹ Such an analysis ignores those nations in which the lower classes provided the principal support for what came to be the fascist Right in the twentieth century: the peasants of the Rumanian Iron Guard or the followers of the Hungarian Iron Cross, 41 per cent of whose membership consisted of industrial workers.² But even in the more highly developed industrial countries of western Europe the Right did attempt to establish relations with